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Abstract
Early professional accountancy associations justified their applications for
incorporation by Royal Charter or under relevant legislation on the premise that the
public interest would be served if work of an accounting nature was restricted to
those with therequisiteknowledge and skill. A claim to specialised knowledge and
skill w a s used by the profession to achieve hegemonic domination of not only
accounting practice but also the determination of appropriate accounting practices or
accounting standards. The success of the Australian accountancy profession in
achieving its objective is evident in its domination of the promulgation of approved
accounting standards that have the force of law.
However, an examination of unexpected corporate failures or the reporting of losses
on activities previously disclosed as profitable, suggest the profession's domination of
accounting has not necessarily served the public interest Accounting standards and
practices have been shown to be deficient in that the flexibility in their application has
been used by corporate management in some instances, to create an impression
through the financial statements that companies were well-managed and profitable.
Thereality,often revealed by investigators in the w a k e of corporate collapse, is that
some of these companies have consistently reported profits when, in fact, they have
been unprofitable for a number of years prior to collapse.
This study offers an explanation of the profession's propensity to promote
indetermination in accounting practice through the promulgation of flexible and vague
accounting standards. In particular, this study maintains that flexible accounting
standards and practices are a result of the profession's need to ensure its autonomy
not only in the practice of accountancy but also domination of the determination of
appropriate accounting practice. This requires maintaining alliances and structural
coupling between the profession and business interests.
The theoretical framework adopted for purposes of analysing the manner in which the
profession originally attained and has since maintained hegemonic domination of
accountancy is based on a translation model of power incorporating the concept of
autopoiesis. The study provides an overview of the professionalisation of
accountancy, in particular, the development of its knowledge base that was then used
to justify its claim to domination in the public interest. S o m e notable unexpected
Australian corporate failures are used to demonstrate that the public interest m a y not
have been served because flexibility in accounting practice have been utilised to
mislead users of financial statements. The development of the standard dealing with
accounting for foreign currency transactions and translations is used to demonstrate
that standard setting is as m u c h political as technical. The study maintains that the
indetermination that characterises accounting standards and practices are a defence
mechanism aimed at ensuring the survival of accounting as an autopoietic system.
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DOMINATION, AUTOPOIESIS AND REGULATORY FAILURE:
THE ACCOUNTANCY CONNECTION

VOLUME ONE

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

ACCOUNTANCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Serving the public interest has been the catch cry of the accountancy profession since
the formation of the first professional accountancy associations last century. Just
what this meant was never spelled out in the Royal Charters of incorporation or
documents detailing the objectives of these associations. This altruistic motive
appears to have been premised on the need to instil in the public the perception that
accounting was a task requiring specialised skill and training. If this was the case,
then only those w h o qualified for membership of the professional associations should
undertake this work.
What is the Public Interest
Over time, the public interest objective of accountancy has been given more substance
even if only in indirect ways. For example, Thomas Brentnall, a foundation member
of the accountancy profession in Australia, implied a link between accounting and the
public interest. This link was the relationship between Australia's need as a young
country to borrow on favourable terms from overseas interests and the provision of
reliable accounts to absentee lenders.

Such accounts could be provided by

appropriately trained and educated public accountants (Australasian Corporation of
Public Accountants ( A C P A ) , 1910a, pi34). In more recent times, the profession in
Australia has issued a series of statements of accounting concepts (SACs). These
statements maintain that general purpose financial statements provide a means by
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which management is accountable for the resources entrusted to them.

This is

consistent with historical stewardship concepts and the role of record keeping.
However, this narrow stewardship focus is extended to an accountability to the
general public. It is claimed that when general purpose financial statements provide
relevant and reliable information, resource providers will use this information to
facilitate an economic allocation of resources ( S A C 2 Objectives of General Purpose
Financial Reporting paragraphs 26, 27; S A C 3 Qualitative Characteristics of
Financial Information paragraphs 5). A n economic allocation of resources will
benefit the general public because resources will only be directed to those entities that
will use them efficiently and effectively and in compliance with any rules laid d o w n for
their use ( S A C 2, paragraphs 12, 13). This is consistent with the religious basis of
stewardship that all things were created by G o d to be used for the c o m m o n good of
human kind (Chen, 1975). This is the interpretation of public interest adopted for
purposes of this study.
Public Interest - Fact or Fiction?
History, unfortunately, suggests that accounting has not necessarily achieved this. In
fact, there is evidence to suggest that accounting has been used quite consistently to
manipulate the information presented in financial statements often to present an
impression of a profitable and well-managed organisation.

In some instances,

subsequent investigation has revealed that the companies were not profitable and
quite often, were not well-managed.

For example, a prominent feature of the

Australian corporate landscape in the late 1980's early 1990's has been the number of
spectacular and often unexpected corporate collapses.

These collapses were

unexpected because, in m a n y cases the companies concerned had been publishing
audited financial statements depicting them as profitable and well managed.

In one

notable case to be discussed at length in Chapter 4, the company issued a press release
boasting record profits just two weeks before being placed in receivership. Another
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factor has been the announcement by companies of huge losses on activities that were
previously reported as profitable. A n example that will be discussed extensively in
Chapter 6 is foreign currency transactions.

There is also substantial evidence to suggest that this has been a persistent problem
for more than a century.

In a book dealing with the Australian land b o o m and

subsequent crash in the 1890's, Michael Cannon has stated:
The falsifying of balance sheets, the payment of dividends from
non-existent profits and the publication of misleadingly optimistic
forecasts were among the shocking features of the crash (1972 ,
p28).

It could quite rightly be argued that at this particular point in time, the accountancy
profession was in its infancy. There were no accounting standards and no method of
enforcing them even if they had existed. However, in more recent times, claims
similar to those m a d e by Michael Cannon have been m a d e and excuses of this type are
no longer valid.

Sykes undertook a study of the major corporate collapses to occur in Australia since
the formation of the first Australian company (1988, Introduction, px). The evidence
collected by Sykes led to the conclusion that poor accounting systems and practices
were among the main dangers facing top management because these could mean that
management was given misleading information as to the profitability of the company
(p.549-550).

In 1990, Sykes reaffirmed this view but in the context of investors rather than
management:
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A s receivers and investigators gradually strip bare the recent
corporate scandals in Australia, one factor becoming apparent is
that the accounts of the companies concerned have been
unsatisfactory, to say the least (1990, p.43).

To the extent that resource providers were misled by the information in the financial
statements, it is probable that there was not an efficient allocation of resources.
Therefore, the public interest has not been served. It is accepted that financial reports
are highly condensedrepresentationsof a company's activities and financial position.
In addition, the information that is publicly disclosed is further limited by the types of
financial statement required. For example, for the first half of this century, companies
were only required to publish an audited balance sheet. The requirement to publish a
profit and loss account was a later development. A further refinement to disclosure
requirements was provided by the professional associations and the stock exchange
with the introduction of a requirement to publish a funds statement. In the aftermath
of the corporate collapses of the late 1980's, the requirement to produce a funds
statement was replaced with a cash flow statement requirement in apparent
recognition that companies could be profitable but be insolvent This was not readily
apparent from a balance sheet or funds statement.

However, where subsequent investigation demonstrates that where duly audited
financial statements were misleading, and that flexible accounting practices have
facilitated the deception of users of financial statements, the argument that accounting
has not served the public interest would have merit

INACTION DISGUISED AS ACTION?
As indicated, above corporate failures have been part of the Australian business
landscape since last century. In the aftermath of these failures questions are invariably
raised about the ethics of corporate management and claims that the regulatory
system is not adequate. M c Q u e e n , for example, suggests that the spate of corporate
4

failures in the late 1980's has created a "moral panic" over the ethics of business and
the inability of the regulatory system to contain corporate wrongdoing (1991, p22).
Furthermore, this is not new.

M c Q u e e n refers to recurrent instances of both

corporate failure and regulatory failure in Australia from as early as the 1870's (pp2223). Similarly, Justice Rogers of the N e w South Wales Supreme Court considers the
Australian economy is characterised by a recurring cycle of booms and collapses.
Inevitably, the collapses are followed by calls for more effectiveregulatorymeasures.
N e w measures are often introduced or existing regulations are strengthened but, as
Justice Rogers notes, the next round of collapses reveal that the measures taken have
not prevented a recurrence of the problems (1991, pi).

In an accounting context, Clarke and Dean consider the solutions proposed by the
General Council of the Australian Society of Accountants in the wake of the
corporate failures of the 1960's have done nothing to prevent the same abuses of the
corporate form being repeated in the 1980's and 1990's (1992). In the 1960's, there
were neither accounting standards nor a conceptual framework of accounting (pi82).
In the 1980's, substantial progress had been m a d e in both areas but with little
apparent impact on preventing companies from producing misleading financial
statements. In fact, Clarke and Dean claim that compliance with accounting standards
has been as m u c h responsible for manipulation of financial information as noncompliance (pi 86).

Similarly, Chambers maintains:
The practices that companies have adopted have generally been
permissible under the statutes,regulationsand technical rules of
accounting ... The trouble has been that the laws,regulationsand
rules have been vague, toothless and often self-contradictory
(1973, Preface, Securities and Obscurities [no pagination]).

5

O n e of the explanations for management's penchant for manipulating financial
information is linked to competition for resources.

If the purpose of financial

statements, as set out in S A C 2 and S A C 3 and outlined above, is to facilitate
decisions about the allocation of resources, then management has an incentive to
present an image that will induce the entrusting of resources to them. O n the basis
that resource providers will prefer the image of a well managed company, as
evidenced by profitability, to a less well managed company, as evidenced by smaller
profits or even losses, management will desire to portray an image of a well managed
and profitable organisation. Accounting practices are likely to be interpreted and
applied in such a manner as to present companies in the most favourable light so as to
encourage investment and the extension of credit facilities. Rennie (1988) and
Shanahan (1990) support this view. Evidence from investigators' reports into three
of Australia's notable corporate collapses will be presented in Chapter 4 to support
this contention.

The ongoing cycle of regulatory failure-regulatory reform suggested above indicates
layers of failure. Where accounting methods have been used specifically to present a
misleading picture of a company, these failures can be seen to be connected. For
example, management hasresponsibilityunder the law for the preparation of financial
statements and, therefore,technically,is responsible for the selection of accounting
methods. However, if accounting standards did not allow for a choice of methods or
the application of particular accounting standards on the grounds of materiality, then
management would not be able to select the method most suited to their purpose.
Therefore, the company accountant advising management on the appropriate
accounting method to use and those responsible for developing and promulgating
accounting standards are implicated in the failure of regulation to achieve an efficient
allocation of resources. Under the corporations law, financial statements of most
public companies must be examined by an independent external auditor. The role of
the independent auditor includes ensuring that the information reported in financial
6

statementsrepresentswhat it purports torepresent,is verifiable and unbiased. Unless
there has been some undetectable and deliberate attempt by management to conceal
fraud or illegal acts, misleading financial statements receiving an unqualified audit
opinion suggest a further layer of failure. There is evidence of further failure in the
enforcement layers of the regulatory system w h e n prosecutions arising out of
investigations of corporate collapses where financial statements have been shown to
be misleading either fail to produce a conviction or where legal action, either civil or
criminal is not instigated. Evidence of failure at all these levels will be provided in the
course of this study.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The overall purpose of this study is to provide an explanation for the role played by
the accountancy profession in the ongoing cycle of regulatory failure-regulatory
reform. In particular, attention will centre on the profession's claim to serve the
public interest by facilitating an economic allocation of resources through the
information provided in external financial reports. This claim to serve the public
interest was the platform on which the profession aspired to and achieved a dominant
position in the determination of appropriate accounting practices and standards. It
will be argued that accounting standards are flexible by design. This flexibility
extends not only to allowing a selection of accounting methods but also ambiguity.

Flexibility and ambiguity create indetermination in the application of accounting
practices. Indetermination serves at least two purposes. Firstly, it justifies the
existence of a profession because without indetermination, accounting practice could
be reduced to a set of mechanical processes. A n y o n e w h o can learn the processes can
be an accountant. The need for professional judgment calls for specialised knowledge
and skill and a professional organisation is a means of ensuring that those w h o
espouse to the possession of this knowledge and skill have undertaken specified
7

education and training. Second, ^determination is a means by which the profession
maintains its domination because it reduces dissidence and resistance to its rules of
practice. This is particularly important where a company's right to incorporation,
limited liability and even its continued existence is contingent upon it complying with
the accounting and audit provisions of the corporations law. Flexibility in accounting
practices and standards allows companies to comply with the letter of the law if not
the spirit Evidence suggests that the management of some companies have used this
flexibility to producefinancialstatements that present the corporate image most useful
for management purposes.

The focus of this study will be the Australian accountancy profession and regulatory
system. While emphasis will be on the accountancy profession it is contended that the
regulatory system comprises a number of sub-systems including the accountancy
professional associations, accounting standard setters, corporate regulators such as
the Australian Securities Commission (ASC), State and Federal Governments and
companies. The activities of the accountancy profession cannot be examined in
isolation from the other participants particularly as this study maintains that these
other systems play a vital role in influencing the outcome of the profession's activities.
Also, while recognising the risks of generalisation, where considered appropriate,
reference will be m a d e to the activities of accountancy professional associations and
regulatory systems in other countries. This is because there is an increasing trend
towards harmonisation of accounting practices throughout the world. In addition, the
profession in Australia has traditionally been influenced by the activities of the
professions in the U K and the U S A (evidence will be used to support this assertion in
subsequent chapters).
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework adopted for purposes of this study is based on a translation
model of power and autopoiesis. In a translation model of power, power is not
something that can be possessed and it is not used to achieve a particular outcome.
Instead,resources,including knowledge and skill, are used to create an environment
wherein some groups or organisations are able to dominate a given area or field by
forming alliances and agencyrelationshipswith other interest groups. The group
wishing to act as the agent for the others tries to prove, or create the impression, that
it is the appropriaterepresentativeof all those w h o have an interest in a given field.
Alliances and agencyrelationshipsare then used as resources to enable one group to
achieve hegemonic domination of a particular area.

Domination is the means by which power is exercised because it allows the dominant
group to determine the rules of practice including membership of the dominant group.
In a translation model, domination and agency are seen in terms of a chain where it is
essential that each link in the chain must inject its o w n energy or domination and
agency will not be maintained. Furthermore, domination and agency are subject to
challenge by both endogenous and exogenous factors. This means that domination
and agency are not fixed. Forces of dissidence and resistance can effect changes
because such forces m a y necessitate arenegotiationof alliances and the foundation
upon which they are built

The specific translation model adopted for purposes of this study is based on the
works of Callon (1986), Latour (1986) and Clegg (1989).

The translation of

resources to achieve domination involve five interrelated stages: problematisation,
interessement, enrolment mobilisation and dissidence and resistance. The translation
process takes place at two levels of a power circuit, the levels of social and systems
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integration. Once domination and agency have been achieved, power is exercised at
the third level of the circuit the level of episodic agency power.

This study argues that the accountancy profession used its claim to specialised
knowledge and skill to achieve hegemonic domination of accounting. It used this
claim to specialised knowledge and skill to form an agencyrelationshipbetween itself
and the general public. The basis of this agencyrelationshipwas that accounting was
a means by which management would be accountable for the resources entrusted to it
Only those with the requisite knowledge and skill, as recognised by the professional
associations, could ensure that financial statements duly audited fulfilled this function.
However, a claim to be serving the public interest was not sufficient There had to be
a means of demonstrating this and also conveying this to appropriate parties such as
legislators and those most likely to m a k e use of accounting services. This required
the formation of alliances. A s will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the profession
has consistently forged alliances with governments, business interests and the press.
It will be argued in this study that the maintenance of alliances has been an integral
goal in the development of flexible accounting standards.

The concept of autopoiesis will be used to help explain the development of the basis
of the accountancy profession's claim to a specialised body of knowledge and skill. It
will also be used to help explain the regulatory failure-regulatory reform cycle. The
concept of autopoiesis was derived from the study of biology by Maturana and Varela
to explain living beings that are self-producing (Maturana and Varela, 1988, pp4243).

R o b b has adapted the concept of autopoiesis for application to the social

system that is accountancy (1989a, b; 1991). A n autopoietic system is a unity created
by an act of distinction whereby the organisation defines itself and facilitates its o w n
existence (p40) separate and distinct from its environment (p46). In other words, an
autopoietic system has a boundary that distinguishes the components created by the
system itself and it is also autonomous because it creates its o w n reality and rules
10

(p48). Autopoietic systems also determine the structure of the components within its
boundary (Luhmann, 1986, pl74). Through the process of autopoiesis, the system
recursively reproduces itself.

The autopoietic system is organisationally or operationally closed but cognitively
open. Itreactsto stimuli in its environment and uses energy and information from the
environment to restructure the components of the systems and create n e w ones.
Hence, an autopoietic system can alter components and the structure of the system.
However, such changes are not determined by the environment The direction and
nature of the changes is determined by the system itself. Also, any changes in the
autopoietic system are always directed towards self preservation. Similarly, because
an autopoietic system is cognitively open, it can trigger changes in the environment
but cannot determine the nature of those changes.

In Chapter 2, it will be argued that double entry bookkeeping exhibits the
characteristics of an autopoietic system and also that it has facilitated the separation of
a company not only from its owners but also the abstraction of its activities into
classifications designated by the system and recorded in the books of account as
debits and credits.

Just as dissidence and resistance pose a threat to domination in a translation model of
power, a lack of structural coupling or congruence between the structures of the
autopoietic system and between the autopoietic system and its environment can
threaten the survival of the autopoietic system. If compatibility is not maintained, the
interactions between the autopoietic system and its environment m a y become
destructive and ultimately could lead to the destruction of the autopoietic system
rather than conservation of its autopoiesis.
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It will be argued in this study that the accountancy profession translated its claim to
specialised knowledge and skill to create conditions conducive to achieving
hegemonic domination of external financialreporting,including auditing, as a means
of regulating the activities of corporate management It will further be argued that
accounting is, by its nature, an autopoietic social system. Autopoiesis will be used to
help explain the regulatory failure-regulatory reform cycle. Specifically, it will be
argued that dissidence and resistance which are part of the translation model of
power, are also necessary to the maintenance of autopoiesis and hegemonic
domination. This is because the means by which an autopoietic system maintains its
structures and extends its boundary are conversation and communication.

The

meaning of these terms in the autopoietic context will be explained in Chapter 2.
Maintenance of autopoiesis requires a continual process of conversation and
communication. Dissidence and resistance trigger conversation and communication
within the system. Indetermination in accounting practices and standards also ensure
continued conversation and communication within the autopoietic system and
between it and its environment

FORMAT OF THE STUDY
The study will take the following format:

Chapter 2 will further explicate the circuits of power framework and the concept of
autopoiesis and specifically link them to accounting as a system within the
environment of corporate regulation. This foundation will then be used to explain the
emergence of professional accountancy associations in the U K and, in particular, the
development of the knowledge base upon which the emerging accountancy profession
based its claim of service to the public interest

12

The professionalisation activities of Australian accountants will be examined in
Chapter 3. The study will cover the formation of the first professional accountancy
associations through to the achievement of statutory backing for approved accounting
standards. This chapter will include an examination of the alliances forged between
the various professional associations in Australia and between those in Australia and
the U K and alliances between the Australian professional bodies and the government
business interests and the press. It will be demonstrated that these alliances were
essential to the acquisition of a Royal Charter by Australian public accountants. Postprofessionalisation activities will also be examined including the establishment of
profession-sponsored research and standard setting organisations.

The first part of Chapter 4 will provide an interpretation of how financial reporting
serves the public interest. This interpretation will be developed within the context of
economic and social arguments for the regulation of external financial reporting by
corporations. It will then be demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric, corporate
regulation has failed to achieve theresultsit was supposed to. Furthermore, it will be
shown that accounting and auditing practices as well as accountants have contributed
to this failure. The investigators' reports into some of Australia's notable corporate
collapses will be analysed to support this claim.

In Chapter 5, some of the underlying weaknesses contributing to regulatory failure
will be identified and explained. It will be argued, however, that these weaknesses are
the result of dissidence and resistance to the existing institutional order, including
accountancy. It will be argued that accountancy's contribution to regulatory failure is
a result of the profession's desire to maintain its dominant position and recursively
perpetuate its o w n existence.

Chapter 6 will use the development of the foreign currency translation standard to
demonstrate the forces at work that result in flexible, vague and ambiguous
13

accounting standards but at the same time, allow the profession to maintain its
dominant position. The analysis will predominantly be in the Australian context but
because of the increasing harmonisation of accounting standards around the world,
the philosophy underlying the development of foreign currency accounting standards
in other countries will alse be examined where consideredrelevant.The experiences
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board with its first foreign currency standard,
F A S B 8, will be the subject of specific study because Australian standard setters were
clearly influenced by the attitude towards foreign currency accounting in the U S A .

The final chapter will provide a summary and overview of the dominant argument o
the study within the circuits of power framework and autopoiesis. The purpose of
Chapter 7 is to specifically identify the links between Chapters 2 to 6 and develop an
overall explanation for the failure of accountancy as aregulatorymeasure and a
conclusion as to the likelihood of change in the efficacy of corporate regulation.

EDITORIAL NOTE
Before continuing, some apparent anomalies and inconsistency in terminology and
spelling will be addressed.

This study covers the emergence of the first professional associations through t
present time. In thattime,one of the major Australian accountancy associations has
changed its name from the Australian Society of Accountants (ASA) to the Australian
Society of Practising Accountants (ASCPA). Hencereferenceto the A S C P A in the
latter history of the profession does not indicate a new organisation only that an
already existent organisation now has a new title. In general, the acronyms A S A and
A S C P A will be used interchangeably.
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Similarly, in 1984, the Accounting Standards Review Board ( A S R B ) was established
by a memorandum of the Ministerial Council. In 1991, the A S C established the
Australian Accounting Standards Board ( A A S B ) . Apart fromre-organisationand the
change in name, the A A S B and the A S R B are synonymous. The change in name also
has implications for the identifying prefixes used for approved accounting standards.
Prior to the name change, approved accounting standards were prefixed " A S R B " .
Since 1991, the identifying prefix is " A A S B " . The two will be used interchangeably.

Finally, there are a number of what appear to be spelling anomalies in this study.
These have arisen because spelling conventions in the source material used for this
study have varied from country to country and^overtime^/The most notable of these
anomalies are the spelling of words such as problematisation, organisation, and
mobilisation. The alternative, for example, problematization, will only be used in
direct citations of source material. A similar anomaly arises with the spelling of
enquiry and its derivatives. In some instances, this word is spelled inquiry. Once
again, the second version will only be adopted where this is necessary to maintain
consistency with the source of the information.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
CIRCUITS OF POWER AND AUTOPOIESIS

This study will be undertaken within the framework of a translation model of power
incorporating the concept of autopoietic systems. The purpose of this chapter is
initially to give a brief account of everyday conceptions of power and outline four
models based on the diffusion model of power and demonstrate the limitations of
these models as explanations of regulatory failure. A translation model of power
based on Clegg's circuits of power framework will then be developed. The concept of
autopoiesis will be used to elaborate on the power framework in the context of
apparent systems closure. The emergence of accounting will be used to demonstrate
systems closure through the development of double entry bookkeeping and the
relationships between accounting, business practice and the law.

POWER AS A CAUSE
A review of the literature on power reveals that capacities viewed as power have been
seen as coercive, persuasive,restrictive,facilitative, prohibitive, productive, enabling
and disabling. It has been seen as having one, two and three dimensions or faces.
Individuals have been said to possess power because of the position they hold in
society, for example, a monarch, president, prime minister, premier or even a dictator,
or due to their wealth or control over sources of production. Power can also be seen
as a physical attribute such as size or the horse power of an engine. Power has also
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been seen in a spiritual or intangible sense such as an evangelist or religious leader
with a large following or the power of the press.

It is not difficult to find definitions of power. Barnes has described power in terms of
its capacity to achieve a particular outcome (1986, ppl81-182; 1988, p2).
Power should be taken in the first instance as a theoretical term
referring to distributions of capacities, potentials or capabilities
(1988, p2).

Ball offers a similar description "... 'power' refers, at a minimum, to one agent or
agency's ability to affect... attitudes and/or actions" (1988, p80).

Connolly has looked at the different forms power has been said to take (1983, p93).
These include persuasion, manipulation, coercion, deterrence, anticipatory surrender
and force.

While the above indicates there is some agreement that power carries connotations of
capacities, these definitions say nothing about h o w these capacities are attained and
maintained. The nature of power in this respect is problematic. The inference is that
people or things seen to possess power in this sense can achieve a particular outcome
which includes causing something not to happen. Power, therefore, is seen as an
effect or cause. It can be possessed and hoarded.

Models based on this view of power have been termed by Latour as diffusion models
(1986, p267). In a diffusion model, power is seen as a cause. In other words, power
is possessed and used to achieve a particular outcome. The diffusion model is also
characterised by friction orresistancesuch that the outcome achieved m a y or m a y not
be completely what the possessor of power intended. It could be said, therefore, that
in a diffusion model, power is a matter of degree depending on the amount of
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opposition or indifference or, conversely, acceptance, enthusiasm or even fear there is
towards the possessor of power by those w h o are subject to it Latour likens power
in a diffusion model to the inertia principle in physics (p266). This means there is
some inner force which will trigger and keep an order, claim or artefact moving in one
direction until an obstacle such as the action or reaction of others changes the
direction or speed of this m o v e m e n t A diffusion model seeks to explain the initial
force and/or the force which diminishes the power through resistances and friction
(p267). The diffusion model is characterised by its simplicity. All that is necessary to
explain events is to identify those w h o have power.

Many of the political economy models of regulation which could be used to explain
therepetitivepattern of regulatory failure-regulatory reform identified in Chapter 1
are based on a diffusion model of power. For purposes of illustration, four such
models will be briefly outlined: public interest, private interest, cost/benefit and
pluralist
(i) Public Interest Model
The public interest theories of regulation are based on the premise that regulation is
instituted to further the public interest in some way. This m a y be to protect the public
from abuses of the corporate form including fraud and misrepresentation, anticompetitive activities of monopolies, pollution and similar anti-social behaviour of
companies, other groups and individuals. Public interest theories can be classified as
economic and/or social theories and, as such would be consistent with the views
expressed in S A C 2 Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting (hereafter
referred to as S A C 2) and S A C 3 Qualitative Characteristics of Financial
Information (hereafterreferredto as S A C 3) regarding the relevance and reliability of
information contained in general purpose financial statements.

S A C 3 defines

relevance andreliabilityas
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"relevance" means that quality of financial information which
exists w h e n that information influences decisions by users about
the allocation of scarce resources by:
(a) helping them form predictions about the outcomes of past,
present or future events; and/or
(b) confirming or correcting their past evaluations;
and which enables users to assess the rendering of accountability
by preparers;
"reliability" means that quality of financial information which
exists w h e n that information can be depended upon to represent
faithfully, and without bias or undue error, the transactions or
events that either it purports to represent or could reasonably be
expected to represent (paragraph 5)

The introduction to SAC 3 specifically links these qualitative characteristics to the
objectives of general purpose financial reporting as identified in SAC 2 paragraphs 26
and 27:
... the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to
provide information to users that is useful for making and
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources
(paragraph 26)
When general purpose financial reports meet this objective they
will also be the means by which managements and governing
bodies discharge their accountability to the users of the reports . .
. the rendering of accountability by reporting entities through
general purpose financial reporting is encompassed by the broader
objective of providing information useful for making and
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, since
users will ultimately require the information for resource
allocation decisions (paragraph 27).

S A C 3 paragraph 4 further states that these qualitative characteristics will assist
preparers of financial information, auditors, participants in the standard setting
process, regulators and others to select appropriate reporting policies and indicate to
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users the qualities that users can expect of financial information m a d e available to
them.

SAC 2 paragraphs 12 and 13 make it clear that financial information has both
economic and social consequences and that the community interest will be best served
w h e n there is an efficient allocation and use of scarce resources. For example,
investors, creditors, governments and parliaments will use financial information to
m a k e investment credit and policy decisions. If these decisions are based on relevant
and reliable financial information, resources will be allocated to those entities which
will use them in the most efficient and effective manner. This in turn, will increase
productivity, employment opportunities and living standards.

This implies that regulation of company financial reporting is necessary to ensure an
adequate or economic distribution of resources. The report of the Senate Select
Committee on Securities and Exchange (the Rae Committee), for example, concluded
that government regulation had two goals. The first of these could be termed a public
interest objective:
... to maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the
capital market in the interests of economic development, efficiency
and stability (Australia, 1974,16:15).

This is similar to Posner*s view of the "public interest" theory that"... regulation is
supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or
inequitable market practices" (1974, p335) .
(ii) Private Interest Model
In contrast, the basis of the private interest theory is essentially that one interest
pressure group is able to "capture" regulation or the regulatory body established to
administer the regulation of a particular industry or industry in general. In Stigler's
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view, "capture" means that the impetus for a given regulatory measure came from a
particular industry. Furthermore, the design and operation of the regulation is
directed towards the benefit of that industry (Stigler, 1971, p3).

Alternatively, regulation may be introduced which is not of benefit to a particular
industry or industry in general but over time, industry is able to dominate or control
the regulatory agency established to administer the regulation (Posner, 1974, p341).
According to Walker, therelationshipbetween the accounting professional bodies and
the Australian Accounting Standards Board ( A A S B ) is a classic case of this form of
regulatory capture (1987). This matter will be discussed in more detail in later
chapters of the study.

A number of reasons have been advanced for the success of industry in achieving this
preferential treatment Most are based on the view that power is a function of status
in a community. A long standing view is based on the notion that the institutions of
society, including regulation, are controlled by the capitalists as being the controllers
of productive resources, or, using perhaps more modern terminology, big business
(Posner, 1974, p341).

This approach is based largely on the works of Marx.

Essentially, the private interest model is based on the premise that the ruling class, for
example, business interests, are able to enlist the support of the State, including the
regulatory system, by virtue of the pressures they are able to bring to bear in pursuit
of their o w n objectives. Because these pressures are greater than those exerted by
other groups, the State serves business interests to the exclusion of others.
Furthermore, the system is set up in such a w a y to ensure that the ruling class
maintains its dominant position (Miliband, 1969, pl46; Quinney, 1975, ppl92-193).
A n accounting example of this would be where a business group or groups
successfully lobbied for the repeal of a particular standard on the basis of the
economic consequences flowing from application of its provisions.
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A variation on this theme is the power-elite model which adopts the perspective that
dominant groups in society, for example, business or industry, are able to achieve
political ends at the expense of other less powerful groups (Tomasic, 1980, p28;
(Hart, 1980, p239).

Higley, Deacon and Smart see elites as including leading businessmen, incumbent and
retired politicians, trade union leaders, wealthy graziers, voluntary associations and
even leaders of minority, reform or protest organisations (1979, p4) These authors
define elites as ". . . persons with power to affect organisational outcomes
individually,regularlyand seriously" (p3). In an accounting context, it has been
argued that standard setting bodies have been unduly influenced by the audit section
of the profession for the benefit of clients. In other words, business interests had de
facto control of the accounting standards through company auditors (Burns, 1974).
(iii) Cost/Benefit Model

Under the cost /benefit model, the explanation of the success or failure of regulation
concerned with an analysis of the impact ofregulationor policy on individuals and
groups. According to Wilson, individuals and groups tend to react more to decreases
in net benefits than increases (1974, pi38). Hence if the impact of a regulatory
measure on an individual or group is negligible, they are less likely to take an interest
in it than if the impact, in terms of either costs or benefits, is great

Research by Morris (1986), Gavens, Carnegie and Gibson (1989) and Coombes and
Stokes (1985) suggests there is a bias in the standard setting process towards the
interests of large business. This did not occur because of their position in society per
se but because they were more likely to respond to exposure drafts than smaller
business interests. This could be seen as indirect support for the cost/benefit model
because larger companies could be seen as having more resources at their disposal to
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keep up to date with proposed changes in accounting methods. Morris offered a
number ofreasons,which could be seen as consistent with the cost/benefit model, for
w h y some w h o could be considered to have an interest in standards did not take
advantage of the due process procedures and voice their views in submissions. For
example, Morris argued that some potential lobbyists m a y not participate in due
process procedures because they considered their view would not be taken into
consideration. Others m a y not lobby because of the "free riding" problem whereby
the benefits of lobbying by one group m a y flow through to competitors even though
they have not incurred the expense of lobbying (1986, p46). These considerations
would suggest the cost of lobbying would not be justified.

To the extent that some groups lobby and others do not, the cost/benefit model is a
variation of the private interest model.
(iv) Pluralist Model
Supporters of the pluralist model do not believe that power is consistently vested in
the hands of a select interest group They consider power to be widely dispersed and
open to competitive bargaining. For example, Clegg sees the pluralist conception of
power as
. . . most likely to be dispersed among many rather than fewer
people; to be visible in instances of concrete decision-making
rather than throughreputation;to be competitively bargained for
rather than structurally pervasive; to be best viewed through
relatively formal instances of voting and to be more widely
dispersed than narrowly concentrated in communities (1989, p8).

In a similar vein, Matthews' discussion of Australian pressure groups, puts the
pluralist viewpoint in the following terms
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... no group has a monopoly or even a new monopoly of political
resources. Resources m a y be spread unequally; but they are not
spread cumulatively. Even the unorganised or weakly organised
sections of the population ... at least have the power to vote
(1980, p468).

In Cranston's view, the pluralist model is based on the premise that there are a num
of conflicting interest groups including the state which m a y act independently for its
o w n interests or as a surrogate for other interests (1982, p4). T o achieve business
regulation or the implementation of policies generally, it is necessary to mobilise
support T o gain this support, it m a y be necessary to counter opposition by making
compromises, for example, watering d o w n or weakening the effects of a proposal,
rather than see the proposed policies defeated. The overall effect is that there is no
clear-cut winner or loser because no one group has achieved their ideal situation.

LIMITATIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS

There are two major defects in these models. The first relates directly to the conce
of power. Being perceived as having power is one thing, exercising power is another.
Hence, an elite such as a monarch or politician m a y be seen to have power but may
not be able to exercise power in any concrete manner. For example, the Queen of
England is ruler of the United Kingdom in name only. She is a figurehead. The laws
of England are formulated by Parliament and are administered and enforced by a
network of public offices, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. The Queen
m a y give the royal assent to laws but this is on the advice of the Prime Minister w h o
in turn is acting on behalf of Parliament which, in turn, is supposed torepresentthe
interests of the United Kingdom as a whole.

In Australia, the power of the Prime Minister is constrained by the membership of the
relevant political party. Hence the Prime Minister may propose nominations for
particular portfolios in the government but will be guided in this selection by party
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views. Party policies are also determined in this way. The laws created by the
Federal and State Parliaments are, in Australia, constrained by the Constitution and
are subject to interpretation and possiblyrejectionby the judges of the High Court

A dictator usually has power only as long as an army or a police force enforces it
The population m a y only follow orders emanating from a dictator out of fear of
reprisals either on this earth or, in the case of areligiouslybased dictatorship, in the
hereafter.

In Australia, the AASB has power under the Corporations Law to review and develop
accounting standards (Australian Securities Act, section 226). Where these standards
are subsequently approved, section 298

of

the Corporations L a w imposes on

company directors an obligation to comply with these standards.

In all such cases, a diffusion model would maintain that the force which prompted a
particular law or activity was the power of an individual or group Furthermore, this
power would be all that was necessary to sustain achievement of the status quo until
such time as friction orresistancesuch as opposition from other interest groups or
indifference diminished the force of the power. These theories concentrate on power
as an outcome but they do not explain h o w those w h o are perceived as being in power
achieved this position or the mechanisms whereby they might lose it. A s Latour
argues
If the notion of 'power* may be used as a convenient way to
summarise the consequences of collective action, it cannot also
explain what holds the collective action in place (italics in
original) (1986, p265).

In other words, monarchs hold their position by virtue of their ancestry. At some
time in history, however, there has to be some explanation as to w h y a particular
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family line holds this position and what stops or has stopped some other family lineage
from claiming this privileged position. A dictator usually attains this status through
force but by what mechanism does a dictator gain and maintain the support of an
army of followers in the first instance? The A A S B has a statutory mandate but
subsequent chapters of this study will demonstrate that this mandate is necessary but
not sufficient to enable the A A S B to exercise its standard setting power. In other
words, the A A S B cannot simply issue accounting standards without considering the
impact of proposed accounting standards on those w h o will be bound by them. If it
did, it is likely the statutory mandate would be withdrawn in response to pressure
from interest groups such as business and, possibly, the government itself if standards
issued by the A A S B were perceived as having adverse consequences on the economy
as a whole.

Related to this is the notion of interests. All four political economy models outlined
above are based on interests of some description. This raises the question of h o w
these interests are tetermined. For example, what exactly is the public interest? This
issue will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters (in particular, Chapter 4).
For present purposes, a brief overview will be provided following Ippolito and Walker
w h o describe the public interest in the following terms:
... a collective good, the achievement of which will not
selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of
the [public interest] organisation
... in the best interests of all the ... people
.. . policies beneficial to all citizens or beneficial to large portions
of the population generally (1980, p302).

However, as Higley, Deacon and Smart assert:
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Societies rest on various social and cultural understandings, but..
. there is never a single, overriding point of view to which all, or
even m o s t members of a society adhere. Consequently, in the
broader areas of social action c o m m o n interest is always fairly
minimal (1979, p2).

Clearly, the nature of the public interest is problematic and defies definition in anyway
other than perceptions of what individuals or groups may perceive to be the public
interest This is a political decision and, as such, requires explanation within a power
framework because questions of public interest are really nothing more than an
extension of a private interest model. The same comment is valid for the cost/benefit
model

Private interests, are arguably, more easily identified than public interests because the
are attributed to particular groups such as business, political activists, trade unions,
the wealthy and so forth. Ippolito and Walker define an interest group as:
... an organised collection of individuals who are bound together
by shared attitudes or concerns and w h o m a k e demands on
political institutions in order to realise goals which they are unable
to achieve on their o w n (1980, p271).

Private interest theories thus suggest that particular groups within society are able to
influence regulation because of their position in society (as outlined above) and/or the
ability to effectively organise activities aimed at achieving particular outcomes.
However, the issue which is not addressed is how the "interests" of a given group are
determined. The nature of the group will usually indicate its philosophical
underpinnings, for example, aboriginal land rights, but how these are developed and
shaped and finally presented as an issue is another matter.

Issues develop overtime and tend to change in response to the views of supporters
and even opponents. In other words, there are likely to be trade-offs between those
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with an interest in a particular issue in a bid to gain consensus within the support
group and present a united front Opponents m a y m a k e similar compromises for the
same reason. Overcoming opposition m a y alsoresultin compromise in order to have
general agreement on an issue. The bid for a Royal Charter by some groups within
the Australian accountancy profession will be used to demonstrate this point in
Chapter 3. The charter bid extended from 1905 to 1928. Bringing it to fruition
required gaining acceptance for the conferral of the charter from other groups within
the profession both in Australia and the U K and also from government sources w h o
considered Australia did not need such forms of recognition from the U K .

To

overcome this opposition, a number of compromises were m a d e including the
widening of admittance criteria to the organisation to be formed by the Royal Charter.

The accounting standard setting process is a further example of such activities. As
will be discussed in Chapter 5, the due process procedures of standard setting
organisations which include the calling for submissions on the content of proposed
accounting standards are political activities undertaken to overcome resistance to an
accounting standard on the part of those w h o will be required to comply with it
Often, however, it is also necessary for the accountancy profession to overcome
dissidence within its o w n ranks over appropriate accounting practices. Chapter 5 will
provide evidence of both resistance to accounting standards by business and
government interests and dissidence within the profession by reference to issues such
as the inflation accounting debate. Chapter 6 will use the accounting standard dealing
with foreign currency translation as a specific and detailed example of dissidence
within the profession andresistancefrom business interests to a particular accounting
issue.

The point is that issues or interests may not be readily identified or articulated. As
Hindess has observed ". . . the specification of interests is always open to dispute:
interests are not given properties of individuals or groups" (1986, pi 17). A further
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implication of this line of argument is that if interests are developed over time, then
members of a group m a y not have identical interests. Hence ". . . every identifiable
group contains winners and losers, and even where all the winners are in one group
they end up short-changed" (Peltzman, 1976, p240).

Again, accounting standards

can be seen as evidence of this. For example, in the case of the foreign currency
standard, business preferred flexibility in the translation of foreign currency financial
statements and the accounting for translation gains and losses while the profession
was committed to uniformity. A s Chapter 6 will demonstrate, the compromise was a
reduction in translation methods from four to two. The ability to defer and amortise
foreign exchange gains and losses on overseas borrowings was removed except in
specified circumstances. Both sides lost to a certain extent

A further and related point is why some interests are supported while others are not
even within one group This line of argument also applies to the pluralist model.
Lukes, for example, has argued
... the pluralists assume that interests are to be understood as
policy preferences - so that a conflict of interests is equivalent to a
conflict of preferences. They are opposed to any suggestion that
interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and above all, to
the idea that people might actually be mistaken about, or unaware
of, their o w n interests (1978, pl4).

In addition, the pluralist model
.. . emphasises the importance of initiating, deciding, and vetoing
.. . takes no account of the fact that power m a y be, and often is,
exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively
"safe" issues (pi8).

Again, the accountancy profession provides evidence of this which makes it clear that
even within the profession itself, there is not a consensus on appropriate accounting
practices in all cases particularly controversial issues. The foreign currency issue was
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extremely contentious as evidenced by a gestation period for the Australian standard
of some 12 years. A n exposure draft was issued in 1973. N o further action appears
to have been taken until 1979. O n e explanation for this was that the issue of the 1973
exposure draft was prompted by the volatility of the exchange market in the early
1970's. W h e n this volatility declined in the mid-1970's, there was no longer a need to
pursue the issue (Corsi, 1987, p8). Alternatively, it could have been that the issue
was too controversial and achieving agreement was considered to be too hard
(Pierpont 1977, p88). Similarly, Moonitz has stated that, in its final years, the A P B
avoided controversial issues because of adverse reactions to its attempts at dealing
with difficult issues from members of the accountancy profession, business and the
government (1974, p28).

Furthermore, it has already been pointed out that larger business concerns are more
likely to m a k e submissions on proposed accounting standards than smaller companies
(Coombes & Stokes, 1985; Morris, 1986; Gavens, Carnegie and Gibson, 1989). The
reasons for this suggested by Morris and referred to previously support the criticisms
of the pluralist model put forward by Lukes. For example, unless business keeps up
to date with proposed accounting standards, it cannot k n o w the likely impact of such
proposals m u c h less articulate their interests. Not taking action because of the free
rider problem can itself be seen as a form of power because it denies the potential
benefits of lobbying to competitors that m a y well face similar impacts from accounting
standards.

A diffusion model of power cannot adequately explain regulatory failure. The major
reason for this is that it sees power as being something that is possessed and hoarded
rather than as power relationships. In a diffusion model possession of power is often
deemed to be a function of the possessors position in society. However, there is a
difference between being perceived as having power to order or proscribe a particular
activity and the ability to enforce that edict. Possession of power, if this is indeed
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possible, and the exercise of power are not the same. Furthermore, the political
economy models of regulation offered as examples of diffusion models are based on
the concept of interests. If interests cannot be clearly identified and articulated, they
cannot adequately explain action in general and regulatory activities in particular. In
addition, diffusion models imply that all interested parties are equal in terms of
knowledge of strategy, agenda setting and access and the ability to organise and form
alliances with others with similar interests.

Regulation is complex. Mitnick sees regulation as a special case of the general policymaking process which has three aspects: access (issue creation, issue expansion,
agenda entrance); decision, implementation, administration, impacts (and their
evaluation); termination (1980, p79).

The second aspect could be further divided into enactment, for example, company
legislation and accounting standards, and enforcement phases.

In Mitnick's view, the behaviours at each stage of the policy making process must be
accounted for and explained in order to understandregulationand its effects:
A full theory of regulation must . . . explain how regulation is
proposed, formally considered and approved, put into effect
administered, has impact, is evaluated and, is altered (1980, p80).

Mitnick's views are as applicable to the setting of accounting standards as they are to
regulation in general. For thisreason,it is argued that a diffusion model of power will
not adequately provide an explanation of w h y accounting standards are flexible, vague
and ambiguous. Therefore, a translation model of power will be used for purposes of
this study.
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CIRCUITS OF POWER FRAMEWORK
In a translation model, power m a y be an effect but it is not a cause and it cannot be
possessed.

Outcomes are shaped and usually changed or modified, that is

transformed, by all those w h o have an interest in them and are prepared to act on that
interest The end result is that thefinaloutcome probably bears littleresemblanceto
what was originally intended (Latour, 1986, p268). Clegg defines the translation
process as follows
By attending to politically engaged agents seeking to constitute
agencies, to constitute interests, to constitute structures, the
method seeks to m a p h o w agents actually d o 'translate'
phenomena into resources, and resources into organisation
networks of control, of alliance, of coalition of antagonism, of
interest and of structure (1989, p204).

The process of translation is complex and comprises four moments or stages of
translation, problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. There is a
further m o m e n t of translation, dissidence, which can be seen as the antithesis of
power. However, it will be argued in this study that dissidence is as necessary to the
maintenance of power relationships as the other moments of translation (these
concepts will be explained briefly later in the chapter). Despite the complexity of the
translation process, its essence can be explained in fairly simple terms. For example,
Callon states:
To translate is to displace . . . allies ... to express in one's own
language what others say and want, w h y they act in the w a y they
do and h o w they associate with each other: it is to establish
oneself as a spokesman. A t the end of the process, if it is
successful, only voices speaking in unison will be heard (1986,
p223).
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A translation model either specifically identifies or implies the necessity for efficient
organisation and agency. With regard to organisation, Latour states that since power
cannot be possessed or hoarded
You no longer have stored-up energy to explain why a President
is obeyed and a multinational grows since these effects are a
consequence of the actions of multitudes. Y o u are thus faced with
multitudes that wonder h o w to act as one (1986, p269).

Related to this is the idea of agency or the identification of who or what will act as the
representative or agent of the multitudes:
If power is not something you can hoard and possess, it is
something that has to be made. W h o will make it? Others . . .
These others, the only ones w h o are really powerful (in actu),
therefore have to attribute their action to one amongst them w h o
becomes powerful inpotentia (1986, p274, italics in original).

Clegg's circuits of power framework is based on a translation model. It explicitly uses
the concepts of agency and effective organisation. In addition, the circuits of power
framework uses the concept of hegemonic domination. Power is not something that
can be possessed and used to achieve a particular outcome. Instead, resources,
including knowledge, are used to create an environment wherein some groups,
associations or organisations are able to dominate a given field by forming an agency
relationship with other interest groups. The group wishing to act as the agent for the
others tries to prove or create the impression that it is the appropriate representative
of all those who have an interest in a given field. The professionalisation of
accountancy can be seen as an example of a translation model whereby accountants
have sought to gain hegemonic domination of not only work of an accounting nature
but also the determination of appropriate accounting standards and practices.
Selander, for example describes professionalisation as
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... the aspiration that an occupational group cherishes to reach
exclusive societal advantages and preference of interpretation
within their specialfieldof knowledge and praxis (1990, pl39).

Domination and agency, however, are not necessarily fixed over time. Both are
subject to challenge, resistance and opposition such that it m a y be necessary to renegotiate and modify the environment if domination and agency are to be maintained.
The overall result is that outcomes are often compromise or second best solutions in
order to maintain dominance and agency. It will be argued in this study that flexible,
vague and ambiguous accounting standards are the result of such negotiations and
explainable in terms of Clegg's power framework and its application to the
professionalisation process.
The Moments of Translation
(i) Problematisation
The process of problematisation involves attempts by one group or organisation to
convince another group or organisation that the latter has a problem and that the
solution to that problem can be provided only by the former group or organisation. In
Callon's terms, problematisation involves a group or organisation making itself
indispensable in the network of relationships it is seeking to create (1986, p204). The
purpose of this process is facilitation of a strategic agencyrelationship.T o achieve
this, the would-be agent must establish and control a "necessary nodal point" (Callon,
1986, p205) or "obligatory passage point" (Clegg, 1989, pl99) between itself and the
other group. Clegg refers to a "necessary nodal point" as "... a channel through
which traffic between them occurs on terms which privilege the putative strategic
agent" (1989, pl99).

Callon further elaborates on the meaning of problematisation which "... describes a
system of alliances, or associations, between entities, thereby defining the identity and
what they 'want'" (1986, p206).
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A s will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, professions use their claim to expert
knowledge and skill as a strategy to establish themselves as an obligatory passage
point between professionals and their clients. Lubell, drawing on the works of
Montagna, Barber and Greenwood, describes the process as follows
Because professional services are built upon esoteric knowledge,
the public tends to regard members of a profession with a certain
degree of mystique. It is felt that the professional practitioner is
better prepared than the client... to determine the client's needs
and the nature of services appropriate for a given situation. The
client does not tell the professional what services are required.
Rather, the professionaltellsthe client what services are necessary
(1978, pp62-63).

This view can be extended to the relationship between the profession, regulatory
authorities, government investors and creditors and the general public in the
development of accounting standards. The accountancy profession seeks to not only
establish its members as obligatory passage points for clients but also between itself
and the public interest in the promulgation of accounting standards. The accounting
standards promulgated by the profession are held out as providing relevant and
reliable information for the purposes of making decisions leading to an economic
allocation of resources (SAC 2 and 3).
(ii) Interessement
In the next stage in the process of translation, interessement, a group or organisation
seeks to cement its position in the power framework by "interesting", "enrolling" or
"attracting" another group or organisation to its own by coming between that group
or organisation and another (Clegg, 1989, p205). Callon explains interessement as
"[fjo be interested is to be in between (inter-esse), to be interposed" (1986, p208).
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The purpose of interessement is to establish membership and meaning of certain
categorisation devices (Clegg, 1989, p205).

For purposes of this study,

categorisation devices are taken to include professionalisation processes such as the
formation of professional associations with entry requirements including specified
training and education. In this way, the profession determines its membership and
establishes a distinction between non-professional accountants and professional
accountants, public accountants as opposed to those working in industry. Chapters 3
will show that the emerging accountancy profession sought to m a k e this distinction on
the basis that the public interest would be best served by members of specified
professional associations. The reason for this being that specialised skill, knowledge
and training were required in, for example, the conduct of an audit and only those
w h o qualified for membership of certain professional associations had such attributes.
In other words, the first phase of the translation process is aimed at achieving a
dominant position in a particular field. The second phase is a consolidation process
whereby the organisation seeking to attain the dominant position attempts to
strengthen its hold or claim by forming an agencyrelationshipwith other parties w h o
could also be expected to have an interest in the particular field. Callon describes
interessement as "how the allies are locked into place" (1986, p206). This is necessary
because, as Callon states the entities and relationships identified during the
problematisation

process

must

be tested to

determine

the

strength

of

problematisation:
Each entity enlisted by the problematization can submit to being
integrated into the initial plan, or inversely, refuse the transaction
by defining its identity, its goals, projects, orientations,
motivations, or interests in another manner (p207).

The process of interessement can take many forms depending on the nature of the
problem identified and those to be enrolled and what they want (p211). Interessement
is aimed at achieving a balance of power favourable to the enrolling agency by
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reducing competition within a particularfield,for example excluding the unqualified
from the practice of accountancy, and by creating alliances with those to be enrolled
(p211).
(iii) Enrolment
The third phase in the translation process is enrolment (Clegg, 1989, p205) or
definition and co-ordination of roles (Callon, 1986, p211). In this phase of the
process, agencies attempt to form "alliances and coalitions between memberships and
meaning which they have sought to fix" (Clegg, 1989, p205). This phase appears
similar to the second. However, there is a difference. Alliances and coalitions are not
the same as an agency relationship and could be seen as a means of avoiding
resistance from other groups that m a y wish to encroach on another's hold over a
particularfieldof endeavour. Interessement attempts to form alliances but m a y not
necessarily be successful. Enrolment is the achievement of alliances (Callon, 1986,
p211). Callon describes enrolment as ". . . the group of multilateral negotiations,
trials of strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them to
succeed" (p211).
(iv) Mobilisation
The final phase of the translation process, mobilisation, is the means by which the
enrolling agent ensures that it is not betrayed by the enrolled agencies, that is, the
representations of interest remain fixed (Clegg, 1989, p205). Thisfinalphase can be
seen as the most critical in the process as it effectively is the culmination of the
previous phases. Will the enrolling agency be accepted as therepresentativeof the
enrolled and will the enrolled follow their representative? In other words, what the
enrolling agency is seeking is a transition from enrolment to active support (Callon,
1986, p218).
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(v) Dissidence
Even if the process of translation is successful, it does not m e a n a dominant position
will be maintained. There is a further stage in the translation process, dissidence,
whereby translation m a y become treason. Callon explains this stage as follows:
Dissidence . . . brings into question some of the gains of the
previous stages. The displacements and the spokesmen are
challenged or refused... N e w displacements take the place of the
previous ones but these divert the actors from the obligatory
passage points that had been imposed upon them.
New
spokesmen are heard that deny therepresentivityof the previous
ones. Translation continues but the equilibrium has been modified
(pp218-219).

Power and dissidence or resistance are inextricably linked (refer for example, Clegg,
1989; Barbalet 1985) and while power m a y be limited by dissidence or resistance,
Clegg argues that it will be rare for existing obligatory passage points to be destroyed
(1989, p209-210). The idea of this relationship between power, dissidence and
resistance will be linked later with the notion of autopoiesis and systems closure
which, it will be argued, have allowed the accountancy profession to maintain and
even expand its dominance offinancialreporting.
Clegg's Circuits of Power Model
There are three circuits of power in Clegg's model: episodic, dispositional and
facultative. The circuits are interrelated withrelationshipsat the dispositional and
facilitative levels either reproducing or transforming power relationships at the
episodic level. The facilitative level is the most dynamic of the circuits. A s its name
implies, it is the level that empowers or disempowers the rules of meaning and
membership which fix or re-fix the obligatory passage points at the dispositional level
which in turn set the scene for domination and facilitate the episodic power relations
at the agency level. Each level and the type of power associated with that level will
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be discussed in turn with brief examples drawn from the regulation of company
accounting used where appropriate to explain the level in more detail.
(i) Episodic Agency Circuit
Episodic agency power is the circuit through which outcomes are secured. Therefore,
it is the most visible of the circuits (p211). In this sense, it closely resembles the
traditional conception of power whereby an A, because of a superior bargaining
position or standing conditions which allow A to utilise resources, can cause a B to
follow a particular course of action. This can be either some action B would prefer
not to take or preventing B from taking some particular action (p217). Power at the
episodic agency level is the closest power comes to being reified, that is, "...
thinglike ... solid,realand material... "(p207). The episodic agency view of power
is based on the concept of sovereign power (pi87) which Clegg sees as being "...
tied irrevocably to the formal apparatus of the state ..." (pi 55).

In terms of the moments of translation, the episodic circuit represents the outcome of
the translation process. Those w h o exercise power at this level have achieved both an
agency position and a position of domination in a given field and thereby are able to
cause others to undertake some activity they might not otherwise have done. In other
words, they have used the resources available to them and translated them into power.

It is important to note that agency in the circuits model is not restricted to humans but
extends to collective forms of decision-making, including organisation (pi87).
Achievement of organisational agency is potentially more significant than individual
agency because, as Clegg points out
... it involves the stabilisation of power relations across an
organisational field of action, and thus between many
subjectivities, rather than simply within one embodied locus of
subjectivities (pi88).
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This view of agency as organisational is essential to the application of autopoiesis to
the accountancy profession.

The setting of accounting standards that are binding on members of the two
accounting professional associations and, in the case of approved accounting
standards, binding on preparers of statutorily mandated externalfinancialstatements is
an example of power at the episodic agency level. The fact that the profession
effectively dominates this process could be seen as the ability of A (the profession) to
m a k e B (preparers of financial statements) do something B would not otherwise have
done (comply with accounting standards).

This level is characterised by resistance which may take one of two forms (p207).
First resistance m a y take the form of attempts to create entirely new power
relationships by establishing n e w obligatory passage points. A s will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 4, the establishment of the Accounting Standards Review
Board ( A S R B ) was viewed by the Australian accountancy professional associations as
a m o v e by the Federal Government to remove the standard setting process from their
control.

The second and more likely form of resistance leaves existing power relationships
intact butresiststhe exercise of power (p207). A n example of this type of resistance
m a y be evidenced by a failure on the part of professional association members to
comply with accounting standards. O n the other hand,resistancem a y be proactive in
that business groups m a y lobby the government to over-rule an accounting standard
as has happened twice in the U S A and also in Australia with regard to S A C 4
Definition and Recognition of the Elements of Financial Statements (details will be
provided in Chapter 5). In Australia, activities of this nature are more likely to be
undertaken in the case of approved accounting standards which have the force of law
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under the Corporations Law. Resistance m a y also be evidenced in formal submissions
on proposed accounting standards and/or media coverage of the impact of a particular
accounting standard.

It will be argued that this potential for conflict helps explain why accounting standards
are flexible, vague and ambiguous.

The long debate over the foreign currency

translation standard will be used to demonstrate this point in Chapter 6.

It should be clear that episodic agency power is not necessarily absolute or permanent
or immutable. Maintenance of power at the episodic agency level requires
reproducing the rules of membership and of meaning, rules of practice and obligatory
passage points through the dispositional and facilitative circuits of the framework.
Even if resistance does not create n e w obligatory passage points, it can cause a
change in the w a y power is exercised at the episodic agency level. This is consistent
with what Jamous and Peloille term "transformations of a profession" which ". . . are
not m a d e by a self-regulating system but by sudden jolts when the principles of the
dominant tegitimacy are shaken" (1970, pl42).

Influences and relationships within the other two levels of the power framework will
determine the degree of change in the balance of power at the episodic agency level.

(ii) Dispositional Circuit
Dispositional power at the level of social integration is based on Lockwood's (1964,
p245) concept of social integration as orderly and conflictfulrelationsbetween the
actors in a system (Clegg, 1989, pl8). These relationships are concerned with
specifying rules of meaning and of membership (p224). Theserelationsof meaning
and of membership construct an "actor-network", "organisationalfield"or "field of
force" which is m a d e up of the allies and those successfully enrolled into an agency
relationship by the translation process (p225).

DiMaggio and Powell define an
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organisational field as " . . . those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a
recognised area of institutional life..." (1983, pl48).

In the context of the present study, the relevant organisational field or field of force
corporate regulation. The major organisations making up this field include the
accountancy profession as a whole, the legal profession, State and Federal Parliaments
as representatives of the public interest regulatory authorities such as corporate
affairs commissions and the National Companies and Securities Commission (both
n o w replaced by the Australian Securities Commission), the stock exchange and
corporations. It is recognised that other organisations such as those representing
industry and those w h o use external financial statements are also likely to have a place
in the organisational field comprising corporate regulation. However, it is likely that
these groups would play a less significant role in the organisational field than the
major groups.

This power circuit encompasses rules of practice or modes of rationality which can be
seen as solutions to the problems organisations face. This is part of the process of
problematisation. The key to this power circuit is for a would-be agent to first
convince an organisation or organisations that they have a problem and then persuade
them that the would-be agent can offer the optimal solution. In this way, the enrolling
group or organisation endeavours to establish itself as the "obligatory passage point"
through which environmental resources such as knowledge and information must
pass. Maintaining power at the episodic level requires control of the "obligatory
passage points" at the dispositional and facilitative levels which means fixing and
refixing the rules of practice which, in turn, provide the context determining what the
rules of membership and of meaning are interpreted as being. This fixing and refixing
is aimed at stabilising the organisational field and is achieved through a process of
institutional isomorphism, which means that organisations within the field become
increasingly alike. This acts as an in-built defence mechanism which guards against
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radical change in the future. Chapter 3 will argue that the professionalisation of
accountancy was directed towards achievement of this position.

As indicated above, this circuit is characterised by interessement and enrolment which
are necessary to the formation of an agency relationship O n e w a y of achieving an
agency position or forming alliances is by demonstrating a commitment to
representing the interests of the principal, for example, by lobbying the government to
attain a particular outcome beneficial to the principal.

A n early example of

interessement on the part of the accountancy profession in the United Kingdom was
the support of business by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales ( I C A E W ) against government proposals to require disclosure of profit and loss
information. After almost forty years, the I C A E W eventually supported greater
disclosure in the interests of shareholders and creditors (Aranya, 1974, pp7-8). A n
Australian example is provided by submissions to the government or regulatory
authorities by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) on various
matters including allowance for depreciation on income-producing buildings, double
taxation of dividends and taxing of closely related companies as groups (ICAA,
Annual Report, 1982, p7).

Achievement of an agency relationship also requires effective organisation. The
relevant m o m e n t of translation here is enrolment. O n e w a y in which the accountancy
profession could be seen to do this is by attempts to unify the profession. In other
words, to join a number of professional associations into one, or, where this has
proved infeasible, to at least work together to give the appearance of a united front.
The standard setting mechanism established jointly by Australia's two major
accountancy professional associations is an example.

Finally, mobilisation is also part of this circuit as it includes rules of practice which
the basis of the establishment of obligatory passage points.

The purpose of
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mobilisation is to avoid betrayal by enrolled agencies so thatrelationsof meaning and
membership remain fixed. In the context of the present study, rules of practice will be
taken to include accounting and auditing standards, ethical pronouncements, rules of
entry to membership of the accountancy profession, membership of accounting
standard setting and review boards and due process procedures.

By successful translation of resources through the dispositional level, domination is
institutionalised (Clegg, 1989, p213). "Institutionalised" in this context is based on
Meyer and Rowan's view of institutionalisation as ". . . the processes by which social
processes, obligations, or actualities c o m e to take on a rulelike status in social thought
and action" (1977, p341).

In the context of the present study, therefore, it is argued that the accountancy
profession has used its claim to unique knowledge and skill to create the view in
society that only those with that knowledge and skill and recognised by the
accounting professional associations should undertake work of an accounting nature
and also determine appropriate accounting practices. B y the process of formation of
professional accounting associations with entrance requirements specifying a high
standard

of

education

and

training

and

ethical

codes

and

continuing

professionalisation activities such as the development of practice guidelines,
accounting standards and conceptual framework projects, the profession has
effectively institutionalised its domination of the accounting aspects of corporate
regulation. A s will be discussed in Chapter 3, the Australian accountancy profession
does not have any statutory authority to establish accounting standards enforceable by
law. However, through control of the Australian Accounting Research Foundation
( A A R F ) which provides technical support in the development of approved accounting
standards, the two major accountancy bodies in Australia, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in Australia ( I C A A ) and the Australian Society of Certified Practising
Accountants ( A S C P A ) effectively dominate the standard setting process.
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If the translation process at this level is successful, then agency will have been
achieved and, as Callon puts it" . . . only voices speaking in unison will be heard"
(1986, p223). T h e profession appears to have attained this position with regard to the
setting of accounting standards. However, it should be noted here that while agency
and organisation facilitate domination, domination will be weakened because of
agency (Clegg, 1989, pl93). In other words, domination will, to a certain extent, be
dependent upon the continued support of enrolled agencies and allies or inrefixingthe
rules of practice and rules of meaning and of membership The forces at work at both
this level and at the facilitative level of the framework will determine the extent of this
support and its maintenance or changes therein.

Changes in the rules of practice, membership and meaning at the level of social
integration arise from either endogenous or exogenous forces arising from innovation
in techniques of discipline and production (p224). However, as already indicated,
radical change in an established organisation in the face of innovation is rare (p226).
O n e reason for this is what Clegg terms "organisational outflanking". Organisational
outflanking refers to the ability of organisations in an established network to
outmanoeuvre subordinate or n e w organisations that lack the resources to launch
effective collective action to effect change in the existing order (pp218-240). While
there is a trend towards the status quo, resistance or dissidence within the ranks of the
dominated can weaken the relationships within and between the dominant groups
within an organisational field.

More importantly, however, is the view based on the work of DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) and Meyer and R o w a n (1977) that organisations in a particularfieldstructure
the environment in which they exist in such a w a y as to m a k e radical change difficult
The organisational field effectively institutionalises responses or rules of practice
which guide innovation (Clegg, 1989, p266). The process by which this is achieved is
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institutional isomorphism.

DiMaggio and Powell identify three mechanisms of

institutional isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic and normative (1983, pl50).
(a) Coercive Isomorphism

Coercive isomorphism occurs where one organisation in a given field has the ability to
exert pressure on another organisation within the samefield.For example, companies
wishing to offer their shares for sale to the public are required to undertake activities
prescribed by the Corporations Law.

These activities include the issue of a

prospectus and, once incorporated, the annual publication of audited financial
statements.

They are dependent on the government for the ability to raise finance

from the public and also the benefits of limited liability. Corporations are also
dependent on the stock exchange in order to have shares publicly listed and, therefore,
must follow the requirements of the stock exchange, which include the lodging of
interim financial reports, or face losing their listing. A s a consequence of the
Corporations L a w and stock exchange requirements, corporations are dependent on
the accountancy profession in order to prepare financial statements which will be
attested to by the external auditor as showing a true and fair view which in Australia
extends to the application of Australian accounting standards.

Corporations,

therefore, are subject to coercive isomorphism which guarantees similarities in the
manner in which companies are incorporated and report to their shareholders and
others w h o use annual financial statements.
(b) Mimetic Isomorphism

Mimetic isomorphism, as the name implies, occurs when organisations imitate the
features of other organisations. Conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity arising from
innovation in techniques of discipline or production lead organisations to mimic the
features of similar organisations which are perceived by the imitating organisation as
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being more legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, pi52). Collins
refers to this as "status" emulation. Would-be professions model themselves on
established professions which have successfully protected their members from market
competition (1990, p25).

The formation of the ICAA could be seen as an example of mimetic isomorphism in
that the founders of the I C A A sought to imitate its U K counterpart, the I C A E W , by
gaining a royal charter. The Scottish precursors of national professional accountancy
associations were themselves styled after the legal profession (Carr-Saunders and
Wilson, 1933, p209). The affinity of the I C A A with the I C A E W is evidenced by its
application for a charter which was virtually identical to that of the I C A E W . The
I C A E W was granted its charter on M a y 11, 1880 (Howitt, 1966, pxi) and by the turn
of the century had established itself as a source of some authority and influence in the
development of corporate and related legislation. Examples of this include the
inclusion of a member of the I C A E W on the Board of Trade's departmental
committee to review the Companies Acts of 1862-1890 appointed in 1894 (The
Accountant, 1895a, p411). A past president of the I C A E W gave evidence before the
Board of Trade's departmental committee on behalf of the London Chamber of
Commerce (The Accountant, 1895b, p750).

A further example of niimetic isomorphism is the decision to develop an Australian
conceptual framework for accounting, an idea obviously derived from attempts by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to develop such a conceptual
framework. However, the idea of a conceptual framework or theoretical core was not
novel. The F A S B itself appears to have imitated other professions or groups in its
decision to develop a conceptual framework
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Perhaps because accounting in general and financial statements in
particular exude an aura of precision and exactitude, m a n y persons
are astonished to learn that a conceptual framework for financial
accounting and reporting has not been articulated authoritatively
( F A S B 1976, p2).

This perception of the need for a conceptual framework appears to have origins in the
notion of what constitutes a profession. Goldstein considers that the key to
controlling a field of knowledge is an intellectual core that raises those who possess
that particular core "... above mercantile concerns ... to become a kind of secular
analogue of the clergy" (1984, pl75).

Both the Australian and USA conceptual frameworks appear to be based on a desire
to increase the efficiency of the standard setting process. The FASB defined a
conceptual framework and its purpose as
... a constitution, a coherent system of interrelated objectives and
fundamentals that can lead to consistent standards and that
prescribes the nature, function, and limits of financial accounting
and financial statements (1976, p2).

Similarly, Release 200 stated that the Ministerial Council had directed the newly
created ASRB to sponsor and encourage the development of a conceptual framework
for accounting in Australia
. .. since without such a framework the Board would not be able
to ensure that approved accounting standards were logically well
developed and consistent with each other ( A S R B , 1985a,
paragraph 3.2)

Moonitz (1974) and Miller and Redding (1988) support the view that a conceptual
framework is directed towards improving the standard setting process. According to
Moonitz, the lack of a conceptual framework would result in pronouncements issued
by the FASB being inconsistent, incomplete or vague which, in turn, would allow
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special interest groups to exploit loopholes in standards (1974, p84). The basis of
Miller and Redding's argument is that a conceptual framework provides a "global
view" of accounting as well as defining basic terms. This means that accounting
issues do not need to be handled on an ad hoc basis as the need arises. A n ad hoc
approach, particularly w h e n a controversial issue is involved, results in
inconsistencies and contradictions in standards as compromises m a y be m a d e in order
to accommodate the needs of particular interest groups or because, as the
composition of the standard setting board changes overtime, different viewpoints will
be encompassed in accounting standards (1988, p24).

The extracts from the FASB and from Release 200 also suggest that conceptual
framework projects are seen as a means of legitimising not only accounting standards
but also the profession's domination of the standard setting process. W h e n viewed in
context of events occurring in corporateregulationat the time conceptual framework
projects were considered in both Australia and the U S A , it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that these projects were defence mechanisms aimed at mamtaining
accountancy's position within the regulatory framework.

The FASB's predecessor, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), was disbanded, in
part, because of its inability to formulate the basic postulates and principles of
accounting. Moonitz argues that the lack of such a conceptual framework frustrated
the work of the A P B (1974, pp83-84). S o m e of the difficulties the A P B encountered
in its standard setting activities will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Similarly, the

Australian profession, through its research arm, the Australian Accounting Research
Foundation ( A A R F ) , initiated a conceptual framework project around the time of the
establishment of the A S R B . A s will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this m o v e
on the part of the Federal Government, had the potential to remove from the
profession control of the standard setting process.
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Research by Hines supports this view (1989). O n the basis of an examination of
studies of conceptual framework projects undertaken by authors such as Peasnell
(1982), H o p w o o d (1988) and Agrawal (1988), Hines concluded that conceptual
framework projects in the U K , U S A , Canada and Australia were strategic
manoeuvres aimed at not only legitimising accounting standards but also the status
and self-regulation of the accountancy profession (1989, pp85-89). Even if the
projects were technical failures, undertaking them created the impression that the
profession had " . . .

a coherent differentiated knowledge base for accounting

standards" (p85).

A further example of mimetic isomorphism relates to the adoption of accounting
practices incorporated into formal accounting standards. There is an increasing trend
for harmonisation of accounting practices throughout the world and Australia is part
of this process. Australian accounting standards include a statement regarding the
compatibility of the particular standard with international accounting standards. In
addition, it is not unusual for Australian accounting standards to closely follow
standards issued in other countries, in particular, the U S A . While the growth in
multinational corporations suggests that harmonisation is desirable, adopting practices
already elevated to standard status in other major countries can be seen as a bid for
legitimisation. In addition, it should not be forgotten that corporations are also part
of the regulatory organisation field and while corporations m a y be dependent on
accountancy, corporations can also be a potent source of dissidence and resistance.
The result is that mimetic isomorphism can readily be seen between corporations and
accountancy. The fact that particular practices are widely used by corporations in the
absence of an accounting standard is often used as a reason for the adoption of those
practices in subsequent accounting standards.

The chapter dealing with the

development of the foreign currency standard will show that the Australian exposure
drafts and the eventual accounting standard dealing with this issue were explicitly
based on standards developed in the U S A and Canada which in turn reflected
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accounting practices in c o m m o n usage by corporations in those countries and,
coincidentally, in Australia.
(c) Normative Isomorphism

Normative isomorphism is usually associated with professionalisation, in particular,
the emphasis on formal education and training and the claims to a body of esoteric
knowledge which cannot be completely codified (Clegg, 1989, p229; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983, pl52).

Professional associations often play a significant role in the determination of the
content of specific educational programmes. In Australia, the I C A A and the A S C P A
impose minimum requirements on subject content for accountancy programmes in
Universities. Universities failing to satisfy these requirements are not accredited by
the professional bodies. In a world where student numbers are essential to funding,
accreditation is often necessary to survival of accountancy departments because
students wishing to qualify for admission to either of the peak professional
associations must complete specified accredited subjects. In this way, the professional
associations are in a position to instil in students specific ideas which become
recognised norms or, in other words, are institutionalised. Accounting graduates take
these views with them into the organisations that employ them and the process
continues.

Ongoing professional training re-enforces this tendency. Graduates wishing to
progress through the ranks of the professional associations are required to undertake
additional study prescribed and, in general, offered by the professional associations or
delegates. Progression through the level of the professional associations also requires
specific work experience for specified minimum time periods. Through mechanisms
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such as these, there is a propensity for accounting and related activities across
organisations to become similar and remain so.

This process of formal education and training also helps re-enforce the myth that
accounting professionals, duly educated and trained, are the obvious choice to
undertake work of an accounting nature including the development of accounting
standards. However, formal education and training does not mean that accounting
can be completely codified.

There must always be room for the exercise of

professional judgment In accounting, the argument goes, that no two corporations
are the same and even within corporations, similar transactions should not necessarily
be accounted for in the same way. O n e of the ways in which the professional
associations have institutionalised this view is the concept of materiality which
according to Australian Accounting Standard 5 - Materiality in Financial Statements
( A A S 5) is
... an overriding concept which governs not only preparation and
presentation of "financial statements", but also the applicability of
Statements of Accounting Standards. Unless explicitly specified
otherwise, a Statement of Accounting Standards (or any of its
individual provisions) needs only to be applied where it will have
material consequence (paragraph 2).

Approved accounting standards each have a materiality clause which provides that an
item is material if
... its omission, non-disclosure or mis-statement is likely to affect
economic decisions or other evaluations m a d e by users entitled to
rely on the accounts or group accounts (eg. A A S B 1012
paragraph .05).

Professional judgment is required in determining whether an item is material in a given
situation. M a n y standards provide for alternative accounting treatments of similar
transactions under specified circumstances. For instance, under A A S 20 - Foreign
52

Currency Translation and its approved counterpart A A S B 1012: Foreign Currency

Translation, the financial statements of foreign subsidiaries are translated using either
the current rate method or the temporal method depending on whether the subsidiary
is independent of the holding company (self-sustaining) or is nothing more than an
extension of the operations of the holding company (integrated). The standards
provide guidelines but these are usually qualitative rather than quantitative so that
professional judgment is essentially subjective.

The Corporations L a w recognises that accounting standards are not applicable to all
companies at all points in time. Section 284(2) states
Accounting standards may be of general or specially limited
application and m a y differ according to differences in time,
locality, place or circumstance.

This approach is not u n c o m m o n and is part of a strategy aimed at creating an aura of
mystique or indetermination around a profession. If knowledge can be reduced to a
set of mechanical processes to be applied in all circumstances, it loses its sense of
esoteric knowledge. Any person who has the ability to learn these steps can
undertake the work and the area is no longer one where exclusive practice can be
claimed. As Larson has observed
... the "best" cognitive basis for a monopoly of competence is
one which reveals, or activates, or maximises the favourable
characteristic of a professional. It must be specific enough to
impart distinctiveness to the professional "commodity"; it must be
formalised or codified enough to allow standardisation of the
"product" - which means, ultimately, standardisation of the
producers. A n d yet it must not be so clearly codified that it does
not allow a principle of exclusion to operate: where everyone can
claim to be an expert, there is no expertise (1977, p31).
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This study will argue that flexible, vague and ambiguous standards are aresultof the
accountancy profession's determination to maintain domination of the standard setting
process and ensure the employment prospects of members of the professional
associations in areas of the preparation and audit of external financial reports. This
approach is adopted at the expense of relevant and reliable financial reports.
Similarly, formal education and training programmes instituted and mandated by the
professional associations are geared towards engendering certain attitudes in future
members of the profession and, thereby, future employers and guaranteeing the
reproduction of these views over time. In this way, accounting has become what
Jamous and Peliolle term a self-perpetuating system (1970, pi 16).

(iii) Facilitative Circuit
Facilitative power at the level of system integration can be seen in terms of
domination.
production

This is the level at which innovation in techniques of discipline and
introduce possibilities for the empowerment or disempowerment of

organisations or agents. Innovation m a y arise from institutional isomorphism or
competitive ecological pressures (Clegg, 1989, p232) that have the potential to alter
existing powerrelationships(p234). For example, by gaining charters, the I C A E W
and I C A A sought to improve their competitive position in the struggle for domination
of work of an accounting nature. T w o related strategies were used to achieve this.
First the claim to a body of esoteric knowledge, as evidenced by a high standard of
education and training, and, second, imitating established professions such as law and
medicine by the formation of a professional association.

Discipline in this framework is not used in the Foucaldian sense as "hierarchical
observations, normalising judgements and examinations" (p232). Instead, discipline is
viewed more in terms of "rationalised obedience" and is inseparable from the concept
of production in that power produces power (p232). Using the I C A E W and I C A A as
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examples once again, gaining a charter gave members a certain status in society
whereby they were recognised as qualified accountants by the initials they were able
to place after their names. Status gave the profession a vehicle for market closure or
at least partial market closure and market closure re-enforced the status of the
I C A E W and the I C A A and its members. However, achievement of this status meant
certain educational and ethical requirements had to be met and maintained. Education,
status and market closure m a y thus be seen as interrelated power mechanisms.

In Australia, approved accounting standards have the force of law. The two major
professional associations dominate the standard setting process.

Hence, the

professional associations dominate the methods used to produce statutory external
financial statements as well as non-statutoryfinancialstatements prepared by members
of the professional associations.

This level provides the greatest potential of all the circuits to introduce uncertainty
and instability into the model because it introduces opportunities to disrupt and/or
replace existing standing conditions in the episodic agency circuit and also provide
conditions for therefixingof the obligatory passage points in the dispositional power
circuit. O n the other hand, this level of power can be used to reproduce existing
powerrelationsin the other circuits.

Lockwood sees system integration in terms of orderly and conflictful relationships
between the parts of a social system (1964, p245).

Conflictful relationships or

competitive ecological or institutionally isomorphic pressures have the potential to
change existing standing conditions and obligatory passage points and m a y arise from
what L o c k w o o d terms a "lack of fit" of the existing institutional order with its
material base (p252). In the context of the present study, institutional order m a y be
seen as the rules of practice, membership and meaning that permit the accountancy
profession to dominate both work of an accounting nature and the standard setting
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process. The material base could be seen as the public interest which accounting is
supposed to protect through the regulation of external financial reporting, or more
specifically, the objectives of general purpose financial statements as set out in S A C 2.

The confhctful relationships or "tensions" may arise from either endogenous or
exogenous sources and m a y trigger defensive activities or "compensating measures"
within both the level of system integration and social integration (Lockwood, 1964,
p252). If the defence mechanisms are successful, existing obligatory passage points
and the relationships of meaning and of membership which they determine, will remain
intact This does not necessarily mean that the features of the organisational field will
be unchanged.

In order to maintain the existing institutional order, it m a y be

necessary to create n e w organisational forms but the processes of institutional
isomorphism will tend towards the creation of organisations similar to those already in
existence, that is, with the same or similar rules of practice, of membership and of
meaning (Clegg, 1989, p233). Hence, change in the organisationalfieldthrough, for
example, the creation of n e w organisations, m a y be acceptable to the existing
organisationalfieldbecause the status quo will appear to be changed when, in fact, it
has been maintained.

It is possible to identify all of the moments of translation at this level of the power
circuits as groups respond to change and challenges to their dominance in a particular
area. Problematisation is evident at this level and will be demonstrated later in this
chapter by showing that accounting evolved and developed in response to
environmental and economic changes (competitive ecological pressures) over time
even before the formal establishment of professional accounting associations
(institutional isomorphism). These changes meant that with the increasing complexity
of commercial life, the importance of accountants also increased. This provided the
vehicle by which accountants, using strategies of problematisation, interessement
enrolment and mobilisation, were empowered to determine appropriate accounting
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practices and apply them. It also provided the grounds for the application for a
charter by thefirstnational professional accountancy association in England.

The formation of national accountancy professional associations, as opposed to the
evolution of accounting referred to above, could itself be attributed to forces at the
facilitative level of power which m a y be due to both institutionally isomorphic and
competitive ecological pressures. The formation of national or peak accountancy
professional associations is also evidence that tensions or conflictfulrelationshipsdo
not have necessarily negative effects. The tensions created in the nineteenth century
by the increasing complexity of commercial life gave rise to the "problem" identified
by the founding members of the I C A E W

that accounting work could and was

undertaken by unqualified people. The 1879 charter application clearly suggests that
the public interest would be served by such work being undertaken only by those with
the necessary qualifications "... to secure for the community the existence of a class
of person well qualified to be employed in the responsible and difficult duties often
devolving on Public Accountants" (cited by Howitt 1966, p21).

A not so altruistic reason for the formation of the ICAEW, and the ICAA and
A S C P A , for that matter, is that achievement of an agency relationship requires
effective organisation. The drawing together of a number of smaller professional
associations into one large organisation could well enhance the success with which
alliances and agency relationships are achieved. Strategic activities such as these
could be seen as mobilisation. The recent One Voice unification campaign of the
I C A A and the A S C P A was based on a similar premise that one unified professional
association would generate more respect from the government and thus be more
effective than two separate associations. A s will be discussed in Chapter 3, lack of
unity within the profession was a major factor in the long delay in the achieving of a
Royal Charter for the public accountants of Australia.
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Accounting has continued to respond to changes not only for the benefit of the
recipients of the output of accounting but to maintain its role in society. This has
often meant the creation of even more organisations within the accounting network.
The formation of research groups and standard setting boards are examples. The
creation of some of these organisations, for example, the A A R F and the A S R B , will
be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. In keeping with the underlying premises
of the facilitative level of the framework, this process led to the creation of new
organisations, that is, bifurcation.

This study maintains that the purpose in establishing these various committees and
boards was in response to criticism of the profession which m a y have ultimately led to
a vesting of the determination of accounting standards in an organisation other than
one appointed by the profession. The failure of the profession to enforce its o w n
accounting standards led to the establishment of the A S R B in 1984. The A S R B
initially was seen as an independent standard setting body and in this sense, the rules
of practice or obligatory passage points of the standard setting process were altered
with a corresponding change in the standing conditions in the episodic power level.
However, the process of institutional isomorphism saw a near end to this when the
A S R B was merged with the Accounting Standards Board of the A A R F in 1988. The
profession was, once again and n o w formally, an obligatory passage point in the
determination of accounting standards. In fact, its position was strengthened because
standards promulgated by the A S R B have statutory backing and must be complied
with.

As the foregoing indicates, the circuits of power framework has three distinct but
related levels, episodic agency, dispositional and facilitative.

Each level is

characterised by agency and organisation. Power can be seen to be exercised at the
episodic agency level but achievement and maintenance of this position requires a
stabilisation of standing conditions at this level. This in turn depends on stabilisation
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of control of obligatory passage points or rules of practice that provide the context for
interpretation of rules of membership and of meaning which both the dispositional and
facilitative circuits must pass through. Achievement of power at the episodic agency
level by establishment of obligatory passage points is the result of a translation
process of problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation at the
dispositional and facilitative levels.

The fifth stage of the translation process, dissidence or resistance, is introduced by
exogenous and/or endogenous factors arising from innovation in techniques of
discipline and production at the facilitative level. These factors have the potential to
disrupt powerrelationshipsat both the dispositional and facilitative level and through
these, the obligatory passage points which enable the exercise of power at the
episodic agency level. However, once established, it is unlikely that dissidence or
resistance willresultin radical change in an organisational field. N e w organisations
m a y be introduced to the organisational field but these will tend to have similar rules
of practice, of meaning and of membership so that obligatory passage points and
standing conditions at the episodic agency level will remain essentially unchanged.

This study argues that the accountancy profession has used this approach to achieve
and maintain hegemonic domination of accountancy work and the development of
appropriate accounting practices including-accounting standards.

The following section will outline the concept of autopoiesis as an explanation of the
ability of the profession to achieve system closure and effectively self-perpetuate its
existence.
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AUTOPOIESIS
The term autopoiesis was derived by Maturana and Varela to explain living systems
which recursively reproduce themselves (1988). The original theory was established
in the discipline of biology where the living systems under analysis consisted of cells
and organisms.

These cells and organisms were said to be operationally or

organisationally closed in that they produced their o w n boundaries, processes,
structures and all other elements needed for existence (Maturana & Varela, 1988,
p46; Bednarz, 1988, p59).

Autopoiesis occurs where the elements produced

recursively reproduce the system itself.

While autopoietic systems are organisationally closed, they are, at the same time,
cognitively open (Maturana 8c Varela, 1988, p95). In other words, the autopoietic
system does not exist in a vacuum "... it... is born in a particular place, in a medium
that constitutes the ambience in which it emerges and in which it interacts" (p95).

In order to survive, the cells and organisms have to be compatible with their
environment

Compatibility is determined by what Maturana and Varela term

structural congruence or coupling in that there must be congruence or compatibility
between the structures of the autopoietic system and the structures of its environment
(p95). If this compatibility ceases to exist, the autopoietic system also ceases to exist
This is not to say, however, that the environment actually has any input to the
autopoietic system or vice versa (Luhmann, 1986). The system is autonomous and, as
such, specifies its o w n rules, laws and its very existence (Maturana & Varela, 1988,
p48; Luhmann, 1988a, pl5). The environment can trigger changes in the autopoietic
system but the system itself will determine what changes actually occur within its
structure (Maturana & Varela, 1988, p95). A n y changes which do occur are aimed
solely at maintaining autopoiesis (p99).
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There have been a number of attempts to extend the concept of autopoiesis to social
systems in general (eg. Luhmann, 1986; Bednarz, 1988; Mingers, 1989) and particular
social systems such as law (eg. Teubner, 1988a, b; Luhmann, 1988a, b) and
accountancy (Robb, 1991). The attempt to extend the notion of autopoiesis is fraught
with difficulty and has led writers such as Robb (1991), Lempert (1988), Kennealy
(1988) and Mingers (1991) to suggest the need to speak of "virtual autopoietic
systems" (Robb, p218) or apply the concept in terms of metaphor (Mingers, 1991;
Lempert, 1988; Kennealy, 1988). A way out of this dilemma has been proposed by
Luhmann (1986, pl72-173) w h o has developed a multi-level approach whereby the
upper level consists of a general theory of self-referential autopoietic systems while
the lower levels comprise psychic systems, living systems and social systems. This
approach overcomes one of the major difficulties of applying autopoiesis in a
biological sense by divorcing human actions from the concept of autopoiesis in social
systems. The difficulty lies in characterising an autopoietic system as autonomous. If
a social system is autopoietic, it is by definition, autonomous in that it creates its o w n
boundary, components, reality and rules. Creation of humans lies in the biological
system and thereby, humans cannot be a component of a social system.

To overcome this difficulty, concepts of cognition, conversation, meaning and
communication have been adapted to explain the interaction between components of a
social system and also between a social system and its environment Maturana and
Varelareferto cognition as "bringing forth of a world" or as an "effective action" that
will facilitate the continued existence of a living being within the environment in which
it has established itself (1988, pp28-30). Cognition, used in this sense, can be seen as
thought processes and is linked with knowledge or ways of knowing h o w to survive
or conserve structural coupling (pi74).

Communication is the means by which social systems achieve and conserve their
autopoiesis. It is the coordination of behaviours (Maturana and Varela, 1988, pi93),
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However, this is not to say that this coordination is in any way conscious or that it
consists in the transmission of information as is commonly understood to be the
process of communication. Communication is the basic element of social systems
(Luhmann, 1986, pi74). It is created by the system, exists only within the system and
is self-referential (Luhmann, pl75).

Robb terms communication as "the use of

meanings in linguistic interactions" (1991, p219).

Interaction within a social system is via communication (Teubner, 1988a, p3) or
communicative acts (Robb, 1991; Luhmann, 1988a, b; Bednarz, 1988) rather than
through physical forms of interaction. Communication is thus the basic element of an
autopoietic social system (Teubner, 1988a; Luhmann, 1988a, b; Robb, 1991).

Robb (1990) has extended the idea of communication in social systems to include
conversation. Communication still has all the properties listed above but, in line with
Pask's (1980, p. 144) view of communication, is further seen as the " . . . sending of
signals between participants . . . " (Robb, 1991, p219). The signals sent between
participants are theresultof conversation which is defined as "... the medium of
social integration" (1990, p23) and "... the mechanism of conflictresolution"(pl5).
Robb uses conversation in terms of the creation of shared meanings within the
cognitive domain (1991, p219). Conversation is, therefore, contextual. Meanings are
also contextual with the result that the creation of new meanings depends on the
existence within the cognitive domain of already shared meanings such as terms,
definitions, assumptions, intuitions and rules (p219). A s indicated, the view adopted
by Robb is based on the interpretation placed on the term "conversation" by Pask.
For Pask, shared meanings or concept sharing implies agreement or consensus (1980,
pl47) which Pask maintains is arrived at through "commanding and obeying or
questioning and answering" (pl44). In this sense, conversation is a process of conflict
resolution (pl51).

The means by which concepts are shared include requests,

commands and persuasion (pl47). Concepts can also be seen as skills such as
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knowing h o w to perform specified tasks or understanding rules such as geometry
(pl47).

Communication is essential to conservation of autopoiesis because it calls forth
further conversation which, in turn, founds new meanings to be communicated. This
process of conversation, meanings and communication within the cognitive domain of
the autopoietic system m a y cause boundary, structural and component changes within
the system, it m a y even extend the boundaries of the system but these will only be
contextual changes designed to maintain autopoiesis.

This interpretation of conversation and communication is the key to the application o
autopoiesis to social systems. For example, Luhmann describes autopoietic social
systems as meaning-using systems to distinguish them from living autopoietic systems
(1986, pl73). This is similar to the approach adopted by Robb w h o argues that social
systems are not "assemblies of human individuals" but are systems of shared meanings
(1991, p219).

Autopoiesis and the Accountancy Profession
A s indicated above, a major difficulty in applying the concept of autopoiesis to social
systems such as accountancy is that autopoietic systems only produce themselves and
use elements created by the system to reproduce the system.

H u m a n s do not

recursively produce and reproduce themselves and, therefore, cannot be part of an
autopoietic system. They can, however, be part of the environment within which the
autopoietic system exists. Systems created by humans also cannot be part of an
autopoietic system because they have not created themselves. Mingers refers to
systems designed by humans as heteropoietic (1989a, pi64). Allopoietic systems
produce something other than themselves (Robb, 1991, p216; Mingers, 1989a, pl64).
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Heteropoietic and allopoietic systems can also be part of the environment in which
autopoietic systems exist

Robb states, however, that autopoietic systems can also be allopoietic systems (p216).
Autopoietic systems are organisationally closed but cognitively open so that they
import energy, information and material. These imports m a y be transformed by the
autopoietic system to create something other than the components and structures
which m a k e up the system. In this way, the autopoietic system exports energy,
information and material (p216). In this sense, professional accounting associations,
research and standard setting boards, conceptual framework projects and accounting
and auditing standards can be seen as the output of accountancy as an autopoietic
system.

On the other hand, accountancy may be viewed as an autopoietic system by using
autopoiesis as a metaphor or to abstract from the allopoietic and heteropoietic
systems and view accounting and auditing standards, conceptual framework projects
and even professional associations as forms of communication and organisation. In
Robb's view
An autopoietic social system is one in which meanings arise from
conversations and are acted upon through communication and in
which that communication gives rise to conversation to form new
meanings (italics in original) (1991, p220).

This is not inconsistent with the circuits of power framework in which Clegg makes it
clear that achievement of power depends on effective agency and organisation but
that this need not necessarily be human "... agency is not a generic term for people; it
m a y well often refer to collective forms of decision-making, such as organisations"
(1989, pl87).
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Collective forms of decision-making arising from agency relationships and alliances,
problematisation, interessement, enrolment and dissidence and resistance occurring
within the circuits of power will be interpreted as communication or communicative
acts for the purposes of this study. This, of course, does not overcome all of the
difficulties in applying autopoiesis to accountancy. Other difficulties will be addressed
in discussion dealing with determination of the boundary of the accountancy system
and its interactions with other systems within its environment including society which
will be viewed as the overall system within which accountancy exists.

One point which should be made clear at this point is what autopoietic system is being
considered. It was pointed out earlier, in terms of the circuits of power framework,
that the focus of this study is corporate regulation. In the context of autopoiesis, this
is also the relevant environment in which accountancy as an autopoietic system exists.
In keeping with the previous discussion as to the other participants in the field of
corporate regulation, the elements sharing the regulatory environment with
accountancy include the legal profession, State and Federal Parliaments as
representatives of the public interest regulatory authorities and corporations.

Because accountancy derives its statutory power to develop and approve accounting
standards from the government it could be argued that it is a part of the legal system
constituted by acts of parliament However, it is contended here that accountancy
imports only its powers from acts of parliament

Its output or conversation and

communication in the form of accounting standards are developed within the
autopoietic system. A s an autopoietic system, it is cognitively open and is responsive
to triggers from other elements in the system including the law and corporations, if
such responses are necessary to its survival. In this sense, it m a y also import
information such as reactions to proposed standards or perceived needs for standards
on particular topics.
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T h e Boundary of Accountancy

If an autopoietic system creates itself as well as all the elements which make up the
system andrelationshipsbetween them, the questions must be answered as to how,
where and when a particular autopoietic system emerged. Teubner (1988b, p223),
Luhmann (1988a, p26) and Maturana and Varela (1988, p40) shed some light on h o w
these questions m a y be answered. Teubner, for example, maintains that the products
of a system and even the processes which produce the products can exist initially in
the absence of a completely autopoietic system. The recursive reproduction of the
system by its o w n productive processes is one indication of the emergence of an
autopoietic system.

Maturana and Varela identify an autopoietic system as a unity created by an act of
distinction. In other words, the system takes on an identity separate and distinct from
its environment It, therefore, has a boundary created by the system within which it
produces the other components of the system. Maturana and Varela describe a
boundary as a membrane which "...

not only limits the extension of the

transformation network that produced its o w n components but it participates in this
network" (1988, p46).

The unity thus created can be said to be self-determined. To be autopoietic, the
system must also be self-reproducing or self-referential, that is, itrefersto itself in the
reproduction of its elements (Luhmann, 1988a, p26). The act of distinction implies
the system and the function it performs is unique or, in Luhmann's terms, the system
has "exclusive orientation to a function" (p26). System unity extends beyond the
determination of the system to thefinalelements and processes which the operations
of the system combine (pl4).
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Accountancy appears to meet these criteria to a certain extent. S o m e of the products
of accountancy, for example, double entry bookkeeping, which Baecker (1992)
argues is a self-referential system, audited financial statements, bankruptcy and
liquidation work and cost accounting, existed before accountants attempted to
achieve exclusive practise of these functions. Indeed, prior to the mid-nineteenth
century, accounting in Scotland, which has been designated the place of origin of the
accountancy profession, was seen as a sub-set of the law (Carr-Saunders and Wilson,
1933, p209).

By forming professional associations, accountants endeavoured to not only separate
the practice of accountancy from the law but also to ensure that only those with the
requisite training undertook work of an accounting nature. However, there are a
number of professional accountancy associations representing different branches of
accountancy or types of accounting practice.

Membership of a professional

association is not necessary to undertake many aspects of work of an accounting
nature. In the absence of one definitive professional accountancy association or
statutory recognition, of what constitutes a "professional" or "qualified" accountant,
for example, an accountant'sregistrationboard, it is difficult to see the boundary of
accountancy.

The extension of accountancy into activities such as management

consultancy services and information systems compounds this difficulty.

This difficulty is not insurmountable. Robb suggests looking at systems where it is
difficult to distinguish a boundary as "virtual" autopoietic systems or thinking of them
"as if they are autopoietic systems (1991, p218). The distinguishing element will be
the presence of mutual causal feedback loops which must exist and be organisationally
closed so as to sustain autopoiesis. Similarly, L u h m a n n talks of partial systems where
there is not a complete differentiation between the system in question and its
environment
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Indeterminacy in that which belongs to a system always means
incomplete differentiation, or in other words dependence on an
overall social basis of operation which is not ordered as the
difference between partial system and environment (1988a, p26).

Accountancy, and in particular, the regulation of corporate financial reporting, does
not operate in isolation from the rest of the regulatory framework. In Australia, the
provisions of the Corporations L a w requiring the audit of financial statements and the
true and fair view prescription which n o w extends to compliance with the provisions
of the Act and Australian accounting standards, means the accountancy profession is,
in part, dependent on the law for its existence and legitimacy. The law itself must
operate within the confines of society as a whole as must accountancy.

Nonetheless, the accountancy profession through the AARF and the AASB does
perform a unique function in that it dominates the determination of accounting
practices. Mutual feedback loops between the system and its environment are evident
in the events which trigger the decision to develop a standard dealing with a particular
accounting practice and also in the mechanisms whereby the standard is developed,
modified and ultimately issued and becomes operative.

The process does not cease once the standard is formally issued and operative. The
impact of the standard is monitored and, if necessary, the process of development and
modification are re-instituted. Even if the standard is not subject to question or
modification, the feedback loops are still operative because the scope for
interpretation which is built into accounting standards allows for the exercise of
professional judgment on the part of the accountant advising management on the
application of the standard to a particular transaction. In addition, the auditor is
required to determine whether the interpretation and application of the standard is
appropriate to the particular circumstances of transactions.
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This interaction m a y extend to the legal system and regulatory authorities in the event
of a dispute between the appropriateness of a particular application of a standard
which impinges on the truth and fairness of theresultingfinancial statements. The
result of all these interactions m a y be a referral back to the accountancy system
regarding the efficacy of a particular accounting standard. Hence, there are mutual
causal feedback loops between accountancy, accounting practitioners w h o are not
part of the autopoietic accountancy system but components of its environment the
legal system, the corporate system, regulatory authorities and society in general.
Autonomy of Accountancy
Another element which m a y help distinguish the boundary of an autopoietic system
from its environment and identify it as an autopoietic system is autonomy. Autonomy,
in this context, means that the system is self-determined in that it produces and
reproduces itself by organising itself in such a way that it alone determines what is
part of the system and

the relationships between its elements or components

(Maturana and Varela, 1988; Bednarz, 1988; Teubner, 1988b; Luhmann, 1988b). In
this, the notion of autonomy extends beyond being able to determine its o w n
operations or self-regulation. Luhmann uses the concept of operational autonomy to
describe the autonomy of autopoietic systems. Operational autonomy means that the
autopoietic system makes use of its o w n operations to produce its o w n operations,
that is ". . . they can reach forwards and backwards to operations of their o w n in
order to produce operations of their own"(1988b, p345).

Autonomy is, therefore, essential to an autopoietic system since without it, the system
would not be self-determined and self-perpetuated. This is the key difference between
an autopoietic system and one which is not autopoietic (Mingers, 1989a, pl66;
Bednarz, 1988, p58; Maturana and Varela, 1988, p48).

Luhmann describes
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autopoietic systems as "sovereign" in that "[fjhey do not create a material world of
their own. They presuppose other levels ofreality"(1986, pi74).

Achieving this requires the appropriate organisation of the components or elements
of the system. Organisation establishes therelationshipsbetween the components or
elements of the system. It is the organisation of the components or elements and the
relationships between them which place the system in a particular classification.
Mingers uses the analogy of the organisation of components and their relationships
and properties which characterise or define a car (1989a, pi63). Maturana and
Varela use a chair to m a k e the same point (1988, pp42-43).

A profession can be defined in a similar fashion. The attributes or identifying elements
or components of a profession are often said to include a body of esoteric knowledge,
a code of ethics, self-regulation and exclusive practice of a particular function. These
attributes require the establishment of support mechanisms such as at least one
professional association, or better still, statutory recognition such as a registration
board, to identify the qualified and thereby exclude the unqualified; researchers to
discover and extend the body of esoteric knowledge; academics (who m a y also be
researchers) to impart knowledge to the would-be qualified; and practitioners to
provide training facilities for aspiring professionals and also supply the professional
service to the public. It is important to note here that professional associations,
researchers, academics and practitioners are being used in an abstract sense not as
h u m a n individuals. From the perspective of autopoiesis, these "components" or
"elements" have to be viewed in terms of "meaning" or, following Robb

"shared

meanings":
Social systems are assemblies of shared meanings, rather than
assemblies of h u m a n individuals or even the acting out of social
roles as they are often defined (1991, p219).
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This notion of shared meanings will be elaborated in the following discussion of the
structure of the accountancy system.

For present purposes, the importance of

"meaning" is provided by the interpretation of L u h m a n n by Bednarz
Meaning is ... the basis upon which, or rather the vehicle by
which, certain kinds of systems are organised - it is the
counterpart of life in the physical domain ... it is the basis upon
which system unity is established . . . meaning is essentially a
relation (italics in original, 1988, p62).

Structure of the System of Accountancy
Organisation is necessary to the autonomy of the autopoietic system because it
provides the m o d e of operations which establish and maintain the system's
autopoiesis.

However, organisation is not sufficient to maintain autopoiesis.

Organisation provides the characteristics of a broad classification. Structure provides
the specifics which identify or specify particular characteristics of the system.
Mingers, for example, extends the car analogy to specifics that m a k e the distinction
between a car as opposed to a "rusty blue mini" (1989a, pl63). Hence, structure can
be used to specify a particular profession such as accountancy.

The distinction

between organisation and structure is important A s Bednarz notes
While organisation is necessary to establish system unity . . .
structure is necessary because different domains place different
demands upon system components (1988, p59).

Structure thus confers meaning on the components or elements of a system and the
specificrelationsbetween them. In an autopoietic social system, structure is not a
physical attribute but a process of conversation and communication (Robb, 1991,
p220).
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B y the processes of conversation and communication, the system creates its o w n
reality in that it does not import concepts as such from outside its o w n boundary
(Teubner, 1988a, p9; Luhmann, 1986, pl74). Instead, it takes information, material
and energy from the environment The system itself determines h o w these will be
used. For example, accountancy has effectively created its o w n reality by the use of
everyday terms such as assets, liabilities, income, expenses, profits and so forth and
giving them specific accounting meanings determined within the system itself.

The system of accountancy takes the conceptualisation of double entry bookkeeping
and the meanings developed for terms within the double entry system further by
developing rules for when and h o w an asset, liability, expense or revenue will be
recognised by the system. It determines what transactions will be recorded and which
will not In external financialreportingthe purpose of these processes is classification
and measurement in the balance sheet and determination of accounting profit. S o m e
of these items are tangible, others are intangible but nonetheless given a "thinglike"
quality that accounting purports to "measure". Profit, goodwill, depreciation and
provisions for doubtful debts allfitinto this classification. The creation of its o w n
reality lies in part in that what accountancy sees as an asset, for example, m a y not be
seen as such by those outside the accountancy system. The non-accountant m a y have
difficulty in seeing h o w part of income tax to be paid for the current period can
constitute an asset called Future Income Tax Benefit or h o w an anticipated foreign
exchange loss can also be an asset in the same w a y as an item of plant, a building,
inventory or a vehicle is an asset

The structure of accountancy determines the meaning allocated to these accounting
terms. The professional associations or the research groups appointed or created by
them play a major part in determining the meaning attached to accounting concepts.
In Robb's terminology these meanings are theresultof "conversations" (1991, p220).
The outcome of these conversations, meanings, are communicated to other
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components of the system and also to relevant systems in the autopoietic system's
environment

Responses from both within the autopoietic system and from its

environment trigger further communication between the system, its components and
the environment Further conversation takes place giving rise to n e w meanings and
the process of conversation, communication, conversation continues.

The development of an accounting standard follows this pattern and it is this pattern
of conversation, communication, conversation which both identifies and maintains
accounting as an autopoietic system. This pattern also explains the failure of the
accountancy profession to find an agreed conceptual framework of accounting or
generally accepted accounting practices as well as flexible, vague and ambiguous
accounting standards. If a definitive solution could be found in the form of a
conceptual framework or in explicit accounting standards dealing with particular
issues, communication would stop and accounting would cease to be an autopoietic
system. It would no longer have exclusive orientation to accounting work because
anyone w h o had the ability to apply given criteria would be able to undertake work of
this nature. Uncertainty in what constitutes an asset or liability in a given situation
creates the necessity for professional judgment on the part of the accountant
preparing the financial statements as well as on the part of the auditor. The removal
of uncertainty removes the need for a professional and all therelatedstructures which
giveriseto a profession. This uncertainty also provides the mechanisms for change
within the structures of accountancy without altering its autopoietic organisation.
Structural Change, Communication and Autopoiesis
Autopoietic systems are organisationally or operationally closed but they are
cognitively open in that they must be compatible with their environment if they are to
survive (Maturana and Varela, 1988, p95). If a social system is a system of "shared
meanings" (Robb, 1991, p219) and "communication" is the sending of signals to
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system participants w h o share meanings, there must be acceptance of meanings
between participants of individual systems and relevant systems in the environment
W h e n meanings are not shared or accepted by all parties, even those within the system
under consideration, further communication and conversation take place to establish
new meanings. In this w a y the structures of an autopoietic system m a y change.
W h e n one component of a system changes, there will be correlative changes
throughout the system (Maturana and Varela, 1988, pi 16).

Luhmann provides further refinement of the role of communication in an autopoietic
system (1988a, ppl6-18). Communication is not simply the act of sending signals but
is the synthesis of information, communication and comprehension (pl7). In order to
establish the boundary of an autopoietic system and maintain its autopoiesis, it is
essential to control or at least partially control the communication process as well as
determination of meanings communicated or in Robb's terminology, conversation
(Luhmann, 1988a, pi8; Teubner, 1988b, p222). If reproduction of the conversation
and communication processes is to continue, the information or meanings must be
understood or comprehended (Luhmann, 1988a, pl6). This is essential if further
elements are to be produced and identified within the system.

Maturana and Varela use the term ontogeny to describe the history of structural
changes within an autopoietic organisation (1988, p74-75). These changes occur as a
result of interactions between the components of the system or between the system
and its environment This notion of change is similar to the concepts of dissidence or
resistance in the circuits of power framework which m a y arise from either endogenous
or exogenous sources. If the autopoietic system is to survive, it must be compatible
with its environment in m u c h the same way as an organisation attempting to maintain
its agency relationships and hegemonic domination in the circuits of power
framework. Just as the circuits of dispositional and facilitative power at the levels of
social and system integration respectively can be both integrative and disintegrative
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(Clegg, 1989, p224) as a result of dissidence andresistance,interactions between the
autopoietic system, its components and environment are also double edged.
Perturbations within the system and between the system and its environment have the
potential to destroy autopoiesis if compatibility is not maintained. At the same time,
however, these perturbations provide impetus for conversations which give rise to
new meanings and m a y open up new avenues of communication.

Structural coupling is used to describe the recurrent interactions between the system
and its environment (Maturana and Varela, 1988, p75). The changes which take
place in the system as a result of these interactions are not determined by the
environment but by the structures of the autopoietic system (p95). This is a two-way
process in that the autopoietic system can trigger changes in the environment but
cannot determine what those changes will be (p95). Furthermore, when one aspect of
the system changes, there will be corresponding changes in other aspects of the
system as well as in the environment (pi 16). There is a furtherriderto this concept
of change. Since the operations of the system are aimed at reproducing the elements
of the system and mamtaining autopoiesis, change is limited. The structure may
change but the autopoietic organisation remains unchanged. This is almost axiomatic
because the system is organisationally or operationally closed. However, this does
not mean the system cannot extend beyond its o w n boundaries and import concepts
from other systems or its environment It can do both through "shared meanings".
For example, double entry bookkeeping made a distinction between assets and
liabilities, debits and credits. A s double entry bookkeeping was progressively adopted
by business concerns, the meanings given to assets and liabilities or the distinction
between them, became part of the language of business. A s will be discussed shortly,
as the nature of business changed, and with the progressive separation of ownership
and management double entry bookkeeping became accounting (Baecker, 1992).
This change was facilitated in part by the law. Accounting shared its meanings with
other members of the environment

It took energy from its environment and new
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concepts or distinctions emerged such as permanent capital and the going concern.
B y these means, double entry bookkeeping extended its boundaries and progressively
m a d e the transition to accountancy.

This is similar to Clegg's view of new

organisations emerging at the facilitative level of the power circuit. These new
organisations exhibit similar characteristics to existing organisations because of the
process of institutional isomorphism.

Maturana and Varela refer to changes in the autopoietic system and the environment
as a structural (1988, pl02) or natural drift (pi 17) which is theresultof adaptation
and conservation of autopoiesis. This is an evolutionary process which Teubner sees
as occurring through three evolutionary and necessarily communication mechanisms:
variation, selection and retention (1988b). Clegg also uses these mechanisms to
explain change in the configuration of episodic power capacities occurring as a result
of innovation of techniques of discipline and production at the level of system
integration (1989).

Teubner (following Luhmann) considers these three functions can be related to social
systems as follows
. . . normative structures take over variation, institutional
structures (especially procedures) take over selection, and
doctrinal structures take overretention(1988b, p228).

For Clegg variation is explained in terms of sources of difference in innovations of the
techniques of production and discipline (1989, p233). In the circuits of power
framework, these sources m a y be strategically innovated within an agency or arise
independently in the environment

The major source of innovation is competitive

pressure for resources (p234).

Whether these sources of change result in

empowerment or disempowerment depends on the position an agency has created for
itself within the existing configuration of powerrelationshipsat the episodic agency
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level of the circuit. There are similarities here with Teubner's view that the change
that takes place depends on whether or not the system has reached the stage of
autopoiesis.

If the system is autopoietic, change m a y be triggered from the

environment but will be determined by the system itself. Similarly, Clegg maintains
that where an agent controls the obligatory passage points, change will tend to result
from institutional isomorphism and, thereby, will be empowering rather than
disempowering (p233).

There is also similarity between Clegg's use of selection and retention and that used by
Teubner. However, again, Teubner is referring to systems which have reached
autopoiesis while Clegg's interpretationrelieson control of obligatory passage points.
Selection for Clegg lies in the selection of sources of change, arising for example,
through market competition and agency and environment characteristics. Selection is
at the discretion of the agency which has greatest control over available resources
(pp234-236).

In an autopoietic system, selection is determined by the norms,

meanings, conversations institutionalised by the system itself. Retention in the circuits
is the "reproduction of the selective variation" (Clegg, 1989, p235). Teubner calls it a
stabilising function which guarantees system-internal mechanisms (1988b, p234). In
other words, the system is self-referential in that it "remembers" past interactions and,
in particular, what was successful and what was not (p234). In this way, the system
learns h o w to survive which is essential to the maintenance of autopoiesis. It is also
essential to the maintenance of hegemonic domination and control of obligatory
passage points in the circuits of power framework.

IMPLICATIONS OF CIRCUITS OF POWER AND AUTOPOIESIS

While it is clear that an autopoietic system must be operationally closed, the system is,
nonetheless, subject to change as aresultof interactions within the system itself and
with its environment However, it is important to remember that the environment
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does not determine what change takes place within the autopoietic system.

The

environment can only trigger responses which are determined by the system itself.
Similarly, the autopoietic system only triggers responses from the environment

Responses within the system and with the environment are given meaning through a
process of conversation which is then transmitted by a process of communication.
Maintenance of autopoiesis is contingent upon control of the processes of
conversation

and

communication.

These

processes

of conversation

and

communication must be continuous or the system will disintegrate.

The circuits of power framework explains how an organisation or agent is empowered
to exercise power at the episodic agency level of the circuits framework. It also
explains h o w this power is maintained and the likely form that change arising from
dissidence and resistance in response to innovations in techniques of discipline and
production. The extension of this framework to incorporate the theory of autopoietic
systems demonstrates h o w domination and agency are perpetuated in the context of
systems closure.

It is contended in this study that accountancy has used methods of translation to
achieve and maintain hegemonic domination of work of an accountancy nature
including the determination of accounting practices and standards.

Over time,

accountancy has also developed to the stage of at least a virtual or partial autopoietic
system in that it determines its o w n boundaries, elements, components and
relationships between them. It also uses its o w n processes to recursively reproduce
itself. This is evidenced by the continual recycling of accounting issues and the
continual pattern of regulatory failure-regulatory reform which has characterised the
corporate scene since its inception more than 100 years ago.
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indetermination arising from flexible, vague and ambiguous accounting standards are
part of this process and are essential to the maintenance of autopoiesis of the system
of accountancy. This argument also extends to the lack of an agreed conceptual
framework of accounting. A n agreed conceptual framework would remove the
necessity for accounting standards because the elements of accounting would have
definitive meaning and interpretation in particular circumstances would no longer be
required.

In the absence of

an agreed conceptual framework or the in-built

uncertainty of accounting standards, conversation and communication within the
system and between the system and its environment would cease. The system would
also cease to have exclusive practice of the function of accountancy. Without this
exclusive orientation and conversation and communication, the system would no
longer be autopoietic and would disintegrate. In terms of the circuits of power
framework, there would be no need for an accountancy profession to act as agents or
allies for the public, corporations,regulatorybodies, users of financial statements and
so forth. The whole system of professional associations,researchers,academics and
practitioners would become redundant. Hence, despite the rhetoric, uncertainty in
accountancy is undoubtedly here to stay - for the foreseeable future at least.

The balance of this chapter will be devoted to an overview of the origins of
accounting knowledge and the manner in which it became progressively more abstract
thereby laying the foundation for the accountancy profession's claim to a specialised
body of knowledge and skill.

ABSTRACTION, ESOTERIC KNOWLEDGE AND DOMINATION
The first part of this section will briefly outline the origins of the occupation of
accountancy and the nature of professions in general. The purpose of this historical
excursion is to show h o w accounting evolved over many centuries and also that this
evolutionary process laid the foundation for the claims to a special body of knowledge
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m a d e in the mid-nineteenth century by the emerging profession and its bid for
hegemonic domination of accounting.

In particular, the increasing abstraction of

accounting provided the need for accountants with specific accounting training. It is
also intended to show that abstraction is not a recent phenomenon.

Schmandt-

Besserat has undertaken extensive studies of clay tokens, envelopes and tablets dated
from 8 0 0 0 B C (1981; 1983; 1984; 1986a, b). These archaeological artefacts are
considered to represent not only an ancient recording or accounting system but also
the precursors of writing and numeracy and suggest the art of abstraction clearly
emerged at an early stage of h u m a n development or, to quote Schmandt-Besserat
This story, in essence, a study in the stages whereby human
culture slowly, and then ever more quickly, mastered the art of
abstraction, which stands as one of the peculiar marks of
distinctive h u m a n consciousness (1986 b, p39).

Following this historical discussion, the attributes of a profession will be briefly
outlined. T h e attributes identified and discussed are drawn from literature dealing
ostensibly with the sociology of the professions. The purpose of undertaking this
side-track is to link the process of professionalisation with the frameworks of power
and autopoiesis. In other words, the introduction of a discussion of professional
attributes is not meant to suggest a functionalist or trait approach to the analysis of
accountancy's bid to effect control of the occupation. This control was not premised
on the value of the attributesreflectedin services to society but on the basis that they
demonstrated the profession's ability to regulate the activities of members (Johnson,
1972, p45).

This part of the study will form the basis of an analysis, to be undertaken in Chapter 3,
of the professionalisation processes adopted by accountants in a bid to achieve and
maintain hegemonic domination of work of an accounting nature.
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The Genesis of Accounting
(i) Record Keeping in Ancient Civilisations
Schmandt-Besserat provides evidence that shows the existence of the keeping of
some form of accounting records from possibly as early as 8000BC (1981; 1984;
1983; 1986a, b).

A n extensive examination of archaeological artefacts has led

Schmandt-Besserat to conclude that clay tokens and envelopes were used by ancient
Middle East civilisations for accounting purposes from a time pre-dating both writing
and counting (1981;1984; 1986a, b). In fact, the transition from the use of tokens as a
means of record keeping to the imprinting of tokens on clay tablets, is seen by
Schmandt-Besserat as the "invention of writing" (1981,p341; 1986b, p237).

Initially, plain tokens in the shape of ovoids, spheres, disks, cones, tetrahedrons an
cylinders were used from about 8000BC probably to account for agricultural
commodities (1986a, p35; 1986b, p32). At this point in time, it appears the
association between tokens and what theyrepresentedwasreadilyunderstood by all
members of the community (1984, p876). A s life became more civilised around
3300BC, as evidenced by the appearance of "monumental architecture" indicative of
the emergence of formal government and coercive taxation, more complex tokens
were developed by the use of new shapes such as parabolas and bent coils and incised
and punch markings, applique' coils and embossing tokens with pellets (1983, pi 17;
1986a, p36; 1986b, p32). The more complex nature of the tokens of this time period
suggest a more complex or abstract usage such as quantities of goods and
measurement of land and services (1984, p875), manufactured and luxury goods
(1986b, p36), types of fibres and cloth, tools, weapons and furniture (1986b, p37).
The more abstract nature of the tokens meant an understanding of what they
represented was limited to the "initiated" (1986 a, p36).
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The practice of enclosing tokens in clay envelopes for storage purposes developed
between 3300 and 3250 B C (1986a, p36-37). However, once enclosed and the
envelope sealed, it was impossible to determine the content of the envelope.
According to Schmandt-Besserat "accountants" of the time overcame this problem by
making an imprint of the tokens on the surface of the envelopes (1986a, p37). In
time, the use of tokens enclosed in envelopes gave w a y to the imprinting of symbols
on clay tablets (1986a, p37). Mattessich has suggested that the duality of the ancient
recording system and its one-to-one correspondence between the item being recorded
and the symbol representing it was in fact identical in its logical structure to the
modern double entry system (1987, p80).

With the advent of counting and writing around 3200BC (Mattessich, 1987, p86) an
even more abstract reality was created. A s these skills were limited to the select few,
usuallyreferredto as scribes, with the necessary education or training, accounting, or
more accurately at this point record keeping, was already exhibiting operational
closure (Lee, 1990, pp219-220). Keister'sresearchconfirms this (1963, p372). By
reference to archaeologicaltextsand journals, Keister found that archaeologists had
recovered evidence of the keeping of commercial records in Mesopotamia (1963,
p371). These records, in the form of clay tablets up to 4000 years old, record diverse
commercial activities includingreceipts,disbursements and partnership agreements.
B y this time, the law required the recording of all commercial activities in
Mesopotamia (including marriage). Public scribes were called upon and paid for
completing this task (Keister, 1963, p372). The dependence of accounting on other
systems, primarily, the law, was also clearly emerging at this time.

It appears that commercial trade between Mesopotamia and its contemporaries, saw
the spread of record keeping practices to Egypt, Babylon and beyond (Keister, 1970).
Accounting or record keeping continued to be used as a representation of economic
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reality. The closure of accounting by the use of abstractions in the form of writing
and numerals continued (Lee, 1990, p299).
(ii) The Emergence of Double Entry Bookkeeping
B y the ninth century, this closure was becoming more complete with the term
"accountant" coming into vogue at that time to describe those w h o kept records of
commercial activities (Abs et al, 1978). The term had a more literal sense than what it
has today, however. A s Lee points out, the accountant was the object of accounting
or, more precisely, the accountant's honesty, integrity, stewardship or accountability
in the conduct and recording of commercial activities (1990, p300). The emergence
of double entry bookkeeping provided a further abstraction of economic reality and at
the same time, provided the vehicle for the separation of the accountant as a recorder
of commercial activities from the person w h o actually undertook those activities. The
records so produced were a further abstraction in that commercial activities recorded
were classified as debits and credits.

In spite of the developments outlined above, and Mattessich's suggestion that the
system of plain and complex tokens and clay envelopes represented evidence of an
early double entry system (1987, p81), there does not appear to be any concrete
evidence of h o w or when double entry bookkeeping emerged. However, there is
some consensus that double entry bookkeeping was a product of the increase of
commercial trade in mediaeval Italy (de Roover, 1978; Irish, 1968; Littleton, 1968).

Littleton identified a number of antecedents of double entry bookkeeping which, in
addition to numeracy and literacy, included private property, money, credit,
commerce and capital (1968, p21). According to Littleton, these elements were
essential to the formation of double entry bookkeeping because they provided the
material in the form of the exchange of goods for profit and credit transactions and a
language in the form of money, writing and arithmetic by which to give expression to
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private property, capital, commerce and credit (p22). Littleton argued that these
elements were all in evidence in ancient civilisations yet did not give rise to
bookkeeping (p24).

The catalyst which Littleton identified for the eventual

emergence of double entry bookkeeping was the crusades (p25) which saw a
transition from an agricultural society to one based on trade (p26).

In the two hundred year battle for Jerusalem, there was a steady stream of armies to
and from the crusades. The Italian cities, Venice, Florence and Genoa, had by this
time well-established trading posts and a large fleet to conduct trade with the East
and, thereby, were in a position to provide, and profit from, transport and supplies
for the travellers to and from the crusades. In addition, a demand for goods from the
East created the need to produce European goods for purposes of exchange with the
East (pp25-26). M a n y of the traders of the time took advantage of this b o o m in
commercial activity by buying goods and ships to carry them. Partnerships were also
formed, not only to provide the necessary funds to finance ventures but also to allow
the less adventurous to invest without the necessity of undertaking lengthy and
dangerous sea voyages (Irish, 1968, p55). Finally, Littleton suggests the adoption of
Arabic numerals and methods of calculation facilitated the systematisation of record
keeping necessitated by bills of exchange (p28). In Littleton's opinion, double entry
bookkeeping was a direct development of this process (p29). At this time, however,
there was no distinction between capital and profit and little distinction between
business and private affairs (Irish, 1968, p58). It should also be noted that while
records m a y have been kept, their use wasrestrictedto calculation of profit at the end
of each venture. There is no indication that records were kept for purposes of
evaluating performance. Performance evaluation appears to have been an innovation
of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Chatfield (1979) and Irish (1968) maintain that changes in avenues of trade and form
of business association in England also resulted in n e w accounting practices. Foreign
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trade, in particular, saw a growth in the formation by Royal Charter of corporations
such as the Russia Company, the East India C o m p a n y and the Hudson's Bay
C o m p a n y (Irish, 1968, p59). These ventures were initially of limited duration. At the
conclusion of each venture, the company was liquidated and profits and assets divided
amongst the participants (p60; Chatfield, 1977, pp79-80). In time, concepts of going
concern and permanent capital as opposed to revenue eliminated the need to liquidate
ventures at the end of each voyage.

Maintaining a permanent capital meant that

accounting methods had to be adapted to distinguish between income and capital
rather than simply distributing all funds on the termination of each venture. While
methods of distinguishing between capital and income were required, they did not
clearly emerge at this time. Ultimately, the rules for such distinctions were
determined over time by business practice and by the courts (Irish, 1968, p63).
Nonetheless, record keeping was thus becoming more complex and, at the same time,
an increased need for accounting records was occasioned by the growing separation
of management and ownership A s yet, however, financial statements, separate from
the accounting records, were not prepared (pp60-61).

The Industrial Revolution further contributed to the evolution of accounting practices
and theroleof the accountant in society. This time in history saw the birth of factorybased industries with concomitant developments in management accounting, in
particular, accounting for materials, wages and overhead costs (Lee, 1990, vol 2, ppl2). The Industrial Revolution and the accumulation of capital from a number of
sources to take advantage of the developments in technology occurring at this time
m a d e freedom of incorporation a necessity (Irish, 1968, pp61-62).

However,

incorporation to this time was a privilege granted by Royal Charter.

In 1844 the Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act provided for
general incorporation but this right was granted on the basis that accounts be kept,
balanced and annually audited and published. The intent of this legislation was, inter
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alia, to provide a means by which directors and management would be made
accountable for their actions and also to provide to investors and creditors
information on the state of affairs of the company (Select Committee on Joint Stock
Companies, First Report, pp v, vi, 5). The 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act extended
the 1844 Act by granting limited liability to corporations even though the 1855 Act
had m a d e the account and audit provisions optional. B y the turn of the century,
however, the account and audit provisions again became a part of the mandatory
provisions of the U K legislation and along with it, opened the w a y for an emerging
profession to lay claim to the domination of the account and audit provisions.
However, even before thistime,bankruptcy legislation had laid the foundation for the
need for accountants to become formally organised.

The development of double entry bookkeeping can be seen as integral in the evolution
of the modern limited liability corporation. This, of course, is not to say that the
modern corporation would not have evolved without double entry bookkeeping.
Rather, it would probably be more appropriate to say that the two were
complementary developments. The importance of the emergence of double entry
bookkeeping is that it provided a means of recording the activities of business entities
and determining the consequences of those activities.

Baecker sees double entry bookkeeping as a self-referential system (1992, ppl64165). It makes a distinction between assets and liabilities, debit and credit (pl63).
The rules of the system require that for every debit there must be a credit. This
provides for a check on the accuracy of the recording process but also a means of
viewing assets as liabilities and vice versa (pi63). The system is self-referential
because the system determines what transactions will be recorded (pi60) and
corresponding debits and credits are not determined by anything outside the recording
system (pi64).
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Double entry bookkeeping, by making a distinction between debits and credits,
facilitates the separation of the business entity from ownership interests. This arises
because the duality of the system provides a w a y of making a distinction between cash
or wealth that the entity can use for trade or other purposes and capital or wealth as a
liability to the ownership of the business entity (pl69). It is at this stage that double
entry bookkeeping becomes accounting by the further abstraction of the system to
financial statements representing the consequences of the activities of the business
(ppl61, 169). In this sense, accounting is a means of structural coupling between
business and ownership.

As indicated above, the development of double entry bookkeeping and the evolution
of the business entity, separate and distinct from ownership interests, appear to have
occurred in tandem. This process appears to have been facilitated by the emergence
of shared meanings in that overtime, the principles of double entry bookkeeping
became part of business language and practice (pi65). In other words, there was a
process of conversation and communication. Meanings developed by the double entry
system were shared with business. Mutual feedback loops developed between double
entry bookkeeping and business and further concepts, such as going concern and
permanent capital, emerged. Triggers in one system gave rise to responses in the
other and vice versa.
(iii) The Emergence of the Accountancy Profession
Dependency on accountants and operational closure of accounting through the
construction of reality in its o w n unique terms continued with not only the spread of
trade and double entry bookkeeping but also with the dissemination of knowledge of
the double entry system through publication of bookkeeping texts. The first known
book dealing with double entry bookkeeping was published by Pacioli in Italy in 1494.
In 1683, a treatise on double entry bookkeeping was authored and published in
Scotland (Parker, 1974, p358). While the invention of the printing press made
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possible ready access to bookkeeping texts and thus reversed the closure of
accounting by its increasing abstraction, reading and writing were still largely skills
held only by an educated elite (Lee, 1990, p301-302).

However, literacy, numeracy and record keeping were not skills confined to
accountants. Similarly, diligence and honesty, accuracy and orderliness, foreign
exchange calculating, negotiation and arbitration and agency which by the eighteenth
century were seen as skills or traits of accountants, were also considered to be
applicable to other occupations (Hines, 1989, pp75-76). Hence, even though an
accountancy reality had been created and, thereby, a client and societal dependency
upon accountancy skills, the practice of these skills was being undertaken by any
person w h o could read and write and wished to designate themselves an accountant
In other words, there was competition over work of an accountancy nature.
Accountancy did not control the obligatory passage points at this time. It lacked
organisation and even though, by implication, it considered itself to be in an agencytype relationship with those in need of the expert knowledge and skill of accountants,
thisrelationshipwas not formally recognised.

Walker (undated) presents evidence to support this. For example, evidence reported
by Walker shows that accountants represented the majority of professional trustees in
Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century and that 75 per cent of bankrupt estates were
managed by professional trustees (p20). Minority participants in this area included
lawyers, bankers and merchants. W h e n legislation was proposed in 1853 which
would have placed the management of bankrupt estates in the hands of the courts
(pi6), these minority groups were occupationally organised through professional
associations to protect their interests (p21). The accountants, on the other hand,
lacked such organisation. In Walker's view, it was the threat of the removal of the
administration of bankrupt estates which mobilised the accountants of Edinburgh and
Glasgow to become formally organised (pp21, 26, 35). Having formed professional
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associations incorporated by Royal Charter, the accountants launched what could be
termed an associative strategy to form alliances with the legal profession and
merchants of Scotland to defeat this legislation on the basis that it was proposed by a
committee from London and was, thereby, a reproach to Scottish nationalism (p2834). This combination ultimately saw the defeat of the legislation (pp34-35).

The formal establishment of professional accountancy associations can be seen as
taking place within the facilitative circuit at the level of systems integration.

In

forming professional associations incorporated by Royal Charter the Scottish
accountants of the time were using mimetic institutional isomorphism by organising
themselves along the lines of the legal profession (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933,
p209). The English associations appear to have followed the lead of their Scottish
counterparts and in 1886, the Incorporated Institute of Accountants of Victoria was
formed in Australia. O n e of the foundation members, T h o m a s Brentnall, stated
specifically that the decision to form a professional association and thereby raise the
status of practising accountants was influenced by the achievements in this regard of
the I C A E W , the Society of Accountants and Auditors and the three Scottish Institutes
(Brentnall, 1938, p64). The decision to apply for a Royal Charter was similarly
motivated (Editorial, 1905, p4). A s Collins notes, emulation of older professions in
acquiring privileges and status is not an u n c o m m o n strategy (1990a, p25). It appears
the accountants in Scotland perceived the benefits of organisation accruing to the
legal profession and merchants in protecting their interests in the face of legislation
damaging to their livelihood and took appropriate action to allow them to initiate a
counter attack. Hence, emulation of the legal profession and merchants was not only
appropriate but advisable. However, as Walker points out, formation of professional
associations, even by charter, was not sufficient to achieve domination of accounting
(undated, p27). It was a starting point but complementary activities were necessary if
the emerging accountancy profession was to attain control of the obligatory passage
points in its field.
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The formation of Australian professional associations by Royal Charter and
incorporation and complementary activities will be the subject of Chapter 3. The
following section of this chapter will provide a discussion of the attributes of
professions and therelationshipsbetween these attributes, frameworks of power and
autopoiesis.

THE NATURE OF PROFESSIONS
Problem of Definition
The view adopted for purposes of this study is that professionalisation is part of the
process of achieving hegemonic domination of a particular area of knowledge.
Accountancy has employed this strategy, amongst others, to delineate a boundary
between itself and other disciplines and acquire hegemonic domination, if not
autonomy and monopoly, of work of an accounting nature. It has also used its claim
to professional attributes to establish itself as a profession as opposed to a purely
technical occupation.

One approach to identifying particular professional groups is to make a distinction
between professions in trade or commerce or what m a y be called technical
professions, for example, a plumber or electrician, and the "learned professions"
which, for purposes of this study, will be taken to include accountancy. While the
distinction between technical and learned professions is a starting point, the problem
of definition remains. However, it is possible to identify a number of attributes which
learned professions are considered to exhibit Larson, for example, maintains that the
unequivocal answer of social scientists is that
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. . . professions are occupations with special power and prestige.
Society grants these rewards because professions have special
competence in esoteric bodies of knowledge linked to central
needs and values of social systems, and because professions are
devoted to the service of the public, and above and beyond
material incentives (1977, px).

T o be more specific, professional attributes are said to include at least the following:

1. a body of unique knowledge
2.

high level of education and training

3.

a code of ethics

4.

a public interest in the practice of professional activities

5.

professional associations

6.

autonomy to determine and enforce the nature and level of
education and training, codes of ethics and standards of
practice and, thereby, control of admission to the profession

7.

monopoly over the body of knowledge and its practice

8.

public recognition and acceptance of autonomy and monopoly

9.

social status and prestige

10. client dependency (Summarised from Carr-Saunders and
Wilson, 1933; Stewart, 1975; Larson, 1977; Hines, 1989;
Lee, 1990)

As suggested previously, it is not merely the perception that a group possesses these
attributes that identifies it as a profession.

Rather, the demonstration of these

attributes justifies autonomy (Johnson, 1972, p45).

Walker provides evidence of this in the battles of the three chartered accountancy
associations before the Privy Council and Court of Session over rights to exclusive
use of the tide, chartered accountant, and the designation, C A .
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... the most persuasive arguments employed by the chartered
societies for the maintenance of their monopoly rested on the
functionalist concept that their privileges had been sanctioned by
the community as the fair reward for the provision of essential
accountancy services by competent practitioners (1991, p260).

This study maintains that the attainment of autonomy, monopoly and the social status
and prestige associated with public recognition and acceptance and client dependency
are contingent to a large extent, on the firstfiveelements listed above. These five
elements are interrelated and while some, such as Goldstein, argue that the possession
of esoteric knowledge is a pre-requisite of professionalisation, it is really a chicken
and egg-type debate because the acquisition of knowledge is an on-going process as is
the professionalisation process and one re-enforces the other over time (1984, pl75).
This is similar to Foucault's concept of power-knowledge

... it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces
a corpus of knowledge, useful orresistantto power, but powerknowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of
which it is m a d e up, that determines the forms and possible
domains of knowledge (1979, p28).

Just as professionalisation and knowledge are not sequential, the other attributes are
not sequential and are subject to change over time in response to environmental
changes and changes in other attributes. Having acknowledged the lack of a simple
cause and effectrelationshipbetween the attributes, this particular analysis will centre
on the concept of esoteric knowledge and h o w it is used in the process of achieving
hegemonic domination and the support of the state by facilitating the demonstration of
the other attributes.
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Esoteric Knowledge
The Chambers Family Dictionary defines esoteric as "taught to a select few: secret,
mysterious: initiated" (Kirkpatrick, 1990, p257). Karpik states that "knowledge" can
be seen as not only referring to
... the symbolic reality transmitted by the university, but to that
combination of abstract knowledge and practical application that
appears in the form of books, legal codes and procedures, in the
practices of organisations and institutions, in oral transmission and
tradition, all of which are used daily (1990, pi86).

Larson refers to theoretical knowledge as " . . . esoteric, granted to specialists by
specialists and fully meaningful only in their circles" (1977, p45). According to
Goldstein, the possession of "a body of esoteric knowledge" is essential to the
designation of a profession. In Goldstein's view:
... the sociological conception of a profession posits a previously
given intellectual core and a subsequent, multifaceted social
process which takes place around that core: the application of the
body of knowledge to social needs; the social strategies by which
a certain group comes to monopolise that application; the
prestigious social niche which that group carves for itself, in part a
function of that contact with the world of learning which serves as
the basis of its claim to have been elevated above mercantile
concerns and to have become a kind of secular analogue of the
clergy (italics and emphasis in original) (1984, pl75).

These excerpts suggest that professional knowledge goes beyond technical skills to
something more abstract and mystical. This intellectual core, body of esoteric or
unique knowledge, or the claim to it, is the first step towards the demarcation of a
boundary which distinguishes an identifiable profession from other professions and
occupations. Creation of this boundary provides an incentive to form professional
associations because a body of esoteric knowledge requires a high level of education
and training. There must be some group to determine the form and content of this
education and training as well as provide it. There must also be some mechanism,
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such as a code of ethics, to monitor the work of those undertaking work of a
professional nature and ensure that their skill and knowledge is being used in the
public interest

A professional association can fulfil these functions and, at the same time, re-enforce
the demarcation of the boundary by making a public demonstration of the distinction
between those possessing a given body of knowledge from those w h o do not, in other
words, a distinction between the qualified and the unqualified. This process of
exclusion requires evidence of acquisition of unique knowledge and skills and,
thereby, gives rise to the need, not only for specific education and training but
evidence, such as examinations, that the necessary knowledge and skills have been
acquired. The emphasis on knowledge and skill directs attention to the status and
prestige of the members of the profession rather than on the nature of the work they
do (Collins, 1990a, p26).
(a) Uncertainty, Indetermination & Discourse
The claim to a body of knowledge and the legitimacy to that claim as evidenced by the
existence of a professional association where admission isrestrictedto those with the
requisite knowledge, training and skills provides the basis for autonomy, monopoly
and client dependence. Johnson elaborates on this by reference to the exclusionary
effects of a community language or jargon. The possession of such a language or
jargon not only facilitates autonomy but also maintains internal homogeneity (1972,
p56).

The evolution of accounting from ancient civilisations through to the

emergence of professional accountancy associations was detailed earlier as one of
increasing abstraction with the ultimate abstraction being double entry bookkeeping.
Littleton saw double entry bookkeeping as a language for reworking material such as
private property, capital, commerce and credit and expressing it in terms of permanent
records and arithmetical calculations including values, prices and profits (1968, p22).
The further development of accounting through the centuries brought further
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abstractions such as the concept of going concern and the need to allocate items such
as revenue and expense to arbitrary time periods and the distinction between capital
and revenue.

However, autonomy, monopoly and client dependence would be impaired if the body
of knowledge could be reduced to technical processes. For this reason, there must be
a trade-off between the control over a body of knowledge that would arise from
codifying it to the extent that it becomes a technical process open to all w h o have the
ability to learn and apply it and the desire torestrictentry to the practice of the body
of knowledge. This desire for operational or organisational closure gives rise to the
introduction of an element of uncertainty, indetermination or mystique surrounding
the body of knowledge. Johnsonrefersto this as social distance which ". .. creates a
structure of uncertainty ..."

(1972, p41) and gives rise to power relationships

between practitioner and client which m a y give rise to a greater social distance
between practitioner and client (p42).

Social distance facilitates practitioner

autonomy and control over practice (p43).

Thus uncertainty or indetermination is deliberately created as it is a source of power
for the profession (p43).

However, in creating this aura of uncertainty or

indetermination, the profession has borrowed what it needed from other disciplines.
Bakhtin expresses this view in the following manner
The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated
andtension-filledenvironment of alien words, value judgments
and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships,
merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third
group: and all this m a y crucially shape discourse, m a y leave a
trace in all its semantic layers, m a y complicate its expression and
influence its entire stylistic profile (1981, p276).

As noted earlier, the use of complex tokens representing intangibles such as services
rendered followed in time with the advent of numeracy and literacy provided a special
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niche in the community for those w h o understood the meaning of the complex tokens
and, later, the scribes w h o could read and write. The scribes were ensured of work
through the legal requirement to record all commercial transactions.

Indetermination is enhanced by the application of undefined quality labels such as
materiality, relevance and reliability. These are matters of professional judgment and
are guided by professionally-determined criteria and, thereby, are used to widen
further the gap of understanding between the trained accountant and the lay person,
the initiated and the uninitiated, the qualified and the unqualified.

This creation of an accounting specific reality can be viewed in terms of discursive
processes and discursive formation which Goodrich
. . . refers to loosely as both the processes that intervene and
determine the relationship of a language to the formulation of
utterances (discursive processes) and also . . . more generally to
the relation of bodies of knowledge to social practice and
structure (discursive formation) (1987, pl32).

The uncertainty and indetermination inherent in the body of professional knowledge
can be explained in terms of discursive processes and formation.

The meaning

ascribed to terms, phrases and words evolve through c o m m o n usage and also
according to some intended purpose within a particular area of knowledge or as
Volosinov has stated
Every sign ... is a construct between socially organized persons
in the process of their interaction. Therefore, the forms of signs
are conditioned above all by the social organization of the
participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their
interaction (1973, p21).

Furthermore, as Goodrich, using the work of Volosinov and Bakhtin, observes, signs,
terms, phrases and words can have a multiplicity of meanings or referentiality
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depending on the ideological context in which they are used (1987, pl42-143).
Hence, simple and complex clay tokens might have appeared to some members of
ancient civilisations as nothing more than odd shapes while the accountants of the
time and others with a knowledge of their use would have seen them as a means, for
example, of recording debts due and owing, or so m u c h grain or cloth made of
particular fibres. Similarly, modern day accountants use terms such as assets and
liabilities which have an everyday meaning as well as an accounting meaning when
used to classify intangibles such as goodwill, contingent liabilities and other
potentially more obscure items including future income tax benefits. The use of
abstractions such as profit and accounting income, depreciation and amortisation is an
extension of this process and helps ensure the dominance of trained accountants in the
regulation of financial reporting.

This indetermination and uncertainty is not confined to the content of accounting but
also to what actually comprises work of an accounting nature. Carr-Saunders and
Wilson refer to a Board of Trade committee appointed to consider theregistrationof
accountants and therestrictionof accountancy work to those whose name appeared
on that register (1933, p208; p217). The committee was unable to come to a
conclusion as to what constituted work of an accounting nature and made a
recommendation againstregistration(p217). Carr-Saunders and Wilson suggest that
this was in part due to the wording of the minute which established the committee
(p217). However, they further state that allrepresentativesof the chartered bodies
appearing before the committee were opposed to any scheme which was suggested.
Registration m a y have provided a monopoly over accountancy work to those w h o
qualified for admission to theregisterbut it could also have had an adverse impact on
the autonomy of the profession in determining the nature of accounting work and the
qualifications necessary for registration and, thereby, entrance to the relevant
professional associations (pp217-219).
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The power of the profession derived from the aura of uncertainty and ^determination
is enhanced by the profession's ability to specify its o w n body of knowledge and
perpetuate it through its control of the content and nature of professional education,
training and practice. Not only are clients dependent on the professional practitioner
but society is also dependent on the profession as a group to establish standards of
education, training and practice because only the profession has the necessary
knowledge and skills to determine

what is appropriate.

Uncertainty and

indetermination are not only a source of power for a profession but they are also
essential to the maintenance of autopoiesis which requires continuous conversation
and communication.
(b) Conversation, Communication and Autopoiesis

(i) Reality Creation
Conversation and communication were defined earlier in this chapter as "the creation
of shared meanings within the cognitive domain" and "the use of meanings in
linguistic interactions"respectively(Robb, 1991, p219). Similarly, Pask refers to
conversation as "concept sharing" and communication as "the transmission and
transformation of signals" (1980, pl44). While the two processes are linked in that in
order to have conversation there must be some communication, they are distinct and
one need not follow from the other. In other words, good conversation does not
imply good communication or vice versa (pl44). Communication is a basic element
of a social system (Luhmann, 1986, 1988a, b; Bednarz, 1988; Kock, 1981).
Communication determines the structure of the system, its adaptive capacities and
ensures all components of the system perform the functions necessary to achieve
autopoiesis and organisational closure (Robb, 1990, p20).

While conversation is the process of ascertaining meaning, this cannot be achieved
unless there are sufficient shared meanings already within the system. In this sense,
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conversation also has parallels with Bakhtin's view of discourse and h o w meaning is
conferred on particular concepts:
But no living word relates to its object in a singular way: between
the word and its object between the word and the speaking
subject there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words
about the same object the same theme, and this is an environment
that it is often difficult to penetrate. It is precisely in the process
of living interaction with this specific environment that the word
m a y be individualized and given stylistic shape (italics in original)
(1981, p276).

Conversation also is similar to the rules of practice that provide the context in which
rules of membership and meaning are determined. Rules of practice or pre-existing
shared meanings, in this regard, can be seen as premises or assumptions such as the
idea encompassed in the statements of accounting concepts issued by the AARF that
users of financial statements will use general purpose financial statements for making
decisions that will facilitate an economic allocation of scarce resources (SAC 1
paragraphs 7-9 and SAC 2 paragraphs 11-15).

Because conversation and communication are the means by which a system makes a
distinction between itself and other systems and establishes and maintains its
autonomy (Pask, 1980, pl51), these are also the processes by which an autopoietic
system creates its own reality. As Luhmann notes
Autopoietic systems ... are sovereign with respect to the
constitution of identities and differences. They do not create a
material world of their own. They presuppose other levels of
reality. ... Whatever they use as identities and as differences is of
their o w n making (1986, pi74).

B y creating their o w n reality, autopoietic systems are able to institutionahse
indetermination and uncertainty, in other words, indetermination and uncertainty form
the "material basis" of the system (Goodrich, 1987, 144). As will be discussed
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shortly, indetermination and uncertainty ensure the continuation of conversation and
communication by introducing the potential for conflict and instability. Both these
elements are essential to the maintenance of autopoiesis because "[i]t is not the
function of communication to produce a consensus as to the favoured state of mind..
. If the system were set up to produce consensus it soon would c o m e to an end"
(Luhmann, 1986, pl76).

There are clear parallels between the process of interessement at the dispositional
level of the circuits of power and conversation and communication. A s noted earlier,
interessement is the process of establishing rules of membership and meaning (Clegg,
1989, p205). Dispositional power is the level of social integration at which orderly
and conflictfulrelationshipsspecify the rules of meaning and membership (p224). In
turn, the rules of membership and meaning establish an actor network, organisational
field orfieldof force (p224). A s discussed previously, social systems, are structures
of shared meanings which determine the components of a system and the relations
between them.

Structure, however, is not physical but rather a process of

conversation and communication (Robb, 1991; Mingers, 1989; Bednarz, 1988).
Laclau and Mouffe use the concepts of discourse, articulation, elements and moments
in m u c h the same context (1985, pl05). Articulation is
.. . any practice establishing a relation among elements such that
their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.
The structure of a system resulting from articulatory practices is
"discourse". M o m e n t s are differential positions articulated within
a discourse. Elements are differences which have not been
"discursively articulated" (pi05).

Conversation and communication are similar to rules of practice in the frameworks of
power. Control of the rules of practice through control of the obligatory passage
points is the basis of hegemonic domination and the exercise of power at the episodic
level. Similarly, an autopoietic system, is by definition, autonomous in that it is self100

perpetuating and determines the components of the system and the relationships
between them (Maturana & Varela, 1988; Bednarz, 1988; Teubner, 1988b; Luhmann,
1988b).

Thus, an autopoietic system must also control conversation and

communication (Luhmann, 1988a, pl7). Luhmann has defined communication as "..
. a synthesis of three selections: namely, information, utterance and understanding
(misunderstanding) (1986, pl74) and more recently as " . . .

a synthesis of

information, communication and comprehension" (1988a, pl7).

Autopoiesis, autonomy and control of obligatory passage points are not static, if they
were, the system would not develop further and would cease to exist A s Luhmann
states " . . . the elements are produced in order to end immediately, the system
continually disintegrates itself and the autopoiesis stops at every m o m e n t - unless
continued" (1988b, p341).

In terms of accountancy, shared meanings or concepts can, therefore, be taken to
include the rules of double entry bookkeeping as well as terms such as asset, liability,
revenue, expense, equity and capital which have unique meanings in an accounting
context as well as rules for their recognition and measurement. It also includes the
specialised skills of a trained accountant which allow the accountant to determine the
manner in which double entry principles are applied and the interpretation and
application of these rules when judgment is required such as in revenue recognition,
cost allocation and materiality. While the basic principles of, for example, what
constitutes an asset or a liability, revenue or expense m a y be generally accepted, there
are often differences of opinion as to when such items should be recognised or h o w
they should be measured. Accounting standards provide guidelines as to h o w such
differences of opinion m a y be solved.

However, as will be discussed in later chapters, it is these very disagreements which
m a k e standard setting a difficult task. Conversation, persuasion or conflict resolution
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become political processes whereby consensus is often bought at the cost of
compromise of ideal. For example, the foreign currency translation standard to be
discussed in Chapter 6, allows a choice of translation methods based on the
relationship between the parent company and its subsidiaries. It also allows flexibility
in the treatment of gains and losses on foreign currency monetary items which can be
reasonably attributed to qualifying assets. The standard also does not address
accounting for speculative transactions in spite of a recognised need to do so. If
accounting standards did not leave scope for flexibility or further refinement
accounting could be reduced to a technical process whereby anyone w h o could learn
the application rules of a particular standard could undertake accounting work in that
area. Flexibility and unresolved issues provide the means whereby accountancy can
continue conversation and communication and, thereby, maintain its distinction from
other disciplines and its autonomy.
(ii) The Processes of Change
Just because meaning is shared does not mean that it will not change over time. A n y
change, however, must be drawn from the knowledge base of the system itself
because autopoietic systems are, by definition, self-referential and self-determining. In
other words, only the system can decide what components comprise the system and
what therelationshipsare between the components. Drawing once again on Luhmann
and the application of autopoiesis to the law
The autopoiesis of the legal system is normatively closed in that
only the legal system can bestow legally normative quality on its
elements and thereby constitute them as elements.
The system reproduces its elements by its elements by transferring
this quality of meaning from m o m e n t to m o m e n t and thereby
always providing n e w elements with normative validity (1988a,
p20).
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The autopoiesis of the legal system in this regard is analogous to that of the
accountancy profession and the emphasis it has placed on the development of a
conceptual framework. The framework currently being developed by the A A R F
details the objectives of external financial reporting ( S A C 2), and, in theory, proceeds
to develop concepts dealing with the qualities accounting information should have to
m a k e it useful ( S A C 3) and thereby fulfil the objectives specified in S A C 2. The
A A R F s most recent concepts statement deals with definitions of the elements of
general purpose financial reporting, assets, liabilities, revenue and expense and the
criteria to be used in determining when these elements should be recognised in general
purpose financial statements ( S A C 4 Definition and Recognition of the Elements of
Financial Statements). Ultimately, the A A R F intends to issue a concepts statement
dealing with measurement of assets, liabilities, revenue and expense.

The development of a conceptual framework can be seen as a process of conversation
and communication. Accountancy is creating its o w n reality in adopting a decisionusefulness approach to the specification of objectives of general purpose financial
reporting. The argument being that users of financial statements w h o are unable to
specify the accounting information they require, will use general purpose financial
reports issued by reporting entities (paragraph 7). The objective of general purpose
financial reports is to facilitate an economic allocation of resources (paragraph 13).
This approach is logical, perhaps, given the altruistic motive of the profession. In
other words, there must be a social need for accounting and that need is the provision
of information which will facilitate an economic allocation of resources. However,
accountancy can be seen to be creating its o w nrealitybecause there is little empirical
evidence to support its contention that shareholders, creditors and other resource
providers actually use financial statements as the basis of their dealings with
companies or that this will achieve an economic allocation of resources ( S A C 2
paragraphs 21-25 and paragraphs, 28-40). Research in the area of the users of
financial information and h o w that information is used has been inconclusive (eg. Lee
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and Tweedie, 1976; Benjamin and Stanga, 1977; Libby and Lewis, 1977; Courtis,
1982).

Nonetheless, the profession in Australia appears to have succeeded in

convincing the state that a conceptual framework is not only desirable but necessary.
The Australian Securities Commission Act section 226 includes as one of the
functions of the A A S B a duty to develop a conceptual framework that is to be used in
evaluating proposed accounting standards.

The state has thus sanctioned the

profession's creation of its o w n reality. The profession is also in a position to
maintain its autopoiesis through the conceptual framework because the reality created
by the conceptual framework is the basis of further creations, such as what constitutes
an asset or liability in a certain circumstance. This activity or reality creation is all
premised on the notion of servicing the public interest by achieving an economic
allocation of resources.

However, because the system creates and defines its own elements that create and
define further elements, there is the potential problem that meaning will appear to
change but really be static. The necessity for the system to co-exist with others within
its environment adds to this problem. A s R o b b (again following Pask) notes, this is
the danger in the "togetherness" or consensus created by conversation particularly in
higher level organisations that have achieved autopoiesis (1990, pl6, p20). Firstly,
there m a y be so m u c h "togetherness", that no information transfer takes place at all.
Pseudo-conversation m a y occur in that conversation appears to take place but it is
nothing more thanrepetitionof previous conversation so that no n e w meanings are
established. Pask specifies the limits of "togetherness" as
(a) complete saturation (organisational closure and no information
transfer);
(b) the type of "supersaturation" that yields an indefinitely large
number ofreplicas(imaging systems which, being replicas, do not
need to converse for they have nothing to say) (1980, pl55).
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Alternatively, an organisation m a y have reached the stage where even pseudoconversation does not occur unless the stability of the autopoietic processes is
threatened. Stability m a y be threatened both from endogenous and exogenous forces.
In the circuits of power framework, innovation in techniques of discipline and
production precipitate changes in the rules of practice, membership and meaning.
Whether the force for change is coming from within the organisation or from its
environment conversation will be instituted but only to the extent that is necessary to
maintain autopoiesis.

Boreham has made a similar observation with regard to professions and paradigmatic
shifts which m a y occur in the face of conflict
. . . changes will ensue only when those who dominate the upper
levels of professional hierarchies have assimilated those elements
of innovation which are applicable to the perpetuation of the
dominance of the professional project (1983, p701).

This suggests that change within an autopoietic system is linked to conflict and
instability. In fact L u h m a n n maintains that instability is the basis of the stability of
the autopoietic system because it ensures the recursive reproduction of the system by
continuous conversation and communication (1986, pl81). This implies a degree of
almost planned instability and conflict which appears to be at odds with the circuits of
power framework in that the continuation of the exercise of power at the episodic
agency level depends on stability at that level as well as of control of the obligatory
passage points.

Change within the power framework is possible, however, in

response to endogenous and exogenous forces due to innovations in techniques of
production and discipline. W h e n these forces cannot be dealt with by the dispositional
level of the circuit change or bifurcation, such as the creation of n e w organisations or
components of the system, occur at the facilitative level of the framework. A s will be
discussed in Chapter 3, the formation of professional associations and continuing
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professionalisation processes such as the establishment of research groups first within
professional associations and eventually as separate entities provide an example of this
process. The formation of research groups within the professional association is likely
to be a mobilisation activity taking place within the dispositional level of the power
circuit Bifurcation in the form of a research organisation, the A A R F , separate and
distinct from the two major Australian professional associations, but financed and
sponsored by them, followed criticism of the profession to fail to deal adequately with
the development of accounting practices. This will be discussed in more detail in the
next chapter.

In this sense, the responses in either of the situations identified by Robb (1990) can be
seen to result not only from autopoiesis but from organisational outflanking and
institutional isomorphism which are both attempts to continuously fix and re-fix the
rules of practice, membership and meaning. Organisational outflanking occurs where
an established group controls the obligatory passage points and, thereby, also controls
the rules of practice and the rules of practice set the context within which the rules of
membership and meaning are determined. This established group usually has the
resources to outmanoeuvre other organisations attempting to invade itsterritory,for
example, formation of the A A R F could be seen as a defence mechanism adopted by
the profession to preempt any m o v e by the government to take over the role of
developing and prescribing accounting standards and practices. This also allows the
profession to institutionalise indetermination and uncertainty in its body of esoteric
knowledge and, thereby, maintain hegemonic domination of a particular field of
endeavour.

Institutional isomorphism, be it coercive, rnimetic or normative, will ensure, however,
that radical change is unlikely to occur where the rules of practice, membership and
meaning have become institutionalised (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and
R o w a n , 1977). This is facilitated by the processes of problematisation, interessement
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enrolment and mobilisation which, if successful, create alliances and agency
relationships at the dispositional level. These relationships are complemented by
institutional isomorphism which results in the components of an organisational field
becoming increasingly alike. The danger in this is that a point of saturation m a y be
reached so that bifurcationresultsin "... an indefinitely large number ofreplicas. . .
[having] nothing to say" (Pask, 1980, pi 55) or engaging in communication

"...

which m a y appear to be conversation, but is noi in fact, conversational" (pi54,
emphasis in original). Nonetheless, as suggested above, conversation will be necessary
if the autopoiesis of the organisation is to be maintained in the face of threats to its
stability. Therefore, radical change can occur, even to the point of contradiction of
previously accepted meanings or* conversation, if this is necessary to the continued
autopoiesis of the system.

However, while the possession or claim to a body of esoteric knowledge may be
necessary to achievement of hegemonic domination of a particular area or field of
endeavour, it is not sufficient Recognition of the possession of this body of esoteric
knowledge and a perception of its use in the public interest is also necessary.
Public Recognition - The Role of the State
Public recognition and acceptance of a profession and its unique knowledge depend
on the state. Johnson refers to this as "state mediation" (1972, p46). State mediation
can be seen to take place at the facilitative level of the power framework as part of the
process of social integration. Social integration deals with the resolution of orderly
and cornTictfulrelationshipsor tensions within a social system (Lockwood, 1964,
p245). In this sense, state mediation can facilitate a professional monopoly and at the
same time limit autonomy. The granting of charters or incorporation of professional
associations can be seen as facilitative. A monopoly is further enchanced by the state
identifying a need in the community and legislating for its provision. For example,
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legislation prescribing the preparation and audit of annual financial reports has
provided a societal niche for accountants. O n the other hand, specifying membership
of boards or committees dealing with the practice of a profession, such as the
promulgation of accounting standards, can be seen as limiting autonomy of the
profession.

Without the support of the state, a would-be profession would have little hope of
attaining the legitimacy conferred by incorporation, the granting of a charter, licensing
or registration. Statutory licensing andregistrationwould, to a certain extent, be
more powerful tools than incorporation or granting of a charter because they provide
legislative closure of a field of knowledge. In other words, only those w h o are
licensed or admitted to a register under the legislation are able to undertake the
activities of that profession. However, as noted previously, statutory licensing and
registration would introduce an outside party, probably one without therequisiteskill
and knowledge of the professional, into the administration of the profession. The
profession would be likely to lose some of its autonomy in that administration. In
other words, the rules of membership would be altered and, as a consequence, the
control of the obligatory passage points.

The accountancy profession in Australia provides an example of the loss of autonomy
which m a y follow government intervention in the conduct of professional activities.
The advent of statutory backing for approved accounting standards appeared to
reduce the profession's autonomy in the standard setting process in that the A A S B
had the potential to become little more than a government department. This could
have left the profession as "an occupational pressure group" trying to influence rather
than control accounting practice (Johnson, 1972, p82). It will be shown in subsequent
chapters that the Australian profession effectively controls the standard setting
process in this country but the Federal Government has the right to veto standards
approved by the A A S B .

The legislation establishing the A A S B also prescribes
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membership requirements including the bodies w h o m a y nominate prospective board
members. T o this extent the profession's autonomy has been reduced. A similar
situation could arise with regard to registration in that the legislators control the
content of the registration act including prescribing the qualifications of those w h o
m a y be registered.

Incorporation or granting of a charter does not necessarily lead to such a loss of
autonomy. Rather it achieves therestrictionof specifiedtitles,such as chartered
accountant or certified practising accountant, to members of a particular professional
association. In some respects this has advantages over legislative closure in that
registration or licensing forces the profession to admit an outside element the
government or a government appointed body, into the regulation of the profession.
Exclusive right to atitlem a y not guarantee exclusive practice in a given field but it
does distinguish the qualified from the unqualified without necessarily losing any
aspect of self-regulation or autonomy. The distinction between the qualified and
unqualified highlights the boundary around the profession and also confers status and
prestige on members of the professional association. This status and prestige facilitate
the autonomy of the profession to determine levels of education and training and
standards of practice. It also contributes to the autonomy of the practitioner in their
day to day w o r k activities because the professional practitioner is recognised as an
expert in a given field.

In other words, status and prestige underwrite the

technological monopoly of the profession and its members.

In addition, the state, through legislation, can effectively provide a profession with a
guaranteed clientele (Johnson, 1972, p78).

C o m p a n y legislation requiring the

preparation and audit of annualfinancialstatements is one such example. Refinements
to this legislation such as the requirements to comply with approved accounting
standards and procedures to be followed when a change of auditor is proposed by
management have helped to consolidate state support of the accountancy profession.
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Claim to a body of esoteric knowledge is not the sole pre-requisite to state support of
a professional organisation. A distinctive trait of a profession, or in Lee's view, the
most obvious trait is altruism or the use of a body of esoteric knowledge in the public
interest (1990, pi38) . Hence the motives of the members of the profession in using
their skills extend beyond material gains to benefiting society (Larson, 1977, px).
However, to ensure that the public interest is served, it is considered that organisation
of the profession is necessary to maintain high standards through education and
compliance with ethical codes and that practices within the profession are based on an
intellectual core.

It is apparent from the foregoing that the attributes of a profession are inter-related.
There must be, or at least a claim to, a body of esoteric knowledge as evidenced by
high levels of education and training. The expert skill and training which is derived
from this body of knowledge must be used in the public interest as opposed to being
used for mere personal gain. A public interest motive provides incentive for the state
to lend its support to aspiring professions in the form of incorporation, charters,
registration and licensing which provide public recognition of the expert knowledge
and skills of members of professional associations. This, in turn, confers status and
prestige on members of professional associations and operates as a means of
operationally closing the practice in a given field to all but the qualified.

The

profession and its members use this status and prestige as a means to autonomy in the
determination of appropriate skills, training and practice.

T o maintain public

recognition, autonomy and a technological monopoly, the profession must continue to
demonstrate its special body of knowledge and expertise.

Chapter 3 will use the circuits of power framework and theory of autopoiesis
developed in thefirstpart of this chapter and elaborated on in the second part to
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demonstrate h o w the accountancy profession attained hegemonic domination of
accounting including the promulgation of accounting standards.

Ill

CHAPTER 3
PROFESSIONALISATION AS A POWER
STRATEGY

This section of the study will show that accountancy has used professionalisation
processes to attain and maintain hegemonic domination of work of an accounting
nature. The time frame of these activities will cover the formation of professional
accountancy associations in the 1890's through to the merger of the A S R B and the
Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) of the A A R F in 1988. This particular timeframe has been selected because it provides evidence of the translation process that
accountancy used to achieve hegemonic domination of accounting practices. The
merger of the A S R B with the A c S B represents the culmination of the translation
process in that it provided the profession with control of the obligatory passage
points, in this case, the setting of accounting standards, and thereby, the means to
exercise episodic agency power. This control was specifically endorsed by the State.

The processes used by the profession in achieving this dominant position have
included formal incorporation of accountancy associations and, in some instances,
acquisition of Royal Charters, and prescribed levels of educationfirstlyprovided by
the profession itself and later through tertiary education facilities.

Further

professional training and development through employment and post-tertiary
qualification courses of study and examination are also part of the professionalisation
processes prescribed by the professional accountancy associations. In times when it
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appeared the professional associations were unable to adequately regulate the
activities of their members, that is through rules of membership and meaning,
bifurcation occurred. In Australia, bifurcation saw the establishment of research and
accounting standard setting bodies which were ostensibly separate from the
professional associations that created them. Further bifurcation ultimately led to the
establishment of the A S R B and statutory backing for approved accounting standards.

Early sections of this chapter will draw upon professionalisation activities of not only
Australian accountants but also those of the U K . Details of the emergence of the
profession in the U K are of interest because it is the recognised birth place of the
accountancy profession (Walker, 1988; Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Hein, 1978;
Stewart, 1975). Also, as will be demonstrated, some of the founders of the profession
in Australia specifically stated an intention to emulate their U K counter-parts.

It is not intended to use archival material such as minutes of meetings in this study.
This area has already been covered by Poullaos (1992; 1993). Instead, extensive use
will be m a d e in this chapter of The Public Accountant and other newspapers and
journals to show the development of an accounting discourse over time. It is
contended that the profession used these media to create a favourable public
perception of the profession and certain of the accountancy professional associations.
O n e of the ways in which this was achieved, was publication in The Public
Accountant

of dinner speeches given not only by members of the professional

associations but by judges, members of Parliament editors of journals and other
public figures. These speeches invariablyreflecteda positive image of the profession
and the work of both practitioners and the professional associations. Addresses to
student societies and at annual general meetings of professional associations were also
published. Once again, these addresses appear to have been designed to convey an
image of a highly professional organisation dedicated to providing the public with
well-trained and knowledgeable accountants. Editorials were also used extensively to
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publicise the viewpoints of the profession on a number of matters including the long
battle for a Royal Charter by accountants in public practice in Australia.

These activities can be seen as part of the professionalisation process aimed at
delineating a boundary between qualified and so-called unqualified practitioners and
achieving domination of accounting by members of professional associations by
showing a commitment to the public interest by raising the standard of members of
professional associations through prescribed levels of education and training. Others
w h o were not favourably inclined towards the profession or the activities of some of
the professional associations also used these mediums to counter these efforts.

It should be noted that this section of the study does not purport to be a
comprehensive history of the accountancy profession in Australia or of the activities
of Australian accountants in pursuit of a Royal Charter. Extensive histories of
Australian professional associations, charter applications and the emergence of
accounting standards and standard setting bodies have been undertaken by others (eg.
Zeff, 1973; Gibson, 1976; Graham, 1978; Marshall, 1978; A S A , undated; Poullaos,
1992; Rahman, 1992) and there is no intention to duplicate their work in this chapter.
The intention of this chapter is to demonstrate that the professionalisation activities of
some Australian accountancy associations were used as

means of creating an

accountancy discourse in their favour and attaining hegemonic domination of
accountancy practices in Australia.

PROFESSIONALISATION & FRAMEWORKS OF POWER
The professionalisation of accountancy is explainable within the circuits of power
framework.

Initial professionalisation activities can be sited within the dispositional

circuit at the level of social integration utilising the problematisation, interessement
enrolment and mobilisation moments of translation. The formal establishment of
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professional associations was a strategic activity undertaken within the facilitative
circuit at the level of systems integration. These activities were aimed at achieving
hegemonic domination of accountancy in part by delineating a boundary between the
qualified and the unqualified. For example, one of the longest running debates within
accountancy itself has been the distinction between the accountant in public practice
and the accountant employed in commercial ventures. The desire for this distinction
led to the formation of The Australasian Corporation of Public Accountants ( A C P A )
"[fjo support and protect the profession of Public Accountants in Australia"
(Editorial, 1908, p34) by drawing "... a distinct line ... for all time between the
practising public accountant and the non-practising accountant" (Editorial, 1911a,
pi99). Attempts to attain Royal Charters by public accountants in England, Scotland
and Australia were an extension of this process. Howitt clearly makes this point with
regard to the gaining of a charter by the Institute of Chartered Accounts in England
and Wales

(ICAEW)

Among the great advantages of charters were the fact that the
tradition surrounding them dated back to the fourteenth century,
the prestige attaching to them and the characteristics of monopoly
they conferred (1966, p20.)

As noted in the previous chapter, Walker argues that formal organisation of the
accountancy profession in Scotland was prompted by the threat posed by proposed
bankruptcy legislation which would have placed the administration of failed estates
with the courts (undated, pl6, 21, 26, 35). Other groups with an interest in this area
included the legal profession and merchants. These groups had formally established
organisations to protect their interests (p21).

The accountants of Edinburgh and

Glasgow sought formal organisation by incorporation of professional associations by
Royal Charter. Once formed, these organisations formed alliances with other interest
groups, including the legal profession and local merchants, and successfully defeated
the proposed legislation (pp34-35).
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In Australia, the perceived benefits of a Royal Charter were also clearly recognised
It [a Royal Charter] is the academic hall-mark of Great Britain and
its dependencies, and has had,... a particularly significant effect
upon the profession of accountancy since the issue of a charter to
the Scottish accountants in 1854, and to those in London and
elsewhere in 1880, since which dates the appellation "Chartered
Accountant" has become prima facie evidence of integrity and
ability in Great Britain (Editorial, 1905a, p4).

Continuing professionalisation activities such as entrance requirements based on
education and examinations, research, practice guidelines, accounting standards,
conceptual framework projects and the establishment of complementary structural
components in the form of research organisations and standard setting bodies are
aimed at maintaining hegemonic domination. In other words, the emerging profession
sought to establish itself as an obligatory passage point in the conduct of work of an
accounting nature and, thereby, the exercise of power at the episodic level of the
power framework. Maintaining power at this level requires continued control of the
obligatory passage points.
Formal Organisation - The Moment of Problematisation
The accountants of Edinburgh were the first to establish a professional accounting
body by obtaining a Royal Charter in January 1853. Accountants in Glasgow and
Aberdeen followed with Royal Charters being granted in 1855 and 1867 respectively
(Macdonald, 1984, pi87). As already discussed, Walker's research suggests the
accountants of Edinburgh and Glasgow sought Royal Charters in a bid to mobilise
support in the battle against proposed bankruptcy legislation. Walker's earlier
research suggests a reason why the accountants of Scotland, once formally organised,
were able to achieve alliances with the legal profession and merchants. It would
appear that the foundations had already been laid in that Walker considers that the
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accountants of Glasgow originally achieved occupational recognition through an
association with commerce and, in particular, the Glasgow Stock Exchange (1988,
pi6). The accountants of Edinburgh, on the other hand, attained status and prestige
as aresultof a long "occupational and social association" with the law which already
had the prestige and status of a recognised profession (pi3).

Walker further maintains that the organisation of the accountants in Scotland was
aimed at achieving social closure (p37). A s evidence of this, Walker cites evidence
from pamphlets issued by the group which was to become the Society of Accountants
in Edinburgh. These pamphlets argued that "professional trustees" should be suitably
qualified. A separate professional body should be formed and only members of that
organisation should undertake bankruptcy work. The objective was to exclude the
incompetent (ie. non-members of the proposed professional association) from the area
(pp20-21).

In England, the first accounting professional association was formed in Liverpool in
1870 (Macdonald, 1984, pl87; Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933, p210). In 1880,
the I C A E W was thefirstnational body toreceivea Royal Charter (Macdonald, pi87;
Carr-Saunders and Wilson, p210; Walker, 1991, p258).

The impetus to organise

members of the profession in England appears to have been a perceived need to
preclude undesirable persons from taking up the work of accountants. In Johnson's
view, the tactic of protecting society from charlatans and quacks is "a creation of
professionalism" aimed at achieving and maintaining an occupational monopoly
(1972, p57). The advent of the Industrial Revolution had increased the need for
accounting services such as bankruptcy and liquidation work. With the introduction
of more liberal incorporation rights under companies legislation from 1844 onwards,
the audit of corporate accounts also provided work for accountants.
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It appears the impetus to form professional accountancy associations in Australia was
two-fold. First the "boom" of the 1880's had witnessed a rapid expansion in joint
stock companies to take advantage of the growth of a wide range of industries
including building and manufacturing. A s with the growth in foreign trade and the
Industrial Revolution, this b o o m and its concomitant increase in capital expenditure
led, in turn, to a need for more sophisticated forms of bookkeeping (Graham, 1978,
pi; Marshall, 1978, pplO-11). A n e w area of knowledge was beginning to take on an
important role in the country and the accountants of the time seized the opportunity
of laying claim to it:
... if those who were holding themselves out as public
practitioners were to gain the confidence and support of the
public, there must be a standard fixed which would connote the
possession of the necessary qualifications for this special work
(Brentnall, 1938, p64).

This gave rise to the second reason for the formation of Australian accounting
professional associations. This was a desire to attain for Australian accountants the
perceived status and prestige of their U K counterparts (p64).

Registration or

licensing of accountants was sought by some members of the profession as a means of
limiting the practice of accountancy to members of specified accounting associations
and thereby, preclude the unqualified (eg. licensing of auditors, section 31(2),
Victorian Companies Act 1896; Brentnall, 1898b, p329; Corporation of Accountants
of Australia, 1904, p37). Apart from the perceived status of a Royal Charter, it was
also considered this would preclude the unqualified from undertaking accountancy
work or more precisely, the work of public accountants ( A C P A , 1910a, ppl33-134).
For example, T h o m a s Brentnall, as President of the A C P A , recognised the value of
the "general office accountant" or "highly-qualified clerk" but insisted a clear
distinction should be m a d e between the practising public accountant and the former
(pi33). Furthermore, the "professional man", in other words, the practising public
accountant and, presumably, member of the A C P A , had the right to ". . . protect
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himself against charlatanry and incompetency ..." (pi 34). A Royal Charter was one
method of providing such protection.

Brentnall went on to point out that obtaining a Royal Charter was not only in the
interests of practising public accountants but also in the interests of Australia.
Australia was a young country and, in order to fully utilise its "illimitable resources",
it was necessary to rely on borrowed capital, particularly from the U K . In addition, it
was important that such borrowings be on favourable terms. It was in this regard,
that Brentnall saw the need for public accountants "... in furnishing reports upon
which an absentee lender m a y feel that he can absolutely rely" (pi34). A s altruistic as
this m a y sound, there was also an element of self-interest because, in m a n y cases, U K
investors required investees to be investigated by chartered accountants which meant
that Australian public accountants were being deprived of work. The granting of a
Royal Charter to Australian public accountants would overcome this (pi34).

To achieve the distinction between accountants and lawyers and qualified accountants
and unqualified accountants, the emerging profession adopted a "problematisation"
strategy. T h e "problem" identified was that any person w h o wished, could designate
themselves an accountant. This "problem" was not unique to Australia. In England,
for example, not only could lawyers do work of an accounting nature but also
"charlatans and rogues" and others without the requisite training. This state of affairs
was argued to be detrimental to society (Howitt, 1966, p4). The "solution" was the
formal establishment of a professional association, membership of which would be
limited to those with the appropriate training and experience.

The petition for a charter lodged by the Institute of Accountants in Glasgow
expressed similar sentiments. It also included a request for the Institute to be granted
power to determine the qualifications required for membership:
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. . . that it is obvious that to the due performance of a profession
such as this a liberal education is essential...

. . . that the object in view in the formation of the Institute of
Accountants in Glasgow . . . was to maintain efficiency as well as
respectability of the professional body . . . that this object will be
further greatly assisted by the formation ... into a body corporate
. . . with power to m a k e regulations and bye-laws respecting the
qualification and admission of M e m b e r s (cited by Stewart, 1975,
pi 13).

The Royal Charter petition of the I C A E W m a d e it explicitly clear that it was thought
incorporation would provide public recognition of the status of qualified accountants
in society and that the public interest would be served by such recognition

... it would greatly promote the objects for which the said
societies have been instituted and would also be for the public
benefit if the members thereof were incorporated as one body as
besides other advantages such incorporation would be a public
recognition of the importance of the profession and would tend to
gradually raise its character and thus secure for the community the
existence of a class of persons well qualified to be employed in the
responsible and difficult duties often devolving on Public
Accountants (Royal Charter of the I C A E W , 11 M a y 1880).

The first Australian Royal Charter application was similarly worded

... that for divers good and meritorious causes and considerations
in the said Petition mentioned it would in the judgment of the
petitioners very greatly promote and further the objects for which
the said Associations [Incorporated Institute of Accountants,
Victoria and T h e Australian Institute of Accountants] were
established and would also greatly redound to the public good if
the members of the said associations were incorporated as one
body politic... (Victorian Charter Application, 1905, p20).

Through formation of professional associations and, in some cases, the gaining of
Royal Charters of Incorporation, the profession achieved a number of things. By
virtue of incorporation, the title "Chartered Accountant" became legally protected
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(Lubell, 1978, pp41-42) in that only members of the professional associations holding
them could use it This also provided a means whereby the public could identify
"qualified" accountants in that members of the I C A E W were identifiable by the initials
"FCA" or " A C A " after their names (Howitt, 1966, p25). Members of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of Scotland and its antecedent bodies, the Society of
Accountants in Edinburgh, the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow and
the Society of Accountants in Aberdeen, (Walker, 1988, p7; 1991, p258) were
identified by the initials "CA." after their name (Walker, 1988, pll). In Australia,
members of the first professional accounting association, the Adelaide Society of
Accountants, were identified by the initials "FASA" (being a Fellow of the Society).
Members of the second association to be formed in Australia, the Incorporated
Institute of Accountants, Victoria, used the designations "FIAV" (Fellows) and
"AIAV" (Associates). The use of these appellations was the beginning of the formal
demarcation of a boundary around the profession of accountancy. This point was
recognised in the March 1907 Editorial of The Public Accountant which dealt with a
U K legal decision, Society of Accountants and Auditors v G o o d w a y and Others,
preserving therighttouse the designation, "Incorporated Accountant", to members of
that society.

The Editorial expressed the view ". . . that the decision would

undoubtedly be followed by our courts" in similar circumstances (pl06). This would
provide protection to both the public and members of established accountancy
associations because
... the rule of law laid down will effectually prevent unqualified
adventurers from posing as members of reputable Associations of
Accountants, and thus gaining confidence which the merits of their
o w n work would never gain for them (pi07).

Public recognition of distinguishing appellations also forms the basis for autonomy in
the determination of work of an accounting nature and h o w it should be practised. In
turn, public recognition of qualified accountants and the importance of their work

121

laid the foundation for a technological monopoly (Lubell, 1978, p42) or, in Clegg's
terms, the profession sought to achieve for its members the position as "nodal points"
or "obligatory passage points" through which accounting practices must pass (1989,
204-205).

The term "system's closure" has also been used to describe what is

effectively the enclosure of an area of knowledge to a select group (Selander, 1990,
pl40).

In achieving this position, the professional associations also had to convince the public
that in undertaking accountancy work, special skills are required and the public
interest would be best served if this work was undertaken by qualified accountants as
recognised by membership of professional accounting associations. A s already noted,
the Victorian Institute was formed for this purpose (Brentnall, 1938, p64). Similarly,
the objects of the Adelaide Society of Accountants included

(iv) to foster in commercial circles a higher sense of the
importance of systematic and correct book-keeping, and to
encourage a greater degree of efficiency in those engaged in
accountancy and auditing (Adelaide Society of Accountants List
of Members, Constitution and Rules (1886, clause 2)

In this way the profession cultivated client and societal dependency on it and its
members. Walker argues the chartered accountants of Scotland did achieve this:

The distinctive professional designations adopted by the members
of the three chartered societies were rapidly recognized a m o n g
their clientele - the legal, commercial and manufacturing
communities (1991, pp261).

Support of this contention, was evidence given before the Privy Council and the
Court of Session by senior lawyers and businessmen of the time w h otestified,inter
alia, that they would employ chartered accountants in preference to those without the
same professional status, education, high character andrespectability(p262).

The
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Australasian Insurance and Banking Record ( A I B R ) provides similar evidence. In a
lengthy quote cited in the September 1911 Editorial of The Public Accountant, the
AIBR stated:

... The Australasian Corporation of Public Accountants is the one
that is most professional and therefore merits the confidence of the
financial and mercantile world . . . O u r long experience in
examining accounts and balance-sheets convinces us that the more
the services of the responsible professionals, highly qualified by
actual experience, are retained, the better. The Australasian
Corporation of Public Accountants is gradually raising the status
and utility of the profession (pi99).

This would suggest that members of a profession, through extensive training and
experience, are held to possess esoteric knowledge of their particular field of
endeavour. This knowledge sets members of that profession apart from other groups,
including other professions, and allows them to identify problems and use their
professional judgment to solve those problems. Lubell, drawing on the works of
Montagna, Barber and Greenwood, describes the process as follows:

Because professional services are built upon esoteric knowledge,
the public tends to regard members of a profession with a certain
degree of mystique. It is felt that the professional practitioner is
better prepared than the client... to determine the client's needs
and the nature of services appropriate for a given situation. The
client does not tell the professional what services are required.
Rather, the professionaltellsthe client what services are necessary
(1978, pp62-63).

While there m a y be little in the w a y of direct evidence to support this assertion, there
is evidence of its intuitive validity. A recent example is provided by the establishment
in 1977 by the South Australian Government of a Committee to Inquire into the
Registration and Conduct of Accountants. The Committee considered accounting to
"... have been an adjunct of the organization of communities from the time of earliest
civilization known to man" (South Australia, 1979, pll). In discussing the
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qualifications necessary forregistration,the majority of the Committee considered
membership of either the Institute or the Society was appropriate because in their
view, these two bodies constituted the profession and "... the profession can itself
best determine the standards of academic and practical training necessary to qualify a
person as an accountant" (p26).

Lee maintains that the skill and knowledge of the professional are crisis relevant in
that they are intended to create in the mind of the client the impression that
professional skills are a means of avoiding disaster (1990, pl38). Carr-Saunders and
Wilson (1933, p497), Johnson (1972, ppl3-14) and Larson (1977, p58) adopt similar
views. All three see claims to professional altruism as engendering in the eyes of the
community, the notion that professions are a stabilising influence in society.

A

speech by a m e m b e r of Parliament at the second annual dinner of the A C P A provides
some evidence of this view: " W e look upon Accountants as m e n closely identified
with the progress of the country" ( A C P A , 1910b, pl70). Therefore, there is not only
a client dependency on professions but also a societal one. This dependency and the
autonomy andtechnologicalmonopoly which accompany it are in part attributable to
the mystique, indetermination and uncertainty surrounding the body of accounting
knowledge.

The reality constructed by accountancy and the exclusion it has

perpetrated and perpetuated has not been a recent phenomenon.

A s already

suggested, the formalisation of exclusion has been recent but the exclusionary process
occurred over m a n y centuries beginning as early as 3500BC.

The processes of achieving and maintaining domination can be seen as links in a chain
whereby each link injects its o w n energy, shaping claims and instituting change over
time (Latour, 1986, p267-268). The formation of professional associations premised
on an altruistic motive to use the knowledge and skills of the profession in the public
interest was thefirstlink in the chain as it was also thefirststep in the specification of
rules of meaning, membership and practice (Clegg, 1989, p224).

Because the
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profession dominates the specification of these rules, it controls the obligatory
passage points which in turn facilitates autonomy in practice and also a monopoly of
sorts over accounting.

However, the granting of charters to English and Scottish professional accountancy
associations and incorporation of their Australian counterparts did not immediately
provide accountants with a technological monopoly. At this time, they did not control
the rules of practice. All the formation of professional associations did was provide a
means of recognising members of those associations. At this time also, there were no
rules of practice other than those governing admission to the professional
associations.

Membership

of professional accountancy associations was not

mandatory in the conduct of accountancy work. The profession needed to undertake
a number of activities, including education, examination and training of members and
potential members and attempts to gain statutoryregistrationand/or Royal Charters
for their associations, in order to demonstrate their superior skills in the conduct of
accountancy w o r k and thereby establish the basis of their claim to control of the
obligatory passage points of the field.

The following section will examine the education and training activities of the
accountancy profession in Australia and h o w these activities laid the foundation for
further problematisation strategies in the form of attempts to attain statutory
registration of accountants and a Royal Charter for public accountants. However, it is
not intended to cover these areas exhaustively. The intention is to show h o w the
profession attempted, in the early part of this century, to demonstrate its ability to
dominate accountancy work.

For this reason, a full history of the profession's

education,registrationand Royal Charter activities will not be attempted. The focus
of attention will be the views of members of the profession, as expressed in The
Public Accountant, lectures and speeches, on the need for these activities and also
w h y s o m e of them failed to achieve the desired end.
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It is contended that the activities of Australian professional associations in their
formative years helped them to eventually achieve a dominant position in the
formulation of accounting standards. Even though membership of professional
associations is still not mandatory, the fact that approved accounting standards have
the force of law and, therefore, must be complied with in the preparation of statutory
financial statements, means that the profession has achieved its goal of establishing
itself as an obligatory passage point in the regulatory framework.
Problematisation - The Australian Approach
In Australia, the budding accountancy profession introduced entrance examinations to
boost the public perception of its specialised skill and knowledge. This appears to
have been particularly necessary following the land b o o m and crash of the late 1880's
early 1890's. A number of scandals involving accountants, including members of
professional accountancy associations, came to light at this time with theresultthat
accountants were not held in high esteem in several quarters.

For example,

parliamentary debates dealing with the audit provisions of the 1896 Victorian
Companies Act show clearly that some members of the legislature did not consider
membership of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants or The Federal Institute of
Accountants to be any guarantee of ability to undertake an audit (24 November, 1896,
pp3606-3608). The reasons for this included a perception that accountancy work did
not equate with the work of an auditor (p3607). In addition, foundation members of
the above professional bodies had been admitted to membership without examination
to attest to their abilities. Again, even if members had submitted to examinations, this
did not qualify them as auditors (p3607). Finally, some of the auditors whose work
had been called into question around this time were members of "one or other of these
institutes" (p3608).
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Further examples of adverse public perception of accountants and members of early
professional associations are available from the AIBR. In 1893, it was stated

. . . admission into an Institute of Accountants at its inception is
not necessarily a guarantee of ability, or even m u c h knowledge . .
. a proportion of the public accountants practising in the colonial
centres are such, not because they are the most fit but because
other employments have failed them (1893, p668).

Three years later, this perception persisted

... when it is reflected that,. . . most of the balance sheets of the
bogus and mushroom companies of Melbourne, the administration
of which has frequently been marked by the utmost
unscrupulousness, have been signed from time to time by
Fs.I.A.V., the pretension of the institutes to a monopoly of
accountancy work ought not to be encouraged (1896, p717).

The quotes cited from the AIBR of 1893 and 1896 and from the Victorian
parliamentary debates were quite valid in so far as foundation members of
professional associations were not required to undertake examinations to demonstrate
their accounting abilities. However, as noted earlier, by 1911, the AIBR had amended
its view at least with regard to the ACPA. As will be demonstrated shortly, the AIBR
was not alone in its view of the ACPA and other professional associations. It is
contended that this change in perception was due, in part, to the education and
training activities of the various professional associations and also the successful
creation of a discourse through professional journals such as The Public Accountant.

1. Education and Training
From their inception, professional accounting associations required prospective
members to sit for examinations. The Adelaide Society of Accountants, the first
Australian accountancy association established in 1886, required candidates for
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membership to ". . . submit to an examination as to [their] qualifications as an
accountant" (List of Members, Constitution and Rules, 1886, clause 6). Similarly, the
Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria was formed and adopted its first
examination regulations in March 1887 (Marshall, 1978, pll; Australian Society of
Accountants, undated, p25). The first examinations, comprising four papers, were
held in 1889 (Marshall, 1978, pll; Brentnall, 1938, p65). Topics examined included
bookkeeping, commercial, mercantile and company law, bankruptcy, receivership,
partnership, executorship contracts and auditing (Marshall, 1978, pll; Brentnall,
1938, p65).

According to Marshall, the reason for the introduction of a system of

entrance examinations was the ".. . urgent need toregulateand raise the standards of
public accountants" in the wake of the b o o m of the 1880's and the accompanying
increase in joint stock companies (1978, pll). In a lecture to accountancy students
in 1908, a similar view was expressed:
... as the profession developed, and no legislation was enacted to
govern it it became necessary for the protection of the public as
well as of practitioners, to form Institutes for Self-Government
and the admission of candidates by examination (Hickson, 1908,
pl78)

The passages from the AIBR and the Victorian parliamentary debates suggest that this
m a y be a valid point of view.

In time, some of the associations provided for different levels of examination:
preliminary, intermediate and final. The institute of Accountants, Victoria introduced
preliminary and

intermediate examinations in 1895

(Australian Society of

Accountants, undated, p26). Thefirstfinaland intermediate A C P A examinations
were held in 1908 ( A C P A , 1909, p42). Passing the necessary examinations, however,
was not sufficient for membership of the A C P A . Aspiring public accountants were
required to undergo a minimum of three year's training in a public accountant's office
( A C P A , 1911b,p232).
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While the various professional associations required n e w members to take
examinations, no educational facilities were provided for would-be examination
candidates. The Society of Accountants appears to be an exception in that classes
were conducted in accountancy, auditing and law (Victoria, 1904, p319). For other
associations, private coaches provided what teaching was available (1904, p315;
Nixon, 1936, p270).

This situation was remedied to a certain extent by the

formation of students' societies. In 1898, a students' society was established in
Victoria by the Victorian Institute (Brentnall, 1938, p67).

Students' societies were

later established in Sydney in 1910 and in Adelaide and Hobart in 1911 (Australian
Society of Accountants, undated, p30). In September, 1902, The Corporation of
Accountants' Students' Association held its first meeting (Brierley, 1902, p21). The
Federal Institute of Accountants formed a students' society in conjunction with the
A C P A in 1913 (p53). These societies served at least two purposes. Firstly, for most
of the professional associations, they provided the only formal educational facilities
for accountancy students (Australian Society of Accountants, undated, p30).
Secondly, they provided student members with experience and training in the
management of the affairs of parent societies (p30). The student societies thus were
instrumental in facilitating institutional isomorphism. A s one historian has noted "...
many members, w h o later served with distinction on State or General Councils,
[obtained] their early experience and training in institute affairs through their
association with these Societies ..." (p30).

Initially, accountancy education, examinations and training were entirely the province
of the professional associations. Lectures to student societies were given by members
of the professional associations. Similarly, examinations were set and conducted by
members of the associations. However, from as early as the turn of the century, the
idea of formal classes in bookkeeping and accountancy was mooted. In 1904, a Royal
Commission on the University of Melbourne considered, inter alia, the need for
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commercial education at the university level.

Evidence was presented to the

Commission byrepresentativesof commercial interests including various accountancy
associations (Victoria, 1904, p70). In addition to the perceived need for formal
teaching of accountancy and bookkeeping, the need for a broad based education for
accountants including English, foreign languages such as French and German and
commercial geography (ie. a knowledge of the products, trade and currency of
different countries) was also recognised (pp316-318). This view was later expressed
in The Public Accountant although university education was seen as an adjunct to,
rather than a substitute for, professional association examinations and practical
training and experience:
It will enable them to acquire what practical experience alone,
however extensive, can never give - that grasp of principle, that
elevated point of view, without which no m a n can be thoroughly
equipped for the higher branches of commercial life (Editorial,
1907a, p91).

The move towards university level commercial education began before the turn of the
century. The assistance of the professional associations was also called for in this
regard. For example, in 1899, the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria,
was approached by the University of Melbourne to recommend a lecturer to teach
accountancy and bookkeeping (Australian Society of Accountants, undated, p31).
Accountancy subjects were taught at the University of Adelaide from 1902 (p31).
The University of Sydney announced its intention to found a "commercial section"
early in the century.
examinations.

Accounting was to be a compulsory subject for the first

However, to the disappointment of The Public Accountant, the

subject accounting, was to be optional thereafter. Subjects such as physics, chemistry
or geology could be substituted in subsequent examinations (Editorial, 1906a, p49).

The success of the profession's education and training activities in raising the status
professional associations was evident from the early 1890's with the AIBR, while
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critical of the professional associations in some aspects, considering their education
and examination activities to be a step in the direction of overcoming some of the
deficiencies of then practising accountants (1893, p668; 1896, p718). By 1903, the
AIBR was quite glowing in its comments regarding the Incorporated Institute of
Accountants, Victoria:
They have taken a much wider view in making the Institute a great
training body . . . That so many have passed the examinations of
the Institute is highly gratifying. The qualifications of accountants
and book-keepers in private offices have certainly been raised by
the Institute system of examinations (1903, p475).

While not providing any evidence to support his contention, Thomas Brentnall, then
president of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, testified before the
Royal Commission into the University of Melbourne, that clerks were known to be
rewarded with a bonus from their employer on passing Institute examinations
(Victoria, 1904, p315). There is some evidence, in addition to that from the AIBR,

which suggests that some professional associations were quite successful in lifting the
public image of their members. For example, at the 1911 Annual Dinner of the
ACPA, the editor of 77K? Register stated:
... it should be an absolutely requisite requirement that no
accounts of any public body which handles public money should
be audited except by a thoroughly qualified man; and to the extent
to which your association raises, and keeps raised, the standard of
accountancy and insists upon the greatest care in the management
of finance generally, to that extent the public is undoubtedly its
debtor ( A C P A , 191 lb, p229).

Perhaps more concrete evidence is that members of the profession were beginning to
be approached to give advice on matters of public interest. For example, members of
the ACPA were appointed to investigate the costing methods of Victoria's suburban
railways. The Victorian branch of the ACPA's Parliamentary and Laws Committee
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was invited to m a k e recommendations on the draft of proposed Victorian companies
legislation ( A C P A , 1911a, p217).

The foregoing suggests that education and training were an integral and successful
part of the early professionalisation process of accountants. However, it was not
sufficient to give any professional association hegemonic domination of accounting.

One reason for this was that, there was no mechanism by which the existing
professional accountancy associations could prevent the formation of other such
associations. For example, in Australia between 1890 and 1910, some thirteen
accounting associations were formed (Graham, 1978, p3). At least three reasons can
be given for this proliferation of accounting associations. The first is non-political and
is based on the fact that Australia is divided into six states [or colonies prior to
federation]. Given the poor state of communication between the colonies late last
century (Graham, 1978, pi) and, to a certain extent, colonial/state rivalry, it is not
surprising that local societies were formed rather than national societies (Graham,
1978, pi; Mackenzie, 1915, p90).

At a political level, the formation of new associations represented a threat to the
dominance of those already in existence. They also were a potential threat to the
attainment of high standards given that each n e w group formed had its o w n entry
qualifications (Graham, 1978, p4). This was perhaps accentuated given that entry to
some associations formed in Australia was limited to practising public accountants,
for example, the Sydney Institute of Public Accountants (p3). The Corporation of
Accountants of Australia was formed in response to the need to provide for those
accountants w h o were not in public practice (p3). The A C P A (one of the major
precursors of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia) was formed in
1908. It was r^imarily for accountants in public practice. M a n y of thefirstoffice
bearers of the A C P A were also office bearers of the Victorian Institute but restriction
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of membership caused a rift between the two organisations which would take almost
20 years to m e n d (p3).

While education and training did not prevent the formation of ever more professional
associations or the practice of accountancy work by non-members of professional
associations, the emphasis on education and training formed the basis of the
problematisation process which was used in a bid to gain statutoryregistrationof
accountants and, to a certain extent, a Royal Charter for practising public
accountants.
2. Registration
Statutory registration of accountants appears to have been a goal shared by
accountants in m a n y parts of the world including Australia, the U K , U S A , Canada,
N e w Zealand and South Africa ( A C P A , 1915, pp85-89). In Australia, the issue was
more than a little contentious for at least two reasons. The first was the nature of
Australian federalism and the Australian constitution which gave limited legislative
powers to the Federal Government. The interpretation of these powers meant that
any attempt on the part of the Federal Government to pass legislation for the
registration of accountants throughout Australia would be deemed unconstitutional.
The individual state parliaments could have referred their legislative powers to the
Commonwealth for purposes of passing federal legislation for theregistrationof
accountants. A s this was not forthcoming, state by state legislation was required
(Editorial, 1906c, ppl8-19; 1906d, p35; 1907d, pi56). This was one of the major
barriers to statutory registration because the likelihood of achieving uniform
legislation across six states was remote (Editorial, 1906c, pl9; 1907d, pl56; 1913a,
p4).

As will be discussed in more detail shortly, the second barrier to statutory registrati
came from within the profession itself. Effective organisation is the key to achieving
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agency relationships and control of obligatory passage points. A s argued in The
Public Accountant in 1907, "auditors ... are the agents of shareholders for the
purpose of auditing the accounts" (pi75). The profession's lack of unity with regard
to the question of w h o was to be eligible forregistrationappears to have been one of
the factors that prevented it from obtaining the statutory recognition of its control
over accountancy's obligatory passage points which m a y have been conferred upon it
by statutory registration (Priestley, 1905, p41).

In terms of the theoretical framework of this study, the major arguments for and
against statutory registration were based on a problematisation process. It was
argued the public interest would best be served by limiting accountancy work to those
w h o were qualified - at least in the view of particular professional associations. For
example, the December 1903 Editorial of The Public Accountant cited the following
passage from an address by Herbert Priestley (a one time President of the N e w South
Wales Committee of the Society of Accountants and Auditors, England) to the
Students' Union

Look around you and see the number of so-called Public
Accountants in our midst They spring up on every hand like
mushrooms. . . [T]hey are menace to the profession, and this
condition of affairs is likely to continue until statutory recognition
is accorded to the profession and none but those w h o are in every
sense of the word 'duly qualified' will be able to receive the Hallmark of Registration ... (pi9).

In 1904, the President of the Corporation of Accountants of Australia expressed the
view that Federal legislation to regulate accountants and, if possible, to create one
"large and influential" accountancy body in Australia would be
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... a measure which would confer a great benefit upon them as
Accountants, and be a boon to the public, w h o would gain by
having the services of highly-trained and properly-qualified m e n
placed at their disposal (Corporation of Accountants of Australia,
1904, p37)

The call for one accountancy body was part of the problematisation process aimed at
reducing the number of existing professional associations and preventing the
formation of new ones (Priestley, 1904, p36; Editorial, 1907d, pl54; 1907e, p234;
1908, p34; ACPA, 1915, p90). Again, this approach was not restricted to Australia
as noted by the President of the ACPA in 1915:

Even in the home of the most highly privileged and best developed
accountancy bodies, other organisations have sprung up, and there
are no m a n y n e w Societies of Accountants, with varying
qualifications for membership, all seeking to take a part in
directing, controlling and regulating the business methods of the
old land ( A C P A , 1915, p90).

As the author went on to observe, the situation in Australia was worse because the
Commonwealth was made up of six states. Each state had its own professional
associations with different membership criteria but an overall objective of "securing
large a membership as possible" (p90). To this end, qualification and examination
standards were lowered so that in some cases "... even the fool of the family" was
able to qualify as an accountant (p90).

The bid to achieve statutory registration in Australia began as early as 1899 (ACPA
1911a, p203). At a conference attended by members of all Victorian accountancy
institutes and societies, a committee was appointed to draft an accountants
registration bill to be presented to the Victorian Legislative Assembly (ACPA, 1915,
p85). The first post-federation registration bid was in Tasmania (Editorial, 1905b,
p30). Other states also initiated attempts for statutory registration (ACPA, 1915,
pp89-90).
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While the professional associations often initiated or supported proposed statutory
registration of accountants, it was a contentious issue within and between professional
associations. In the first few years of this century, The Public Accountant, in
editorials and reproductions of lectures and speeches, often m a d e reference to the
need for statutoryregistrationand lamented the profession's inability to secure this
(eg. Editorial, 1903; Corporation of Accountants of Australia, 1904; Editorial, 1905b;
1907b; 1907d). However, there were some prominent members of the profession
w h o opposed statutory registration from the time of Victoria'sfirstattempt in 1899.
For example, Brentnall, in the inaugural address to the Incorporated Students' Society
(Victoria) considered the outcome of statutory registration would "simply be
appalling" because it would "necessitate the admission of all w h o are at present
recognised as accountants in the widest interpretation of the word ..." (1898, p329).

This result would be similar to that of section 31 of the 1896 Victorian companies
legislation which provided, inter alia, for the licensing of company auditors. Section
31 also specified the qualifications necessary to obtain a licence. These qualifications
included a Municipal Auditors' Board certificate and membership of various
Australian and British accountancy associations. However, the section also provided
that any person w h o could prove they had practised in Victoria as an auditor or
accountant for three years could also receive a licence within five years of the
commencement of the A c t Brentnall considered these provisions had set the progress
of the accountancy profession back "by at least ten years" by making the qualifications
of an auditor so broad that almost anyone, including a "wayfaring man, though a fool"
could be a licensed auditor (p329). Brentnall was prepared to admit that there was
some merit in the proposed statutoryregistrationof accountants because subsequent
admissions to the profession would be determined by examination so that in fifteen to
twenty years, the beneficial effects would be felt (p329).
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The passing of the N e w Zealand Society of Accountants Act in 1908 supported this
fear of throwing open the doors of the accountancy profession to just about anyone
w h o cared to enter. W h e n the N e w Zealand legislation was initially proposed, it was
greeted with enthusiasm by The Public Accountant

as legislation aimed at " . . .

ensuring that accountancy and auditing shall be performed only by persons w h o have
the necessary knowledge and skill to do the same" (Preamble to the Bill, cited in
Editorial, 1906c, pi8). However, enthusiasm waned when theregistrationact was
eventually passed because it allowed large numbers of "accountants" to be registered.
According to figures cited by Brentnall, there were five times as many so-called public
accountants in therelativelysmall community of N e w Zealand compared to the total
number of public accountants in all of Australia ( A C P A , 1910a, pl38).

The impact of the New Zealand legislation was a trend away from calls for statutory
registration ( A C P A , 1910a, pl38; 1911a, p203; The Public Accountant, 1913a, p7;
Editorial, 1913c, p221). This trend was not, however, universal. In 1915, the then
President of the A C P A questioned whether the argument that "a large number of
unqualified and undesirable individuals" could become registered accountants was
valid given that without statutory registration, this position already prevailed
(Mackenzie, 1915, p91). Arguments of this nature, including that expressed by
Brentnall in 1898 that eventually allregisteredaccountants would be duly qualified
because admission to theregisterwould be by examination, were not readily accepted.
A s one author of the time observed

... the Legislature is [not] justified in creating chaos, at very
serious present inconvenience to the community, in the hope that
at some future day order m a y be evolved therefrom (The Public
Accountant, 1913a, p7).

In the absence of agreement as to qualifications for registration and, even if such
agreement existed, the constitutional barriers to uniform professional accountancy
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legislation throughout Australia, there appears to have been a conscious effort on the
part of some professional associations to obtain public recognition through other
means. For example, in two editorials in 1913, The Public Accountant expressed the
view that if the A C P A maintained its high standards with regard to ethical conduct
and professional qualifications through examination, training and limiting membership
to practising public accountants, its members would be favourably regarded by the
commercial community (1913a, p4; 1913b, p73). There is also some evidence that
the A C P A ' s attempts to obtain a Royal Charter were part of its o w n particular
problematisation process.
3. Royal Charters
Problematisation and the boundary it helped to create around accountancy was not
sufficient to establish hegemonic domination of accountancy. The aspiring profession
was threatened by competition for control of the obligatory points and, thereby,
control of work of an accountancy nature. Other moments of translation had to be
utilised to achieve the profession's autonomy, monopoly and, thereby, dominant
position. Accountancy had sought to identify the problems corporations and society
faced and, through their claim to superior knowledge and skill, held that only those
with the requisite knowledge and skill, could offer the optimal solution. However,
the professional associations were only one of the organisations beginning to m a k e up
thefieldof corporate regulation. A s suggested in Chapter 2, the organisational field
that is corporateregulationincludes accountancy, the legal profession and State and
Federal Parliaments asrepresentativesof the public interest. In order to test and
consolidate the problematisation process (Callon, 1986, p207), the accountancy
profession needed to form alliances and agencyrelationshipswith other organisations
within theregulatoryenvironment In the circuits of power framework this is termed
interessement
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Interessement in the circuits of power framework is similar to structural coupling in
autopoiesis. Both concepts recognise that one group, system or organisation needs to
be compatible with other groups within their environment Moreover, the formation
of a boundary and the achievement of status, autonomy and monopoly of a given area
of knowledge often needs the goodwill of those w h o will be affected by autonomy
and monopoly of the field by one group

Selander says that occupational groups form alliances or co-operate with others in
order to protect themselves and strengthen their o w n position (1990, pl40). Once a
social and occupational demarcation of a boundary has been achieved, they effect a
closure of the area orfieldof knowledge. That is to say, others or their views are
called upon and taken into consideration in planning professional activities until such
time as the group considers it is strong enough to stand alone. Selander considers
that where an occupational group which has organised itself around a body of
knowledge, but is still in a middle or subordinate position, will adopt an associative
strategy to assimilate and neutralise other organised interests (pl42). Alternatively,
even where an occupational group or profession has achieved closure but is weakened
for some reason, an associative strategy m a y be used to reduce conflict and mobilise
resources (pl43). Similarly, Callon sees interessement as a means of achieving a
balance of power and curtailing competition within a givenfield(1986, p211).

Structural coupling is aimed at maintaining compatible relationships between one
organisation and the other organisations within the environment. Interessement and
structural coupling are, therefore, both aimed at maintaining and consolidating the
position the organisation has achieved within its given environment

There were three formal attempts by Australian accountants to achieve a Royal
Charter of Incorporation. These were made in 1905, 1909 and 1928. The first
attempt was m a d e by the two Victorian Institutes of the time. The reasons for the
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failure of this attempt laid the foundations for the compromises that were made during
the second unsuccessful and thefinalsuccessful attempts.

As suggested earlier in this chapter, a Royal Charter was an integral part of the
problematisation process undertaken by parts of the Australian profession in their bid
to secure a monopoly over work of an accounting nature for members. Securing a
charter was justified in the public interest because it would allow the public to identify
the "qualified" accountant thereby, preventing the unqualified from wreaking havoc
on unsuspecting clients. This theme continued throughout the second and third
charter attempts. However, as will be shown, problematisation was not sufficient to
achieve the charter. Those w h o sought the charter had to form alliances and
compromise in order to achieve their overall goal. A s Brentnall noted "... before w e
finally got the Charter ... in 1928, w e had to concede almost everything which had
barred the w a y ..." (1938, pl91).
(i) First Charter Attempt
In 1905, the Victorian Institutes lodged a formal application for a Royal Charter for
the accountants of Victoria. The ground-work for the petition had been carried out in
trips to England some six years earlier by two members of the Incorporated Institute
of Accountants, Victoria, C M Holmes and Thomas Brentnall (Brentnall, 1938, p69).
The petition was supported by the Victorian Government but was doomed due to
opposition from not only other accountants in Australia but also the U K (Graham,
1978, p7; Marshall, 1978, pi 2; BrentnaH, 1938, p69).

The major arguments by Australian accountants against a Royal Charter for Victoria
were explicitly set out in a counter-petition lodged by the Corporation of Accountants
of Australia and the N e w South Wales Committee of the Society of Accountants and
Auditors, England (Proposed Victorian Charter, 1905, pp38-39). These arguments
included the large number of chartered accountants that would be created under the
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provisions of the petition. It was estimated this number would be in excess of 600
which was more than the total number of members of all other public accountancy
associations in Australia at that time (paragraphs 6 & 7). Furthermore, that 600
included some w h o did not practice exclusively as public accountants (paragraph 8).
A further argument was that the designation, Chartered Accountant, was not to be
restricted to members practising within the State of Victoria (paragraph 10). It was
considered that this would be detrimental to members of other accountancy
associations (Editorial, 1905a; 1905b; Corporation of Accountants of Australia,
1906). This could be overcome byrestrictinguse of the designation to accountants
practising in Victoria or by granting a charter to a federal association of public
accountants (Proposed Victorian Charter, paragraph 12) which the petitioners were
attempting to form (paragraph

15). A counter-petition was also lodged by the

accountants of South Australia and protests were sent to the Secretary of State from
individual accountants (Editorial, 1905b).

The opposition to the Victorian Charter bid was not confined to Australia. In June
1906, The Public Accountant reproduced correspondence between the Secretary of
State for the Colonies and the Under Secretary for Finance and Trade (The Treasury,
N e w South Wales) regarding the use of thetitle"Chartered Accountant". This
correspondence, which included a letter to the Colonial Office from the Secretary of
the Institute of Chartered Accountants, London, had been forwarded for comment to
the Corporation of Accountants of Australia.

The view expressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not bode well for
the Victorian Charter application if its success meant members of the Australian
chartered body were able to adopt the initials andtitlesused by the English Institute.
It was considered such usage "... would lead to inconvenience and misunderstanding
both here and in Australia, and would give the members of the English Institute
serious

ground

for complaint"

(Letter from

Lord

Elgin

reproduced

in
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Correspondence, 1906, p72). The basis of this contention was a letter from the
Secretary of the Institute of Chartered Accountants which suggested the Colonial
Office give attention

... to the public inconvenience which may arise, not only at
h o m e but all over the Empire, from the multiplication of
"Institutes of Chartered Accountants", all of w h o m have
apparently copied theirtitlefrom that of this Institute, being fully
aware of the value of thetitle"Chartered Accountant" and the
respect it c o m m a n d s in financial circles all over the world (p73).

The letter went on to state that the Institute would oppose the Australian charter
unless adequate protection was given to thetitle"Chartered Accountant". While the
stated basis of such opposition was a lack of knowledge of the adequacy of
accountancy examinations and professional standards, it is possible that such
arguments were premised more on the fear that once Australian accountants could use
the designation, Chartered Accountant, British chartered accountants stood to lose
their monopoly on auditing the books of U K companies operating in Australia.

This contention is borne out to a certain extent in that not only did the Institute
oppose the charter but also colonial legislation which could confer thetitle"Chartered
Accountant" on members of specified professional associations or provide for
registration of Australian accountants. This had already occurred in Canada and
South Africa (pp72-73). This issue was again raised w h e n a private member's bill
calling for theregistrationof accountants was introduced into the N e w South Wales
Parliament

O n c e again, the Secretary of the Institute protested via the Colonial

Office arguing that the provisions of the bill could prevent members of the English
Institute undertaking audits of N e w South Wales companies and from doing business
for clients in that State (Correspondence, 1907, pl47).

This was claimed to

disadvantage British investors w h o , having invested capital in the colonies should be
able to appoint the auditor of their choice (ppl47-148).
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These fears provided the basis of an alliance strategy undertaken by the Australian
professional associations. For example, the letterreferredto above was forwarded for
comment to the Corporation of Accountants of Australia by the N e w South Wales
Treasury Department

The response m a d e it clear that the Corporation considered

British chartered accountants should not be debarred from undertaking accountancy
work in any Australian state. Furthermore

. . . any Bill brought before the House affecting the profession of
Accountancy will be closely watched by the Council of this
Corporation, w h o will do all in their power to conserve the
interests of the profession, not only throughout the
Commonwealth, but they trust, throughout the Empire
(Correspondence, 1907, pl49).

Similar sentiments were expressed in the May and June 1907 Editorials of The Public
Accountant

(1907c, pl40; 1907d, pl57 respectively). Whilst some Australian

accountants quiterightlytook exception to perceived slurs on the abilities of members
of the Australian professional associations contained in the letter from the London
Institute (Editorial, 1907a), a conciliatory approach was necessary because the
support of the U K Institutes was needed if a Royal Charter was to be secured.

However, the assurances from the Corporation were to no avail, and, even if they had
persuaded the English institute to withdraw its opposition, other sections of the
Australian profession continued to oppose the petition. The Royal Charter petition
was officially refused on the basis that a charter should not be granted to individual
associations but to one representative body (Marshall, 1978, pl2; Corporation of
Accountants of Australia, 1907, p96; A C P A , 191 la, p206). It was further suggested
by the Colonial Office that the Australian accountancy profession should be regulated
by local legislation. In the absence of such legislation, any charter application should
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have the support of the Australian Federal Government (Poullaos, 1992, p79-80; 8383). This was the starting point for the second unsuccessful charter bid.
(ii) Second Charter Attempt
A s indicated in the counter-petition of the Corporation of Accountants, Australia and
the N e w South Wales Committee of the Society of Accountants and Auditors,
England, moves were already underway to form a federal association of practising
public accountants (Proposed Victorian Charter, paragraph

13). This movement

began in 1899 when the Institute of Accountants in South Australia, the Sydney
Institute of Public Accountants and the Incorporated Institute of Accountants
(Victoria) agreed to a system of uniform examinations (ACPA, 1911a, p204). In
1900, Queensland, Tasmania and N e w Zealand joined the scheme which operated
until 1905 (p204).

M o r e concrete steps toward a unified profession of public

accountants were set in motion in 1901 with agreement to draft a constitution to be
commented upon at a meeting in Adelaide the following year. A further meeting in
1903 produced a series ofresolutionswhich were later put to the members of the
various Institutes throughout Australia and N e w Zealand.

Despite protracted

negotiations, agreement could not be reached and the issue was dropped (p205).

Early in 1906, the Corporation of Accountants of Australia and the Sydney Institute
of Public Accountants entered into negotiations aimed at forming an association of all
practising public accountants in Australia (Corporation of Accountants of Australia,
1907, p97). Later that year, the Institutes in Melbourne were invited to consider the
amalgamation proposals developed by their Sydney counter-parts (ACPA, 1911a,
p206). The negotiations continued into 1907 when the scheme eventually came to
fruition with the formation of the Australasian Corporation of Public Accountants
( A C P A ) on June 14 (p207).
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It appears that a desire to create an organisation, the membership of which was
composed exclusively of practising public accountants, was the primary reason for the
formation of the A C P A . The various Institutes already in existence in Australia had
members w h o were not practising public accountants. The founders of the A C P A
considered "... the time had arrived when w e ought in justice to ourselves, to say
nothing of the advantage to the well-being of the general community, band the Public
Accountants into one body" ( A C P A , 1910b, ppl74-175).

This exclusion of non-practising accountants, in particular, those who had passed the
requisite examinations but had not yet entered private practice either in their o w n
right or as a clerk in a private practice appears to have been the major barrier to the
formation of the new association ( A C P A , 191 la, p207). This factor plus the support
given to the newly created A C P A by senior members of the Victorian Institute, some
of w h o m became office bearers of the A C P A , was to cause a rift between the two
bodies which persisted well into the 1920's (Graham, 1978, p5; A S A , undated, p2728; Marshall, 1978, pl3). A s will be discussed shortly, the exclusion of nonpractising accountants was also a major stumbling block in the ACPA's attempts to
attain a Royal Charter.

Clearly, the formation of the ACPA was not for the sole purpose of obtaining a Royal
Charter for a federated association of accountants. However, within two years of its
creation, the A C P A lodged a petition for a Royal Charter through the Australian
Federal Government (Graham, 1978, p7). The purpose of applying for a Royal
Charter was to obtain for Australian public accountants the recognition and status
accorded chartered accountants in the U K ( A C P A , 1910b, pl75; Editorial 1913b,
p75). A s with the charter attempt of the Victorian accountants in 1905, there was
considerable opposition to the application.
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Opposition was again voiced by the chartered accountants in the U K with regard to
the usage of the designation "Chartered Accountant" (Graham, 1978, p7; A C P A ,
1911b, p232). Frank Yarwood, a foundation member of the A C P A and long time
member of the Sydney Institute of Public Accountants went to London in a bid to
counter these objections ( A C P A , 1911b, p232). Yarwood proposed that Australian
chartered accountants be permitted to use the designation but, to remove any possible
confusion, "(Aust)." be added for members of the Australian chartered body (p232).
This compromise was accepted and the I C A E W promised its support for the
Australian charter (p233; A C P A , 1910b, pl75).

The second source of opposition was not so readily overcome. The Incorporated
Institute of Accountants, Victoria objected to any charter being granted to an
association consisting entirely of public accountants and was able to enlist the support
of the Victorian Government in the pursuit of its opposition (Graham, 1978, p7;
A C P A , 1910a, pl34; A C P A , 1910b, pl75).

The exclusionary tactics of the ACPA clearly had some element of snobbery attached
to it Statements in Editorials in The Public Accountant and by leaders of the A C P A
such as Thomas Brentnall make it clear that accountants not in public practice were
considered to be second-rate citizens being described as "commercial book-keepers"
and "clerks" (Editorial, 1911b, p245; A C P A , 1912c, p236). Brenmall's Presidential
address to the third Annual General Meeting of the A C P A clearly indicated the view
held of accountants not in public practice:
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A membership of 427 Public Accountants and their clerks
throughout the Commonwealth . . . sufficiently indicated the
approval with which the movement to differentiate the practising
from the general office accountant has been received. ... it is not
intended to institute any invidious comparisons or to belittle the
importance of the latter class, but one cannot lose sight of the fact
that the varied nature of our work, as compared with the daily
routine of the general clerk, in itself constitutes a distinction and
difference which enforce recognition (1910a, pl33).

In fairness to the A C P A , the insistence on members being in public practice in
addition to having passed the requisite examinations was not a purely elitist stance.
This approach which, in the terms of this study, can be seen as an alliance strategy or
structural coupling, was necessary if the opposition to the charter application from the
public accountants of the U K was to be overcome. W h e n Yarwood visited London in
1909, the question of the charter was discussed with the accountants of England and
Wales.

In addition to the stipulation that a clear distinction be m a d e between

Australian chartered accountants and those in the U K , a minimum of three year's
training in a public accountant's office was to be a mandatory membership
requirement if the I C A E W was to support the charter application ( A C P A , 1911b,
pp232-233). The I C A E W had implied this stipulation as early as 1906. In November
1906, The Public Accountant

reproduced an Editorial from The

Accountant

(England) which stated:
... it would be desirable that throughout His Majesty's dominions
the term "Chartered Accountant" should be recognised as being
synonymous with "qualified accountant" but that its use should be
limited to those w h o are really qualified to practice . . . (The
Public Accountant, 1906, p39).

The A C P A steadfastly adhered to this viewpoint insisting that a charter would not be
granted to Australian accountants unless the application was lodged by an association
consisting entirely of "bone fide" practising public accountants ( A C P A , 1911b,
pp232-233; 1912c, p237; Editorials, 1912, p251; 1913b, p74).
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In addition to its argument that support of the U K chartered accountants rested upon
the requirement that membership of the proposed Australian chartered body be
restricted to those in public practice and their clerks, the A C P A also maintained that
experience in public practice was essential in the public interest. From the perspective
of this study, this approach is consistent with a desire to demonstrate professionalism
as an altruistic motive is part of the professionalisation process.

In Editorials in The Public Accountant, ACPA Annual Meetings and Dinner addresses
this concept of experience in addition to examinations and itsrelationshipto the
public interest was frequently raised (eg. A C P A 1910a, b; 1911a, b; 1913; 1915;
Editorial, 1914). It was, for example, argued that the ability to pass examinations did
not m a k e a public accountant. Practice in the office of a public accountant was
essential training for those w h o were to offer their services as qualified public
accountants because practitioners should not learn at the expense of their clients
( A C P A , 1912c, p226; Editorial 1914, p66; A C P A , 1914, p66). The objective of the
A C P A was stated as being
. . . not so much to provide members with degrees and
designations as to give the public a means of protection . . . from
incompetent work and also from certain malpractices ... the
attainment of these objectives [made] it necessary in the interests
of the public to m a k e practical experience in the work of a Public
Accountant an absolute essential for those wishing to qualify for
membership ( A C P A , 1913, p203).

The ACPA did attempt to overcome the opposition to the charter of the Victorian
Institutes. The 1912 A C P A , Victoria Branch, Annual Report stated
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The Victorian Local Council have during the year, by means of a
small committee, endeavoured to bring about a better feeling
between the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, and
this body, with a view to inducing the Institute to withdraw its
opposition to the proposed charter ( A C P A , 1912c, ppl93-194).

The compromises offered by the ACPA included providing for Commercial
Examinations open to "commercial book-keepers" who, if they passed, were eligible
for membership if they entered public practice or became clerks in the office of a
public accountant (Editorial, 1911b, p245; A C P A , 1912a, pl57). Provision was also
made for those w h o were members of "specified local" institutes to join the A C P A
on commencing public practice (ACPA, 1912a, pl57; A C P A , 1912c, pp237-238).
This compromise was accepted by all therelevantinstitutes and societies except the
Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria (ACPA, 1912c, p238).

The other source of opposition to the ACPA's charter application came from
Australian governments, in particular, the Commonwealth

Government and the

Victorian State Government. The support of the Commonwealth Government had
been specified by the Colonial Office as a pre-requisite to the granting of a charter
when the Victorian charter application was refused (Poullaos, 1992, p79-80; 83-83).
Poullaos argues that the support of the Commonwealth Government was not
forthcoming during the second charter bid because the A C P A had alienated it by its
frequentreferencestothe constitutional barrierstofederal legislation (p84). A review
of The Public Accountant provides ample evidence of what could be seen as a total
lack of tact on the part of the A C P A with regard to this issue. For example, Brentnall
argued at the Second Annual Dinner of the A C P A that a Royal Charter as a means of
incorporation was sought because the Commonwealth Constitution made it
impossible to achieve incorporation which would be effective throughout all of the
States (1910b, pl75). A slightly more pointed comment appeared in the Editorial of
The Public Accountant in November 1912 where it was stated that it was practically
impossible and unreasonable to expect all the States to submit similar legislation for
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approval by the Federal Parliament (1912, p250). References to the constitutional
barriers to uniform legislation also appeared in Editorials in January and M a y 1913
(1913a, p4; 1913b, p73). Yarwood's Presidential Address to the Fifth Annual
Meeting of the A C P A was even more tactless in thatreferenceswere made to State
jealousies and expressed the view that "... in the present condition of Australian
politics, there is [not] the slightest hope of anything beingreferredby all the States to
the Federal Parliament" ( A C P A , 1912b, p236).

However, the constitutional barrier was not the only aspect of local legislation
driving the A C P A towards a Royal Charter. It appears the A C P A did notreallywant
local incorporation even if it was Australia wide and its arguments could well be seen
as a slur on the n e w Commonwealth. Yarwood, for example, argued that a Chartered
degree would be recognised world-wide while a "purely local degree" would not
( A C P A , 1912b, p239). World-wide recognition meant reciprocal agreements could
be m a d e so that Australian chartered accountants would be able to work as such in
other countries (pp239-241). Similar sentiments were expressed in the M a y 1913
Editorial of The Public Accountant which further stated "... the object in view in
connection with this application has been the obtainment of a designation and status
for Australia similar to those which hold good in the Old Country... "(1913b, p74).

Given that the Commonwealth was still in its infancy, it is not unlikely that the var
Australian governments would take exception to such statements even if the
constitutional arguments were valid. Before embarking upon its charter bid, the
A C P A had taken the trouble of seeking the opinion of "eminent Counsel" including a
former U K Attorney-General and a constitutional lawyer, all of w h o m expressed the
view that the Commonwealth Constitution would preclude the possibility of effective
incorporation throughout Australia (1910b, pl75).

150

It appears the Victorian State Government took particular exception to the idea of a
Royal Charter mamtaining that the process was "archaic" and therefore, Australian
accountants should be regulated by local legislation rather than the "old country"
( A C P A 1910b, pl76).

Victoria's opposition was mentioned at various A C P A

meetings and annual dinners. Brentnall raised the issue at the Third Annual General
Meeting in 1910 ( (1910a, pl34). Yarwood referred to Victoria's opposition at the
ACPA's Annual Dinner in 1911 and the Fifth Annual Meeting in 1912 ( A C P A , 1911b,
p233; A C P A , 1912b, p235).

These references suggest that the opposition of the

Victorian Government was based more on its support of the Incorporated Institute
of Accountants, Victoria than on any other issue. During the course of the third
charter bid, Brentnall m a d e it clear that this was the basis of the Victorian
Government's opposition to the second charter application:
The action of the Incorporated Institute was the dominant factor
which led to our defeat because through their poUtical influence
the Victorian Government were induced to withhold their consent,
avowedly on the ground that Australia ought to be competent to
grant all the protection which was needed for the profession
within its borders ( A C P A , 1924a, pill).

Whatever the reasons behind the Commonwealth and Victorian Government's
opposition to the charter, it was apparently too strong to turn thetideat this time. In
April 1914, The Public Accountant stated "... the opposition has been politically too
strong, and ... it is not likely the matter will be pursued further" (Editorial, 1914,
p66). The outbreak of World W a r I and the necessary preoccupation of the British
Government with it sealed the fate of the second charter attempt and the matter was
dropped ( A C P A , 1915, p85).
(iii) Third Charter Attempt
In 1923, a third and final movement was begun in the quest for a Royal Charter
(BrentnalL 1938, p69). Initially, this attempt looked destined for the same fate as the
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prior attempts. However, just as an autopoietic system learns to survive, it appears
that the A C P A and its major protagonist, the Incorporated Institute of Accountants,
Victoria, m a y have realised that if either organisation was to secure and maintain a
prominent place in society, compromise would be necessary.

Perhaps both

organisations recognised the validity of an article in The Accountant (England) which
stated
A Charter is hardly likely to be granted, unless supported by the
whole of the accountancy profession in Australia at least
... if an absence of unanimity is found fatal to legislation in
Australia, it is likely to be found equally fatal to any movement for
the incorporation of one only of the accountancy bodies in
Australasia by Royal Charter (Reproduced in The Public
Accountant, 1913b, pp96-97).

According to Marshall, both the ACPA and the Commonwealth Institute were wellestablished (1978, pl3). The Victorian Institute had increased its membership not
only within Victoria but throughout Australia and, as a consequence, had amended its
titletothe Commonwealth Institute of Accountants in 1922 (pl3; Graham, 1978, p8).
A s suggested previously, the A C P A had established itself as a well-respected
professional association as early as 1912.

One of the clearest indications of a change in the approach of the ACPA towards not
only their Victorian adversaries but also the Commonwealth Government was the lack
of mention of the third charter attempt in 77i* Public Accountant and public addresses
by senior members of the A C P A .

Brentnall, for example, referred to charter

negotiations at the N e w South Wales Branch Annual Dinner in 1924 but only to say
that so far no progress had been m a d e but there was still hope ( A C P A , 1924b, pl78).
At the Seventeenth Ordinary Meeting of Members in October of that year, Brentnall
had m a d e more extensive comment regarding the charter application but m a d e it clear
that even though the Victorian opposition was painful "beyond words" he still had
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"nothing but the kindest feelings" for the Institute of which he had earlier held office
as President and Vice-President ( A C P A , 1924a, pi 12). Yarwood was a little more
antagonistic stating in 1925 that Australia should not be prevented from getting what
it was entitled to "through little jealousies" (New South Wales, 1925, pl45). The
Editorial column of The Public Accountant was remarkably silent on the issue and, in
general, there was no return to the acerbity that characterised reports on the previous
attempt including reference to the "antagonistic spirit" and "dog-in-the manger"
tactics of the Victorian Institute being, as it was, a "less publicly important"
organisation (1912, p250; 1914, p66).

There was also a clear change in the approach of the now Commonwealth Institute to
the A C P A . In 1924, the A C P A once again lodged a formal charter application with
the Privy Council and the Commonwealth Institute, predictably, lodged a counterpetition (Marshall, 1978, pl3; A S A , undated, p28; A C P A , 1925, pi 14). However, in
this instance, opposition was not based on the exclusion of non-practising accountants
but on the granting of a charter to a specified accountancy association (Marshall,
1978, pl4; A S A , undated, p28; A C P A , 1925, pi 14).

At the 1925 Annual General Meeting of the ACPA, Brentnall reproduced the
Presidential Address of the latest Annual Meeting of the Commonwealth Institute
( A C P A , 1925, ppl 14-115). The address set out the reasons (as indicated above) for
the counter petition lodged by the Council of the Institute and suggested meetings of
all practising accountants throughout the country with a view to renewing the charter
application on behalf of "every reputable and genuine practising accountant
throughout Australia" (pi 15). Brentnall expressed the view there was "little or
nothing to object" to in this proposal and informed the members that meetings had
already been held in Melbourne to "reconcile long-standing differences of opinion"
(pH5).
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Early in 1926, agreement was reached between the two bodies. The terms of the
resolution included that members of the Commonwealth institute w h o had passed the
full examinations of that body prior to the date of the granting of the charter should be
eligible for membership of the chartered body on entering public practice. This was
similar to the provisions the A C P A had already included in its articles except, of
course, that prospective members previously had been required to sit for A C P A
examinations so thisrepresentsa clear compromise on its part. In addition, the A C P A
and the Commonwealth Institute were to have equal representation on the first
Council of the n e w chartered body. It was also agreed that all negotiations and
correspondencerelativeto this agreement be kept strictly confidential being disclosed
only to members of the General Councils of the two bodies until such time as the
Victorian Attorney-General withdrew that State's objection to the charter application
(Graham, 1978, pp8-9). This perhaps explains the lack of public reference to the
charter bid and also the scant almost negligible,recordsof the negotiations (p8).

The other hurdle to be overcome in the quest for a charter was gaining the active
support of the Commonwealth Government. This had been a stipulation imposed by
the Colonial Office since the time of thefirstcharter application. A s discussed
previously, this had not been forthcoming. In 1923, however, Stanley Melbourne
Bruce became Australia's Prime Minister and lent active support to the charter bid
(Graham, 1978, pll). Bruce apparently had a desire to cultivate a close relationship
between Australia and Britain and, according to Graham,"... saw the Royal Charter
asfittingevidence of the special nature of thisrelationship"(pll).

With all hurdles effectively removed, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Australia came into existence with the granting of a Royal Charter on 19 June, 1928,
to Thomas Brentnall, George Mason Allard and Henry Joshua Wise on behalf of the
public accountants of Australia (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia.
Royal Charter; Editorial, 1928, p3).
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POST-PROFESSIONALISATION ACTIVITIES
A s suggested in the foregoing, the Australian profession, in particular, the practising
public accountants, had endeavoured to attain

public recognition of their

professionalism through claims to superior knowledge and skill acquired and
demonstrated by the passing of examinations and practical training and experience.
State and public recognition of professionalism was sought both in Australia and
overseas through the acquisition of a Royal Charter incorporating the practising
public accountants into one body politic, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Australia. This was eventually achieved in 1928.

Commercial accountants, or those in private as opposed to public practice tended to
be a more disparate group at this time with a large number of accountancy
associations in existence. In 1952, the Australian Society of Accountants (now the
Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants), was formed through the
amalgamation of the Commonwealth Institute of Accountants, the Federal Institute of
Accountants and the Association of Accountants of Australia (Zeff, 1973, pi; A S A ,
undated, pix; Fitzgerald, 1962, p290). Fitzgerald termed the formation of the A S A ".
.. a marked return to sanity in the organisation of a unified profession" (p290).

The ICAA and the ASCPA represent the two major accountancy associations in
Australia and as such, they control

entry to the profession through rules of

membership in the form of education and training requirements and a code of ethics.
However, membership of professional accountancy associations is not mandatory and
the situation prevails whereby anyone w h o so wishes can call themselves an
accountant even if they cannot use the designations reserved for members of
professional associations. Nevertheless, membership of professional associations, as
evidenced by the use of identifying initials after the members name, carries status and
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prestige and this m a y act as an inducement for those w h o are qualified to join the
appropriate professional association. In this sense, the formation of a professional
association and the achievement of public recognition and acceptance of its autonomy
and monopoly over its area of knowledge in terms of determining educational and
training requirements and ethical codes is a form of mobilisation.

Mobilisation is aimed at ensuring that the enrolling agent is not betrayed by the
enrolled. In other words, therepresentationsof interest remain fixed (Clegg, 1989,
p205). This is the final and, arguably, the most critical phase of the translation
process as it is seeking a transition from enrolment or alliance, to active support
(Callon, 1986, p218). A s Callon puts it only one voice will be heard. Mobilisation is
directed towards avoiding betrayal by enrolled agencies so thatrelationsof meaning
and membership remain fixed as do rules of practice.

Until fairly recent times, accountancy had rules of entry as determined by education,
training and a code of ethics but it did not have formal rules of meaning or of practice.
These did not begin to emerge until towards the middle of this century and, until
recendy, were not binding on anyone other than members of the professional
associations. The setting of accounting and auditing standards and guidelines is a
form of mobilisation because of the threat of denial of membership of a professional
association for non-compliance with them.

This is so even if membership is not

compulsory because of the perceived status and prestige attached to membership of a
given professional association. A s the profession in Australia exerts considerable
influence on the education of aspiring accountants, normative isomorphism also helps
ensure compliance with standards set by the profession.

The accomplishment of legal backing for standards approved by the AASB is another
example of mobilisation by the profession, particularly since the merger of the
Accounting Standards Board and the A S R B .

The profession n o w has de facto
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control of the rules of practice through its research arm, the A A R F . Similarly, the
statutory provisions requiring auditors to state whether or not accounting standards
have been complied with m a y also act as incentive for management to apply the
accounting standards prescribed by the accountancy profession. Therefore, not only
are accounting standards a form of mobilisation but so is the company legislation
which gives compliance with them legitimacy.

Accounting standards also provide the basis of the accountancy profession's exercise
of episodic agency power not only over members of the profession but company
management w h o are obliged by law to comply with accounting standards. The
practitioner, particularly the auditor, also has a certain level of autonomy based on
"professional expertise" in the interpretation of accounting standards and, thereby, a
degree of episodic agency power over company management. Episodic agency power
is the most visible of the power circuits because it is the circuit through which
outcomes are secured (Clegg, 1989, p211). It is therealisationof the translation
process in that in order to exercise power at this level, control of the obligatory
passage points must have been achieved at the dispositional and facilitative levels.

The following section of this chapter will deal briefly with the history of the standard
setting process in Australia including the achievement by the two major professional
associations of control of that process with the express blessing of the State.

Once

again, it is not intended to attempt an exhaustive study of this aspect of the
professionalisation process. K e y events such as the decision to issue accounting
recommendations, the establishment of research bodies and committees and,
eventually, the creation of the A S R B

will be used

to demonstrate the

professionalisation process and the activities of the two major professional bodies in
attaining domination of the standard setting process.

Where appropriate, the

experiences of the professions in the U S A and the U K will be referred to. This will
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only occur, however, where the Australian profession has clearly indicated that it has
been influenced by these activities.
Australian Accounting Standards
Australian accounting standards are a fairly recent phenomenon arising, it would
seem, not out of any pressing urgency on the part of the accountancy profession to
protect the public interest but out of a desire to maintain professional autonomy. As
noted above, the formation of professional associations,registrationof the profession
and the attainment of a Royal Charter for practising public accountants were all
argued for on the premise of their desirability in the public interest. Accounting
standards, on the other hand, appear to have heen in response to a perception that if
the profession did not set them, the legislators would. For example, in discussing A.
A. Fitzgerald's paper dealing with accounting standards presented at the Australian
Congress on Accounting in Sydney in 1949, C W M Court, State Registrar of the
Western Australian branch of the I C A A , stated that "[c]omplacency on the part of the
profession will mean compulsion,regimentationand legislation" and, therefore, the
profession should act and ". . . give the legislators no excuse to legislate for
improvement of our standards" (Fitzgerald, 1949, p40). This fear of legislative
interference appears to have been based on the position in which the establishment of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed the profession in the U S A .
Fitzgerald made specific and detailedreferenceto instances in the U S A and U K which
should serve as warnings to the Australian profession.
Learning From Others

(i) The USA Experience
During the 1920's, the profession in the U S A was subjected to increasing criticism for
failure to producefinancialstatements which provided adequate information for the
use of shareholders, the state and the general public (Ripley, 1972, pi65).

One
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suggestion was that the Federal Trade Commission, created by statute in 1914, to
require corporations to file special and annual reports in accordance with rules
specified and prescribed by the Commission (p215).

A s one would expect, the

profession disagreed with this course of action. G. O. M a y , a prominent member of
the American Institute of Accountants, suggested instead that efforts should be made
to deterrriine the properresponsibilitiesof auditors (who at this time bore the brunt of
the criticism for inadequate financial statements) and h o w to ensure that these
responsibilities were carried out (May, 1936, p54). It was further suggested that cooperation with other bodies, including stock exchanges and banks, should be sought
in this endeavour (p56). Hence, M a y was suggesting what this study would term an
alliance strategy in overcoming the threat of legislative interference.

However, this scheme did not come to fruition and the stock market crash of 1929
brought more extensive criticism of the accountancy profession:
The stock market crash in the fall of 1929 was a catastrophe
beyond the worst predictions of the most pessimistic observers.
The financial community was in a state of shock. Thirty billion
dollars of quoted value of securities vanished in less than a month.
Banks failed and, in some states, were closed. Financial paralysis
gripped the country. Public reaction was bitter, and a critical
review of the process of the financial market, including financial
reporting practices, became an obvious political necessity. (Carey,
1979, p245)

In the wake of this catastrophe, the New York Stock Exchange issued an invitation to
the American Institute to appoint a committee to work in cooperation with the
Exchange with a view to improving financialreporting,including a reduction of the
number of accounting methods used to deal with similar transactions (Zeff, 1971,
pl21). The invitation was accepted and the Special Committee on Cooperation with
Stock Exchanges, with M a y as chairman, was appointed. Thus began thefirstformal
attempt to develop a set of agreed upon accounting principles although it was not
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considered appropriate to specify detailed methods of accounting.

Individual

corporations were to be left to select, within the broad principles formulated, the
methods most suited to their business (May, 1936, pl20). However, despite the
formulation of a number of recommendations, no substantive action was taken by the
profession.

In 1933 and 1934, federal legislation was introduced for the regulation of interstat
securities markets and national securities exchanges. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was created to administer these Acts and, most importantly, from
the profession's viewpoint had the power to prescribe the accounting and auditing
practices to be adopted in the preparation of financialreportsfiledwith it under the
Acts. The S E C did not invoke its powers in this regard other than to require the audit
and certification of financial statements and annual reports by an independent public
accountant (Zeff, 1971, pl30).

However, when, by 1935-36, there were still a

number and variety of accounting practices in use, the S E C began to issue threats to
use its powers to improve accounting practices. Initially, such threats were somewhat
veiled. For example, in 1937, the then S E C Commissioner, Robert Healy, stated:
It seems to me, that one great difficulty has been that there has
been no body which had the authority to fix and maintain
standards [of accounting]. I believe that such a body n o w exists in
the Securities and Exchange Commission. (1938 p5)

By 1939, the threat was quite explicit In its report to Congress, the SEC stated that
if the profession was "unwilling or unable" to "maintain and improve the standards of
accounting practice", the S E C would use their statutory powers to do so (Zeff, 1971,
pl39).

The profession's response, via the American Institute, was to increase the membership
of its Committee on Accounting Procedures (which was appointed in 1933 under the
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title Special Committee on the Development of Accounting Procedure and renamed in
1936) from seven members to twenty-one members. The composition of membership
was also changed to no longer include members of the large accounting firms only but
also those of the smaller firms andrepresentativesfromaccounting academia.

At its initial meeting the Committee discussed the feasibility and desirability of
developing a comprehensive statement of accounting principles as a guide to day to
day practice. However, it was concluded that such a task would be too time
consuming and the S E C m a y not be prepared to await the outcome. The plan was
rejected and the Committee instead addressed specific problems as and when they
arose. In addition, both the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
( A I C P A ) and American Accounting Association ( A A A ) commissioned studies of
accounting principles while an independent study was also conducted. These were:

1936 Tentative Statement of Corporate Accounting Principles
Underlying Corporate Financial Statements, A A A

1938 A Statement of Accounting Principles, AICPA

1940 An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards, Paton and
Littleton

The major purpose of these studies was to describe existing practice rather than
prescribe accounting practice.

The activities of the USA profession can be seen as taking place within the circuit of
dispositional power at the level of social integration. Co-operation with other
organisations is not only a process of creating alliances but also of constructing an
"actor-network", "organisationalfield"or "field of force" (Clegg, 1989, p225). As
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noted in Chapter 2, accountancy is only one element of the regulatory framework. B y
seeking to involve stock exchanges and banks in its attempts to discover the principles
of accounting, the American Institute was attempting to enlist their support by
recognising their existence within the regulatory framework.

The attempts to formulate accounting principles were efforts to establish rules of
practice or modes of rationality which would provide the solutions to the problems
facing not only accountancy, but others within the business and regulatory field. In
particular, by assisting corporations and accountants, including auditors, to prepare
more useful financial statements for the information of users. In this respect, the
m o v e to identify and formulate accounting principles appears to have been a
problematisation process in response to exogenous forces arising from innovation in
techniques of discipline and production within the facilitative circuit at the level of
systems integration (Clegg, 1989, p224). The Wall Street crash and other corporate
failures of the 1930's, for example the Kreuger and McKesson and Robbins cases
(Fitzgerald, 1949, pl7) forced the profession to acknowledge the need for change in
the existing rules of practice which, prior to the establishment of the S E C , extended
only to incorporation. There were no controls over disclosure in published financial
statements.

At the professional level, attention had previously focused on

terminology and auditing procedures (Zeff, 1971, pi 19).

N o w , in response to

corporate failures and the criticism of the accountancy profession which followed it
the professionre-directedits attention to accounting methods.

By directing its attention to formulating accounting principles in response to
corporate failures, the American Institute was also using the translation process of
interessement. Interessement means to c o m e between (Callon, 1986, p208; Clegg,
1989, p205). Hence, there must be at least three groups or elements in this process.
A s already discussed, Lee (1990, pl38), Larson (1977, p58) and Johnson (1972,
ppl3-14) see the work of the professional as crisisrelevant,that is, the professional
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stands between the client and disaster. The professional thus is attempting to put
itself in an agencyrelationshipby avowedly using its expert knowledge and skill for
the benefit of those in crisis. In this particular case, the American Institute appears to
have been attempting to not only assist business but to also ensure that published
financial statements were useful to those w h o relied on them. Hence, the American
Institute was attempting to form an agencyrelationshipbetween itself and the users of
financial statements.

The activities of the profession in establishing committees to consider accounting
procedures and commissioning independent studies were methods of "organisational
outflanking" (Clegg, 1989, pl9; 218-240). The profession appears to have been
attempting to outmanoeuvre the government and any others w h o sought to assume
control of accounting practices by using resources such as its experience and
accounting knowledge to maintain its autonomy. The success of the profession is
evident in that the S E C did not invoke its statutory powers with regard to prescribing
accounting practices to be used in the preparation of financial statements.
(ii) The UK Experience
With regard to the U K , Fitzgerald contended that interest in accounting practice was
sparked by the Royal Mail case (1949, pi4). Prior to this, accounting practice in the
U K was a matter of individual judgment and any attempt to prescribe the form or
content of financial statements was frowned upon (1949, pl4). During the 1930's,
there was a progressive change in this approach. This change was clearly designed to
forestall government interference and, as such, can be seen as "organisational
outflanking" in m u c h the same way as the activities of the American Institute.
However, the U K approach was, perhaps, a more blatant and calculated example of
organisational outflanking. In 1932, the then president of the I C A E W , H L H Hill, in
discussing company law with regard, inter alia, to the duties of auditors recognised
the inadequacies of the law and the fact that it was not difficult to stay within the law
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and at the same time, prepare accounts that did not provide useful information or
could even be misleading (The Accountant, 1932, p45). Hill did not consider that
auditors should hide behind inadequate legislation nor should they be content with
meeting the m i n i m u m obligations of the law (p45,46). The profession should, in fact,
lead the way:

There is always a lag, and legislation with which we are concerned
is always framed upon the best accountancy practice. W e m u s t
therefore, take the lead so that, if and when fresh legislation is
enacted, there m a y be by that time an established practice in
accountancy in advance of the requirements of present-day
legislation, and established practice that will assist and direct those
w h o frame the law to institute further safeguards for investors and
the public (p45).

The risk in not taking such a leading role was that legislation could be instituted w
would reduce auditors to "mere automata" obeying "audit programmes laid d o w n by
statute" (p46).

In other words, auditors would lose their ability to exercise

professional judgment Hill also specifically discussed the Royal Mail case and its
impact on the profession and again expressed the view that the profession should not
be content to restrict theirresponsibilitiesand obligations to the minimum
requirements of the law (p46). The profession had a responsibility to those w h o relied
on the balance sheet and accounts to ensure that they did not present an incorrect
view or wrong impression. From this last, it is clear that Hill was also indicating a
form of agency relationship between the profession and the users of financial
statements (p46).

The accountants in the UK did not follow the same path as their USA counter-parts in
that they appear to have initially concentrated on influencing company legislation.
However, in 1942, the I C A E W began issuing recommendations on accounting
principles (Fitzgerald, 1949, pi6).
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(iii) Australia's T e p i d R e s p o n s e
It is clear from Fitzgerald's paper and the commentary and discussion which followed
it that not only Fitzgerald but other members of the profession saw the need for
Australian accountants to learn from the experiences of both the U S A and the U K and
to develop standards of practice.

In particular, Fitzgerald saw the lack of

"authoritatively expressed accounting standards" as an unsuspected weakness of the
profession which was brought to light by abuses of the corporate form. In turn,
abuses of the corporate form highlighted the limitations of accounting practice based
on convention (ppl7-18). Fitzgerald urged the profession in Australia to "actively"
pursue research into accounting standards and not wait for "atomic bombs" such as
those in the U S A and the U K to shatter their complacency and arouse their selfinterest (pi 8).

Both the ICAA and the Commonwealth Institute of Accountants had, by this time,
begun issuing guidelines to their members.

The Commonwealth Institute had

established a Committee on Accounting Principles in 1938 (ASA, undated, p47; Zeff,
1973, p29).

This committee issued a pronouncement on cash discounts allowable

and receivable in 1940 (ASA, undated, p47; Zeff, 1973, pp29-30). N o further
pronouncements had been produced by the time of the Australian Accountancy
Congress in 1949.

However, an Accounting Research Committee had been

established in 1948 (Zeff, 1973, p32).

The ICAA issued five Recommendations on Accounting Principles in 1946 with two
more being issued in 1947 and 1948 (Zeff, 1973, p3).

The titles of these

pronouncements were identicaltothose issued by the I C A E W :

Form of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account
The Treatment of Taxation in Accounts
The Inclusion in Accounts of Proposed Profit Appropriations
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Reserves and Provisions
Disclosure of the Financial Position and Results of Subsidiary Companies in
the Accounts of Holding Companies
Depreciation of Fixed Assets
The Valuation of Stock in Trade

The use of the overall designation, Recommendations on Accounting Principles, and
their content was also taken from the I C A E W (ICAA, 1966, p3; Zeff, 1973, p3).
The content of the Recommendations was modified in light of local conditions
(ICAA, 1966, p3).

This is an example of mimetic isomorphism in that the ICAA was deliberately
imitating the I C A E W . A s discussed in Chapter 2, an organisation will imitate what it
considers to be a more legitimate or successful organisation when there is uncertainty
or ambiguity arising from innovation in techniques of discipline or production
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, pl52). Ambiguity and uncertainty would have arisen
in part because accountancy, as an organised profession, was only just beginning to
establish rules of practice and meaning. There was no tried and tested mechanism for
the process and, perhaps more importantly, both accountants and corporate
management had been autonomous is determining appropriate accounting methods
and practices in individual situations. Ambiguity, therefore, could be seen as arising
from a lack of knowledge of what practices were generally in use. Uncertainty would
have existed as to h o w accountants and directors might respond to any attempt by a
professional association to prescribe accounting practices.

The ICAA was relatively "young" compared to the ICAEW. It had already styled
itself on the I C A E W in terms of its rules of membership Therefore, it is not unusual
that the rules of practice formulated by the I C A E W were also adopted by the ICAA.
Zeff sresearchsupports this contention. In a study of the development of accounting
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principles in Australia sponsored by the A S A , Zeff found that some members of the
I C A A considered it appropriate to follow the Recommendations of the I C A E W in
light of its "more mature professional experience" (1973, p9).

Despite this early start into the arena of formally determining accounting practices, t
profession in Australia made little progress towards the setting of accounting
standards during the 1950's and early 1960's other than the establishment of various
research committees such as the Australian Chartered Accountants' Research and
Service Foundation created by the I C A A in 1956 (Zeff, 1973, p6).

This dearth of

Australian progress in developing accounting standards was raised by Fitzgerald in
1962. Fitzgeraldreiteratedthe view that what had spurred the research activities of
the 1930's and 1940's had been corporate failures and scandals and expressed the
hope that the profession in Australia would not wait for "another series of financial
cataclysms" to spur it to action (1962, p293, 294). It was, in fact, a series of
corporate failures that brought criticism of the Australian profession and finally
prompted ittomore significant action than what had been taken in the past.
Australian Accountancy's "Atomic Bombs"
The 1960's saw the failure of some of Australia's most prominent companies including
Reid Murray Holdings Ltd, Stanhill Development Finance Ltd and H. G. Palmer
(Consolidated) Ltd (ASA, 1966; Birkett & Walker, 1971). The failure of these
companies and the subsequent investigations into them brought considerable criticism
of the accountancy profession. T o quote Birkett and Walker:
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M a n y of the failures followed hard on the heels of the publication
of audited financial statements depicting a profitable past and an
apparently sound present
The inspectors' reports later
documented breakdowns in accountability. M a n y of the failed
companies had been in a state of crisis for some considerable
period prior to their ultimate collapse. Their financial statements
had not only failed to inform investors - they had also been
misleading. These financial statements had been prepared by
accountants, signed by auditors. In the public's eye they were the
responsibility of the accounting profession (1971, pl31).

It appears that both the I C A A and the A S A were somewhat slow in accepting
responsibility for the inadequacy of financial statements of failed companies.
However, in 1964, the General Council of the ASA expressed its concern at the
publicity which inspectors' reports into failed companies was generating in the press
and instituted a study of some of these reports (ASA, 1966, p4; Zeff, 1973, p37).
The results of the study were issued in 1966 under the title, Accounting Principles
and Practices Discussed in Reports on Company Failures (ASA, 1966). The General
Council argued that many of the criticisms of accounting principles found in the
inspectors' reports were either unjustified or unsoundly based (p5). However, it was
conceded that criticisms of directors, management and financial policies did have
implications for the profession as did the many departures from generally accepted
accounting principles detailed in the reports (p5).

In response to these criticisms and their implications for the accountancy profession,
General Council considered there should be proper control and development of the
profession and its members (p28). The matters which General Council considered to
be of prime importance to the profession were:

(a) the establishment and promulgation of generally
accepted accounting principles and standards of conduct
(b) the continued adherence to these by members of the
profession
(c) disciplinary action to be taken by the profession against
members for conduct derogatory to the profession of an
accountant

168

(d)

publication of any disciplinary action taken as in other
professions (ASA, 1966, pp31-32).

The Accounting Research Committee of General Council was instructed to undertake
research with a view to the formulation, promulgation and review of accounting
principles for the guidance of members. Care was to be taken, however, that these
activities did not inhibit continuing enquiry or future changes in accounting practices
in response to changing circumstances (p28). There was, however, a difficulty with
this. The A S A had, as yet, not issued any statements dealing with

recommended

practice. This was partly due to the cost involved in formulating and promulgating
such statements. A further consideration was that such activities would put the A S A
in direct competition with the I C A A which had issued Recommendations to its
members (Zeff, 1973, p37). The alternative, the creation of a jointly sponsored
research foundation, had been proposed in 1964 (Zeff, 1973, pll). In 1965, the
Accountancy Research Foundation came into existence (p43).

The aim of the Accountancy Research Foundation was "... the consolidation and
dissemination of extant accounting and auditing principles and unresolved problems of
accounting and auditing ..." (Boehme & Braddock, 1965, p318).

However, its

functions did not extend to issuing Recommendations which remained the prerogative
of the I C A A and the A S A (Zeff, 1973, p44).

Both associations continued to

formulate their o w n principle statements with a consequent duplication of effort. In
1971, the futility of this exercise was identified and moves were made to bring the
standard setting processes under the umbrella of the Research Foundation (p21).
1973 saw the separate standard setting activities of the I C A A and A S A brought under
the auspices of a restructured and renamed research foundation, the Australian
Accounting Research Foundation ( A A R F ) (Gibson, 1988, p29).

In 1974, the

Australian Accounting Standards Committee assumed, as part of the A A R F , the
responsibility for developing accounting standards (Balmford, 1977, p546).

169

The profession was finally united in terms of formulating rules of practice at least
This was an essential step if the profession was to achieve episodic agency power
because the key to this circuit of the power framework is the creation of agency
relationships through effective organisation. A s suggested in the discussion of the
corporate failures in the U S A and the U K which led to the moves in those countries
to formulate accounting principles, the agencyrelationshipthe profession was to forge
was between it and the public, in particular, the investing public. Thisrelationshipwill
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
The Role of Accounting Standards - Uniformity v Disclosure
A s noted previously, the General Council of the A S A had not only seen the
establishment and promulgation of generally accepted accounting principles and
standards of conduct as pressing matters for the profession, but also the adherence to
these by members of the profession. Failure to do so would, ideally,resultnot only in
disciplinary action but its publication (ASA, 1966, pp31-32). This approach was
consistent with a need to reduce diversity in accounting practice identified as early as
1953 with the establishment of the ASA's Research Committee.

The aim of the Research Committee was "... to narrow areas of difference and
inconsistency in accounting practice and to further the development and recognition
of generally accepted accounting standards ... by means of Statements of Accounting
Practice ..."

(The Australian Accountant, 1977, p539). However, as a Senate

Select Committee on Securities and Exchange discovered some 20 years later, this
goal had not been achieved. In 1974, the Australian Securities Markets and Their
Regulation report (the Rae Committee report) expressed concern at the ". . . lack of
uniformity in the preparation and presentation of the financial accounts of members of
the different stock exchanges" (Australia, 1974, 3.81). In addition, surveys conducted
by the N e w South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission in the mid-1970's showed
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that even where the profession had issued statements of accounting practice, there
was substantial evidence of non-compliance with them (Ryan, 1977, p559).

Moves to enforce compliance with accounting standards by members of the ICAA
and the A S A had begun as early as 1969 when the Research Committee of the I C A A
issued three exposure drafts containing a paragraph stating that the provisions of the
pronouncement must be followed except in "exceptional circumstances" (Zeff, 1973,
ppl6-17). The General Council removed these clauses (pl7). In 1971, however, the
General Council issued Conformity with Institute Technical Statements which stated,
inter alia, that members
... should observe the accounting practices and principles set out
in the Institute Statements and Recommendations, knowing that
they will be under an obligation to the Institute to disclose
significant departures therefrom and to justify their concurrence
with any deviations from recommendations of the Institute
(reproduced in Zeff, 1973, p22).

In 1976 an amended version of this statement, Kl/300 Conformity with Accounting
Standards, was issued jointly by the I C A A and the A S A . The amended statement was
not as strongly worded in that it required members of the Australian accountancy
profession to support the standards promulgated by the profession (paragraph 4) and
to m a k e appropriate disclosure of any departures from the profession's accounting
standards (paragraph 5). It was further stated that failure to observe accounting
standards or disclose departures therefrom would be investigated. Disciplinary action
would be taken in the event that the member's explanation of the apparent failure was
not satisfactory (paragraph 11).

During the course of the 1977 Annual Research Lecture of the Victorian Division of
the Society, John Balmford, a practitioner and member of the National Council of the
I C A A , expressed the view that the emphasis on disclosure and explanation of
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departures was more appropriate than mandatory compliance because it provided the
user of the accounts "with information on which he can make up his o w n mind"
(1977, p554).

In commenting on Balmford's paper and this point in particular, the New South Wales
Commissioner for Corporate Affairs, F J O Ryan, disagreed saying the approach "...
simply does not meet the needs of the times ..." (1977, p560). H e used an example
which had actually come before the Commission earlier in 1977 in which a company
reported a half-yearly profit of $81,247. The auditors, however, considered the
appropriate accounting principles to be applied in the circumstances would have
shown a loss of $1.6 million. Nonetheless, they were unable to prove to the
Commission's satisfaction that the profit of $81,247 was not an honest or reasonable
result (p560). A s noted by Ryan:
The principal point of concern is not the disparity of $1.7m
between the two figures. Rather it is the fact that it arose from
the absence of enforceable and universally accepted standards, so
that in any given case the difference can be open-ended. This
leads to theresultthat where a contest as to the truth and fairness
of accounts can be made to turn upon a difference of opinion
between directors and auditors as to the appropriate principle to
be applied, a prosecution will only succeed in those cases where
no reasonable m a n could possibly have arrived at the same figure
as the directors (p560).
The Birth of the Accounting Standards Review Board
In Ryan's view, the profession was incapable of solving this problem without "...
legislative support for the standard setting process and legislative endorsement of the
standards so produced" (p560). This had, in fact, been one of the recommendations
of the ASA's General Council in its report on Accounting Principles and Practices
Discussed in Reports on Company

Failures (ASA, 1966). In dealing with adherence

to generally accepted accounting principles by members of the profession, the General
Council stated that there was little use in having rules andregulationsunless members
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were compelled to comply with them (ASA, 1966, p28). Council, therefore, called
for disciplinary action against members of the profession w h o failed to adhere to the
accounting principles promulgated by the profession to be enforced by statute (p32).
However, the General Council made it clear that this authority should be vested in the
profession itself and not in some "statutory authority" (p30).

The basis of the

contention was that an outside authority would not be competent to deal with the
ethical, educational and other aspects of the profession which m a y arise from
instances of non-compliance and weaknesses in professional standards (p29).
Furthermore, control by an outside authority m a y prevent new thought and progress
(p29).

The response to Ryan's suggestion was similar. To some this did not appear to be a
viable proposition if it meant the establishment of a body similar to the S E C although
this was seen as perhaps the only w a y to ensure compliance with accounting
standards:
This [the establishment of a quasi-governing body to prescribe,
inter aha, reporting standards] is not imminent while sufficient
opposition to the equivalent of a Securities and Exchange
Commission exists in Australia. However, the very absence of an
S E C in Australia could limit the effectiveness of any new
standards-setting body which the Institute and Society may
voluntarily set up (Taylor, 1977a, p21).

While not stricdy the equivalent of the SEC, the National Companies and Securities
(Commission was established in 1980 on the recommendation of the Rae Committee
(Australia, 1974,1.1). The N C S C was actually a compromise arrangement in that the
Rae Committee

recommended

the creation by the Federal Government of an

Australian Securities Commission (1.1). The N C S C was in fact a joint commission
established by a grouping together of individual State Corporate Affairs Commissions
which the Rae Committee had specifically rejected (16.14). However, as will be
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discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter, perceived constitutional impediments
to Federal corporate legislation precluded the creation of a Federal securities
regulatory scheme.

In 1984, the Accounting Standards Review Board was created. The impetus for the
establishment of the A S R B appears to have been the 1981 Final Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System (Campbell Committee).
O n the basis of evidence supplied by the N e w South Wales Corporate Affairs
Commission, the Committee criticised the accounting profession for its failure to pay
sufficient attention to the enforcement of accounting standards (Australia, 1981,
21.58, p372). According to this evidence, the Commission examined 2463 company
accounts in 1979. O f these accounts, 45 per cent had not complied with accounting
standards (21.58, pp372-373).

A further concern of the Commission was the incidence of apparently misleading
financial reporting. A s noted above, Birkett and Walker found that many of the
corporate failures of the 1960's occurred after the companies concerned reported
profits (1971, pl31). The Campbell Committee noted a similar phenomenon
Critics point out that some major company collapses during the
1970's closely followed the publication of audited financial
accounts ... which showed the companies to be solvent and even
profitable (1981,21.47, p371).

In this regard, the Campbell Committee went on to state, on the basis of The
Sandilands Committee ( U K ) findings, that the major problem was "the imprecise
nature of accounting standards" (21.48, p371). Furthermore, stringent reporting
requirements would not benefit users of accounts if imprecise standards meant the
"true state of affairs or a trend" could not be assessed (21.49, p371).
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For the above reasons, the Committee

recommended

(a) The two professional accounting bodies should continue
to be responsible for the design and development of
accounting standards.
(b) A n Accounting Standards Review Board should be
established with responsibility for deciding on the
adoption of accounting standards, having regard to the
needs of different users; the N C S C , professional
accounting bodies and other interested parties should be
represented on the Board.
(c) Accounting standards recommended by such a board
should be given lgislative support (21.57, p372).

The Committee considered the professional accounting bodies should continue to
develop and design standards because they had the "necessary expertise" and
furthermore, if standards were to be designed and developed by government
... it is questionable whether the standards would be as soundly
based or as closely attuned to the needs of users of accounts as
standards developed by those actively involved in accounting
practice (21.55, p372).

However, in the adoption of standards which have legal backing to facilitate
enforcement there should be a balancing of interests (21.56, p372). In making this
observation, the Committee recognised the political nature of accounting standards in
that such standards had the potential to affect the economy through investment
behaviour, and therefore should not be solely determined by the accountancy
profession (21.46, p370).

Similar sentiments as to the flexibility of accounting standards, the political nature of
accounting standards, problems of enforcement and the need for an Accounting
Standards Review Board had been expressed by the New South Wales AttorneyGeneral, Frank Walker (1981a, b). For example, Walker stated that on becoming
Attorney-General in 1976 he was "... shocked to discover important prosecutions
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failing through lack of certainty as to what were proper accounting standards" (p235).
The fact that the selective application of accounting principles could, on the one hand,
produce a loss of $3 million while on the other give a profit of $100000 was also
cause for concern particularly when bothresultswere deemed to give a true and fair
view (p235). In order to overcome the deficiencies of accounting standards, Walker
recommended the establishment of an independent Accounting Standards Review
Board withrepresentativesdrawn not only from the accountancy profession but also
from industry, commerce, law, economics and Government (p235).

Such a

representative board was necessary because mandatory compliance could be onerous
and costly particularly if the standards were inflexible (1981b, p23).

Substantive moves towards the establishment of an ASRB began in 1980 when the
Ministerial Councilresolvedthat such a body should be considered and requested the
N C S C to formulate a proposal for its creation ( N C S C , 1982, p21). In response to
this request, the N C S C recommended, inter alia, the establishment of an A S R B which
was to be independent of the professional accounting bodies. However, the A S R B
was not to design and develop accounting standards. Instead, the A S R B was to
review accounting standards set by the accounting bodies and, if acceptable,
recommend N C S C endorsement (1982). In November 1981, the N C S C issued a
media release detailing its recommendations and calling for submissions from
interested parties.

A joint submission was made by the I C A A , the A S A and the

AARF.

In its submission, the profession accepted the need for legislative backing for
Australian accounting standards because such backing would:
a. Focus greater public attention on the content and
importance of accounting standards ...
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and

b.

Ensure a higher degree of compliance with accounting
standards and hence raise the quality of external financial
reporting generally (Australian Accountancy Profession
Joint Submission, 1982, B.4).

However, the profession considered that the most simple and economical method of
achieving legislative backing for accounting standards was to follow the Canadian
approach and give legislative support to standards set by the accountancy profession
(C.l). The profession argued that it had the expertise to not only develop accounting
standards but also to determine priorities in the preparation and revision of them
(B.6).

The establishment of a government-sponsored A S R B should only be

considered if this was considered essential to the achievement of legislative backing
for accounting standards (D.ld).

The NCSC was not persuaded by the profession's arguments. In December 1982, the
N C S C issued a media release detailing its report to the Ministerial Council with
regard to the establishment of an A S R B . The N C S C maintained its stance on the
independence from the professional bodies of the A S R B ( N C S C , 1982b, paragraph
6(i)). T h e basis of its recommendations included a perception by the N C S C that the "
... profession had difficulty in securing the acceptance of its accounting standards by
the business community" and "... the business community could be expected to
resist the imposition of standards set unilaterally either by government or by the
accounting bodies" (paragraph 7). Furthermore, the N C S C Media Release stated
that those w h o had advocated legislative support for the accounting profession's
standards had done so in general terms and few had addressed the issue of benefits to
users of statutory backing for those standards (paragraph 34).
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Leigh Masel, then N C S C Chairman, elaborated on these views stating that the N C S C
was not convinced by the profession's case for legislative backing for standards set by
it (1982, pl2). In Masel's view, legislative backing for the profession's standards
represented a transfer of a form of voluntary restraint to a form of compulsory
restraint backed by government enforcement (plO). Masel also raised the point made
in the N C S C Media Release that those w h o advocated legislative backing for the
profession's accounting standards did so in very general terms only (pll).

The

accountancy profession, as noted above, based its claim on its expertise in the area.
However, neither the accountancy profession nor any of the other respondents
addressed the possible impact on the capital formation process of the exploitation of
uncertainties in existing accounting standards (pll).

A s noted previously, the

imprecise nature of accounting standards was highlighted by the Campbell Committee
as a factor in the unexpectedness of some of the corporate failures of the 1970's.

Masel also pointed out there was a difference between devising accounting standards
to reduce the likelihood of misleading information and enforcing them (p9). A private
standard setting agency faced problems not only of authority to enforce standards but
also gaining acceptance of its standards (plO). In this regard, Masel considered the
accounting profession needed to realise that in seeking legislative support for its
standards, it was in the realm of politics (pp3-4). O n e of the reasons advanced for
this is that accounting standards can have significant wealth distribution implications.
Masel expressed concern that the profession could be subject to political pressures
and influences such that it would not be responsive to all interests but to particular
business interest or of members of the profession w h o were able to exercise the most
pressure (p9). Politicians were, admittedly, also susceptible to political influences and
pressure from special interest groups. However, politicians were responsible to
Parliament whereas the accounting profession was not

This represented an

impediment to delegating enforcement of accounting standards to the profession (p9).
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Masel also raised the issue of the lack of authority and enforcement power of a
private standard setting agency and saw this as a major weakness (plO).

The

profession's difficulty in attaining compliance with its standards has already been
discussed. The profession recognised this difficulty itself in its submission to the
N C S C (Australian Accountancy Profession Joint Submission, B.3). Non-compliance
suggests that the profession's standards were not generally accepted by the business
community. However, the N C S C also recognised that the business community may
not accept accounting standards set unilaterally by a government body ( N C S C ,
1982b, paragraph 7). A s discussed in Chapter 2, such an attitude is consistent with
the notions of dissidence and resistance which represent an impediment to the exercise
of episodic agency power.

This concept will be discussed in more detail in the

standard setting context in a later chapter. In the face of likely opposition to
accounting standards set by the professional accountancy associations and for the
other reasons outlined above, the N C S C accordingly recommended to the Ministerial
Council the establishment of an A S R B . Its recommendations were submitted jointly
with the N e w South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission ( N C S C , 1983, p48). The
recommendations were accepted by the Ministerial Council on 25 March 1983 and the
A S R B became arealityin January 1984 (pp48-49).

The establishment of the ASRB appears to have been what the General Council of the
A S A was trying to avoid in its recommendations in 1966 (ASA, 1966). A further
blow to the profession was the ASRB's disincUnation to simply rubber-stamp the
accounting standards already promulgated by the A A R F . A s the president of the
I C A A at the time stated:
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Given the exhaustive process in the development of accounting
standards and their extensive application and acceptance within
the business community, it was generally expected that the Board,
. . . would give approval, or at least some form of provisional
approval, to all existing standards.
However, the terms of
reference given to the Board were not seen to permit such a
course of action (Edwards, 1985, p6)

Autonomy Lost, Control Achieved
T o many, the creation of the A S R B could be seen as a loss of autonomy on the part
of the accountancy profession. However, it would seem that the reality of the
situation was that the profession would maintain its control of the standard setting
process through the A A R F .

The ASRB was established to, inter alia, review standards referred to it and spons
the development of standards ( A S R B , 1985a, paragraph 3.1). While the A S R B was
empowered to consider for approval standards emanating from the A A R F and other
interested parties, the professional associations through the A A R F were clearly
expected to maintain responsibility for the design and development of accounting
standards. T o be specific, Release 200 paragraphs 3 and 4 states that the Ministerial
Council endorsed the view that proposed approved accounting standards would
normally originate from the A A R F . Those standards emanating from other sources
would bereferredto the A A R F for comment. Between 1984 and 1988, only three
standards were presented for approval by sources other than the A A R F : the
Australian Shareholders' Association, the N C S C

and the Merchant Bankers

Association. Only one of these proposed standards, that from the N C S C , ever
attained approved accounting standard status and it has since been withdrawn.

Hence, when looked at from another perspective, the establishment of the ASRB can
be seen as an example of bifurcationresultingfroma change in the rules of practice,
membership and meaning. Previously, compliance with accounting standards was not
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binding. Therefore, there was a change in the rules of practice. There was also a
change in the rules of membership in that the profession could only

compel

compliance from its o w n members. Statutory backing for accounting standards meant
that members of the business community coming within the provisions of the
Companies Act and Codes n o w came within the membership of those w h o must
comply with accounting standards. The creation of a government-sponsored A S R B
was considered necessary to enforce compliance. In other words, the profession
could not resolve the issue of compliance at the level of social integration so a new
organisation was created at the level of systems integration to facilitate enforcement
of accounting standards. However, institutional isomorphism ensured there was no
radical change in the setting of accounting standards.

A review of the composition of the ASRB shows that most of its members had
accounting backgrounds and some had been senior office bearers of either the I C A A ,
A S A or other accountancy professional associations. For example, the affiliations and
designations of some of the members of the A S R B in its first four years of operations
included past presidents and vice-presidents of the Australasian Institute of Cost
Accountants, the A S A , I C A A and the International Congress of Accountants 1972; a
past chairman and members of the International Committee of the Accountancy
Profession; International Federation of Accountants and the A A R F .

Some A S R B

members were also partners in large public accounting firms ( A S R B , 1987a, pp6-7;
A S R B , 1987-88, pp5-7).

As discussed in Chapter 2, normative isomorphism is usually associated with
professionalism (Clegg, 1989, p229; DiMaggio and PoweU, 1983, pl52). Through
formal education and training, specific ideas, such as the notion that only those with
such education and training are capable of undertaking accounting work including the
design and development of accounting standards, become recognised as norms and
are, thereby, institutionalised. Therefore, while the profession had lost control of the
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standards setting process in so far as a government-sponsored organisation assumed
the function of reviewing accounting standards which were to have legislative
backing, it maintained control through

normative isomorphism.

Institutional

isomorphism, in this case, normative isomorphism, ensured there would be no radical
change as a result of the establishment of a government-sponsored A S R B .
Subsequent chapters, in particular the chapter dealing with the promulgation of the
foreign currency standard, will demonstrate that imprecise or flexible and ambiguous
accounting standards continued to be issued despite the establishment of a new
standard setting organisation.

In 1988, the profession secured even tighter control of the standard setting proce
In its 1987-88 Annual Report, the A S R B announced that a call had been made during
the year by the Joint Accounting Bodies for a

merger of the A S R B and the

Accounting Standards Board of the A A R F (1987-88, pi). The Annual Report further
stated that the A S R B and the Joint Accounting Bodies had worked together to
formulate agreed terms of the merger for approval by the Ministerial Council (pi).
The merger was approved at the fortieth meeting of the Ministerial Council ( N C S C
1988-89, p65). The newlyreconstitutedstandards board hasresponsibilityfor the
development and promulgation of both approved accounting standards and Australian
accounting standards. A s a result of the merger, the A S R B sets all accounting
standards for the private sector (p66). The membership of the A S R B was increased
from 7 to 9. Four members of the A S R B were to be nominated by the professional
associations. Technical support in the standard setting process was still to be
provided by the A A R F which continued to be funded by the accounting bodies (p66).

This chapter has traced the professionalisation of accountancy in Australia from t
formation of professional associations late last century until 1988. In that time,
accountants have proceeded from a position where they were looked upon with some
measure of disdain as evidenced by comments in the press and in parliamentary
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debates to a situation where they dominated the setting of accounting standards with
statutory backing. Furthermore, their domination was with the express approval of
the State and Federal Governments asrepresentedby the Ministerial Council. A s will
be discussed in a later chapter, there have been further changes in the structure of the
standard setting organisation including the establishment of the Australian Accounting
Standards Board by the Australian Securities Commission Act. The A A S B replaced
the A S R B but there was little substantive change in the manner in which standards
were developed and promulgated. The profession n o w controls not only the rules of
membership of professional associations but perhaps, more importantly, it is able to
exercise episodic agency power over not only its members but all those w h o c o m e
within the provisions of C o m p a n y Law.

This study maintains that this achievement has been reached through a process of
translation whereby the profession has used its claims to expert knowledge and skill as
demonstrated through its commitment to education and training to convince the State
and the public that it is the appropriate arbiter of accounting practices.
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DOMINATION, AUTOPOIESIS AND REGULATORY FAILURE:
THE ACCOUNTANCY CONNECTION

VOLUME TWO

CHAPTER 4
REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that the accountancy profession used the
altruistic motive of the public interest to justify its claims to exclusive practice of
work of an accounting nature and its domination of the design, development and
enforcement of accounting standards. This chapter will consider the nature of the
public interest and h o w accounting is claimed to serve it It is acknowledged that
there are limitations to theories of the public interest Mitnick, for example, argues
Public interest theories can be viewed as vague and indeterminate
because views of the public interest are often vague and can be
conflicting (1980, p91)

and
... the breadth and diversity with which the concept is used is
such that it reduces in effect to "whatever the government does"
(p242).

Nonetheless, given that a public interest motive is integral to claims for professional
domination of accounting and that the profession and others have attempted to detail
h o w accounting can serve it, these limitations will be ignored for purposes of this
chapter.

As statutory account and audit provisions are part of corporate regulation, it is
necessary to specify the nature ofregulationin analysing the public interest claims of
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the profession. A s with the concept of the public interest regulation has different
meanings and interpretations.

Dubnick and Gitelson refer to the definition of

regulation as "a conceptual quagmire" because it cannot be defined "to anyone's
satisfaction" (1982, p424). For present purposes, regulation is used to m e a n the
statutory duty imposed on directors to prepare and present to shareholders, audited
financial statements which both comply with accounting standards and show a true
and fair view. Regulation, therefore, extends to accounting standards.

In this study, the interpretation of accounting standards as a form of regulation is not
restricted to approved accounting standards which n o w have statutory backing. As
was discussed in the previous chapter, statutory backing for accounting standards is a
recent achievement However, as will be discussed in a later chapter, the obligation
for financial statements to show a true and fair view implied compliance with
accounting standards. Accounting standards could, therefore, be said to have had a
form of quasi-judicial backing even before they had legislative backing.

This chapter will briefly provide some insights into the original intentions of UK and
Australian account and audit provisions in corporate legislation. The U K situation
will be discussed because Australia, as a British colony, originally adopted its
legislation.

Government enquiries, such as the Rae and Campbell committees will

also be used to demonstrate the public perception of the need for regulation and h o w
it serves the public interest. The profession's o w n perception of the public interest
will be addressed in the context of S A C 2.

The purpose of this chapter is initially to establish the relationship between the public
interest and the account and audit provisions of corporate legislation. This, in turn,
will provide the basis of an examination of h o w well the profession has served the
public interest through its domination of accounting practice and in the determination
of accounting practices to be used in the preparation of external financial reports and
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their audit For this purpose, some of Australia's notable corporate failures will be
discussed. Emphasis will be placed on instances where accounting has been shown to
have been used to conceal rather than reveal losses and/or hquidity problems facing
the relevant companies. A further point of this discussion is to show that, over time,
similar accounting ploys have been used by companies to conceal losses and liquidity
problems. This has occurred despite actions that purportedly aimed to prevent the
use of accounting techniques for such purposes. In other words, accounting practice
guidelines and standards, even those with statutory backing, have not removed the
flexibility or the exercise of professional judgment which have facilitated the masking
of company weaknesses.

It will be contended that the concealment of impending corporate failure by use of
accounting techniques cannot be claimed to be isolated instances even if they are not
the norm. In an examination of white collar crime in Australia, Grabosky and Sutton
observed "... the harmful practices in question were not unprecedented and, as some
of the cases reveal, Australia is by no means free from similar corporate behaviour
today" (1989, pxvi). Similarly, Sykes maintains that corporate collapses are not a
recent phenomenon nor are they an aberration (1988, px). The causes of the major
collapses of the 1970's and 1980's bear a striking resemblance to the corporate
collapses of the last century. This has led Sykes to conclude that corporate collapses
are "...

a recurrent malaise and endemic to the private enterprise system as it

presently functions" (px).

The "harmful practices" identified in the white collar crime study included accounting:
The lack of objective, consistently applied accounting standards
has been recognised for years as a factor which serves to facilitate,
if not invite, white collar crime (Grabosky, pp21-22).
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Sykes also saw accounting and accountants as implicated in some of Australia's
notable corporate failures in that"... an amazing amount of money has been raised
by Australian companies on the basis of inaccurate accounts" (1988, p551). This is
not to say there was a conspiracy to deceive on the part of management and the
accountant However, as suggested in Chapter 2, accounting practice has become
increasingly abstract over the centuries and the body of accounting knowledge is not
clearly defined The result is that there is ample room for professional judgment on
the part of the accountant. In some instances of corporate failures, it appears the
company accountant has assisted management some of w h o m have also been
qualified accountants, to conceal impending disaster. In this regard, management has
been assisted by accounting in some circumstances. Sykes contends "[c]reative
accounting... can mask thefrailtiesof a company for a long time (1988, p552).

Auditors also have been identified as playing a role in the unexpectedness of corporate
failure in that the published financial statements of some of these companies have
received unqualified audit reports. Sykes, for example, questions whether it is worth
having auditors when financial statements have received unqualified audit reports
despite the fact that relevant records m a y not exist, debts m a y not be recoverable,
accounts have been falsified and assets plundered (pp551-552). A s will be discussed
in the second half of this chapter, investigators into corporate failures have also
levelled criticism at auditors for similar reasons.

CORPORATE LEGISLATION - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Chapter 2, it was shown that accounting, in some form, has existed for hundreds of
centuries. History also shows that for m u c h of its existence, accounting has been used
for accountability purposes. Since the advent of the m o d e m corporation, it has also
been aregulatorymechanism.
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Formalregulationof corporations using accounting has been a recent development
and has, in general, followedrevelationsof abuse of the corporate form (refer to
works such as Littleton and Yamey, 1978; Hunt, 1936; Gibson, 1971). A s early as
1833, the periodic publication of accounts was seen as one way of combating this
problem. Hunt, for example, cites a letter to The Times in April 1833 suggesting
promoters of ventures should be accountable to investors for the funds entrusted to
them and that there should be some form of stewardship reporting (1936, p56).
Chambers provides evidence that the keeping of accounts and periodical financial
reporting were used for accountability purposes from at least the eighteenth century
(1991, pi0). Between 1827 and 1843, the deeds of settlement of some 26 companies
contained requirements for the keeping of accounting records and the regular
preparation of a statement of the stock and capital of the company (pll). Even
before this, partnership agreements included requirements to keep accounts as a
means of ensuring partners were accountable to each other (plO).

In 1844, the UK Parliament enacted the Joint Stock Companies Registration and
Regulation Act which required, inter alia, periodic publication of accounts. While it is
clear that accounting had been in use for some time, the 1844 Act was clearly a land
mark piece of legislation because it provided, for the first time, for general
incorporation. The act was the result of the Report of the Select Committee to
enquire into the lawsrespectingJoint Stock Companies (except Banking Companies).
The Committee was appointed in 1841 and issued its report in March 1844. The
purpose of the enquiry was "the better security of the public". T o this end, the
Committee made a number of recommendations including the periodical balancing,
auditing and publication of accounts (Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies,
First Report, pv). A s Chambers observes, it is unlikely that those w h o framed the
1844 Act were not aware of the provisions of the deeds of settlement mentioned
previously. They would also have been aware of the perceived protection periodical
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financial reporting could provide to company members and creditors against selfserving directors and officers (1991, pi 1).

However, the recommendations were not seen as a panacea for the instances of abuse
uncovered by the Committee. They were seen more as a means of making directors
and management accountable for their actions and also of providing investors and
creditors with an indication of the state of affairs of a company:

Periodical accounts, if honesdy made and fairly audited, cannot
fail to excite attention to therealstate of a concern; and by means
of improved remedies, parties to mismanagement m a y be m a d e
more amenable for acts offraudand illegality (p5).

Furthermore, it was thought:

... probably the greatest benefit in this direction will be produced
by enabling the sharebrokers and other persons professionally
employed in making investments of this kind to learn more easily
and accurately the real nature of these Companies; so that, at
least, the ignorant m a y not be so m u c h misled (pvi).

In 1855, the general right of incorporation was enhanced by the introduction of
limited liability. The 1855 Limited Liability Act provided for additional safeguards
over and above those of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844. These additional
safeguards included a requirement that the Board of Trade approve the auditors
(Gower et al, 1969, p48). The following year saw the Limited Liability Act of 1855
incorporated into the Joint Stock Companies Act which Gower et al term the first
modem Companies Act (p49). Many of the safeguards stipulated in the acts of 1844
and 1855 were deleted from the 1856 act. The requirements as to the periodical

publication of audited financial reports were relegated to an optional set of articles
The appointment of auditors and approval by the Board of Trade were no longer
required (p49). Subsequent amendments were incorporated into the Companies Act
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of 1862 (p50-51). The keeping of accounts and the audit of financial statements
remained optional until the turn of the century when the requirements to annually
provide shareholders with an audited balance sheet were reintroduced.

The 1862 Companies Act was adopted throughout the Australian colonies during the
mid-1860's. It appears there was little or no debate as to the appropriateness of the
legislation to the Australian situation. The rationale for the adoption of the English
legislation appears to have been a perception that it was necessary to maintain British
investment in the colonies (McQueen, 1991, p24). Australia did not have a Board of
Trade to administer the legislation with theresultthat administration was on an ad
hoc basis from state to state. This, in turn,resultedin the provisions of the legislation
not being used as a regulatory device but for procedural matters such as company
formation and verifying that documentsrequiredto be lodged under the provisions of
the legislation were in proper form (p25). The Victorian land b o o m of the 1880's and
its subsequent collapse heralded a change in this approach.

In the wake of the Victorian land boom and the disastrous consequences of its
collapse, it was decided that more comprehensive corporate legislation was required
to prevent the frauds and consequent losses to investors and creditors arising from
corporate activities. For example, Isaacs, w h o was largely responsible for the
contents of the Victorian legislation, argued for it on the basis that the Government
was trying to ensure that the catastrophes of the b o o m were not repeated and to
remedy the evils of the past (Victoria. Votes & Proceedings, 1895, p3338).

Cannon has undertaken a study of the land boom, the major companies involved and
the impact of the collapse of the b o o m on the population. The evidence uncovered by
Cannon clearly demonstrates the validity of the comments of Grabosky and Sutton
(1989) and Sykes (1988) suggesting that accounting had been used for some time to
conceal impending failures:
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The falsifying of balance sheets, the payment of dividends from
non-existent profits were among the shocking features of the
crash. ... At the annual meeting of the Real Estate Bank on 7
August 1891, James M u n r o said : "The properties of the bank are
in splendid order". Four months later it collapsed. At the meeting
of the Land Credit Bank on 31 October 1891, a 10 per cent
dividend was declared, although by that date the bank had lost all
its capital and reserves. O n the same day, Sir Matthew Davies's
Freehold Investment Co. Ltd. declared an 8 per cent dividend and
went into liquidation exactly three months later (1972, p28).

The Victorian Companies Act, 18%, required the keeping of proper books of account
and the annual presentation to shareholders of an audited balance sheet which was to
be in narrative form as specified in the Act. The sequence of items appearing in the
balance sheet was also specified. Debtors were to be categorised and shown after
deducting bad or doubtful debts expense. Other assets such as property and
investments and liabilities were also to be reported by class. The legislation also
required directors to certify that the balance sheet was "true and correct". Managers
were required to make a statutory declaration to similar effect. The Act further
provided for the appointment by public companies of a qualified auditor. Details of
dealings between companies and their officers, advances to directors, in particular,
were to be disclosed (Gibson, 1971, pp44-47).
Perceived Purposes of Regulation
1. Accountability & Investor Protection
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the progressive abstraction of accounting from the
clay tokens of ancient civilisations, through the emergence of a commercial rather
than an agricultural means of existence in mediaeval Italy which, in turn, appears to
have given rise to double entry bookkeeping, the further refinements and abstraction
of accounting as a result of the introduction of the notion of the going concern and
permanent capital, and finally, the impact of the Industrial Revolution. The
abstraction of accounting was complemented in the latter half of the nineteenth
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century with the legislative creation of corporations with limited liability.
Chambers notes, the corporation is itself an abstraction (1991, pll).

As

It has no

feelings of shame or remorse and no concept of ethics, morals or fair dealings.
Corporate directors act on its behalf and the responsibility of directors to shareholders
and creditors arises through the articles of association and statute. In Chambers'
view, the principal link between directors and shareholders is the annual report and
financial statements (pll; 1973, pl72). Similarly, Stamp maintains that financial
reports provide a link between management and owners (1969, p32).

The advent of accounting and audit provisions in corporate legislation is clearly
associated with management's accountability for their actions to shareholders and
creditors. The need for legislative intervention has arisen from the separation of
management from ownership (Stamp, 1969, p32; Chen, 1975, p538). Schoenbaum
maintains that the principal objective of legislation requiring disclosure of financial
information is to ensure potential investors that adequate information about the
investment can be obtained (1972, p575).

Furthermore, legislation provided

assurance that the information obtained would be neither fraudulent nor misleading
(p576).

The report of the enquiry into Australian Securities Markets and Their

Regulation (the Rae Committee) also identified investor protection as a major reason
for companies and securities law (Australia, 1974, 16.17). The Committee based its
view on evidence of a long andrepetitivehistory of exploitation of investors through
fraud, abuse and incompetence (15.3).

In a classical sense, management is the steward and as such, is responsible to those
w h o have invested in a company (Briloff, 1972, p5; Chambers, 1973, p31; Chen,
1975, p539). Stewardship also extends beyond a narrowresponsibilityto existing
investors to potential investors and also to creditors and potential creditors at the very
least It also is not restricted to a simple accounting for the funds entrusted to
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management but to whether those funds have been used efficiently and effectively and
for authorised purposes (Briloff, 1972, p5; 1990, p6; Chambers, 1973, p41).

Chen has traced the origins of the stewardship function from its religious basis in early
civilisations to its application to m o d e m business enterprises (1975). In thistime,the
concept has gone from a broad base to a narrow and then back to an approximation of
its religious origins. According to Chen, the religious basis of stewardship was
premised on the view that all things were created by G o d for use by all humans. If
ownership of things, property, was required in order to use them then the human
owner must use those property rights to satisfy the needs of society as a whole
(p534). Chen argues that socialresponsibilitywas the primary stewardship function
because the "owner of the property" was the steward of G o d (p535).

With the advent of the feudal system, a secondary stewardship responsibility emerged
in that property, land, was given to nobles and lords by the king to be used in a
specified w a y to benefit the manor. Hence, the nobles and lords, and the serfs and
vassals w h o subsequently assumed responsibility for working the land, were agents of
the king. Stewardship still had a primary function being to society or the manor but it
also had a secondary function in that the land was to be used in accordance with rules
specified by the king (pp535-536).

As discussed in the previous chapter, civilisation experienced a change from, or an
extension of, the agricultural m o d e of existence with the beginning of the crusades.
The mediaeval era introduced commerce and the burgeoning of trade for profit. Chen
argues that the spread of capitalism and the growth of the business organisation
brought an end to the mediaeval period and, as a survival of the fittest mentality
emerged, progressively eroded the social responsibility aspects of stewardship.
Managers were responsible only to the owners of business organisations (p537).
Socialresponsibilityagain became an aspect of stewardship with the expansion of
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business and an increase in the size of business organisation (p538). Progressively
larger business concerns meant that ownership became more and more diffused
(p539) so that individual shareholders had very litde power in terms of the operation
of the business (p538). A s business became larger and more complex, management
has had more and more power to control the business organisation. This, in turn, led
to a return of the primary stewardship function in that management has social
responsibility for the activities of business organisations. Therefore, management has
again become not only the steward of owners but also of employees, customers and
society in general (p539). Given the size of corporations today and their potential
impact on society, this view of stewardship is appropriate. A s the chief judge of the
N e w South Wales Supreme Court, Justice Rogers, recently observed:
. . . company directors may through their actions, their behaviour,
and their standard of morality, destroy the health of an economy
and of a community for a decade (1991, pi).

The broader view of stewardship suggested by Chen is evident in current professional
pronouncements. For example, S A C 2 confirms the need to protect investors and
others w h o deal with corporations but replaces the notion of stewardship with
accountability. Accountability, in this sense, extends beyond a mere accounting for
funds entrusted to management to the manner in which resources have been used and
whether they have been used efficiendy and effectively. This view is also evident in
S A C 2 paragraph 5 which defines "accountability" as
... the responsibility to provide information to enable users to
m a k e informed judgments about the performance, financial
position, financing and investing, and compliance of the reporting
entity.

Paragraph 14 then links this definition of "accountability" with the objective of general
purposefinancialreporting
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Managements and governing bodies are accountable to those w h o
provide resources to the entity for planning and controlling the
operations of the entity.

SAC 2 paragraph 14, goes on to confirm that financial statements are a link between
management and resource providers by stating that general purpose financial
reporting is a means by which this accountability m a y be discharged. Furthermore,
S A C 2 paragraph 14 extends management's accountability to the general public:
. . . because of the influence reporting entities exert on members
of the community at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic
levels, they are accountable to the public at large.

On the basis of the foregoing, accounting and audit provisions of corporate legislation
could, therefore, be seen as being not only in the interests of those w h o deal with
corporations but also in the public interest.
2. Public Interest
It was noted in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter that defining the public interest is
problematic because it is impossible to determine what exactly it is in thefirstplace.
W h a t is professed to be in the public interest often begins as one person's point of
view. In this sense, the public interest is really a private interest that has gained
support within the community. For this reason, a definition of the public interest will
not be attempted here. Rather, a description will be offered of h o w accounting and
audit provisions of corporate legislation are held to serve the public interest

As outlined above, stewardship and accountability have primary and secondary
functions. The primary function is applicable to the public interest in that it means
that management will use resources entrusted to them in a manner which will benefit
society. Hence, the accounting and audit provisions of corporate legislation could be
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said to be in the public interest because such provisions are "... in the best interests
of all the . . . people" or because policies of this nature are ". . . beneficial to all
citizens or beneficial to large portions of the population generally" (Ippolito and
Walker, 1980, p302).

The Rae Committee report could be seen as supporting this

view in that one of the objectives of legislative action with regard to the securities
market was identified as being to ". . . maintain, facilitate and improve the
performance of the capital market in the interests of economic development, efficiency
and stability "(1974,16.15).

Corporate regulation, therefore, can be seen as having both economic and social
implications. Regulation on economic grounds m a y be seen as facilitating an efficient
allocation of resources which essentially means that financial resources will be
directed towards efficient companies as opposed to less efficient companies. The
report of the Campbell Committee supports this view in that it states the disclosure of
financial information
. . . helps investors and other members of the community assess
risks and m a k e decisions. ... accurate and timely disclosure .. .
has an important role in the mobilisation of savings and the pricing
and allocation of funds to efficient users (1981,21.29, p368).

Corporate regulation, and disclosure of financial information, can be seen to have
social consequences because w h e n resources are directed towards more efficient
companies, the community is likely to benefit from increased employment and
distribution of wealth. This interpretation of the economic and social consequences of
regulation is supported by Charles Williams, one time Deputy Chairman of the
National Companies and Securities Commission, w h o stated that securities regulation
in Australia has two major objectives:
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1. promoting commercial certainty, reducing business costs and making
capital markets more efficient

2. investor protection by strengthening markets through the confident
participation of savers, large and small, in the markets (1987, p7).

Chambers et al provide further elucidation of the economic and social impact of the
disclosure of financial information. The securities market is seen as a mechanism for
rationing of a limited supply of funds "... in favour of companies having a more
satisfactory record of performance than others" (1978, p20). Information on the
financial performance of a company depends on a combination of
... the efficiencies with which it conducts its manufacturing,
merchandising, and financial operations, and the effectiveness of
its labour-relations, customer-relations and other like policies
(p20).

Chambers et al see three effects of the publication of this information:
Actual and prospective investors are enabled to make comparative
judgements, bidding the prices of securities up or down, to the
consequential advantage or disadvantage of particular companies.
. . . directors and managers are able to compare the performance
of one company with the performance of others.
The information published may enable customers, suppliers,
workers and other parties to m a k e comparative judgements of
companies, and to seek to vary the terms of their relationships
with any company in the light of those judgements (p21).

Friend also argues that securities regulation is necessary due to the impact of the
stock market on the economy:
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The stock market affects the functioning of the economy in two
principal ways. First, market developments m a y affect the
national income through their influence on the aggregate
propensities to consume, to save and to invest Second, even with
a given level of saving and investment market arrangements can
affect the efficiency of the allocation of investment funds (1976,
p3).

The disclosure of financial information, therefore, can arguably improve the efficienc
of companies, and in turn, the economy as a whole. This issue of efficiency and its
economic and social consequences was central to the recommendations of the
Campbell Committee, including the establishment of the A S R B (1981, pi) and the
Rae Committee's call for the establishment of an Australian Securities Commission
(1974,1.1).

From the foregoing it is clear that management owes a responsibility, or is
accountable, to investors and creditors, both current and potential, and others w h o
deal or are contemplating dealing with the organisation. In addition, management is
accountable to society at large because of the impact corporations can have on the
well-being of all members of society whether they deal directly with the corporation
or not This impact on society m a y be direct, such as pollution, or mdirect through
relationships between corporations and those w h o deal with them. If a company's
financial reports indicate that it is a profitable and well-managed organisation, existing
investors and creditors m a y be encouraged to continue theirrelationshipwith the
company.

Potential investors and creditors m a y be prompted to establish a

relationship with the company through the purchase of shares or debentures or
making deposits with or loans to the company, in other words, the allocation of
resources to the company.

If the financial statements have misrepresented the

company's profit and the expertise of its management there will not have been an
economic allocation of resources. Should the company fail and be unable to meet its
commitments to investors and creditors, the impact will be felt not only by the
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investors and creditors but by the general community through, perhaps, loss of
employment in some sections of society which will have a flow through effect on
other sections of society through the loss of spending occasioned by the loss of
employment

Regulation of corporations through, inter alia, accounting and audit provisions in
corporate legislation, has been justified as being in the public interest. However, the
Campbell Committee also m a d e it clear that the securities market should be asfreeas
possible of government intervention because "... the most efficient w a y to organise
economic activity" was through a competitive market system (1.1, pi). Therefore,
there must be a trade-off between free competition and regulation in the public
interest The notion of an efficient and competitive market is the basis of the efficient
capital markets theory that is often used to argue the case againstregulationof the
securities market The next section will provide an overview of the theory of efficient
capital markets and w h y regulation instead of market forces is necessary to achieve an
economic allocation of resources.
3. Competition vs The Public Interest
Proponents of the efficient capital markets theory argue that accounting information is
a commodity and can be subjected to the same forces of supply and demand as other
commodities traded in the market. That is, there is a competitive but uncertain
market for accounting information such that the forces of supply, demand and price
interact to the extent that, at equilibrium, it is impossible, on average, to make
economic profits (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, pl7). In other words, no one market
participant will consistendy earn more than therisk-adjustedmarket rate of return.
This is the basis of the efficient market hypothesis (Watts 8c Zimmerman, 1986, pl7;
Friend, 1976, p4). Efficiency is taken as meaning that the market is efficient in that all
publicly available information is impounded in the share price. N e w information is
taken up quickly so that investors cannot m a k e abnormal gains (Friend, 1976, p4).
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Furthermore the information is available at low cost. Therefore, theregulationof the
disclosure of financial information is not necessary and the capital market should be
left to determine the appropriate amount of disclosure required (Weiss, 1979, p576;
Kripke, 1980, p219)

In support of the free versus regulated market Kripke points out that mandated
disclosure by the S E C has not prevented "instances of inadequate or fraudulent
disclosure" from occurring (1980, p217). Trevor Sykes m a d e a similar statement
recently with regard to the Australian situation. Sykes examined a number of
instances of creative accounting including Cambridge Credit Corporation, Bond
Corporation and Industrial Equity Ltd. According to Sykes:
As receivers and investigators gradually strip bare the recent
corporate scandals in Australia, one factor becoming apparent is
that the accounts of the companies concerned have been sins of
omission. Important items were either left out of accounts
completely, or the necessary background on material figures was
not given (1990, p43).

These corporate scandals have taken place even though Schedule 5 (and its
predecessors) to the Companies Code specifies, in detail, the format and content of
published financial statements and many accounting standards have statutory backing.
Nonetheless, management is still able to "fudge the accounts". Sykes argues that
investors have an alternative to financial statements, the share prices:
Watch the share price, because it is remarkable how often the
market senses that a company is in deep trouble ...
... if the published accounts are saying one thing, and the market
is saying another, always believe the market (1990, p46).
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In Chambers' view, it is not the market which is deficient but the regulation of the
disclosure of financial information:
Atlantic Acceptance, Reid Murray, Pergamon, Continental
Vending, Pacific Acceptance, Westec, BarChris, Yale Express such companies as these have provided the 'spice' of commercial
and financial journalism in the last decade or so.
One thing common to all the companies mentioned is that the
financial information they published was seriously deficient in
quality.. . . because prevailing laws and practices under them give
rise, almost universally, to distorted representations of the
financialresultsand affairs of companies (1973, Preface, no
pagination).

A similar perspective can be found in the Rae Committee findings
While we have expressed our concern and, in some instances,
alarm at the actions of people in relation to certain practices, our
overriding objective has been to find out what steps, if any, were
taken by the regulatory authorities to check the practices
described.
Some of these practices which we have investigated appear to be
of long standing, and w e recognise that those engaging in them
m a y claim that all the existing authorities have permitted the
practices, to the extent that the authorities were aware of them
(1974,1.2).

A number of arguments related to the situation where false or misleading information
is given or inappropriate practices have been adopted have also been raised against

the efficient market hypothesis. Langfield-Smith, for example, argues that even if the

market for securities does impound publicly available information in the share prices,
the absolute or relative prices may not be appropriately determined in the short to
medium term. This is because the market cannot distinguish between false and valid
information in the short to medium term. Consequently, investor protection through
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the market mechanism m a y not be adequate w h e n creative accounting techniques are
used (p8,1990).

Friend similarly raises doubts about the validity of the efficient market hypothesis:
First the market. . . must reflect all available information. The
important question is the relevance of the information to the
subsequent earnings or riskiness of the stock. H o w is information
to be distinguished from misinformation? Second, is a market in
which prices fully reflect the scanty information available as
efficient as a market in which more information is available and
reflected in stock prices? . . . what is the justification for
considering the information set fixed? Third, is the efficiency of
the market independent of the costs incurred? (1976, pp4-5).

In summary, Friend argues for regulation of disclosure on the grounds that disclosure
is necessary if capital markets are to be efficient (p7). Clarke and Dean provide a
recent Australian example where the market does not appear to have been entirely
efficient In 1992, Westpac revised a provision relating to its commercial property

and property-related loans portfolio. This revision resulted in a $2.6 billion write-of
of asset values. The company maintained that it was making public something that
"was already well known". Clarke and Dean debate the validity of this on the basis of
the "surprise and bewilderment on the part of some financial press commentators
following the announcement of the size of the write-downs . . .", and ". . . postannouncement price declines . . ." on UK and Australian stock markets even though
such declines were relatively minor. Further evidence that the market was not fully
informed was provided by rating agencies decisions to reassess Westpac in the wake
of the announcements (1992, pi87).

Efficiency of the capital markets can be seen in three ways: allocative efficiency being
an efficient allocation of resources, operational efficiency which pertains to the
ntinimisation of resource costs and dynamic efficiency which is the ability of the
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system to change and generate innovations (Campbell Committee, 1981, 1.9, p2).
The Campbell Committee considered that the securities market in Australia was
efficient in that it permitted an economically neutral flow of funds within the market
(1.5; 1.6, pi). The market could be seen to be operationally efficient in that regard.
However, the Campbell Committee recognised that an economically neutral flow of
funds m a y not be in accord with social priorities (1.6, pi). In other words, there m a y
not be an efficient allocation of resources which in this context includes equity
considerations. For purposes of this discussion, the focus will be on allocative
efficiency as this is considered most relevant to therelationshipbetween accounting
and the public interest

Allocative efficiency pertains to the quality of the information provided (Friend, 19
p5). Kripke argues that those w h o wish to sell securities in a company and maintain
an active market in those securities must supply sufficient information to attract
purchasers (1980, p204-205). This notion appears to be based on the assumption that
management acts in the interests of the shareholders (Friend, 1976, p4). Puxty et al
point to arguments in the literature that suggest that similar forces wouldresultin the
audit of such information in the absence ofregulation(1987, p278). In other words,
management would publish auditedfinancialstatements even if they were not required
to do so by law. This could be seen as management wishing to ensure that their
company is seen as a good corporate citizen (Tomasic & Bottomley, 1991).

Tomasic and Bottomley interviewed officers of Australia's top 500 listed public
companies (p55) and found that being perceived publicly as a good corporate citizen
was very important to m a n y of those interviewed (p56). The reasons for this included
viewing the good corporate citizen tag as a "marketing ploy" (p57). Being a good
corporate citizen was considered to instil public confidence in the company which, in
turn, would be to the commercial advantage of the company (p57-58) presumably
because the public would be prepared to purchase company goods and services. In
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addition, being perceived as a good corporate citizen was important because it would
encourage people to invest in or extend credit to or m a k e loans to the company (p61).
It was also seen as useful in "placating" government and regulators and, thereby,
avoided "excessive concern with legal rales and regulations" (pp61-62). However,
there was clearly a limit to the extent to which the good corporate citizen image
would be taken. That limit was profitability and the interests of shareholders (pp6162).

In other words, management desired their companies to be seen as good

corporate citizens but apparently would be prepared to stretch the point where profits
and the perceived interests of shareholders were concerned. However, this ignores
the duty corporations o w e to the community. Furthermore, what management may
see as being in the interests of shareholders m a y really be in the interests of
management in presenting to the public an image of a profitable and well-managed
company. Evidence of this will be provided later in the chapter byreferenceto some
of Australia's notable corporate failures. In some cases, directors of these failed
companies admitted that the accounting practices adopted in the preparation of
financial statements were geared towards mamtaining and encouraging the inflow of
equity and debt capital.

It is precisely this mentality which makesregulationrather

thanrelianceupon market forces a necessity. This limitation isreflectedin the views
of Chambers and also thefindingsof the Rae Committee.

Chambers, for example, has questioned how market forces will ensure that the
information provided in financial statements will not be misleading:
It has been held that if all business firms (and their accountants)
were free to exercise their initiative in accounting "market forces"
would eliminate misleading and defective practices. But by what
mechanism no one has yet explained (1981, p370).

204

The investigations and conclusions of the Rae Committee suggest the validity of this
argument and also support Chambers' view cited previously, that "prevailing laws and
practices... giverise... to distorted" financialreports(1973, Preface, unpaginated).

One of the reasons for this is that the corporation is a monopoly supplier of
information about itself. Therefore, the possibility exists for management to disclose
information best suited to its purposes or m a y even issue misleading information. A s
discovered in the course of the Rae Committee investigations, Minerals Securities
Australia Limited (Minsec), provides a good example of this sort of activity. O n the
basis of evidence, the Rae Committee stated

Few companies can ever have experienced as sudden and [drastic]
a reversal of profit trend as Mineral Securities began to experience
after the first weeks of the n e w financial year in July 1970.
Though the public had no inkling of it, the directors had reason to
k n o w that the real share-trading profit in the year ended 30 June
had been $15.2 million instead of the declared figure of $12.4
million, but that the annual rate of loss being suffered in the first
half of 1970-71 was running at more than $10 million (1974,
p 14.39-14.40).

The objective in down-grading the 1969-1970 profit was to allow directors to report
half-yearly profits in excess of $3.5 million on share trading activities in the first half
of the 1970-71 financial year and, thereby, conceal the fact that the company, which
had previously been earning record profits, was n o w experiencing large losses (1974,
14.42-14.43). In discussing the accounting treatment of the write-down of the 19691970 profit, the Committee m a d e reference to the notes, in fine print, appended to the
balance sheet which included a statementregardingthe calculation of the market value
of group investments. This note stated that one of the investments had been "...
written d o w n in the light of post-balance date events to the realised value". The
Committee branded the note as "uninformative or misleading in several ways". It did
not provide any indication of the amount of the write-down or the impact, if any, on
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declared profits.

Furthermore, the note could be interpreted as applying to

investments actually held at balance date rather than to investments bought and sold at
a loss after that date. The interpretation of the Rae Committee appears to be that the
notereferredto investments bought after 30 June 1970 and subsequently sold at a loss
(14.42).

The auditors of the company were criticised for issuing an unqualified audit report
and certifying that thefinancialstatements gave a true and fair view of the company's
state of affairs at 30 June 1970:
We have been astonished that auditors should have said that the
profit and loss account for Minsec for the year ended June 1970
was 'true and fair'. In our view, the accounts were not 'true', and
w e cannot see how, in the circumstances, the auditors were
properly fulfilling their role as the guardians of the shareholders
and the public (14.43).

The activities of the directors of Minsec, would suggest that neither management nor
the auditors were acting in the shareholders' interests nor were their activities likely to
ensure an efficient allocation of resources. Rather, the activities outlined above were
clearly calculated to conceal the company's changing fortunes.

In the Rae

Committee's calculations, the overall impact of the accounting and reporting
deception outlined above and other "remarkable accountancy heterodoxies" (14.44)
was a distortion of the announced half-yearly profit of at least $9.5 million. Burton
suggests that this sort of activity is not unusual
Under conditions of economic stress ... an enterprise seeking
capital m a y have powerful short-run incentives to hide the current
state of its affairs from potential investors (1980, p79).
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O n this line of reasoning, the deception by the management of Minsec would have
potentially directed resources away from efficient companies toward the inefficient
Minsec.

Even if management does act in the shareholders' interest, and, thereby, the public
interest either voluntarily or through the competitive discipline of the market,
relevant information m a y be withheld. The Rae Committee's investigations also found
evidence that the directors of Minsec used privileged information about its
subsidiaries for purposes of profitable trading in their shares (1974, 14.23). Evidence
was also produced which suggested that not only did Minsec use inside information to
buy shares but to influence the price of the shares after purchase (14.31). In one
particular instance, the shares of one company which were issued at $1 sold at a
premium of 60 cents in their first day on the market. The Official Liquidator for
Minsec stated in evidence to the Rae Committee that there was no doubt that the
share trading activities of the Minsec group wasresponsiblefor the escalation of the
share price to around $3 (14.28).

It would seem that share traders can make

economic profits in the short term at least If Minsec had not failed shortly after these
activities, it is questionable h o w long it would have continued to m a k e such profits.

The Rae Committee recognised that it was impossible to lay down rales to prevent all
occurrences of market manipulation or the issuing of misleading statements and that
business errors could not be legislated against However, it was considered that
Full and truthful publication would not only be a deterrent to some
forms of extravagance, but gives fair warning to lenders and
investors of the ventures they are invited to support (14.130).

Sirnilar conclusions were reached by the Campbell Committee. It was concluded, for
example, that depositors and investors face a number of risks including losses due to
market imperfections. Market imperfections refer to the quality of the information
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provided in that it m a y not adequately inform investors of prospects and contingencies
(1981, 18.5, pp284-285). In particular, stability of the financial system required it to
operate efficiently and effectively. This could not be achieved if investors did not
have confidence in the solvency of financial institutions. Furthermore, market stability
and efficient mobilisation of resources would not be achieved in the face of fraudulent
practices within the market (18.20, p287).

It was necessary, therefore, for

governments to take action directed at ensuring public confidence in the stability of
the financial system (18.10, p285). O n e important regulatory method of achieving
this was disclosure.

Disclosure would improve risk assessment by market

participants, facilitate a fair market and ensure the accountability of companies and
their intermediaries to shareholders, policyholders and contributors (18.47, 18.48,
p290; 21.29, p368). Accounting standards would ensure confidence and stability of
the market by ensuring that the information disclosed in the accounts gave a "true"
indication of the financial position of the company (21.31, p369)

Market stability and confidence is important not only to shareholders, investors,
creditors and the public but also to companies that do not adopt creative accounting
techniques. Henry Bosch, former Chairman of the N C S C , has recounted the story of
a conversation between Wmself and the finance director of a large and respected
Australian company. The director argued that accounting standards were arbitrary
and tended to reduce the truth and fairness of financial reports. The implication
appeared to be that accounting standards were not necessary and directors should be
left to determine what was true and fair for each individual company. Bosch detailed
some increasingly c o m m o n practices a m o n g companies and considered the director
came to the conclusion that accounting standards m a y have faults but provided
protection for both companies and the values of directors w h o used conservative and
objective accounting methods (1987 pp2-3).
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Grabosky and Sutton have argued that corporate crime disadvantages honest business
people by tarnishing "...

the image and the legitimacy of the entire system of

Australian enterprise" (1989, pxi). Smark has supported this view stating that"...
pulling Lazarus up from the dead would be simple compared with the task of raising a
single dollar for an Australian company from maimed and bleeding foreign investors"
(1990, p31). Sykes provides evidence of this in the form of a "money panic" in the
wake of the collapse of Cambridge Credit which in turn led to a collapse of investor
confidence (1988, p467). Investors in building societies situated in Queensland,
Victoria and South Australia began withdrawing their money (p468). The fact that
most of these financial institutions were perfectly sound, had solid backing from banks
and or the government and were not in any danger of collapse did not matter to those
w h o were intent on withdrawing their deposits. Despite assurances from Federal and
State Governments, the ran on these institutions lasted for up to four days.
Withdrawals of $10 million were m a d e from one institution alone (p470). According
to a research team which interviewed people queuing outside one South Australian
building society, half of those withdrawing their money thought there was a possibility
it would collapse (p473). Most of the money was re-deposited in the following
weeks. Nonetheless, without the support of the Reserve Bank and other banks, some
of these building societies m a y have, in fact, collapsed through no fault of their own.

The situation related by Sykes has parallels with the October 1987 stock market
crash. In Farrell's view, the October 19 crash of the N e w York Exchange was a result
of "herd instinct" (1988, p38). Farrell's argument was m a d e in the context of the
efficient market hypothesis and two of its underlying assumptions being that investors
are rational and that stock prices only change in response to fresh news and not crowd
psychology:
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W h a t n e w information jarred investors into slashing their estimate
of the value of Corporate America's assets by some 2 3 % in the 6
1/2 hours the N e w York Stock Exchange was open? Hardly
enough news came out that day, or over the weekend, to account
for the plunge (p38).

The stance adopted by Farrell is similar to the view expressed by Sykes that the
"money panic" was sparked by the collapse of Cambridge Credit. For example,
Farrell cites a Yale University survey of nearly 1000 investors which indicated that the
trigger for the panic was the decline of the market on the previous Thursday and
Friday and on the morning of M o n d a y October 19:
Lots of nervous people came to believe the price drops themselves
signalled a crash, and everyone tried to be thefirstout the door
(Robert Shiller, Yale University, cited by Farrell, p38).

From this, Farrell concludes investors, both large and small, did not behave rationall
but on "herd instinct" in response to the falling market (p38).

What this suggests is that corporate failures can have an adverse impact on companies
which in the normal course of events are quite sound and, to all intents and purposes,
efficient and effective users of resources. The overallresultm a y be, that as in the
"money panic" related by Sykes and the stock market crash of October 1987,
investors m a y withdraw their resources from the market altogether and keep them in
so-called safe investments such as banks or, worse still, in a box under the bed! This
means that the public interest will not be served in that there will not be an efficient
allocation ofresourcesthroughout the community.

The argument that an efficient capital market negates the need for regulation does not
appear to be sound. A s indicated above, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that
the market is not always efficient and because of this, regulation is necessary to
protect those w h o deal direcdy with corporations. B y ensuring that those w h o deal
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with corporations are adequately informed, the public interest is also served. This is

because resources will be directed to those corporations that will use them efficientl

and effectively. The next section will address the accountancy profession's role in th
process.
4. Accountability and the Profession
Accountability or stewardship is not restricted to management even though, under the
law, management is responsible for the preparation of financial statements. As
detailed in the last chapter, the accountancy profession went to great lengths to
establish itself as the arbiter of appropriate accounting methods to be used in the
preparation of financial statements. The profession has itself identified the link
between financial statements and the accountability of management SAC 2 states
... the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to
provide information to users that is useful for making and
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources
(paragraph 26).
When general purpose financial reports meet this objective they
will also be the means by which managements and governing
bodies discharge their accountability to the users of the reports . .
. the rendering of accountability by reporting entities through
general purpose financial reporting is encompassed by the broader
objective of providing information useful for making and
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, since
users will ultimately require the information for resource
allocation decisions (paragraph 27).

Clearly, the profession is accountable to users offinancialstatements because the
profession determines the rules to be used in the preparation of financial statements.
Furthermore, on the basis of the specialised skills and training of members of

professional accountancy associations, the profession argued that the audit of financi
statements should only be undertaken by their members. As Chambers has noted, to
the extent that accountants, as auditors, attest to the truth and fairness of annual
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financial statements, the "mantle of greatness" was placed on them because they are "
. . . instrumental in preserving fair dealing in a world of abstract corporations having
no ethical sensibility" (1991, pl2). Preserving fair dealings should lead to the
allocation of resources so that the profession is not only answerable or accountable to
those w h o use financialreportsbut also to the wider community if decisions based on
those reports are to provide for such an economic allocation of resources. Briloff
sees the role and responsibility of the accountancy profession as "absolutely essential"
to the maintenance of a "constitutional, capitalistic, democratic society" because
... such a society is rooted in the delegation of enormous pools of
power, necessitating a full and equal measure of reciprocal
accountability (1990, pp6-7).

While SAC 2 and the views expressed by the UK Select Committee Report of 1844
and the Rae and Campbell committees appear to focus attention on management and
governing bodies, the implications for accountants of the views expressed cannot be
denied. A s noted above, accountants, by law, are not responsible for the preparation
and presentation of financial reports to shareholders. This is management's duty.
However, accountants, by virtue of their professional status, share this responsibility
because it is their skill and expertise which is used to prepare financial reports and the
General Council of the A S A has stated "... the accountancy profession has a general
responsibility to ensure that published financial statements provide information that is
not irrelevant or misleading ..." (1966, p7). Auditors also share theresponsibilityby
virtue of their duty, under the law, to attest to the truth and fairness of financial
reports and to ensure that there has been compliance with approved accounting
standards.

The role of the accountant in this process is to ensure that adequate

information is provided. A s discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the accountant effectively
becomes the agent of the investor.
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Given the view of the public interest outlined above, S A C 2, by implication, extends
"accountability" in a manner which is significant for the profession in its dominant role
in the standard setting process. Paragraph 5 defines "compliance" as
. . . adherence to those statutory requirements, regulations, rales,
ordinances, directives or other externally-imposed requirements in
respect of which non-compliance m a y have, or m a y have had, a
financial effect on thereportingentity.

From this it could be concluded that accountants and auditors must not only ensure
compliance with accounting standards and the law but also, in their capacity as
promulgators of accounting standards, they have a responsibility to ensure that the
rales and regulations they develop are consistent with the objective of enabling
management and governing bodies to discharge their accountability to resource
providers and the public at large.
5. Regulation, Fairness and Morality
This discussion of the perceived purposes of regulation and the link between
accountancy and the public interest suggests that financial information is intended to
provide a means by which corporate management is accountable to investors,
creditors and the general public.

Regulation, including disclosure of financial

information, is necessary to not only protect those w h o deal with corporations but
also to ensure an economic allocation of resources. This is held to be achieved by
nMmtaining a stable securities market so that investors and creditors are confident in
the efficiency and effectiveness of the market. The Rae Committee summarises the
need for corporateregulationin the following terms:
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There is a tendency on the part of some to argue the question of
regulation purely in economic terms. However, theft has been
outlawed to protect individuals, not simply because of its
economic consequences. Similarly m o d e m trade practices and
consumer protection laws are motivated by a desire to prevent
exploitation of the individual by those with greater economic
power, greater access to information or greater bargaining
strength. M o r e adequate and effective company and securities
laws are required on grounds of fairness and commercial morality
(1974,15.2).

The balance of this chapter will provide evidence which suggests that the accountancy
profession has failed in its claim to serve the public interest by ensuring that the
information contained in audited financial statements will facilitate the making of
decisions which, in rum, willresultin an economic allocation of resources throughout
the community.

THE PUBLIC BENEFIT FORSAKEN
The details of the Minsec deception outlined above suggest that, in that particular
case, the financial information disclosed was not in the public interest in that it had the
potential to divert resources to an inefficient company, Minsec, and, therefore, away
from efficient resource users. It could, of course, be argued that this was a one-off
case rather than the norm. However, the Rae Committee report provides ample
evidence that it was not. Furthermore, while the findings of the Rae Committee did
lead to the establishment of a co-operative regulatory scheme aimed at preventing
such abuses of the corporate form, the necessity to appoint the Campbell Committee
less than ten years later suggests that this initiative was not successful. Its findings
support this contention. A similar result appears to have followed the establishment
of the A S R B and statutory backing for approved accounting standards. The quote
from Sykes given previously indicates that the financial information disclosed by
companies can still be misleading despite the existence of several standards with
statutory backing.
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The balance of this chapter will endeavour to show that it is questionable whether
accounting is in fact serving the public interest by ensuring an efficient allocation of
resources. Corporate failures have continued with often devastating effects on the
community. Clarke and Dean, for example, cite evidence from the A M P Society
which estimates that corporate failures of the late 1980's and early 1990's have cost
shareholders some $8 billion (1992, pl81). These failures are often unexpected as
financial statements have indicated the companies concerned were operating
successfully. In some cases, companies have continued to operate even though
activities once reported as profitable have subsequentiy been shown to have given rise
to large losses, these losses having been hidden for a time by selective use of
accounting practices. This has led Clarke and Dean to maintain that misleading
financial statements have been as m u c h the result of compliance with accounting
standards as non-compliance (pi86). Similarly, Chambers has argued that m a n y of
the instances of fraud and mismanagement that have continued over a long period of
time, could not have taken place without "lax accounting practices" (1972, pl82). It
is not unusual, therefore, that accountants and auditors are often implicated in the
deception of users of financial reports when investigations reveal that the financial
reports were misleading. Such revelations cast doubt on the professionalism of
accountants and on the profession's ability to design and develop accounting standards
directed at achieving stable, efficient and effective capital markets and, thereby, an
efficient allocation of resources.

The corporate failures examined in this section of the study have been selected on the
basis of their notoriety and potential adverse impact on the status of accountancy.
The large losses incurred by these companies were, in general, borne by shareholders
and unsecured creditors. In some cases, creditors w h o

thought their investments

were secured, also incurred substantial losses. Specific corporate failures have also
been selected because of the timing of collapse which, in some cases, occurred after
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regulatory measures were taken in a bid to prevent the concealment of impending
financial disaster. It will be argued in this and subsequent chapters that the continued
cycle of corporate failure, regulatory reform is the result of flexible, vague and
ambiguous laws and accounting practices.

Grabosky and Sutton contend "[fjhe

criminal law as it applies to corporate conduct is at times flexible, at times ambiguous.
... In the area of company law, precisely what constitutes a true and fair account is
unclear" (1989, pxiii). A similar argument can be m a d e with regard to accounting and
what, for example, constitutes profit and when should the various components which
m a k e up profit be recognised and h o w should they be measured.

A s will be

demonstrated, the determination of profit, in particular the recognition of revenue and
losses, and the measurement of assets have been key factors in the unexpectedness of
the corporate failures under examination.

The examination will begin with the collapse of the Reid Murray Group in 1963. This
is not to suggest that there were no significant corporate failures between the time of
the land b o o m of the 1880's, 1890's and the 1960's. Sykes has chronicled a number of
corporate failures during this time (1988). However, as the Final Report of the
investigators into Reid Murray (hereafterreferredto as the Final Report) showed, the
loss incurred by the Group was in excess of the equivalent of $40 million (Victoria,
1966, p78). This was an Australian record at the time (Sykes, 1988, p322). It also
brought criticism of the accountancy profession
One of the things most striking to a layman which was disclosed in
the course of the investigation was that different methods of
preparing the same company accounts are regarded by
accountants as acceptable even though results using another
method m a y be very different (Victoria, 1966, p79).

This and further criticisms of not only accounting methods but also auditors which
will be discussed in the next section, appear to have been what Fitzgerald had urged
against in 1949 w h e n making calls for the profession to take a lead in the development
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and publication of guidelines to members of the professional associations. Note that
Australia adopted decimal currency in February 1966 on the basis that one pound
equalled $2. For simplicity, decimal currency will be adopted in the discussion of the
Reid Murray Group collapse.
Reid Murray Holdings and Related Corporations
In April 1963, the Legislative Assembly of the Victorian Parliament ordered an
investigation into the affairs of Reid Murray Holdings Limited and certain of its
subsidiaries including Reid Murray Acceptance. A n interim report (hereafter referred
to as the Interim Report) was m a d e to Parliament by December 1963 (Victoria, 1963,
p3). The Final Report was notfinaliseduntil 1966. The length of time involved in the
investigation suggests the complex nature of the Reid Murray Group. In making its
Interim Report, the investigators alluded to this complexity and indicated that
subsequent investigation m a y vary the details contained in the Interim Report but
doubted if the substance of their conclusions would be altered (p3). This view was
verified in the Final Report (Victoria, 1966, p93). For this reason, m u c h of the
following discussion will centre on the findings set out in the investigators' Interim
Report.

In both the Interim and Final Reports, it was demonstrated that poor management was
the major factor in the demise of the Reid Murray Group. The Final Report stated
clearly there was no apparent fraud but that the directors of the Group adopted a "nomanagement theory". Each company in the Group was left to its o w n devices (p92).
Its public image, however, was of a "large, well ran and profitable concern" (Victoria,
1963, p9). In ordertomaintain this image, generous dividends were paid and less than
conservative accounting policies were adopted to conceal its lack of liquidity and
unprofitable activities (p9). In the Interim Report, the inspectors stated that in their
view, the published reports and accounts of the group were deceptive or inaccurate
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and that they had been "...

startled by the complete lack of reality shown in the

1961 accounts published by the group" (pl07). The investigators admitted that they
were not accountants and that the accountancy profession would not accept their
conclusions but that c o m m o n sense compelled therejectiono f " . . . a number of the
accounting practices used in the group ..." even though such practices were

"...

regarded as acceptable by accountants" (pl07). Furthermore, even if the methods
used were acceptable, the published accounts of the Group and its companies were
misleading because the accounting methods used to arrive atreportedprofits were not
disclosed (p66).

The fact that attempts to remedy this situation were made in the accounts for the year
ending 31 August 1961, was largely irrelevant The investigators considered that the
accounts for 1958, 1959 and 1960 and the indication they gave of a profitable and
booming concern, were what prompted the investment of large sums of money in the
company. For example, Reid Murray Acceptance Limited issued three prospectuses
in the 1959-60 financial year. These issues brought public subscriptions in cash of
$17 million (October, 1959), $11.2 million (March 1960) and $18.4 million (May
1960)(p65). Most of this money and that of other investors w h o subscribed to issues
in response to a series of prospectuses issued up to and including M a y 1962 was
subsequendy lost (p66). The b o o m in investment in the Reid Murray Group and the
rapid expansion of the Group m a y have been slower if the published accounts had
reported more moderate figures. Without the great influx of cash, the expansionist
activities of the Group m a y have been checked and the Group m a y never have failed
(p66). The investigators also considered that while some attempts to disclose the
manner in which profits were calculated in the August 1961 accounts, changes in
accounting methods within the Group and dubious accounting methods used in the
financial statements of subsidiaries inflated reported profits for that year. This,
coupled with the misleading nature of the Directors' Report for that year,resultedin
further credit being extended to the Group. S o m e of these funds were also lost in the
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subsequent collapse of the Group (p81). A s Chambers has observed changes in
accounting methods could not have m a d e the company better than it was. T o the
extent that accounting methods made it appear so, investors were fooled (1972,
pi83). In terms of the public interest objectives outlined previously, the accounting
methods adopted by the Reid Murray Group for the years 1958 to 1961 appear to
have resulted in an inefficient allocation of resources. For example, Chambers has
argued that if it had not been for the overstatement of profits and assets, the Reid
Murray Group would not have been able to raise some $34 million in debentures after
M a y 1960 (pl89).

The Final Report into the collapse of the Group suggests the validity of this view. A
number of serious questionsrelevantto the accountancy profession are raised in the
Reports conclusions:
If the group was badly ran and was engaged in unprofitable
enterprises and suffered its losses for these reasons, h o w was it
that the group appeared for so long to be both well and profitably
ran? H o w did it come about that in 1961 the group published
cheerful accounts showing substantial profits and the directors
m a d e a cautiously optimistic report to shareholders when by the
time the 1962 accounts came to be published it was clear that
disaster had befallen the group? H o w was it, that in May, 1962,
Reid Murray Acceptance was able to put out an equally cheerful
prospectus, and h o w was it that prospectus should have been kept
open to public subscription until mid-October, 1962, when in
November and December, 1962, it became clear that the group
had collapsed? (Victoria, 1966, p93).

The Final Report stated the balance sheets of the Reid Murray companies frequentiy
provided inadequate information about the items included in them (p79) and that the
profit and loss accounts were at times misleading (p80). The fact that the auditors of
Reid Murray Holdings were either too lazy or timid to properly qualify the accounts
meant that shareholders did not receive the information the Companies Act intended
them to receive (p91). The accounting treatment of real estate acquired for re-sale,
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fixed real estate, interest on loans to acquire and develop real estate, debtors and
intra-group transactions were targeted and criticised in both the interim and Final
Reports. The Interim Report provides details of these accounting treatments. It
further states that in the opinion of the investigators, the accounting techniques were
questionable particularly given the poor management of the Group. In some cases the
accounting methods adopted produced completely unrealresultsand failed to present
a true and fair view of the accounts (Victoria, 1963, p63).

Debts and real estate acquired for re-sale represented the two most significant assets
in the balance sheets of the Reid Murray Group companies (Victoria, 1966, p79).
Prior to 1959, the Reid Murray Group had been involved in the business of selling
soft goods and electrical appliances on credit terms. Credit was provided by the Reid
Murray Group to its customers and in the opinion of the investigators, the granting of
credit was vital not only to the operations of the Group but also in its development
and growth (Victoria, 1963, p58). Evidence of this was the low ratio of cash to credit
sales of one to nine (p58). This, in itself, was not a matter of concern to the
investigators. However, the treatment of profit on sales was.

In general, the retail companies of the group recognised the entire profit on credit
sales at the time of sale. Given that theretailersthemselves were the major financiers
of credit sales and that credit was often extended in circumstances that would not
have been acceptable to a finance company, the investigators argued that the profit on
the sale should have been spread over the period of the credit terms. This was
particularly the case where credit terms extended over a number of years (p58). The
investigators accepted the fact that the approach adopted by theretailcompanies was
consistent with generally accepted accounting practice. However, they argued that
this practice should only be followed where there was strict control of credit and
where adequate provision for bad debts was made. A s already noted, the retail
companies extended credit where, in the opinion of the investigators, a finance
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company would not For example, goods were sold on "no deposit" terms (p63).
There was also evidence by the time of the publication of the August 1960 accounts
that the time period of repayment for credit sales was increasing (p63). Even after the
beginning of the credit squeeze in November 1960, little attention was given to debt
collection by the managers ofretailcompanies. Sales personnel were remunerated on
the basis of sales not on debt collection. Emphasis, therefore, was on increasing sales
volume with little regard for whether the purchasers could ultimately repay the debt
(p67). Poor credit control was compounded by a failure on the part of some of the
retail companies to m a k e provision for doubtful debts. Instead, bad debts were
written off as incurred. However, as the investigators pointed out, in the absence of
strict credit controls, it is debatable whether theretailcompanies would have been in a
positiontoreadilyidentify bad debts (p59).

The overall impact of the methods used for accounting for retail sales made on credit
was that profits and assets m a y have been overstated. The investigators suggested
profits were overstated because profits were recognised that "... the companies
concerned had not received and were not then entitled to receive but which would
only be received in full with the passage of time and in some cases of many years"
(p63). Profits were further overstated because no provision was m a d e for bad and
doubtful debts. Expenses, therefore, were understated and assets overstated (p63).

Similar arguments were raised with regard to the land dealings of the Group. As the
investigators noted, the entry by the Group into the real estate market had a
significant impact on the apparent prosperity of the Group and its subsequent demise
(p61).

The years 1958, 1959 and 1960 saw the emergence of yet another land boom in
Australia and the directors of Reid Murray Holdings seized the opportunity for the
Group to profit from this boom. The Group accordingly established subsidiaries to
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enter the land market (p61). The accounts of the Group ended 31 August 1959 show
for the first time the item "Real estate acquired forre-salewith improvements to date
at cost". This item was disclosed as a current asset amounting to $2.8 million (pp6061). A number of aspects of the accounting for this land were of concern to the
investigators.

Reid Murray Holdings lent money to its land company subsidiaries to finance the
purchase and development of the land. Reid Murray Holdings itself had borrowed the
money from its subsidiary Reid Murray Acceptance Limited (p61).

Reid Murray

Acceptance Limited was a listed finance company formed in June 1958 specifically to
finance the expansionist activities of the Reid Murray Group (p8).

In principle, the land company subsidiaries paid interest to the Holding Company
which in turn paid interest to Reid Murray Acceptance Limited. A s the amount of
interest notionally paid by the holding company was less than that paid to it by the
land company subsidiaries, Reid Murray Holdings effectively made a profit on the
transactions (p52). In April 1960, a further company, Re-Mur Finance Company, was
created. This company was formed with the sole purpose of avoiding the payment of
tax on the profits earned from interest on loans from Reid Murray Acceptance
Limited to Reid Murray Holdings and then to the land companies (p51). A s Sykes
has argued, the " . . . utilization of tax losses is an accounting game which can be
played with great skill and complexity" (1988, p309). It appears that the Reid Murray
Group played it well and, at the same time, managed to lull investors in Reid Murray
Acceptance Limited into a false sense of security.

The members of Re-Mur Finance Company comprised five companies all of which
had ceased trading and had accumulated tax losses. All but one of the companies was
insolvent (Victoria, 1963, p51). Re-Mur Finance Co. was effectively nothing more
than a shell being administered by Reid Murray Holdings (p52). Interest bearing loans
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to Reid Murray Holdings and then to the land company subsidiaries were
systematically transferred to Re-Mur Finance C o m p a n y at the end of thefinancialyear
of each subsidiary. Profits arising from the notional interest payments were divided
amongst the five partners of Re-Mur Finance Company. These profits were set off
against the accumulated tax losses of the partners with theresultthat no tax was paid.
A s the tax losses of each partner were absorbed, the companies gradually withdrew
from the partnership (p52).

A more sinister aspect of the arrangement was the lack of protection afforded to
investors in Reid Murray Acceptance Limited. A s noted earlier, public subscriptions
to the company amounting to $46.6 million were m a d e during the 1959-1960 financial
year. Six more public issues were made during the life of the Group. The prospectus
for each issue clearly stated the investment being called for was in first mortgage
debenture stock (pp46-47) secured by aregisteredmortgage over the assets of Reid
Murray Acceptance Limited (p52). However, as the investigators noted, unsecured
loans of some $52 million were m a d e by Reid Murray Acceptance Limited to Reid
Murray companies.

These loans represented the major asset of Reid Murray

Acceptance Limited (p52). The investigators estimated that by December 1961,
unsecured loans represented approximately five-sixths of the company's tangible
assets (p85). The deception of debenture holders was deepened in that the loans were
then systematically transferred to Re-Mur Finance Company, a company without
independent existence and comprised of "...

a partnership of companies whose

history was a history of losses" (p52). In short, their investment was unsecured and
when the Group failed, there was no recourse for them to recover.

The investigators also expressed doubt over the manner in which the land company
subsidiaries accounted for interest charges and development costs. As noted by the
investigators, there is often a long time lapse between the time land is acquired and
developed to the stage where houses have been built and are ready for sale. If the
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land companies had disclosed interest payments and development costs as expenses,
their profitability would have been eroded in the early stages of the land development
projects.

The solution was the capitalisation of interest charges and development

costs with a consequent writing up of land values (p61). The investigators considered
that this practice was justifiable if used in conjunction with planned development but if
this plan was disrupted for an uncertain time period, the practice should be
discontinued. A further consideration, in the view of the investigators, was that the
practice should not be undertaken when the developer had to continue to borrow
funds to complete the project (p62).

A s already indicated, the land companies

financed development by borrowings from Reid Murray Holdings. In addition, it
appears the practice of capitalising interest and development costs continued after the
announcement in November 1960 of a Federal Government imposed credit squeeze
which reduced the likelihood of successful sale of properties at other than what the
investigators termed "sacrifice prices" (pl2, p67). In addition, the practice was
continued into the 1961 accounts at a time when lack of funds prevented further
development (p78). In some instances, land was sold without being developed and on
terms that were "longer" and "easier" than the terms on which Reid Murray land
companies had purchased the land (p64).

The investigators expressed further

concern that the financial statements did not disclose the fact that interest and
development costs had been capitalised. Thefirsttimethis fact was disclosed was in
the 1961 accounts (p63). Even then, however, insufficient information was given to
allow a determination of h o w m u c h of the value of the Group's investment in land
consisted of capitalised interest as opposed to tangible development or improvements
(pi08). This perhaps became more pertinent when the land was appraised by sworn
valuers in August 1962. Land values in the books of group companies at that time
were considered to be overstated by $1,533,880. It was considered that later
valuations would prove land values had fallen even more (pi3).
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A further area of concern for the investigators was the treatment of trading profits on
land A s withretailtransactions, most of the land dealings were on credit terms
sometimes extending over long time periods. This was particularly the case with land
and housing. All of the profit on sale was taken into the accounts at the time of sale,
even though the contracts were often framed in such a w a y that the contract could
later be avoided. Furthermore, it appears that as withretailsales, there was a lack of
control over the granting of credit (p62). The investigators argued that under the
circumstances of the Reid Murray Group, profits on the sale ofrealestate should not
be recognised in full at the time of sale. A provision for unaccrued profit should be
m a d e and deducted from the total profit on the sale. The balance should be reported
as profit (p63).

In addition to the problem of recognising profits at the time of sale, the investigator
noted a lack of consistency inreportingwithin the Group. O n e member of the Group
calculated tax on the "profit emerging basis" (p62). Under this method profits are
recognised in each accounting period on the basis of therelationshipbetween gross
profit on the sale and the ratio of cash actually received during the year to the total
sale price (ASA, 1966, pl7). This had the effect of showing one figure for gross
profit for tax purposes and a completely different figure for gross profit in the
accounts. This approach was used for three consecutive years by the subsidiary in
question. The most marked difference in the two amounts was for the 1959-1960
financial year when gross profit for tax purposes was $61,450 compared to $385,628
gross profit for purposes of the accounts. Once again, the accounting methods used
were not disclosed in the published accounts of the Group (Victoria, 1963, p62).

According to the investigators, the 1960-1961 financial year of the Group saw a
change in its fortunes. The Directors' Report stated that consolidated profit after tax
for the year was $1,791,784 compared with $3,090,680 for 1960 and $1,702,650 for
1959 (p69). The investigators considered the comparison m a d e between the three
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years'resultswas totally misleading. In many instances, accounting changes were
made either by individual companies within the Group or by the holding company.
The Directors' Report for the year stated that some accounting changes had been
m a d e but the investigators observed that the statements "represented only a halftruth" in that the stated reason for at least one change was given as being to
standardise the calculation of unearned income within the Group. The purpose of this
and other changes, in the opinion of the investigators, was for no other reason than to
increase reported profits (p69). The impact of the changes in accounting methods
was estimated to be some $1,959,414 (p73).

The changes questioned by the investigators included the adoption of the Rule of 78
for the calculation of unearned income by bothretailand land companies within the
Group. This increased the profit for the year by $765,214. Contrary to the statement
in the Directors' Report, the investigators found little evidence to suggest this method
had been used to any extent within the Group prior to this time (p69).

The

investigators also noted that during 1961 the Rule of 78 had been recommended for
hire purchase and finance companies at a conference of hire purchase companies and
also by the General Council of the I C A A . However, there was no evidence to suggest
these recommendations had influenced the decision to adopt the method within the
Reid Murray Group. It was concluded, therefore, that the technique was used to
increasereportedprofits for the year (p70).

The auditors confirmed that it was probable that the reported profit for the year
would not have been as high if the Rule of 78 had been used in previous years. The
introduction of this method meant that not only were profits for 1961 included in the
calculation but also profits which would have been brought to account in prior years if
the method had been used during those years (p70).

The investigators also

questioned the propriety of the application of the Rule of 78 to creditretailersgiven
the poor control of credit that was evident throughout the Group (p70-71).
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Criticism was also levelled at a newly adopted method of accounting forrentalincome
introduced by one company within the Group. Prior to the 1961 accounts, rental
income was taken into account as it fell due over a fixed term. Under the new
accounting system, allrentalrevenuedue over a fixed term was recognised when the
rental agreement was entered into.

This change increased reported profits by

$272,032 (p71).

Group profits were further inflated by an amount of $170,168 by a dubious treatment
of what the investigators considered were essentially pre-acquisition profits of a
subsidiary and a change in accounting methods within that subsidiary imposed by the
holding company (p72). With regard to the pre-acquisition profits, the investigators
argued that "deferred" profits which were subsequently included in the 1961 accounts
had been earned prior to the acquisition of the subsidiary in the year ending August
1960. The "deferred profits" arose because the company in question had previously
used the profits emerging basis of recognising profits on land transactions (ASA,
1966, pl7). However, for the purposes of the 1961 accounts, the subsidiary was
forced to abandon this method and adopt the method of recognising profits at the time
of sale even when the sale was on terms (Victoria, 1963, p72). Hence, even if the
"deferred profits" could not righdy be called "pre-acquisition profits", the overall
impact of the change in accounting methods was to recognise in the current year's
profit profits which had been earned in prior years.

As noted previously, it was uncommon for companies within the Group to provide for
doubtful debts. Bad debts were written-off as incurred. In November 1961, the
auditors raised this matter with the holding company (pp72-73). A s a consequence of
the insistence of the auditors, a provision for doubtful debts of $700,000 was raised.
However, it was not written-off against the current profits of the subsidiaries or of
Reid Murray Holdings. Instead, it was m a d e as an appropriation from the retained
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profits of Reid Murray Holdings (p73). This apparently was a compromise arrived at
by a director of Reid Murray Holdings and the auditors. The director was loath to
have any further provisions created (p79). Firstly, the investigators considered the
provision should have been raised in the books of the subsidiaries and written-off
against the gross profit for the year of the individual companies particularly as the
companies involved had been identified. The method adopted did not affect profits
for the year either in the accounts of the subsidiaries or in those of Reid Murray
Holdings (p73).
understated.

In addition, it appears that even this provision was grossly

Doubtful debts in the Group at the time were estimated to be

approximately $3 million (p79).

In addition to the changes in accounting methods, the investigators considered the
consolidated profit and loss for the year would have shown a substantial loss if the
accounts of some of the subsidiaries had been properly prepared (p79). For example,
one subsidiary included profits of $300,454 on the sale of property. At the time the
accounts were prepared, the transaction was not complete. The auditors report of the
subsidiary was qualified with respect to this transaction (pp76-77). The auditors of
Reid Murray Holdings approached the auditors of the subsidiary but were refused any
information regarding the qualification. They then contacted a director of Reid
Murray Holdings w h o assured them the transaction was bone fide (p84).

The

auditors accepted these assurances and their report for the Group was accordingly
unqualified (p84).

T h e accounts of another subsidiary included as revenue a

procurement fee for services which had not been rendered and for a transaction which
was not completed in 1961. A cheque for the fee had been drawn in August 1961 but
was cancelled in December 1961 (p53).

A further "procurement fee" initially

recorded as revenue was subsequently recorded as "goodwill" (p77). In a further
example, profit on the sale of a number of houses was recognised despite the fact the
houses had not yet been built The accounting method adopted was to recognise the
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profit as soon as the agreements for the building of the houses were entered into. A
corresponding liability was raised for estimated construction costs (p77).

The investigators also questioned balance sheet classifications. As discussed
previously,realestate held forre-salewas classified in the balance sheet as a current
asset The investigators had no complaint with this in the event the land was expected
to be sold within a relatively short time period such as twelve months (p80).
However, given the credit squeeze and drop in land sales, the continuation of
classifying the land as a current asset was questioned. In addition, the lack of land
sales at other than "sacrifice prices" (pl2, p67) meant that the land was over-valued in
the accounts (p80). Sworn valuations in 1962 confirmed this (pi3).

Reference was also made by the investigators to the classification as current assets of
amounts o w e d by subsidiary companies to Reid Murray Holdings. Admittedly, these
amounts were payable on demand but as the investigators pointed out, such a
demand would have forced most of the subsidiaries into liquidation. Recovery of the
advances would have taken years and, therefore, they should not have been classified
as current assets (p80).

In summary, the investigators maintained that the financial statements for the year
ending August 1961 were misleading. B y w a y of explanation of the actions of the
directors and other officers of the Group, the investigators pointed to the situation the
Reid Murray Group found itself in at this time (p81). A s noted earlier, the directors
of the Group had an obsession with presenting an impression of a profitable
organisation. However, profitability is one thing and liquidity quite another and from
April 1960, the Group was faced with liquidity problems (p9). These problems
continued and steadily increased culminating in an order for the winding up of Reid
Murray and its subsidiaries in M a y 1963 (pi4).
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This is not to say that cash was not coming into the Group. The debenture issues of
Reid Murray Acceptance Limited generated the inflow of $86 million in cash between
July 1958 and October 1962. However, no provision for theretirementof debentures
was m a d e (p39). In general, it appears there was an assumption the public would
continue to subscribe to debenture issues so that later issues would be used to meet
interest payments and retirement of earlier issues (p39). The lack of any plan for the
retirement of debentures appears to have been compounded by a complete lack of
planning for h o w the money from debentures was to be utilised or h o w much income
would be generated by the funds employed (p49). In addition, prior to 1961, there
was no control of the terms of subscriptions or of debenture maturity dates (p49).

This attitude was exacerbated by the rapid rate at which cash paid on debentures was
spent or committed by companies within the Group. A s borrowed money came in, it
was used to fund the expansion of credit inretailand land divisions (p58-59), the
takeover or formation of new subsidiaries (p8, p59-60) and the purchase and
development ofrealestate (p61). A s already discussed, the bulk of theretailand land
sales were on credit with credit being provided by the selling company. If credit
control had been maintained, self financing would not have been a problem. A s was
revealed in the course of the investigation, this was not the case. The repayment
period for credit sales became increasingly long (p63). The proceeds of debenture
issues was also used to finance the take-over of other companies. The Reid Murray
Group expanded to such an extent that at the time of its demise, it comprised more
than 200 companies (Stamp, 1964, p2). S o m e of these companies were of doubtful
profitability at the time of take-over (Victoria, 1963, pp59-60). In commenting on the
managing director of Reid Murray Holdings, the investigators stated "... he was
selling cash: and he sold cash in great and increasing amounts, without planning the
provision of the funds necessary to pay to-morrow's bills" (p64).
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This use of borrowed money, in particular on "fixed or semi-fixed assets" was a major
weakness in the Group'sfinancialstructure because when a downturn in the economy
came, the inflow of debenture money declined. A s the Group had not provided for
theretirementof earlier debentures, it needed torealisesome of its assets to meet its
commitments. However, such realisation was difficult because of the then prevailing
economic climate (p60). This meant the Group had to rely on an ever increasing bank
overdraft and stand-by arrangements which stood at $11.6 million by the end of the
1961 financial year. The Group's trade creditors and other liabilities also began to
accumulate and a current liability for these items amounted to $12.2 million in 1961.
It therefore was necessary to maintain public confidence in the Group to ensure a
steady, albeit reduced, stream of debenture subscriptions (p49) and, to a certain
extent, the maintenance of bank overdraft and credit facilities. The scene was thus set
for the preparation of the August 1961 financial statements which managed to show a
profit, albeit a smaller profit compared to prior years.

The Group succeeded in that further debenture monies were subscribed in response to
a prospectus issued in December 1961 and another issued in M a y 1962 (ppl2-13).
However, the amounts subscribed were considerably less than previous issues and by
October 1962 outflows exceeded inflows by $432,500. Debentures due to mature in
1963, 1964 and 1965 amounted to $38 million. In the absence of any plan for
retirement of these debentures utilising funds already within the Group or subsequent
operating activities further borrowing would be needed to meet these debts (pi08).
The banks continued to provide overdraft and stand-by arrangements but in
September 1962 refused a request to increase the over-draft limit In December 1962,
Reid Murray Acceptance Limited was unable to meet a $1.2 million debenture interest
payment (Stamp, 1964, p2). Thus despite attempts to maintain its public image as a
well-run and profitable organisation, Reid Murray Holdings and its subsidiaries
entered an agreement on 10 January 1963 with the debenture trustees to appoint a
receiver. A n order for the winding up of the Group was m a d e in M a y 1963 (pl4).
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T h e foregoing narrative has not attempted to question the criticisms levelled by the
investigators at the accounting methods adopted by Reid Murray Holdings and its
subsidiaries. T h e purpose has been to provide some insight into the nature of the
accounting methods used to conceal the failing liquidity and profitability of the Group
as evidenced by the modest profit reported in the 1961 annual reports. A profit which
the investigators suggest should have been a significant loss had it not been for the
accounting methods adopted within the Group (p79).

In response to the investigators' reports on Reid Murray Holdings and other failed
corporations in the early 1%0's, the General Council of the A S A undertook an
examination of the findings set out in thesereports( A S A , 1966). In general, the A S A
report agreed that there was a lack of compliance with a number of generally accepted
accounting principles in the accounts of the Reid Murray Group such as the failure to
provide adequate provision for doubtful debts and the raising of a provision against
the retained profits of the holding company (p23), the treatment of pre-acquisition
profits as being available for distribution by the holding company, including unearned
profits in group profit for the year by recognising profits on transactions which were
fictional or not completed at balance date such as land sales or agreement to build
houses and inappropriate classification, description or valuation of assets in the
financial statements (pp25-26).

Even where General Council disagreed with the

investigators' report, for example with regard to the recognition of profit at the point
of sale even for hire purchase and extended credit transactions, it was prepared to
admit that whether the criticisms of generally accepted accounting principles were
valid or not, there were deficiencies within the accountancy profession.

These

deficienciesrelated,inter alia, to the formulation, promulgation and regular review of
accounting principles and compliance with them by members of the profession (p5).
Furthermore, with regard to the number of acceptable methods of reporting
essentially the same transaction, it was recognised thatfinancialstatements could be
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misleading to investors, creditors and shareholders w h o are unaware of the limitations
of statements prepared in this manner (p7).

As noted in Chapter 3, the collapse of the Reid Murray Group and other companies
prompted calls for the formulation and promulgation of accounting standards. These
calls led to a co-operative effort between the A S A and I C A A to promulgate
accounting standards through the jointly sponsored A A R F . However, as subsequent
events have shown, corporate failures have continued and often, the accounting
methods used to conceal impending failure have been similar to those used in the Reid
Murray Group.
Cambridge Credit Corporation Limited
O n 30 September 1974 Cambridge Credit Corporation Limited (hereafterreferredto
as Cambridge) defaulted on the payment of $2 million interest due to debenture and
note holders on that date. A s a consequence, Cambridge and those of its subsidiaries
guaranteeing debentures and notes were placed in receivership (New South Wales
( N S W ) , 1977, pl5, 2.1). Just fourteen days earlier, the directors of Cambridge had
issued a pressreleaseannouncing profits of $3,055,635 after tax. The press release
further stated theresultswere audited and represented a 33.2 per cent increase in
profits compared to the previous year (pl5, 2.2). S o m e six months earlier, a press
release had announced interimresultsfor the six months to 31 December 1973 which
showed a 99.8 per cent increase in profitability over the same period for the 1972-73
financial year (ppl5-16,2.4).

In the wake of the Cambridge collapse, the New South Wales Corporate Affairs
Commission was appointed by the State Attorney-General to undertake an
investigation of Cambridge andrelatedcorporations. The investigation was to include
the press release profit announcements of March and September 1974, the Group
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profit for the year ended 30 June 1974 and h o w these profits had been determined. A
prospectus had been issued in M a y 1974. The investigation was also to extend to the
auditors' and directors'reportsin the prospectus (pll, 1.1,1.2,1.3).

In 1978, the scope of the investigation was widened to include what the investigators
termed Hutcheson Family Companies ( N S W , 1979, p3; pl5,1.4). The period under
investigation was extended to commence from 1 July, 1965 including every
prospectus dated after 30 June 1966 up to the time of the last prospectus dated 6
May, 1974 (pi.5, 1.5, 1.6). The reason for this was that the investigators considered
that the Cambridge Group and the Hutcheson Family Companies were not
independent

The investigators referred to the overall Group as the Hutcheson

Conglomerate as this was consistent with a group managed and operated as one
company (p21,2.7).

The first interim report appeared in 1977. The second report was published in 1979.
Both reports were highly critical of the auditors of the Group. For example, the
conclusion of thefirstInterim Report stated:
We are of the opinion that the firm failed to take proper steps to
plan and control their audits for the periods ended 31st December,
1973, and 30th June, 1974, and that they were negligent in the
performance of their statutory duties both as auditors of the
Cambridge group for those periods and as reporting accountants
in the Prospectus dated 6th May, 1974 ( N S W , 1977, p281,
12.18).

In the secondreport,the investigators comments were even more pointed:
... had ... the auditors of all the relevant Conglomerate
companies since 1966, adopted a competent, critical and
independent approach in their work, the ultimately disastrous
situation of Cambridge and Northumberland could never have
developed ( N S W , 1979, p5).
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Northumberland Insurance Company Ltd was one of the Hutcheson Family
Companies and effectively had been a Cambridge subsidiary since April 1971 (p3).

The two Cambridge reports deal extensively with the accounts of the Group and the
Hutcheson Family Companies and their audit. A thorough analysis of all aspects of
thereportsis neither possible nor necessary in the present context. A s with the Reid
Murray investigation commented on previously, some key elements of the reports will
be identified and discussed in a bid to establish the lack of due regard for the interests
of investors and creditors and the public in ensuring an efficient allocation of
resources. The lack of concern for those w h o dealt with Cambridge was commented
upon in the second report with regard to therelationshipbetween Cambridge and the
Hutcheson Family Companies:
The Conglomerate for many years had been suffering large cash
losses and had survived only by reason of public borrowing
through Cambridge. These losses and, indeed, the links between
the Cambridge group and other Conglomerate members had never
been disclosed by Cambridge, and when regard is had to them, the
situation of Cambridge must have been precarious since before
1966. This non-disclosure . . . was such as to deceive all w h o
dealt with Cambridge or with Northumberland . . .
Their
concealment of the true situation of these companies was assisted
by the auditors w h o failed to appreciate, let alone report on the
way the Conglomerate was being used to this end (p21,2.7).

M u c h of the first report concentrated on the profit announcements of March and
September 1974. Reported profits were determined on an ad hoc basis to achieve a
preKleterminedresultand, at the same time, to smooth income ( N S W , 1977, pl40,
8.8, 8.9). Management made no attempt to conceal this fact from the auditors (p261,
11.6). In the opinion of the investigators, Cambridge management would have
accepted the auditors' advice regarding appropriate accounting methods had this been
forthcoming. Such advice was apparendy not made available and the audit partner in
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charge simply accepted the accounting policies adopted by Cambridge management
This led the investigators to conclude that Cambridge did not"... receive the benefit
of the expertise they were entitled to expect" (p261,11.7).

On the basis of the evidence before them, the investigators concluded in the first
Interim Report that the profits for the six months to 31 December 1973 and for the
year ended 30 June 1974 were "materially overstated" (p278,12.3; p280,12.11). The
Auditors' Report in the Prospectus issued on 6 M a y 1974 was also considered to
include false statements as to the liquid assets of the Group and reported consolidated
net profits (pp278-279,12.5-12.7). Further evidence detailed in the second report led
the investigators to conclude that the net profits before tax for each six monthly and
annual period recorded in the Auditors' Reports included in prospectuses from 30
June, 1966 onwards were false ( N S W , 1979, p5). W h e n the position of the
Hutcheson Conglomerate as a whole was considered, the investigators considered
Cambridge could well have been insolvent since before 1966 (p3).

In analysing the investigators reports into Cambridge, it is possible to draw parallels
with Reid Murray Holdings. For example, both groups encountered persistent and
increasing liquidity problems. Cambridge's liquidity problems did not stem necessarily
from poor management as in Reid Murray Holdings but from increasing activities in
real estate development. The nature of these activities was such that large capital
outlays were required without any prospect of cash inflows until projects were
subsequently developed and sold. The Group was diversified in that in addition to
land development, it was involved in share trading, hire purchase operations, film
production, hotel management and aerial photographic servicing companies.
However, m a n y of these activities sustained losses and, thereby, added to the Group's
liquidity problems rather than alleviating them (pi6,2.6).
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Given insufficient cash flow from itsrealestate activities and the lack of profitability
of its other activities, Cambridge, like Reid Murray Holdings, was dependent for its
continued existence on public borrowing. Public borrowing, however, required public
confidence in the Group which in turn was seen to be contingent upon the Group's
profitability (pi6, 2.6). The Group's managing director agreed with the investigator's
contention that
... it was Cambridge's objective to produce a "reasonable profit"
for each half-yearly period, not only for the purpose of paying
dividends but also for the purposes of borrowing funds, and that
unless the company could show a profit for each 6 months' period
the ability of the group to raise debt finance would be considerably
impaired (pl40, 8.7).

To meet this objective, profits were "internally generated" through the capitalisation
of interest on loans and what was termed "front end" transactions (p280, 12.13).
Briefly,frontend sales were described in evidence as a process whereby A Company
and B C o m p a n y form a joint venture to purchase land. A third company, C, is formed
and the land is subsequently sold to a second joint venture, A B C Company.

C

C o m p a n y undertakes to provide finance at an agreed interest rate for the development
of the land and also to those w h o subsequently purchase it (pp52-53,4.9).

One of Cambridge's major partners in these ventures was a company called
Intercapital which became a subsidiary of Cambridge in 1973. Other companies were
formed specifically for the purpose of front end transactions. For example, Mt.
Warren was incorporated in April 1970 to serve as a joint venture with Cambridge
and Intercapital for the acquisition and development of land and its subsequent sale.
It was owned equally by Cambridge and Intercapital (p69, 4.51). Another company,
Southern Pacific was incorporated in February 1971. It was specifically formed as a
tri-venture vehicle also for the acquisition, development and sale of land (pp69-70,
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4.52). Ownership of Southern Pacific was 40 per cent Cambridge and 60 per cent
Intercapital (p70,4.54).

Front end transactions allowed Cambridge to recognise "profits" in the early
development stages of real estate projects (pl6, 2.6). From 1970, front end
transactions accounted for an increasing proportion of the reported profits of the
Cambridge Group (p52,4.7). The investigators did not cast doubt on the propriety of
this method of calculating profits per se but did question the recognition of those
profits given that Cambridge invariably maintained an interest in the ultimate
purchaser of the land:
The essential ingredient of front end transactions with which we
are concerned is that Cambridge, as vendor, or having a significant
equity interest in the vendor, retained an interest in the subject
property by virtue of its holding a significant equity interest as a
venturer or shareholder in the purchaser. It was the practice in the
Cambridge published accounts for Cambridge's full share of
vendors' profits from front end sales to be included without
allowance for or disclosure of the proportion attributable to
Cambridge's interest in the purchaser (p52,4.7).

It would appear the investigators' concerns were well-founded. Evidence to the
enquiry included correspondence from within Fell & Starkey, the auditors of
Cambridge and most of its subsidiary and related companies. This evidence clearly
indicated Cambridge's treatment of the profits was a matter of concern (pp53-54,
4.10; p55, 4.13; p62, 4.27; p64, 4.34; p65, 4.39). For example, one member of the
firm stated the Cambridge approach was "outside . . . generally accepted accounting

principles" (p64, 4.34) as " . . . profits are not earned and ... it is a very dangerous
procedure ..." (p62,4.27). Another member expressed the view
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... the basis on which the profit has been brought to account in
Cambridge is not correct. ... It does not seem right for a profit
to be "engineered" simply by moving a small percentage of a
project ownership to another party so that it can be said that an
actual cash profit has emerged which can be taken in as income in
the accounts of one of the original parties to the full extent of the
percentage ownership in the project w h e n a major portion of the
ownership is still actually retained (p65,4.39).

The investigators accepted, in principle, the right of the audit partner in charge to
disagree with these views. What was criticised, however, was the failure of the
auditor to ensure consistency within the Group allowing an "ad hoc approach to front
end sales" and also the failure to verify the validity of transactions:
... the auditors failed to have any critical regard to the bona fides
or the substance of the transactions in question; ... it is as
important for an auditor to satisfy himself as to the genuineness of
a transaction as it is to debate the principles applicable to any
profit apparently arising therefrom (p54,4.11).

In particular, while the investigators were prepared to accept front end transactions as
legitimate devices, the inter-relationships between the parties to the transactions were
"no more than the "churning" of real estate" (p74, 4.75) and profits, therefore, were
neither earned nor realised (pl67, 8.119).

According to the investigators, Cambridge effectively "engineered" at least part of its
99.8 per cent increase in profits for the six months to 31 December 1973 and its
overall 33.2 per cent increase in profitability for the year ended 30 June 1974. This
was achieved by the use of front end profit techniques and the failure to eliminate
intra-group transactions from the Group results.

A s already noted, in March 1974, Cambridge issued a press release announcing a net
operating profit after tax of $1,970,697 for the six months to 31 December, 1973
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(pl6, 2.4). Profit before tax was $3,755,601 (pl04, 8.36). The major contributors
and their respective after tax contributions were as follows (pl45, 8.37):

$

Cambridge
Burhead
Elbrook
Leonda
Preston Markets
Sunderland Holdings
26 other subsidiaries contributed
2 subsidiaries contributed losses of
31 other subsidiaries contributed
neither profit or loss
Total contribution by 65 group members

749,454
921,109
33,256
39,181
38,235
131,983
1,913,218
127,594
(70,115)

$1,970,697

O n analysis of the transactions giving rise to Group profitability, the investigators
concluded the profit had been overstated by at least $3,952,691 by inclusion of
$40,000 interest income which was brought to account twice and the following
transactions (pl68, 8.119):

Sale by Burhead to Group Housing

$

Burhead

1,754,493

Cambridge

1,621,828

Sale by Sunderland to Group Housing

251,397

Sale by Cambridge to Loftus

284,973

O n the surface, the two sets of figures above do not pose any problems. However, all
of the transactions represented intra-group sales. Elbrook was a wholly-owned
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subsidiary of Cambridge while Loftus was 75 per cent owned (p48, 3.10). The
$40,000 interest income was theresultof a land sale from Elbrook to Loftus (pl68,
8.119). Clearly, the transactions between Elbrook, Loftus and Cambridge should
have been eliminated from the Group results.

The dealings with Group Housing were even more suspect and provided ample
grounds for criticism of the auditors by the investigators. There was some doubt as to
the percentage ownership that Cambridge held in Group Housing but it appears it was
either 50 per cent or 75 per cent. The auditors failed to verify Cambridge's beneficial
ownership (pl50,8.61). In addition
Cambridge had supplied all the moneys paid by Group Housing
and it alone was obliged under the terms of the tri-venture
agreement to find all finance for the venture (pl69, 8.124).

Therefore, even if Group Housing was not a subsidiary, the transactions should have
been excluded from Group results as Cambridge had financed them (pi52, 8.64).

This, however, was not the end of the story. As is clear from the above, Cambridge's
o w n accounts had included a profit before tax of $1,621,828 on the sale of land
between Burhead and Group Housing. Cambridge's share of the profit stemmed from
a 50:50 joint venture with Burhead (pl45, 8.39). The joint venture agreement was
not executed until June 1974 but was back-dated to M a y 1973 to authenticate the
inclusion of the profit (pl45, 8.39; pl55, 8.73). The major significance of this is that
without the share of the Burhead profits, Cambridge would have shown a loss for the
six months to 30 December, 1973 (pl59, 8.81).

A similar back-dating of a joint venture agreement occurred with regards to profits o
land sales between two other Cambridge subsidiaries. The profits in this instance
were included in the financial statements of 30 June, 1974 (pl53, 8.68).

The
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transaction in question was apparently completed prior to 31 December 1973 but the
profit of $3,000,548 was not brought to account until 30 June 1974 (p221, 9.72). A
joint venture agreement was executed in June 1974 and back-dated to February 1973.
Cambridge's share of the profit as included in the 1974 financial statement, was
$1,500,274 (p224, 9.81). The investigators argued that even if the sale between the
two subsidiaries was a bonefidefrontend transaction, Cambridge's share should have
been eliminated from the Group result due to its ownership interest in the vendor
(p225,9.87).

A further area of contention was the inconsistent and arbitrary use of at least three
different accounting methods for virtually identical transactions (ppl40, 8.8; 142,
8.16). There were three reasons for the adoption of different accounting methods to
suit particular circumstances. The reasons amounted to desires to maximise profits,
tailor profits to a pre-set target or avoid violentfluctuationsin profits from one period
to the next (pl40, 8.8). The methods in question were the accrual, cash emergence
and profit emergence bases of determining profits onrealestate sales.

The basis of measuring profits for the six months to 31 December 1973 in Sunderland
was the cash emerging basis (pl61, 8.91). A note to the draft profit and loss
statement explained that the terms of the contract extended from 1973 to 1983 and
"conservative accounting" dictated the cash emerging basis for the calculation of
profits. The balance owing under the contract was recorded as deferred profits
(pl61, 8.92). However, further evidence demonstrated that the accrual basis had
originally been adopted in the calculation of Sunderland's profits but this was changed
to facilitate achievement of the pre-determined Group result (pi64, 8.100).

On the other hand, Burhead profits for the same time period were determined on an
accrual basis.

The reason again being matching reported profits with a pre-

determined target (pi64, 8.101). However, the method of accounting was changed
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for both companies during the subsequent six months. For the year ended 30 June
1974, the same transactions were accounted for using a profit emerging basis for
Burhead and an accrual basis for Sunderland (pl66, 8.103).

The profit emerging basis had not previously been used within the Cambridge Group
(p207, 9.55). Its introduction with regard to the Burhead profits was effectively to
smooth income over a number of years. The Burhead profit of $3 million was the
largest six months profit ever m a d e within the Group and had been derived almost
entirely from one transaction (p209, 9.55). The decision to account on the profit
emerging basis and apportion it over ten years was based, in part, on a perception that
no one would believe profits of that magnitude had been earned (p210, 9.55).
Furthermore, the economic climate was such that n o w the Group was looking at a
large profit while in the future, it m a y be trying to find profits. In other words, the
purpose of the change in accounting methods was to spread the profits over several
time periods (p210,9.56).

Evidence to the investigation provided by the two directors responsible for the
determination of accounting methods suggested they were
... unconcerned that the achievement of an acceptable final group
profit total for a given period might result in different and
inconsistent bases of profit calculation being used by the same
parties for different transactions, or by different members of the
Cambridge group for the same transactions. N o r were they
concerned that the bases used for the calculation of the group
profittotalfor a full twelve month period might be different from
and inconsistent with those used either for thefirstsix months of
such period or for the preceding year (pi41, 8.12).

According to investigators, the above activities led to a material overstatement of
profits after tax of $3,055,635 for the year ended 30 June 1974. The overstatement
was at least $3,732,629. The investigators qualified their conclusion by the term "at
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least" because only specified items, in particular, land sales between Group members,
were included in the calculation (p225, 9.89).

Furthermore, the investigators

concluded that the accounts for Cambridge and the Group were misleading because
the method of calculating profits was not disclosed (pl79, 8.152).

The first report into the Cambridge Group also levelled criticism at the auditors with
regard to Prospectus 31 issued in M a y 1974. This criticism included the profit
calculations

discussed

previously

(pp255-257,

10.52-10.57).

In

addition,

investigators came to the conclusion that the debenture issue should not have been
m a d e as Cambridge had effectively been without additional borrowing capacity since
at least 1969 (p226, 10.2; p251, 10.39). Under the debenture and unsecured note
trust deeds, Cambridge's borrowing ability was limited to the lesser of three quarters
of liquid assets and five times shareholders funds (p20, 2.23). Prior to the issue of
Prospectus 31, the operative borrowing limitation had been five times shareholders'
funds (p226, 10.2). The Share Capital and Reserves of Cambridge totalled $15.5
million in December 1973. Five times this amount is $77.5 million. Cambridge's
borrowings at the time were $77,247,600 which meant it had no further borrowing
capacity in terms of that criterion. It appears that Cambridge management set out to
manipulate shareholders' funds to allow a further debenture issue to be made.

In November-December 1973, independent valuations of all real estate and other
assets held by the Group were commissioned by the Managing Director of Cambridge
(pp226-227,10.4). It was stated in evidence that the purpose of the valuations was to
avert a possible takeover bid by informing shareholders that the asset backing per
share was in fact $2.90 rather than the 60 cents indicated by the published accounts.
This information was conveyed to shareholders via a press release and circular in
December 1973 which also stated the licensed valuations had resulted in a net surplus
of $43 million (p227,10.5).

A further effect of the revaluation which was not
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disclosed was that it altered the operative borrowing limit to three quarters of liquid
assets and paved the w a y for Cambridge to extend its borrowings (p234,10.16).

The revaluation of assets was not of primary concern to the investigators. Rather, it
was the underlying motive for the revaluations and the failure of the auditor to
recognise it or to realise the alteration in the borrowing benchmark which occupied
the minds of investigators w h o contended "the dominant if not sole purpose" of the
revaluation was to permit Cambridge to m a k e further debenture borrowings (p226,
10.2; p233, 10.16). This conclusion was based, in part, on the manner in which the
revaluation was treated in the accounts and Prospectus 31. Investigators argued that
if the sole purpose of therevaluationhad been to inform shareholders of the wealth of
the firm, this objective had already been achieved through the press release and
circularisation of shareholders (p233, 10.16).

However, as the

investigation

revealed, Cambridge management went to great lengths to have the revaluation
included in the accounts in one w a y or another.

It appears that Cambridge management initially wanted to include the effect of the
revaluation in the balance sheet as an increase in therelevantassets and by raising an
asset revaluation reserve (p227, 10.7). Members of Fell and Starkey, however,
argued that this was not in the interests of shareholders for a number of reasons
including taxation complications which could have adverse affects on cash flows,
difficulties in interpreting borrowing limitations and trust deeds and that it would
invite rather than deter a takeover bid (p228,10.9).

Cambridge sought legal advice on the matter and initially found support for the
proposed treatment of therevaluation(p228, 10.11). However, on further discussion
between Fell and Starkey, Cambridge and legal counsel, therevaluationwas disclosed
in note form in the financial statements and in Prospectus 31 (pp232-233, 10.13,
10.14). This approach allowed Cambridge to avoid any adverse consequences of
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formally including therevaluationin the accounts but questionably, allowed it to use
the revaluation in recalculating its borrowing limit

The Managing Director of

Cambridge reluctantly agreed during examination that this was the purpose of
disclosing therevaluationin the notes to the balance sheet

It appears that this underlying motive for including the revaluation in notes to the
accounts and prospectus was not recognised by Fell and Starkey, and in particular, by
the partner in charge of the audit. The auditor also failed to realise that the basis of
calculating the borrowing limit under the trust deeds had changed. These conclusions
are readily apparent from the transcript of evidence given by the auditor during the
course of the investigation (pp237-241, 10.18; pp241-243, 10.20). Further evidence
that Fell and Starkey were unaware of or had not considered the borrowing
implications of the revaluation was that on the appointment of the Receiver, advice
was sought as to the propriety of taking the valuation into account in the calculation
of the borrowing limitation (p243, 10.22).

This issue was further complicated by the fact that liquid assets were inflated by the
inclusion, in fulL of advances by Cambridge to joint ventures in which it held a 50 per
cent or greater interest (p247, 10.32; p250, 10.38). These advances amounted to at
least $88 million as at 31 December 1973 and $102 million as at 30 June 1974 (p247,
10.32).

From 1969, when such advances began to represent a significant amount (p251,
10.39), a note to the accounts stated that "Mortgages and Other Receivables"
included secured loans to joint ventures (p247, 10.33).

However, the fact that

Cambridge held an interest of 40 to 45 per cent in the joint ventures was not disclosed
(pp248, 249, 10.35).

A further point of contention for investigators was that

Cambridge's interest in the joint ventures was not considered in the calculation of
liquid assets for purposes of determining the borrowing capacity of Cambridge under
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the debenture trust deed particularly when, in 1973-74, liquid assets became the
relevant benchmark (p249,10.37).

The view expressed by the investigators was that only "advances or loans" to "clients
or customers" should have been included in the calculation of liquid assets (p249,
10.38). Therefore, advances or loans to joint ventures in which Cambridge itself was
a participant should have been excluded from the calculation of liquid assets.
Investigators calculated that a relatively minor reduction in liquid assets,
approximately $26 million, would have meant Cambridge was without further
borrowing capacity w h e n it issued Prospectus 31. W h e n the same logic was applied
to previous years, investigators contended that advances and loans to joint ventures in
which Cambridge had an interest had been significant and increasing in amount since
1969 and that Cambridge had actually been without borrowing capacity since that
time (p251,10.39).

The investigators also questioned the propriety of issuing in September 1974 the press
release announcing record profits at the time the Group was facing a liquidity crisis
(pl81, 9.3). According to evidence to the investigation, liquidity had always been a
problem for Cambridge due to the nature of its activities (pl6, 2.5; pl81, 9.3).
Between March and August 1974, these problems steadily increased to the point
where it was estimated that even if new debenture borrowings of $5 million were
received and all other loans renewed, the Group faced a deficit of $3.5 million by
October 1974 (pl81, 9.3). However, the expected inflow from debenture borrowings
did not eventuate. The fall in expected debenture takings was exacerbated by an
increase in redemptions. Cambridge's liquidity situation was also worsened by the
refusal of banks and finance companies to roll over existing debts or provide further
funding. This effectively meant Cambridge would be unable to meet its $2 million
debenture interest commitment (pl88-191,9.14).
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In justification of the profit announcement given the liquidity crisis, one director
stated that negotiations aimed at raising funds from overseas were in process. If the
profit figures were not announced as was traditional Cambridge practice, people
would realise there was a problem and the whole thing would "blow up" (pl91, 9.14).
A further reason for the profit announcement was that Mainline and H o m e Units had
recently collapsed and there was a general nervousness in the investment market
which meant investors preferred to maintain Uquidity rather than invest (pi92, 9.15).
There seemed to be an implication that the profit announcement was necessary to
maintain the facade of a stable company and attract further debenture money and
bringtofruitionthe loan negotiations with overseas parties. T o failtom a k e the profit
announcement would be to set in motion a setf-fulfilling prophesy. Furthermore, it
appears that at least some members of the Cambridge board were confident financial
disaster would ultimately be avoided (pl92, 9.15). In light of the second Cambridge
report ( N S W , 1979), it appears this confidence was ill-founded.

As noted earlier, the second Cambridge report extended the scope of the investigation
to cover transactions from 1965 and, in particular, the prospectuses issued since 30
June, 1966 (p3). The investigation revealed that not only had Cambridge been
without further borrowing capacity when Prospectus 31 was issued in 1974 but that it
had exceeded its borrowing capacity in every year since 30 June, 1966 (p277, 6.5,
6.6). The extent of the excess debentures issued increased over the period being
$4,436,987 for Prospectus 15 dated 21 September, 1966, peaking at $45,223,706 for
Prospectus 28 issued on 20 November, 1972 and falling back to $38,075,645 for
Prospectus 20 on 12 November, 1973 (p278,6.6).

The deception of the borrowing public was achieved by the use of "faulty practices
and principles" adopted specifically for that purpose (p20. 2.3). The "faulty practices
and principles" identified by investigators in the second report stemmed mainly from
the non-consolidation of the accounts of companies comprising the Hutcheson
248

Conglomerate. A s investigators observed, the managing director and secretary of
Cambridge considered that consolidation was only necessary if ownership of another
company exceeded 50 per cent of its voting shares. The fact that the companies
comprising the Conglomerate were controlled by and financially dependent upon
Cambridge was ignored. Furthermore, Cambridge management used nominee rather
than beneficial ownership of shares to avoid the 50 per cent ownership criterion set by
them. A s with the back-dating of joint ventures discussed previously, Cambridge also
manipulated share ownership to suit its purposes. Hence, despite having complete
control, if not direct ownership, of Conglomerate companies, no consolidated
accounts for these companies was ever prepared (p22, 2.10).

Investigators

considered that the losses incurred by Conglomerate members and the financial links
between them and Cambridge had placed Cambridge in a precarious situation since
before 1966 (p21, 2.7). Without Cambridge's financial support through continued
public borrowing, the Conglomerate would not have survived as long as it did (p21,
2.7).

In calculating the excess debenture issues for the years 1966 to 1973, investigators
prepared consolidated statements for each year and made adjustments for losses,
intangibles, bad debts, advances to conglomerate companies and overstatement of
other assets including goodwill (pp46-54, 2.146-2.176). Investigators formed the
view that the auditors either knew of the existence of the Conglomerate and that it
was being used to disguise the nature and profitability of company members or at least
had sufficient material to do so (p22, 2.10; p276, 5.62-5.64). For example, according
to investigators, between March 1966 and September 1974, advances were made to
Conglomerate members of at least $15,318,139 (p20, 2.5). These "advances" largely
represented trading losses but this was not disclosed in Cambridge accounts, instead,
in the financial reports and prospectuses the advances were disclosed as ordinary
receivables and at full value. Accounting for the advances in this w a y was with the
knowledge and approval of the auditors (p5). Investigators also considered the Fell &
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Starkey partner in charge of the Cambridge audit was aware of other methods used to
manipulate Group results by engineering profits and concealingrealisedlosses (p276,
5.62-5.64).

The overall assessment by investigators was that the auditors had been negligent in
the performance of their statutory duties in the conduct of the audit of Cambridge and
its affiliates. This negligence led to and possibly encouraged the issue by Cambridge
of false and misleading statements which were without audit qualification (p276,
5.63). If the auditors had been competent, critical and independent in their work,
investigators considered the formation of the Conglomerate and its subsequent demise
would not have occurred (p282, 6.39). In particular, investigators concluded the
partner in charge of the Cambridge audit had neither the technical nor perceptive skills
to conduct such a large and complex audit (p263, 5.5; p275, 5.61). The auditor was
not independent nor objective in that statements and assurances given by Cambridge
management were accepted without independent verification (p263, 5.5).

Investigators considered that the financial dependence of Conglomerate members on
Cambridge and Cambridge's o w n dependence for survival on debenture borrowings
should have put the auditor on alert as to the interrelatedness of Conglomerate
companies and the possibility that accounting techniques m a y have been used to
produce desired profit levels so as to encourage continued public investment (p276,
5.62, 5.63). In spite of this, the accounts of Conglomerate members, other than
recognised subsidiaries, were not considered during the audit of the Cambridge
Group. This occurred even though Fell 8c Starkey were the auditors, tax agents and
accountants not only for all members of the recognised Cambridge Group but for
most of the Conglomerate companies (p263,5.4).

Furthermore, the auditors were criticised for the lack of an audit programme or
system of review of work delegated to others (p263,5.5; 1977, p262,11.11).
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A s stated earlier, there are definite similarities between the accounting methods
implicated in both the Reid Murray and Cambridge collapses. S o m e of the Reid
Murray accounting practices were defended in the 1966 A S A report on company
failures (ASA, 1966). In particular, this report provided some authoritative support
for the accrual basis of calculating profits on long term credit sales. The A S A report
also cast doubt on some other activities which Cambridge engaged in up to eight
years after thereportwas published.

Investigators into Reid Murray had suggested that the profits or cash emerging bases
were more appropriate than the accrual basis given the Reid Murray sales were not
only on credit but that Reid Murray itself provided the finance (Victoria, 1963, p58).
This has some bearing on the treatment of profits on similar transactions by
Cambridge. A s outlined earlier, Cambridge used three methods of accounting for
sales, accrual, cash emerging and profit emerging. The only method sanctioned by the
General Council of the A S A in 1966 was the accrual basis. The other two methods
were stated as being contrary to the basis of m o d e m accounting practice (ASA, 1966,
pl2). If this is a valid argument w h y were the emerging bases accepted by the
auditors even if management claimed the methods were used because they were
conservative ( N S W , 1977, pl61, 8.92)? The A S A report suggested that accounting
methods should not be adopted purely because they are conservative (1966, p46).

As noted with regard to Reid Murray, the ASA also recognised that the use of
different measurement methods has the potential to mislead those w h o use financial
reports (p7). This point was also raised by Reid Murray investigators w h o stated that
the failure to disclose accounting methods resulted in misleading financial reports
(Victoria, 1963, p66). Cambridge did not disclose the manner in which profits were
determined nor that the methods were changed to suit changing conditions. Given the
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criticisms of Reid Murray and its auditors, it appears somewhat unusual that the
Cambridge auditors did not act in this regard.

The ASA report also has a bearing on Cambridge's front end transactions and the
failure to eliminate intra-group transactions. A s indicated previously, Cambridge's
profits were inflated by the recognition of profits from front end transactions between
members of the Cambridge Group.

The possibility of manipulation or window

dressing ofresultsof individual companies was recognised in the A S A report. This
possibility was given as a reason for the elimination of the effect of intra-group
transactions (1966, pi9). In addition, the investigators noted in their report that in
1969 there was a directive from vnthin Fell & Starkey that effective rather than legal
control of another company should determine whether or not consolidated accounts
were prepared.

This approach appears to have been based on the view that using

ownership as the sole consolidation criterion allowed companies to comply with the
letter of the law but not the spirit in that in some cases, Cambridge being one, the
resulting accounts did not show a true and fair view ( N S W , 1979, p267-268, 5.215.23). This view was apparently conveyed to Cambridge management by the auditor
but no further action was taken (p268, 5.23). The failure of the auditor to take action
in this regard appears to have prompted investigators to conclude that the auditor's
basic objective was to cater to the interests of Cambridge management (p276,5.64).

Cambridge management's defence of issuing the press release announcing record
profits at the time the company was facing a severe liquidity crisis would also not
have been acceptable in terms of the ASA's 1966 report.

As noted above,

management claimed that if they had not issued the press release at the traditional
time, the situation would have "blown up" ( N S W , 1977, pi92, 9.15). In other words,
potential investors and creditors would have realised Cambridge was in financial
distress and further funds would not have been forthcoming. The A S A stated that
elimination of the practice of not disclosing "bad news" on the basis that it might
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affect share prices or borrowing ability would go a long w a y towards the production
of more informative accounts (1966, p42).

It appears clear that at least some of the accounting methods adopted by Cambridge
were not consistent with generally accepted principles or practices. The investigators
concluded that the manipulation of the accounts by the use of dubious accounting
methods such as front end transactions and including intra-group transactions in
consolidated accounts, the arbitrary use of accounting methods and the back-dating of
joint venture agreements and nominee share holdings was at the instigation of the
managing director and secretary/director of Cambridge (p282, 6.37-6.38). The fact
that both were described in the report as "qualified accountants" would suggest such
practices weretotallycontrary to their education and training as accountants.

The events leading to the collapse of Cambridge and its affiliates and the manner in
which they were concealed m a k e it clear that the financial reports were not aimed at
facilitating an economic allocation ofresources.In fact, investigators concluded m a n y
of the activities detailed in the second report in particular, were aimed at benefiting
the Hutcheson family (p21, 2.8).
Cambridge.

Hutcheson was the managing director of

Investigators concluded there was "little regard for truth in [the]

documentation of transactions and maintenance of accounting records" (p282, 6.38)
and that the structure and accounts of the Hutcheson Conglomerate were manipulated
with the express purpose of "deceiving all w h o dealt with Cambridge" (p282, 6.37).
Given the 1966 report of the A S A , there was little authoritative support for some of
the accounting methods adopted by Cambridge and approved by the auditor. This
disregard of views expressed and endorsed by what would be seen as leaders of the
profession gives some credence to the argument that research is undertaken but the
results are ignored (Lee, 1990, Introduction and Explanation, unpaginated).
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Similar comments are relevant to the failure of the auditor to be independent and
objective and to exercise due skill and care in the collection of evidence and to plan,
document and supervise the audit of Cambridge. In their report, the investigators
m a d e reference to C S 1 General standards in the Statement of Auditing Standards of
the National Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia which
outlines the duties of auditors which included the need for the auditor to have the
technical and perceptive skills necessary to perform the audit, to be independent, to
take reasonable professional care in gathering and evaluating the evidence required to
conduct the audit to plan, supervise and review the audit and adequately document
these activities. While noting that this statement had not been promulgated at the
time of the relevant Cambridge audits, investigators nonetheless considered it
represented a fair summary of accepted audit practices and standards of the time
(p276, 5.64). In the investigators' view, however, the auditor failed in these duties
( N S W , 1977, p277 11.59-11.61). Similar criticisms were directed at the auditor of
the failed merchant bank, Rothwells.
Rothwells Ltd
The collapse of Rothwells in 1988 and the subsequent investigation into its affairs is
more an example of audit failure than the manipulation of accounting reports by the
selective use of accounting methods and practices although this also did occur to a
comparatively minor extent. Rothwells was placed in liquidation on 3 November,
1988 (Australia, undated, plO, 1.14). In March 1989, Malcolm McCusker, Q C , was
appointed Special Investigator into the affairs of Rothwells from the period
commencing 1 January 1985 to 31 December 1988. This appointment followed
private hearings conducted by the N C S C which indicated that offences m a y have been
committed involving breaches of the Companies and Securities legislation, fraud and
dishonesty (pi, 1.2).

McCusker's terms of reference focused on all matters

concerning the affairs of Rothwells and specified associated corporations including
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dealings in money and other property by w a y of loan, purchase or otherwise. In
particular, McCusker's investigation was to centre on matters related, directly or
indirectly, to the failure of Rothwells (p3, 1.5). McCusker's report was issued in two
parts. Part 1 deals extensively with the investigation into the causes of the Rothwells'
collapse and is publicly available. O n the recommendation of McCusker, Part 2,
which deals with evidence given under privilege and recommendations as to further
charges to be laid in the wake of the investigation, has not been published (p21,1.29).

From the outset of the investigation, McCusker set out to determine what the "true"
financial position of Rothwells was in 1985, 1986 and 1987 and the half year to 31
January, 1988. In particular, McCusker was concerned to k n o w whether profits, as
reported, had really been earned and whether adequate provision for doubtful debts
had been m a d e (p9,1.11; pl7,1.23). A s part of the investigation, the accounting firm
of Deloitte Haskins & Sells (now Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu) was engaged to help
determine the true position of Rothwells from 1984 to 1988. This was a difficult task
made more difficult by the lack of adequate records (p9,1.11).

According to McCusker, there was one outstanding aspect of the collapse of
Rothwells which ranked in importance above all other matters under investigation and
that was "... the falsity of the 1986 and 1987 published accounts . . ." (pl9, 1.25).
O f particular concern to McCusker was the state of Rothwells' receivables which, as a
bank, represented its major asset and which McCusker concluded was the "cause" of
the failure (p26, 2.2). The problem presented by Rothwells' receivables was two fold.
Firstly, there was an element of poor management

Rothwells was described as a

lender at the high risk end of the market in that it lent funds to ventures that other
banks would not consider. In spite of this, there was a lack of debtor control and
supervision and records andfileswere inadequately maintained. Overdue debts were
rolled-over with unpaid interest added to the amount of the loan but recognised as
income in the profit and loss account (p26-27, 2.2). This state of affairs was
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compounded by the borrowing of "huge sums" on an unsecured basis by the chairman
of Rothwells, Laurie Connell, through two companies, L. R. Connell & Partners,
being a partnership between Connell and his wife, and Oakhill Pty Ltd, of which
Connell and his wife were directors. For the years 1985, 1986 and 1987, the level of
debt to Rothwells incurred by Connell amounted to $35 million, $138 million and
$324 million respectively. However, this indebtedness was not disclosed in the
financial statements. It was systematically "removed" from the accounts at the
balance date of each financial year andre-instatedearly in the subsequent financial
year (p7, 1.10). A major method used to "remove" Connell-related debt was the
purported assignment of debts to $2 shelf companies. These assignments were never
fully completed and, in many cases, the purportedly assigned debts did not exist
Furthermore, Rothwells financed the purchase of the debts. The purpose of removing
the debts was to obviate the need to disclose the large and increasing indebtedness of
Connell to Rothwells (p35,2.20). In summary, McCusker concluded
... the essential cause of the failure was an unsound asset base,
resulting from mismanagement and misconduct with respect to its
loans portfolio over several years, and apparendy unbridled
borrowing from Rothwells by Connell and his company Oakhill on
an unsecured basis, leaving a "hole" in the Rothwells receivables
of over $ 3 0 0 m (pp27-28,2.4).

The following sections will detail the manner in which the $300 million "hole" in
Rothwells' receivables was made over a period of three years and h o w it was
effectively concealed.
Concealment of Connell-related debts at 31 July 1985
The investigation into Rothwells revealed a close monetaryrelationshipbetween it
and L. R. Connell & Partners (hereafter referred to as L R C P ) for the six months to 31
July 1985 with money passing from one to the other. However, the aggregate
direction of the flow was to L R C P which received approximately $160 million from
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Rothwells during this time (p44, 3.1). Rothwells' books showed a debt by L R C P of
$60,366,153 as at 30 July 1985. The next day, the closing balance was nil (p45, 3.5).
This was achieved by a series of adjusting entries variously described as routine
journals (net), cashbook transactions (net), transfers between accounts (net) and
corrections, which reduced the debt to $35,087,677 (Annexure to Chapter 3,
Rothwells Inquiry - Balance Date Adjustments - 31 July 1985, pi). This amount was
eliminated by a journal entry dated 31 July 1985 which purportedly represented the
purchase by Rothwells of loans and advances from L R C P (Australia, undated, pp4546, 3.5). A s subsequent investigation demonstrated, the transaction was a sham (p49,
3.10).

The only documentation to support the alleged transfer of debts was an unstamped
Deed of Assignment

The Deed was dated 31 July 1985 but showed Connell's

company, Oakhill Pty Ltd, as assignor of the debts rather than L R C P as recorded in
the notation to the journal entry eliminating LRCP's indebtedness to Rothwells (p46,
3.6). Such an assignment could not have occurred as the balance sheet as at 30 June
1985 disclosedtotalassets of $14.6 million including debtors of less than $1 million.
A n examination of L R C F s accounts showed that a number of the debtors appearing
in the Deed of Assignment were, in fact, debtors of L R C P but the total indebtedness
as at 31 July 1985 was approximately $8.4 million. However, those particular debts
were not included in the Deed of Assignment (p47, 3.7). The debtors named in the
Deed of Assignment did not receive any notice of assignment (p47-48, 3.8). Finally,
on 1 August 1985, thefirstday of the Rothwells 1986 financial year, a journal entry
reversed the transaction except that C^udull Pty Ltd n o w appeared as a debtor to
Rothwells instead of L R C P (p48, 3.9). As McCusker noted, this method of removing
Connell-related debts from Rothwells' accounts "... by a spurious "sale" of assets to
Rothwells, reversed after balance date ..." was not an isolated incident Similar
"transactions" occurred in 1984 and were

repeated in 1986 and 1987 (pp49-50,

3.10).
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Concealment of Connell-related debts at 31 July 1986
During the 1985-1986 financial year, Connell and his company, Oakhill, continued to
borrow substantial sums. In McCusker's terms, it was as though Rothwells was
Connell's private bank (p79, 4.1). B y 30 June 1986, the extent of indebtedness of
L R C P and Oakhill to Rothwells was $145,760,356 (p79, 4.3). The following month,
Rothwells was repaid almost $80 million (net).

However, various "correcting"

entries, similar to those used in the 1985 accounts (Annexures to Chapter 4, Balance
Date Adjustments to the accounts of L R C P , ppl-7, Balance Date Adjustments to the
accounts of Oakhill Pty Ltd, ppl-5) brought the balance of the recorded indebtedness
of L R C P and Oakhill to $138,490,422 at 31 July 1986 (Australia, undated, p80, 4.3).
This amount included an unreconciled imbalance of $26,121,839 between the
Depositors Control Account and the Depositors Ledger and a further unspecified
error in the accounting records of $4,982,422 (pp79-80,4.2-4.3).

The "removal" of the Connell-related debt from the accounts was achieved by
transferring it to an accounttitled"Loans and Advances - Others" which was then
included in the 1986 balance sheet of the bank (p80, 4.3, p83, 4.7). Support for this
account was a "list of debtors" which subsequent investigation showed to be fictitious.
Most of the "debtors" included on the list denied owing any debt to Rothwells.
Others did o w e debts to Rothwells but not to the extent indicated on the list A n
examination by Deloitte's showed that the list of so-called debtors was overstated by
$130,814,069 (Annexure to Chapter 4, Rothwells Limited - $138 million List at 31
July 1986).

Furthermore, the debts actually owed to Rothwells, amounting to

$54,441,145, were effectively included in the balance sheet twice because they were
reflected in both the Loans and Advances - Others account and the Commercial Bills
and Advances account (Australia, undated, p83, 4.8, 4.9) In other instances, the
debts included in the list were debtors to L R C P but these debts had not been assigned
to Rothwells (p84,4.10). Further evidence that the $138 million list was a sham was
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the fact that the balance of the Loans and Advances - Other account remained
unchanged throughout the following financial year. N o repayments of principal were
made and no charges nor payments of interest were recorded (p84, 4.11). O n the
following balance day, 31 July 1987, interest of $75,885 was added to the account.
Thisrepresentedone days interest which was recognised as revenue in the 1986-1987
financial statements. The balance of the Loans and Advances - Other account was
then transferred to the account of L R C P and back dated to 1 August 1986.

Concealment of Connell-related debts at 31 July 1987
The pattern of removing Connell-related debt which had been established in the 1984,
1985 and 1986 accounts was repeated in 1987. The total Connell-related debt
removed from the accounts at 31 July 1987 was $324 million.

The size of the

Connell-related debt appears to have made the method of removal more complex
than in previous years. In fact a number of methods involving transactions with other
parties was used. The methods employed included the transfer of deposits, the
assignment of debts and the transfer of other forms of property including listed and
unlisted shares (Annexure to Chapter 5, L. R. Connell and Partners Loan Account
Rothwells Limited). These transactions were invariably financed by Rothwells with
the amount of these loans being used to reduce the Connell-related debt. D u e to the
complex nature of these transactions and the number of parties involved, only a
summary account of them will be provided.

From the report, approximately $59 million of Connell-related debt was extinguished
from Rothwells' accounts by the purported sale of debts by L R C P to four companies.
Three of the "purchasers" were $2 shelf companies with no capacity to repay the
loans to Rothwells used to finance the purchases. The directors of the fourth
company were purportedly unaware of a loan of $15,808,700, including interest, and
the assignment of debts of $15,172,692 from L R C P until a confirmation letter was
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received from the auditors in August 1987 (Australia, undated, pl51, 5.34).
Following discussion with executives of Rothwells, the directors belatedly agreed to
the assignment (pl52, 5.34). In all four cases, there was no effective assignment of
debts and none of the loans to finance the purchases was ever repaid (pl46, 5.29;
pl58, 5.40; pl63,5.45; pl64,5.49).

Another $2 company was used to reduce the Connell-related debt by $12 million but
in this case, no purported sale of assets was involved. Again, the directors of the
company concerned claimed they were unaware of any transaction taking place
between the $2 company and Rothwells.

The directors, w h o were effectively

nominees of a Rothwells' executive, signed 28 Rothwells' commercial bills with a face
value of $12,397,435. The debt to Rothwells thereby incurred, was substituted for
the debt of L R C P (ppl73-174, 5.59).

The Connell-related debt was further reduced by the substitution of loans amounting
to almost $61 million to two companies for the purchase of listed shares. Of the total
loans, $2 million was genuine but the transaction had not been agreed to, much less
completed, at balance date (pl75, 5.62). The $59 million balance represented a
purported sale of shares by Connell, Oakhill and related entities (pl67, 5.51). The
validity of this transaction was doubtful for a number of reasons. Firstly, the
commercial bills securing the loan from Rothwells were signed on 2 August 1987 and
backdated to 31 July 1987. Secondly, at the time of the signing of the bills, there was
no documentation concerning the purchase of the shares or, indeed, any share scrip
evidencing the existence of the shares purchased (pi 68, 5.53). It was subsequently
discovered, that the shares either did not exist or that the price had fallen (pi70,
5.54). In some cases the shares included in the transaction had been sold up to three
times previously (pi72,5.57). Subsequent investigation by the purchaser showed that
sharesrepresentingsome $31 million of the purchased portfolio were not recoverable.
Thirdly, the transaction was undertaken hurriedly (pl71,5.56).
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A further purported sale of unlisted shares reduced the Connell-related debt by $21.45
million. However, the transaction was not completed at balance date and was
subsequently reversed (ppl77-178, 5.66). A similar scenario applies to a purported
loan of $57 million to another company for the purpose of purchasing property.
Connell-related debt was reduced by the amount of the loan despite the fact that no
sale of property took place and the directors of the company in question were
unaware of either the purported loan or property sale (pl77, 5.65).

Another transaction examined by McCusker related to a "round-robin" whereby a
Rothwells' executive approached another company asking it to lend $50 million to
Oakhill. Rothwells then directly repaid the company $30 million and indirecdy,
through yet another company, repaid the remaining $20 million. The "debts" of the
two companies involved were substituted for $50 million of Connell-related debt
(pl76,5.63).

Dubious Accounting Practices 1985 to 1987
In addition to the removal of Connell-related debt at balance date in each of the years
1985, 1986 and 1987, the investigation uncovered other examples of dubious
accounting practices which contributed to the falsification of the financial statements
for those years. Four major examples were the inadequacy of the provision for
doubtful debts, the recognition of fee and interest income and the imbalance of $26
million in the 1986 accounts referred to previously as being included in Connellrelated debt for that year.

As noted previously, Rothwells was a lender at the high risk end of the market. Its
total receivables at 31 July 1985 stood at $162,884,985. Most of these debts were
unsecured. Other banks, such as the National Australia Bank and Westpac, which had
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more conservative lending practices, provided for doubtful debts at approximately 1.5
per cent and 1.4 per centrespectively(p74,3.31). It is unusual, therefore, that for the
year ended 31 July 1985, no provision for doubtful debts was m a d e and no debts were
written off for this period (p62, 3.18). Subsequent investigation revealed that many
of the debts were "non-r^rforming" in that principal was not repaid on the due date
while interest was accumulated and brought to account as income even though it was
not paid (p65, 3.24). The Deloitte's team appointed by McCusker to assist with the
investigation concluded, after examining the receivables at 31 July 1985, that a
minimum provision for doubtful debts at that time would have been $17 million (p64,
3.22). The pre-tax profit of Rothwells for the year was reportedly $7.25 million
Obviously, if such a provision had been made, Rothwells would have reported a loss
rather than a profit for the year (p64, 3.23).

The investigation revealed that Rothwells' profit for the year had been further
overstated by $4 million. This amount represented a settlement fee. However, the fee
was due to L R C P not Rothwells.

Given the circumstances of the transaction,

McCusker suggested the inclusion of the $4 million fee in the accounts of Rothwells
was a deliberate attempt to overstate profits for the year (pi6, 3.32).

At 31 July 1986, Rothwells' reported a pre-tax profit of $13,780,728. The Annual
Report boasted of a 150 per cent increase in profits and growth in shareholders funds
and total assets since 1982. According to McCusker, these claims were incorrect and
misleading (p82, 4.6). Inreality,the position of Rothwells had deteriorated since
Connell had assumed control in 1982 and had continued to do so during 1986. In
fact, based on a reconstruction of the accounts, McCusker considered that by 31 July
1986, the entire consolidated capital and reserves of Rothwells of $54 million had
been wiped out (p90, 4.20). This interpretation of the accounts was based on
recognition of the irrecoverable status of the Connell-related debt and the inclusion in
the accounts as expenses of the $26 million "imbalance" and $4 million "sundry minor
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amounts" which were effectively capitalised by inclusion in the receivables accounts
(p90, 4.20). The position of Rothwells was worse still because the accounts also
should havereflectedan appropriate provision for doubtful debts and interest income
was invalidly recognised in the accounts (p91,4.21, 4.22). The accounts were further
distorted by the inclusion of fee income of $5 million which had not been earned at
year end and which was never paid (pi82,5.73).

By 31 July 1986, Connell-related debt, which was unsecured, represented one third of
Rothwells' receivables portfolio. A n examination of the books of L R C P and Oakhill
showed a deficiency of shareholders funds of $70,101,653 and $31,437,385
respectively. The implication which flows from this is that neither L R C P nor Oakhill
could have repaid the $138 million debt to Rothwells and, accordingly, it should have
been written off or, at the very least a specific provision for doubtful debts for the
amount should have been raised (p89,4.19).

As noted previously, the $138 million Connell-related debt included an unreconciled
imbalance of $26,121,839. O n further analysis, it was found that this imbalance
between the Depositors Control Account and the Depositors Ledger should have been
taken into the accounts as an interest expense (p80, 4.4). During both 1985 and
1986, Rothwells' interest expense had been understated by $12,432,243 and
$13,689,596respectively.The $26 million imbalance in the 1986 accounts was the
cumulative effect of this (p82, 4.5). The effective capitalisation of this amount by
including it in receivables meant that Rothwells' reported profits for both 1985 and
1986 were overstated (p82,4.6).

This overstatement was compounded by a failure to adequately provide for doubtful
debts. A s in 1985, no debts were written off as bad and no provision for doubtful
debts was made in 1986. The only provision raised during 1986 was a "provision for
contingencies" of $1 million. Given the non-performance of many of the debtors and
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the lack of security for them, Deloittes advised the investigation that in addition to the
provision for contingencies, a provision for doubtful debts of at least $16 million
should have been raised (p91, 4.21). The calculation of this provision did not take
into account the Connell-related debt

While Rothwells did not bring interest expense to account or adequately provide for
bad and doubtful debts, it readily recognised interest payable in its financial reports.
From the Deloittes examination of the accounts it was ascertained that interest was
accrued on almost all receivables accounts including those that were non-performing
and apparently irrecoverable (pp91-92, 4.22). In m a n y instances, interest was rolledover and capitalised as part of the principal balances. Deloittes further pointed out
that this was not standard practice according to generally accepted accounting
principles or banking practice. Under generally accepted accounting principles,
revenue should only be recognised when reasonable certainty exists that it will be
received. Given that Rothwells was a bank, normal banking practice would appear to
be the appropriate bench mark for determining reasonable certainty of the receipt of
interest revenue. According to Deloittes, ninety days from the due payment date is
the appropriate reasonable certainty time frame. After that, unpaid interest revenue
should be recognised only if an acceptable explanation for non-payment has been
received from the debtor. In Rothwells' case, the poor state of the records m a d e it
impossible to determine whether acceptable explanations had been received or even
sought (p92,4.22).

Finally, fee income of $5 million was incorrectly included in the calculation of profits.
This fee was supposedly for corporate advice provided by Rothwells concerning a sale
of assets between two other companies. The recognition of this revenue was suspect
in various ways. T o begin, the sale had not been completed at 31 July 1986.
Furthermore, directors of the purported debtor company refused to confirm the fee
was payable and the fee was never paid (pi82, 5.73).

Deloittes classified the
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recognition as income of this fee as "unacceptably "aggressive" accounting" on the
grounds that there was no justification for its inclusion in income. It was successbased and at balance date, no enforceable contract existed either for payment of the
fee or the sale that gave rise to it (Annexure to Chapter 5, Summary of Adjustments
to Reported Financial Statements - Annual Effect p6).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the 1986 financial statements were distorted by the
recognition of revenue which did not pass the reasonable certainty test and an
understatement of expenses such as the write off of bad debts, adequate provision for
doubtful debts and interest expenses. According to McCusker, the profits were
inflated which meant that dividends were paid out of capital and that Rothwells paid
income tax on non-existent profits (Australia, undated, p92,4.23).

The distortion of Rothwells' accounts continued into 1987. In addition to the habitual
removal of Connell-related debt from the accounts, a further pattern had emerged
whereby debts, including interest, were rolled over even though no payments were
received, unpaid interest on debts owing to Rothwells was recognised as income and
an adequate provision for doubtful debts was not raised (pl34, 5.12; pl37-138,5.18).

Rothwells' reported consolidated operating profit before tax for the year ended 31
July 1987 was in excess of $28 million. This included a provision for doubtful debts
and contingencies of $4 million (pl33, 5.12). During the course of the investigation,
it was found that Connell had engaged Price Waterhouse to undertake an independent
review of Rothwells'receivables(pl29, 5.3). Evidence given to the investigation by
a m e m b e r of the review team was to the effect that the $4 million provision for
doubtful debts was grossly inadequate. In fact, a member of the review team stated
that had they been free to raise a provision for doubtful debts or write off bad debts,
the amount would have been in excess of the existing equity of Rothwells (pl34,
5.13). This view was supported by the Deloitte's team. O n their calculations, an
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additional provision for doubtful debts of $64,674,873 should have been included in
the accounts (Annexure to Chapter 5, Summary of Provisions Required Against
"Other Debtors" as at 31 July - 1986 and 1987, p2). Shareholders' Funds as reported
in the accounts was $65,634,000 (Annexure to Chapter 5, Summary of Adjustments
to Reported Financial Statements - Annual Effect pi).

As noted with regard to the 1986 financial statements, a fee for corporate advice was
taken into account even though the directors of the debtor company refused to
acknowledge the fee was payable. At 31 July 1987, this fee was still outstanding.
Nonetheless, no provision for doubtful debts was raised with regard to the debt.
Furthermore, a similar fee for corporate advice was charged to a subsidiary of the
original company in the 1987 accounts. Once again, the fee was not paid and
directors refused to acknowledge that it was payable (Australia, undated, ppl82-183,
5.73). According to Deloittes, an examination of the company's financial statements
indicates it was not able to pay the fee (Annexure to Chapter 5, Summary of
Adjustments to Reported Financial Statements - Annual Effect, p6). A further fee of
$5.5 million was accounted for in the 1987 financial statements. This fee was also of
dubious validity. It was described by McCusker as a "front-end" fee in connection
with a June 1987 loan of $11 million. However, as McCusker pointed out, the fee
would only be paid if the advancetotalling$16.5 million was repaid. Given that the
borrower was desperate enough to pay a $5.5 million fee for an $11 million loan over
six months, recovery of the fee was doubtful and should not have been recognised as
income (Australia, undated, pi83, 5.74).

In a bid to establish the "true" financial position of Rothwells for the years under
review, McCusker directed Deloittes to prepare a number of analyses mcluding
balance day adjustments, summary of provisions required for "other debtors" and
adjustments to financial statements including the write back of fee income where
necessary and provisions for doubtful debts in regard to both Connell-related debts
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and other debtors (pl84, 5.75).

The calculations were simplified by making

adjustments on an individual year basis. However, the analyses clearly show an
overstatement of profits and, thereby, an overstatement of shareholders' funds from
1984 onwards:

1983
($'000)
Reported Shareholders'
Funds
Less Reported Pre-Tax
Profits
A d d back Tax Charges
Adjusted Profits/(Losses)
Adjusted Shareholders'
Funds/(Deficit)

1984
($'000)

1985
($'000)

1986
($'000)

1987
($'000)

NA

7,770
(3,061)

21,257
(7,249)

54,259
(18,582)

65,634
(28,690)

NA
NA

851
(4,575)

2,810
(9,884)

7,491
(81,111)

12,684
(107,979)

$985

$6,934

($37,943)

($58,351)

6,040

$6,040

(Annexure to Chapter 5, Summary of Adjustments to Reported Financial Statements Annual Reports, p6)

McCusker further pointed out that adjustments for provisions for doubtful debts were
conservative and did not include any "general provision". If "general provisions" had
been made in addition to specific provisions, profits and shareholders' funds would
have been further reduced (Australia, undated, pl85, 5.75). In each of the relevant
years, Rothwells' audit report was unqualified. This raises questions as to the quality
of the audit in those years particularly when the audit was conducted by K M G
Hungerfords, one of the then "big six" chartered accountingfirms,which, on evidence
given to the investigation, lulled investors into a false sense of security (pp28-30, 2.72.8).
Rothwells Audit 1985,1986 & 1987
As an overall impression, McCusker branded the manner in which the audits were
conducted for the above years as "perfunctory and tolerant" and implied that this was
the rationale behind the selection of an audit team from K M G Hungerford's Brisbane
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office. At Connell's insistence, members of Hungerfords Perth office were precluded
from participating in the audit in any w a y on the basis that they were too
entrepreneurial. A s McCusker noted, members of the Perth office would have had
local knowledge which m a y have provided them with a better understanding of
Rothwells' debtors and lending policies than members of the Brisbane team (p54,
3.14).

The auditors of Rothwells were extensively criticised throughout the investigator's
report not only for the "perfunctory and tolerant" manner in which the audits were
conducted but also failing to approach the audit task with an enquiring mind (p58,
3.16). These criticisms were based essentially on the perceived failure of the audit
team to give large and unusual balance day adjustments, that is, transactions removing
Connell-related debts from the accounts, the close scrutiny required particularly when
the relevant transactions involved the chief executive of Rothwells (p59, 3.17; pi 18,
4.44; pl22,4.46; 5.71). In particular, the auditor in charge was accused of engaging
... in a course of deliberate blindness, to avoid being told what in
fact was the truth and which would have been readily discoverable
from reasonable enquiry... (pl25,4.49).

Evidence to support this allegation included the fact that Connell-related debts had
been removed from the 1984 accounts when K M G Hungerfords not only audited the
accounts but also "... played a major part in their preparation" (p78, 3.35). In
addition, a m e m b e r of the 1985 audit team admitted to being aware of the interlocking
nature of activities between Rothwells and L R C P including the extensive borrowings
of Connell and that evidence of this indebtedness was being removed from the
accounts, "by design", at balance date (pp59-61, 3.17). The accountant in charge of
the audits for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 also admitted knowing that the purpose
of the balance day adjustments at 31 July 1987 was to remove Connell-related debt
from the balance sheet (pl81, 5.71).

This perhaps explains w h y normal audit
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procedures, such as circularisation of debtors, was either not conducted or conducted
in a questionable manner.

In 1985, a list of purportedly assigned debts was provided to the auditors. Thirteen of
these were selected for the forwarding of audit confirmation letters. However, no
letters were actually sent (p54, 3.14). The auditor claimed thatreliancewas placed
instead on discussions with company officers w h o were familiar with the accounts.
These "discussions" were not documented in the audit working papers (p55, 3.15).

This scenario was repeated in the 1986 audit when Connell-related debt was in excess
of $138 million. O n the admission of the auditor, no supporting evidence of debtors,
in terms of ledger cards or computer print-outs, was examined during the course of
the audit (pi 18, 4.44). O f the $138 million "assigned" debts, thirteen were selected
for audit confirmation letters. In this instance, the letters were sent. However,
confirmation letters sent to debtors appearing on the $138 million list were different
to those issued to debtors drawn from the investment ledger.

Confirmation letters sent to investment ledger debtors were quite detailed referring to
the term, rate and amount advanced under the facility. In contrast, letters sent to
debtors on the assignment list asked for confirmation only of the existence of the
facility. N o details as to term, rate or amount owing were included (ppl 19-120,
4.44). This suggests that the sending of confirmation letters to those on the $138
million list were part of a deliberate ploy to conceal the falsity of the assignment but at
the same time, appear to follow standard audit procedures (pi22,4.46).

The auditor was also questioned regarding the movements in the Connell and Oakhill
loan accounts which gave rise to the $138 million balance in the Loans and Advances
- Other account O n e month before balance date, this account had a nil balance so the
whole of the movement in the account to $138 million occurred in the space of one
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month. The auditor claimed that this rapid increase had not been noticed at the time
of audit

A list of debtors was asked for but was unsupported by further

documentation. O n further questioning, the auditor stated that the rapid increase in
the account and the lack of supporting documentation would not have indicated a
need for further audit enquiry because the amount could have resulted from a series of
computer entries correcting errors which had occurred throughout the financial year.
This would have given the impression of a lot of activity around balance date (ppl 12118, 4.43).

However, no audit investigation was undertaken to support this

conclusion. This led McCusker to question the independence of the auditor "... it
shows ... a notable willingness, on the part of a supposedly independent auditor, to
allow to pass without checking or verification a large and unusual transaction
occurring at balance date" (pi 18,4.44).

In 1987, when Connell-related debt had reached some $324 million, no attempt was
made by the auditor to confirm the debts assigned to various companies, including
four $2 shelf companies or the loans of almost $100 milhon to Beltech (pl81,5.71).

In McCusker's view, the auditors' lack of independence and compliance with the
wishes of Rothwells' management were essential to the concealment of Connell's
indebtedness to the bank. This concealment was a breach of the Companies Code
(pp77-78, 3.34-3.35). For example, the Companies Regulations at thattimerequired
disclosure of outstanding loans by a company to a director, spouse of a director or to
another company in which a beneficial interest of not less than 10 per cent was held by
the director (p45. 3.3). The purpose of the balance day adjustments to remove
Connell-related debt from the accounts was to obviate the necessity of compliance
with this provision. However, as McCusker pointed out, the transactions were a
sham and, therefore, Connell and his companies remained debtors of Rothwells. Nondisclosure of this indebtedness was, thereby, a breach of the Companies Code (pp8789,4.17-4.19).
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Furthermore, the failure to disclose Connell's indebtedness was also a breach of the
Stock Exchange listing rules. Even if the balance day adjustments had represented
legitimate transactions, the need to disclose Connell's borrowings throughout the year
was mandated by the Stock Exchange requirements. The Stock Exchange listing
rules required disclosure of all director-related loans taking place throughout the
financial year including the n a m e of the borrower, the terms and amount of the loan
and interest to be paid and security for the loan (p45, 3.4). Hence, the balance day
adjustments did not avoid the disclosure obligations imposed by the Stock Exchange.
Furthermore, the Stock Exchange Rules required the disclosure of any material
director-related contracts and the shareholders' approval for dealings in the securities
of the company. The assignment of debts represented both material director-related
contracts and dealings in company securities.

The assignment of debts was not

disclosed in the accounts as a material director-related contract nor was shareholder
approval obtained (pp51-53, 3.12).

As McCusker noted, shareholders, potential investors and depositors and brokers and
investment advisers were effectively deceived by the accounts as no indication of
Connell's excessive borrowings was disclosed (p53, 3.13). Connell debts had been
systematically replaced by, inter alia, the invalid assignment of substantially fictitious
debts. In all cases, the substitution of Connell-related debt with other "assets" was
financed by Rothwells.

Given that a substantial proportion of the debts were

"assigned" to $2 shelf companies with no assets, questions must be raised about the
ability of assignees to repay their debt to Rothwells (pl63, 5.46). This gave rise to
additional criticism of the auditors and contributed to further breaches of the
Companies Code.

As the details of Rothwells' accounts given above suggest, adequate provisions for
doubtful debts were not m a d e in the years 1985,1986 and 1987. A s McCusker notes,
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an explanation for the lack of or inadequacy of a provision for doubtful debts was not
to be found in the quality of the receivables portfolio. M a n y of the debts were nonperforming and were unsecured (p65, 3.24). The debtors'filesand records were
variously described in the report as "inadequate" (p63, 3.20), "scant and
unsatisfactory" (p71, 3.28), "in a state of considerable confusion" (pi06, 4.39)
"incomplete" and "downright vague" (p276, 11.3) and "an absolute shambles" and "a
great portfolio of nonsense" (p278,11.4).

According to Deloittes, the poor state of the debtors' files was such that it would have
been impossible for an auditor to form an opinion as to the adequacy of a provision
for doubtful debts had one been m a d e in the 1985 audited accounts (p64, 3.21).
From evidence given regarding subsequent years, it appears this also applies to the
1986 and 1987 years.

In response to questions concerning the audit of the

receivables portfolio in 1985, 1986 and 1987, the auditor in charge admitted placing
greaterrelianceon discussions with a director and officer of Rothwells rather than on
the files (pp70-71, 3.28; pl05, 4.38; pl81, 5.71). The persons upon w h o m the
auditor relied were the director in charge of the receivables portfolio while the
officer's o w n company was a substantial borrower of Rothwells (pl07, 4.39). These
particular persons also were responsible for the balance day adjustments removing
Connell-related debt and preparation of the various "assignment" lists (p36, 2.21).
Suchreliancewas not indicative of the level of auditor independence that shareholders
and the public should have been entitled to expect (pl07,4.39).

This position was exacerbated by the auditor's claim that he derived "a level of
comfort" (p68, 3.26) from an assertion that Rothwells would not suffer any loss due
to doubtful debts because Connell "stood behind the debts of Rothwells" (p65, 3.24).
Therefore, a provision for doubtful debts was not necessary in spite of the fact that
m a n y debts were non-performing and/or were unsecured (p65, 3.24). The auditor
further admitted that no clarification was sought of what Connell's standing behind the
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debts of Rothwells actually meant (p68, 3.26), the legal enforceability of the
undertaking nor, indeed, Connell's financial ability to take up the debts should the
necessity arise (pp72-73, 3.30). The folly of these omissions was clearly evident to
the investigation. First Connell denied making such an undertaking (p68, 3.26) which
clearly suggests there was no written agreement Second, Connell's "wealth" upon
which the auditor relied in accepting the undertaking to stand behind the debts of
Rothwells, had itself been financed by Rothwells (p73, 3.30). Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, Connell's companies, L R C P and Oakhill, had, by 31 July 1986,
deficiencies of shareholders' funds of $70,101,653 and $31,437,385respectively.It is
doubtful, therefore, that Connell, or his companies, would be able to repay their o w n
debts (p89,4.19) m u c h less those of other outstanding debtors.

The further breaches of the Companies Code alluded to above were committed by
both the directors of Rothwells and the auditor.

Section 269(7) of the then

Companies Code required directors to ensure the making of an adequate provision for
doubtful debts. Evidence produced during the course of the investigation and detailed
above, makes it clear that an adequate provision for doubtful debts was not made.
This, in rum, would suggest the accounts did not show a true and fair view as was
then required by section 269 (8B) of the Code. Section 285 (4)(b) required auditors
to form an opinion as to the truth and fairness of the accounts. Given the inadequacy
of the receivables accounts and supporting documentation, McCusker questioned h o w
the auditors were able to form such an opinion (pp63-64, 3.20).

McCusker criticised both the lack of audit independence and the audit as
... a total failure to take any steps, independently of the executive
directors, to determine the true state of the receivables, and an
awareness that for several years the accounts and records relating
to receivables had been and still were quite unsatisfactory (ppl 08109,4.40).
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The auditors were also criticised with regard to the recognition in the accounts of fee
income which was either not payable to Rothwells or had not yet been earned. As
outlined previously, Rothwells' pre-tax profit at 31 July 1985 included $4 million fee
income. This amount was actually due and payable to L R C P . McCusker argued that,
given the auditors' knowledge of the intertwining nature of Rothwells and L R C P , the
possibility of error in the accounts should have been recognised. Also, the $4 million
fee represented a significant proportion of total fee income. This also should have
alerted the audit team to the need for examination of the amount. However, the
auditors failed to undertake any examination to determine the validity of the inclusion
of the fee in the accounts of Rothwells (pp74-76,3.32).

Similarly, fee income was included in the 1986 and 1987 accounts. As discussed
previously, in 1986, a $5 million fee for corporate advice was raised at 31 July 1986
and included in income for the year. The 1986 fee had not been paid at 31 July 1987
and directors of the company concerned denied liability for the fee. While these facts
were k n o w n to the auditors, the debt was not written-off and no provision against the
account was raised. Furthermore, yet another $5 million fee for the same reason was
charged to arelatedcompany in the 1987 accounts. Directors once again denied the
fee was payable. The auditor in charge was also aware of this at the time of the 1987
audit but failed to seek independent verification of the validity of the fee (ppl82-183,
5.73). A further amount of $5.5 million was included as fee income in 1987.
Payment of the fee was contingent upon repayment within six months of a loan of $11
million. The auditor did not question managements' contentions that the fee had been
earned in spite of the questionable recoverability of the loan (pi83, 5.74).

The implication of the foregoing is that there was not an efficient allocation of
resources. This was due in thefirstinstance to the over-statement of Rothwells'
profits from 1984 onwards and, in the second instance, by the failure of the auditor to
qualify the accounts. A s McCusker pointed out, had corrfirmation letters been sent in
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1985 to the debtors on the $35 million assignment list that transaction would have
been revealed as a sham. The auditors would then have been forced to qualify their
report and report the matter to Corporate Affairs (p56, 3.15). McCusker further
argued that if this course of events had occurred, it is unlikely that Rothwells would
have continued to receive increasing deposits from the public which were then used
by Connell for the acquisition of personal assets (p77, 3.34). In other words, Connell
would not have been able to continue to use Rothwells as his o w n private bank (p79,
4.1).
Rothwells October 1987 to November 1988
The deception of investors and the resultant inefficient allocation of resources
accelerated in the wake of the share market crash of October 1987. According to
evidence provided to McCusker
... the only thing keeping Rothwells going was that more people
wanted to put money into it than wanted to take it out... if that
ever changed [Rothwells] would have a problem (pl31, 5.7).

The share market crash precipitated the change which ultimately saw Rothwells
placed in liquidation in November 1988.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, a collapse of investor confidence can have adverse
effects on perfectly sound financial institutions. While Rothwells appeared to be quite
sound in October 1987, many investors apparently believed the bank to be vulnerable
having lent substantially to finance investment in the share market. This collapse of
investor confidence precipitated a "ran" on Rothwells (p28, 2.5). A very public
rescue operation was launched to raise some $300 million to ease Rothwells through
theresultingliquidity crisis and avert a further erosion of investor confidence which
m a y impact adversely on other financial institutions (p242,10.11).
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The package involved the issue to "prominent business people" of $150 million in
share capital and a $150 million overdraft facility from the National Australia Bank.
The West Australian Government was persuaded to provide an indemnity against
Rothwells' possible default on the repayment of the overdraft (p28-29, 2.6).
According to evidence taken during the course of the investigation, the West
Australian Government's involvement in the rescue was motivated, in part, by a view
that if Rothwells failed the Government would be required to fund the operations of
some local Government Authorities and other organisations which had substantial
deposits with Rothwells. It was further considered that if the Government and
prominent business people were prepared to assist Rothwells, this would restore
investor confidence and put an end to the run (p30,2.9; pp232-233,10.2).

The speed with which the rescue was executed precluded an in depth review of
Rothwells' financial position. However, this situation was alleviated by the issue one
month earlier of the 1987 accounts which depicted Rothwells as a profitable and well
managed organisation. Furthermore, the accounts were not qualified and had been
audited by one of the "big six" accounting firms (pp29-30, 2.7-2.8; p234, 10.4; p238,
10.7; p239, 10.8). Evidence to McCusker suggests that the rescuers relied on the
1987 accounts in making the decision to participate in the rescue package (p234,
10.4; p238, 10.7; p239, 10.8) and would not have participated had they k n o w n the
true position (p235, 10.5). Obviously, if the "true" position, in particular, Connell's
extensive borrowings and the non-performance and lack of security of the loans
portfolio, had been disclosed, the "rescue" would not have been undertaken.
Rothwells would have been put into liquidation a year earlier and the overall loss
would have been less (p240, 10.9). Furthermore, the "rescue" of Rothwells allowed
Connell to increase his indebtedness to around $500 million by June 1988 (p42,2.29).

As noted previously, in both Reid Murray and Cambridge Credit, the directors held
steadfastly to the view that therespectivecompanies would survive what were seen as
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temporary liquidity problems. McCusker expressed doubt that, of the Rothwells'
directors, Connell at the very least would not have been unaware of Rothwells
precarious financial position at the time of the rescue (p240, 10.9). The bases of
McCusker's contention included a Price Waterhouse review of Rothwells' receivables
and evidence from former senior employees of Rothwells.

The Price Waterhouse review of receivables was instigated by Connell in February
1987 (pl29, 5.3). The result of this review was that Rothwells was apparently
insolvent (pl32, 5.7) having external labilities in excess of assets (pl33, 5.11).
Rothwells' largest asset was its receivables portfolio and most of the debts were bad
or doubtful (pl32, 5.7) to the extent that a write-off or adequate provision would
effectively wipe out Rothwells' share capital and reserves (pl32, 5.9).

The

significance of the conclusion is magnified when it is considered that the review did
not include Connell-related debts (pl32, 5.8; pl33, 5.9). Connell was apparendy the
solerecipientof theresultsof the review (pl31, 5.6, 5.7; pl34, 5.13; pl35, 5.14).
The Price Waterhouse team had signed a confidentiality agreement that theresultsof
the review would be made available only to Connell (pl34,5.13).

Connell was also well aware of the poor state of Rothwells' debtors' records and files
and its liquidity problems. In 1986, a senior Rothwells' staff member was directed to
review Rothwell's records and balance the debtors' ledger (pp93-94, 4.25).

The

results of this review were reported to Connell and made it clear the accounts were
"in a mess" (p94, 4.26) due to breakdowns in the accounting System and poor
corporate supervision (pp94-95, 4.27) which resulted in a failure to collect interest
and principal repayments (p94, 4.27). In turn, these deficiencies led to a lack of cash
flow and, consequently, liquidity problems (p94,4.27).

Further evidence of Connell's awareness of Rothwell's precarious Uquidity position
was supplied by a former Treasurer of Rothwells. In evidence to McCusker, the
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former Treasurer described the pressure placed on Rothwells' cash flow by Connell's
incessant and unplanned spending (plOl-102, 4.33). Connell's level of spending on a
daily basis necessitated regular overnight borrowings at "huge fees" to "balance the
books each night" (pl02, 4.34). The difficulties imposed on Rothwells through
Connell's expenditures were made known to him but to no avail. Most of the
transactions were made through L R C P which then received fees for arranging loans
for friends and companies associated with Rothwells* management (ppl02-103, 4.33,
4.34). Connell was also aware that the cost of money to Rothwells was higher than
thereturns(pi04,4.36).

The results of the Price Waterhouse review and opinions expressed by the Rothwells'
employees were not m a d e available to the would-be rescuers. Furthermore, rescuers
were told that the extent of Connell, and Connell-related, debt was less than $20
million (p237, 10.6). A s already discussed, the financial statements indicated this was
so. While the reality of Rothwells' position was progressively revealed over the
following twelve months, a half year audit in January 1988 continued to mislead not
only investors but those involved in the rescue.

The ran on Rothwells in the wake of the October share market crash was not the only
problem facing Connell and the bank at that time. A n N C S C investigation into
allegations of share market manipulation and warehousing of shares by Connell and
Rothwells had commenced (p286,11.11). This investigation was terminated on much
the same grounds upon which the rescue was undertaken. If Rothwells collapsed, it
would further shake investor confidence and adversely impact on other financial
institutions (p286-287, 11.11). The termination of the N C S C investigation was on
the condition, inter alia, that a management plan be implemented (p287, 11.11). This
management plan included a requirement that outstanding loans be reviewed. The
review was to cover the security given for loans and recoverability. Theresultsof the
review were to be conveyed to the N C S C by 28 February 1988 (p288,11.13).
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While it is not clear that this was the review prescribed by the N C S C , a further
independent review of Rothwells' receivables was undertaken between December
1987 and February 1988 (p274, 11.1, 11.2). The exact purpose of the review is not
evident from the investigator's report but it appears to have been in connection with
both the NCSC's management plan requirements (p290, 11.15) and the West
Australian Government's guarantee of the $150 million overdraft facility granted to
Rothwells by the National Australia Bank (p274,11.1; p283-284,11.8).

As with the Price Waterhouse review, it was found that records and files were
inadequate. In approximately 60 per cent of the files, no documentation was available
as to terms of repayment or security for loans or even formal application and approval
(pp276-277, 11.3). The conclusion was reached by one member of the review team
that up to 70 per cent of the debts were uncollectable (p276, 11.3). The other
member expressed the view that with hindsight the entire portfolio was doubtful
(p277,11.3). This review was apparendy dismissed by Connell and other directors of
Rothwells on the basis that it was undertaken by "traditional bankers" (p282, 11.7).
Rothwells was a merchant bank. According to the directors of Rothwells, merchant
banks had a different lending philosophy in that a "loan" effectively m a y not be a
repayable debt but an equity investment (p278, 11.4, p283, 11.7) "a shareholding or
part ownership" (p276, 11.3). In spite of this defence of Rothwells' policies, the
results of the review were destroyed (p280, 11.5). The N C S C accepted audited half
yearly accounts instead of the review of the loans prescribed in the management plan.
This course of action was proposed by Connell on the basis that publication of audited
half yearly accounts would help restore the financial markets confidence in Rothwells
(p290,11.5).

The audit of course, was conducted by the same team that had undertaken the 1985,
1986 and 1987 audits and with similar results (p291, 11.15). Once again, reliance
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was placed on directors for information on receivables rather than on documents and
files which were of limited value anyway (p294-295, 11.18; p96, 11.20). In this
instance, a provision for doubtful debts of $100 million was raised even though the
auditors considered $127 million was more appropriate (p295, 11.19). O n the basis
of the Price Waterhouse review and the independent review undertaken between
December 1987 and February 1988, it is obvious that this provision was grossly
inadequate. Nonetheless, the accounts were unqualified (p301, 11.24). Rothwells
issued a press release stating, inter alia, "[fjhe directors took the unusual step of
having the accounts for the period fully audited, confirming their validity" (p302,
11.25).

According to McCusker, both the NCSC and the public were effectively misled by the
publication of the audited results. It appeared Rothwells was recovering financial
stability when, in fact it had almost no income as most of its receivable were nonperforrning.

Rothwells continued to operate by the grace of deposits from

government authorities and agencies (p302,11.26; p307, 11.32).

Evidence to McCusker suggests the deception was maintained until around June 1988
when members of the West Australian Government became aware of the extent of
Rothwells' bad debts which by this time were estimated to be around $300 million
(p304,11.28). Rothwells was continuing to have liquidity problems. There was not a
"run" on the bank as such, but depositors were withdrawing funds reportedly because
of the extent of Rothwells' bad debts (p304, 11.28). Rothwells was having difficulty
borrowing funds because of the poor state of its files and records (p303, 11.27). This
situation gave rise to what could be termed the second Rothwells' rescue in June/July
1988. The full details of the various transactions undertaken as part of this rescue
plan are provided in the investigator's report (pp307-33) and will only be briefly dealt
with here.
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The "rescue" this time was aimed at financing the purchase by Connell of $350 million
of Rothwells' uncollectable debts (p305, 11.28). Financing was provided through an
agreement whereby the West Australian Government and businessman, Alan Bond,
purchased Connell's interest in a petrochemical project for $350 million (p307,11.30).
In this instance, the sale of the debts was approved by shareholders at a general
meeting held on 29 July 1988 (p319, 11.44). Settlement took place on 17 October
1988 (p330,11.61). The overall effect of this transaction was to improve Rothwells'
liquidity by $16.2 million and reduce liabilities by $333.80 million (Annexure to
Chapter 11, Disbursement of "PICL" Payment of $350m, ppl-2).

This, however, was not sufficient to allow Rothwells to continue operations. Two
days later, a governmentrepresentativeand others involved in the management of
Rothwells since the time of the first rescue in October 1987, came to the conclusion
that Rothwells was "technically insolvent" (p330,11.61). A further rescue package of
some $75 million was proposed on 21 October 1988 (p333, 11.62). T o ease an
immediate liquidity crisis, $15 million was provided indirectly by the West Australian
Government through a pre-payment for coal to a Rothwells' subsidiary (p333-338,
11.62-11.68). However, it appears no furtherfinancialsupport was forthcoming and
provisional liquidators were appointed in November 1988.

The Rothwells' saga has definite parallels with both the Reid Murray and Cambridge
Credit cases. A major feature of all three companies for the years immediately prior
to collapse was a lack of liquidity compounded by unprofitable operations. Yet the
published accounts provided no inkling of this. Both Reid Murray and Cambridge
Credit relied on a steady inflow of debenture funds for survival while Rothwells'
continued existence was contingent upon deposits of funds exceeding out flows. T o
this end, the published financial statements of each company needed to portray wellrun and profitable concerns. This was achieved by various methods including the use
of different accounting methods to account for similar transactions, therecognitionof
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profits on transactions not completed at balance date, the back dating of transactions,
capitalisation of development and interest expenses and a failure to provide for bad
and doubtful debts. The deception was further facilitated by all three companies by
the use of a network ofrelatedcompanies and organisations to engineer profits such
as on land sales, nominal interest charges and other fees. Rothwells carried this even
further by using related companies and firmstoconceal director-related debts.

The investigators' reports in each case stated that the published financial statements
were misleading. In each case, investigators contended the auditors had aided and
abetted management in this deception by failing to approach the audit task with an
enquiring mind and demonstrating a willingness to accept management's assurances as
to the validity of transactions in spite of evidence to the contrary. The auditors
concerned had the benefit of professional guidelines to help them. In the Cambridge
Credit and Rothwells cases, the auditors also had the benefit of the experiences of the
auditor in Reid Murray and the A S A Report issued in 1966 to guide them. It appears,
however, that the experiences of the past and the guidance which had been provided
by the profession since at least 1946 were effectively ignored.

In each of the cases examined above, the ultimate collapse of the company concerned
led to the discovery of the misleading nature of the financial statements and failure of
the audit process. A final case will be examined briefly to demonstrate that such
failures of theregulatorysystem can occur without the company concerned going into
liquidation.

AWA Ltd v Daniels [1992] 7 ACSR 759
This was a case dealing with auditor negligence and contributory negligence on the
part of company management

During 1986, A W A Ltd entered the world of

speculation on foreign exchange (p778). A s will be discussed in detail in a subsequent
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chapter, foreign exchange management is characterised by high risk and requires a
great deal of skill and experience to rninimise the inherent risks. The management of
A W A Ltd and, more importantly, those involved in the foreign exchange dealings had
neither experience nor skill in this area (pp778-779).

Initially, the company appeared to be making profits on its foreign exchange dealings
(Peers, 1986, p30) reaching a peak of $26 million for the month of March 1987
( A W A Ltd v Daniels [1992] 7 A C S R 759, p824). The directors were uneasy about
the company's entering into the foreign exchange market particularly when informed
of the March 1987 foreign exchange profits which some described as "almost unreal"
as this was not consistent with previous foreign exchange profit patterns (p823).
Nonetheless, the directors accepted the figure on the basis that the external auditor
would surely pick up any accounting errors and notify them. This did not happen.

As subsequent investigation revealed, the foreign currency accounting records were
substantially incomplete and unauthorised foreign exchange loans had been used to
pay out and thus conceal some of the losses incurred on speculative foreign exchange
transactions. In addition, foreign exchange losses which were not concealed by the
use of unauthorised loans were rolled over. This practice was acceptable under the
then newly released A A S 20 Accounting for Foreign Currency Translation (hereafter
referred to as A A S 20) paragraphs 3 (p), 10, 11 and 53. The provisions of A A S 20
meant that losses incurred on this type of transaction could be deferred and amortised
almost indefinitely. However, a different treatment was accorded foreign exchange
profits which were recognised as incurred. The auditor was aware that the foreign
exchange accounting records were incomplete and that there was a lack of adequate
internal controls to safeguard the foreign exchange operations. The board of directors
was not informed of this state of affairs. B y the time the short comings of the foreign
exchange department were m a d e known to the directors, foreign exchange losses
totalled $49.8 million.
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In terms of the failure of standard setting participants,regulatorsand parliamentary
and government bodies, A A S 20 had taken some 13 years to develop and did not
take effect until 31 October 1986. U p until this time, companies were free to select
the foreign currency translation accounting method of their choice.

The long

gestation period for the foreign currency standard will be shown later to have been the
result of political influences rather than any technical difficulties. The standard, when
finally issued, was flexible in that it permitted, inter alia, the rollover ofrealisedgains
and losses on long term monetary items rather than prescribing immediate recognition.
This, in itself, was a political decision made after submissions to the A A R F (Miles,
1986, p31). It would seem that political expediency overshadowed the need for
relevant andreliableinformation.

The NCSC had been expressing concern at the lack of uniformity in accounting for
foreign currency transactions for some time (Bushnel, 1985, pi; Uren, 1985, pl3;
Wilson, 1985, p40). In 1985, seemingly impatient with the professional accountancy
associations' standard setting process dealing with foreign currency, issued a practice
note dealing with disclosure of foreign currency methods and amounts (Bushnel, pi;
Prosser, 1985, pl5; Uren, pl3). This practice note subsequently became approved
accounting standard A A S B

1003 Foreign Currency Translation - Disclosure

(hereafterreferredto as A A S B 1003).

For some reason, which the N C S C did not

disclose, the prescription of accounting methods was left to the A A S B (Commentary,
A A S B 1003).

In addition, much of AWA Ltd's foreign currency dealings were highly speculative
and evidence will be produced in a later chapter to show that speculation in the
foreign currency market was wide spread among Australian companies. Despite this,
neither the N C S C nor A A S 20 addressed this issue. In fact, the original A A S 20
specifically excluded speculative foreign currency dealings from its scope ( A A S 20
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paragraph 1). The current A A S 20 and its counterpart A A S B 1012 Foreign
Currency Translation (hereafter referred to as A A S B 1012) deal with disclosure of
speculative foreign currency dealings but do not prescribe accounting methods for
such transactions. A s with the immediate recognition versus defer and amortise
options, the failure of the two professional bodies and the A A S B to address the issue
of accounting for speculative foreign currency dealings raises questions about their
commitment to ensuring the achievement of the economic and social consequences
that S A C 2 and 3 argue will flow from the provision of relevant and reliable
information. The situation that A W A Ltd found itself in was, admittedly, more than a
matter of selective application of accounting practices. Nonetheless, A W A Ltd and
the foreign currency losses incurred by other companies (to be discussed in detail in
Chapter 6) serve to demonstrate the failure of accounting standards to provide
relevant andreliableinformation.

Clarke and Dean provide similar examples of companies that reported profits in 1989,
1990 and 1991 and have subsequently reported losses through the write-off of asset
values (1992, pi86). Both the profits reported in previous years and their subsequent
reversal were calculated according to "conventional accounting" (pi86). A s noted by
Clarke and Dean, it is unlikely that the entire decline in asset values occurred in the
year prior to their recognition in the financial statements. This, in turn, casts doubt on
the appropriateness of conventional accountingralesused in prior periods (pi87).

The failures of Reid Murray, Cambridge Credit and Rothwells demonstrate that not
only has the public interest been foresaken in the flexibility of accounting practices but
also by an attitude on the part of some auditors, that the wishes of management take
precedence over the information needs of those w h o deal with corporations. While it
is true that the financial reports of companies are theresponsibilityof management
can accountants morally hide behind the wording of a statute? Accountants are
supposed to have expertise that non-accountants, including management do not
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possess and these special skills are supposed to raise them above the purely technical
occupations.

Accountants are supposed to be able to use their "professional

judgment" to detennine the appropriate accounting treatment for transactions in given
circumstances. The choice of method is supposed to be neutral, in other words, it is
not supposed to benefit one group at the expense of another. If management is to
take the entire blame for the preparation of false and misleading statements such as
those in the cases detailed in this chapter, then it would appear that management is
exercising "professional judgment" and the accountant has been relegated to the role
of bookkeeper doing what management has directed. Also accountants, if members
of a professional body, are supposed to be bound by a code of ethics that requires
them to comply with accounting standards. These standards are meant to represent
best accounting practice - but best for w h o m ? It appears not necessarily what is best
for shareholders and creditors or those affected by the activities of corporations.

The ethics of the auditors must also be questioned. Auditors have a duty to certify
that accounts show a true and fair view and comply with approved accounting
standards. If management by clever ploys and undetectable dishonest means has
hidden the true facts from diligent and competent auditors, then auditors cannot bear
responsibility for accounts that are misleading. However, evidence to investigators in
the cases of Reid Murray, Cambridge Credit and Rothwells suggest that the auditors
were well aware of what management was trying to achieve with regard to the
published financial statements. The failure by the auditors concerned to report clearly,
honestly and professionally on the accounts has discredited the profession.

It could, of course, be argued that the instances discussed in this chapter are isolated
and are not representative of the integrity of either directors or accountants in general.
There is, however, evidence to suggest that this is not the case. Justice Rogers of the
N e w South Wales Supreme Court recendy m a d e reference to a "recurring cycle of
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booms and collapses" and the fact that even though changes are made, the same
problems recur (1991, pi). Similarly, Chambers alleges that
. . . corporate accounting does not do violence to the truth
occasionally and trivially, but comprehensively, systematically and
universally, annually and perennially (1991, pl6).

Clarke and Dean also make reference to the recurring problems of "... bad
management immoral behaviour in corporate life, greed and avarice . . ." (1992,
pl78). These problems were as evident in the corporate failures of the 1960's as they
are in the more recent collapses and this is so in spite of actions supposedly taken to
ensure that such activities were not repeated.

The first part of the next chapter will provide some of the traditional arguments put
forward as explanations for the failures of the regulatory system identified in this
chapter. The second half of the chapter will seek to provide an alternative explanation
based on the concepts of circuits of power, dissidence and autopoiesis.
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CHAPTER 5
IN SEARCH OF AN EXPLANATION OF
REGULATORY FAILURE

The corporate failures detailed in Chapter 4 demonstrate that unexpected corporate
failures have continued despite the existence of company legislation incorporating
account and audit provisions aimed, in part, at providing protection for those w h o
deal with corporations. Unexpected corporate failures have also continued in spite of
the emergence of an accounting profession which claims to be committed to ensuring
that general purpose financial reports provide a means by which management and
governing bodies will be accountable for their actions and which will facilitate an
economic allocation of resources. A s the inspectors'reportsdiscussed in the previous
chapter suggest, m u c h of the blame for misleading financial statements has been laid
at the door of accountants, in particular, auditors. However, as Chambers has noted,
others should also wear s o m e of the criticism:
The practices that companies have adopted have generally been
permissible under the statutes, regulations and technical rales of
accounting of their time. The trouble has been that the laws,
regulations and rules have been vague, toothless and often selfcontradictory.
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Thefinancialinformation on company affairs which flows to the
securities market is the product principally, of accounting rules.
But w e do not hold that accountants or their professional
associations are alone responsible for the state of the rales.
Managers, directors, stock-brokers, financiers, lawyers and others
have also played a part, consciously or unwittingly, in bending and
stretching the rules (1973, Preface, Securities and Obscurities,
unpaginated).

The reasons for this are not clear but McCraw sheds some light on the purpose of
regulation and, thereby, on the difficulties involved in enforcing it: ". . .regulationis
best understood as an institution capable of serving diverse, even contradictory, ends,
some economic, some political, some cultural" (1975, pl80).

Because regulation serves such diverse interests, the potential for conflict is obviously
going to be quite great

The outcome of such conflict will be governed by

weaknesses within the regulatory structure. Hence, as was suggested in Chapter 1,
there are actually layers of failure within the regulatory system and unexpected
corporate failures are the outcome of a series of weaknesses within the system. The
first part of this chapter will attempt to identify specific weaknesses in the regulatory
framework governing financial disclosure which have contributed to regulatory
failures such as those discussed in Chapter 4. The second part of the chapter will
attempt to demonstrate that these weaknesses are themselves theresultof underlying
socio-political influences. It is the contention of this study that these influences are
the cause of regulatory failure and can be explained within the circuits of power and
autopoiesis frameworks developed and elaborated on in chapters 2 and 3.

AREAS OF REGULATORY WEAKNESS
Legislation is/one of the most obvious sources of regulatory weakness. The fact that
company legislation has been in existence for well over 100 years makes one wonder
h o w the examples of grossly misleading financial statements discussed in the previous
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chapter could have occurred. O n e contributory factor m a y be the motives behind the
legislation. A s discussed in the previous chapter, the dominant force behind the
original companies legislation in the U K was to facilitate incorporation. Hence, it was
clearly in the interests of business. In return for the privileges of incorporation,
companies were required to adhere to certain rales or guidelines including the
disclosure of financial information. Australian corporate legislation was adapted from
the U K model and was expanded upon in the wake of the Victorian land b o o m of the
late nineteenth century to provide further protection to investors and creditors
(Victoria, 1895, p3338). However, given that fraud and misrepresentation still prevail
in spite of legislation, it could be asked if the disclosure requirements of company
legislation are little more than a sham or a symbolic gesture to quell the fear
engendered by previous corporate collapses and fraud. A s Cranston states:
Often it is fallacious to assume that the forces dominant in
formulating business regulation really intended to m a k e any dent
on commercial practices.
Business regulation m a y be
characterised as symbolic, since from the outset the purpose m a y
simply have been to assuage public opinion or to divert its
attention (1982, p3).

Legislative initiatives can be both intentionally and unintentionally weakened in a
number of ways with theresultthat those w h o wish to avoid the consequences of the
legislation m a y do so with relative impunity.

Legislative failure could be said,

therefore, to be aresultof weakness in other layers of the regulatory framework. For
present purposes, the major source of weakness in company legislation is uncertainty.
The areas of uncertainty to be examined here are: Australian federalism, frequent
changes in legislation/legislators, lack of authority vested in regulatory agencies, lack
of funding and ambiguous or flexible statutes and standards.
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1. Australian Federalism
Grabosky and Braithwaite discovered in their study of enforcement strategies of
businessregulatoryagencies in Australia that businessregulationin Australia is "... a
fragmented, unco-ordinated melange of overlapping Commonwealth, state, and local
government agencies ..." (1986a, p2).

The fragmentation of regulation in Australia is a result of our federal system. This
weakness in theregulatorysystem was recognisable very early in the life of federated
Australia. For example, the difficulties imposed by the Australian constitution were
raised in Chapter 3 with regard to obtaining legislativeregistrationof professional
accountants. In addition, in 1906, The Public Accountant, suggested each of the six
States refer to the Federal Parliament their powers to legislate for companies
(Editorial, 1906c, pl8; 1906d, p35). The following year, a conference was instigated
by the Federal Government to consider and seek recommendations on the formulation
of uniform company and bankruptcy law throughout Australia (Editorial, 1907c,
ppl38-139). N o progress was made in either thereferralof State powers to the
Federal Parliament or in achieving uniform legislation throughout the Commonwealth.
In an address reproduced in The Public Accountant in 1912, a call for Federal
legislation was m a d e on the basis that the individual Australian States made up a
Commonwealth with a c o m m o n destiny. Hence
[it] is absurd... that a "limited Company" should imply one set of
statutory conditions in N e w South Wales and another in Victoria
or South Australia. Throughout the Commonwealth "limited
liability" should mean one thing, under one comprehensive statute
...(Braddon, 1912, pl45).

Half a century later, the problem still existed:
It is regretted that it appears impracticable to have a Federal
Companies Act which would apply to all states. ...
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At present anyone w h o has to deal with company matters which
extend beyond one State is faced with six companies acts and also
Federal ordinances for Territories. While there is general
similarity in these Acts, they vary considerably in detail and
arrangement (Chancellor, 1957, p200).

Despite a recognised need for Federal company legislation, this was not achieved for
ninety years. A major reason for this has been judicial interpretation of the Australian
Constitution which has effectively supported the reluctance of the various State
Governments to delegate their corporate powers to the Commonwealth. The decision
in Huddart, Parker, C o Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1908) 8 C L R 330 gave a very narrow
reading to section 51(xx) of the Constitution which deals with the Commonwealth's
powers to m a k e laws with regard to corporations. As aresult,the Commonwealth
was forced to seek co-operation from the States in passing uniform legislation.
Alternatively, as suggested as early as 1906, the States could have referred their
powers to the Commonwealth which could then have enacted legislation to regulate
companies on a national level. The States had no desire to take such action. The
compromise was uniform legislation but this was not achieved on a national scale until
1963.

Uniform legislation, however, was not a complete solution. In the wake of the
minerals b o o m of the 1960's, early 1970's, two Parliamentary Committees were
appointed: The Company L a w Advisory Committee, 1967, and the Senate Select
Committee on Securities and Exchange (Rae Committee) 1974. In 1968, the interim
Report of the Company L a w Advisory Committee recommended the establishment of
a Companies Commission to oversee the securities industry including the preparation
and presentation of financial statements (Australia, 1970, ppl4-16). Six years later,
the Rae Committee m a d e a similar recommendation.

The Rae Committee stated

clearly that a joint regulatory scheme involving individual States and the
Commonwealth Government was not a viable solution
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... in advocating the establishment of a national regulatory body
w e are not in favour of such a joint commission, particularly not
one which involves the concept of continuing responsibility to all
the governments. Such an arrangement would seriously endanger
the ability of the system ofregulationto adapt speedily to everchanging circumstances and standards (1974, pl6.14).

However, bringing these recommendations to fruition took another ten years. The
delay appears to have been largely due to the threat of a constitutional challenge to
the Federal Government's powers in this area.

In 1972, the possibility of Federal corporate regulation began to gain ground. The
Huddart, Parker decision was specifically overturned in Strickland v Rocla Concrete
Pipes Ltd [1972] A L R 3 . This turn of events appears to have given the then newly
elected Federal Labor Government the incentive to initiate legislation to regulate
corporations. However, the proposed legislation lapsed when the Labor Party lost
power in 1975.

Rather than risk a constitutional challenge to any attempt to institute national
company

legislation, the newly elected Federal Liberal Government began

negotiations with the States for the introduction of a Co-operative Scheme under
which companies legislation dealing with the Australian Capital Territory and
Territories would be adopted by the States. A National Companies and Securities
Commission ( N C S C ) was to be established which would be independent of direct
parliamentary control either by the Federal Government or by the States.

A

Ministerial Council comprising a minister from each State Government and the
Federal Government was also to be established to oversee the activities of the N C S C
and recommend appropriate legislation or amendments to existing legislation. The
Formal Agreement which brought the Scheme into effect was signed on 22
December, 1978. The aims of the national scheme were summarised by the Campbell
Committee as being
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to achieve greater uniformity in the law and its administration;
to promote commercial certainty;
to reduce business costs and increase the efficiency of capital
markets; and
to enhance the confidence of investors in securities markets
(Australia, 1981, p364,21.4).

The N C S C was established in March 1980 to oversee administration of the uniform
legislation.

For reasons to be discussed in the next two sections, the co-operative scheme and the
NCSC were not as successful as was originally hoped. In February 1980, it was
described in an editorial in the Australian Business Law Review as "the fruition of one
of the "dreams" for the 1970's" (Editorial, 1980, pi). Two years later it was seen as
... a compromise between the most efficient means of regulating
the market to the standards n o w required by the community and
the politicalrealitiesthat must be faced under the Australian
Federal System (Samuel, 1982, p33).

Dissatisfaction with the Scheme continued and culminated in an unanimous
recommendation by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal
Affairs that it be replaced with comprehensive Commonwealth company and
securities legislation (Australia, 1987, 6.8). The Committee described the Cooperative Scheme as "an exceptional constitutional creature" (paragraph 6.1) and
criticised it on a number of grounds including:
administrative and general inefficiency due to the duplication of
functions arising from the delegation of duties by the N C S C to
State and Territory Corporate Affairs Commissions (paragraph
3.8)
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O n the basis of these criticisms and recommendations, the Federal Government
attempted to introduce Commonwealth company legislation. However, this bid has
been thwarted by a successful, if limited Constitutional challenge in N e w South
Wales v Commonwealth of Australia (1990) 1 A C S R 137. The decision in this case
was handed d o w n by the High Court in February 1990. It was held that Constitution
Section 51 (xx) did not confer on the Commonwealth power to legislate for
incorporation of companies but once a company was duly incorporated, it could then
come within any relevant Commonwealth legislation. In itself, the decision did not
directly affect the proposed Commonwealth legislation to any great extent.
Incorporation was only a small part of the legislation. However, it left the way open
for further constitutional challenges. The fact that the case was brought in the first
place highlights the political nature of theregulatoryprocess and indicates the degree
of uncertainty that our federal system is capable of generating in terms of effective
government and control of regulation.

In the wake of the High Court decision, negotiations again began between the
Federal, State and Northern Territory governments in a bid to overcome the
constitutional difficulties. Agreement was reached in June 1990 with the States and
the Northern Territory agreeing to enact legislation adopting the Commonwealth
Corporations Act 1989 and the Australian Securities Commission 1989. A national
corporations scheme, based on Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation,
finally became effective in December 1990 (Australia, 1991c, 1.3.17-1.3.21, ppl414).
2. Frequent Changes in Legislation/Legislators
According to Doyle, frequent changes in legislation can have an adverse impact on
compliance with laws:
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Where lawsrelatingto a subject-matter arefrequentlyaltered . . .
it becomes difficult to persuade those w h o are ruled that
"regulation" ie. technical, neutral implementation of a law, is
possible... the law is in "disrepute" because parties k n o w that the
values are not settled and the "law" is as temporary as the present
configuration of law-makers (1981, p98).

Parliamentary debates of both the Senate and House of Representatives indicate that
frequent changes to company legislation under the Co-operative Scheme were indeed
a problem. For example, in November 1983, Senator Durack commented on the
number of amendments to the legislation before the Senate at that time:
The Senate is about to debate the Companies and Securities
Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill. This involves
amendments to the whole co-operative companies and securities
scheme . . . This m a y be somewhat surprising in view of the
relativerecencyof the co-operative scheme and the codes under
it particularly as the Companies Act itself came into existence
only a short time ago...
It may seem surprising that one would have about 100
amendments proposed to a package of such recent origin. The
Senate should be aware that w e are faced with the prospect of
legislation of this magnitude and complexity virtually on an annual
basis (Australia,!983,p2680).

Parliamentary debates some nine years laterrevealthat nothing has changed.

The

need for lengthy and complex amendments to the 1989 corporations legislation is
indicative of the political nature of the national scheme in that the States would have
been aware of problems of this nature but persisted in launching a constitutional
challenge to Federal legislation. In discussing the report of the Joint Committee on
Corporations and Securities presented to the Senate in June 1992, reference was
made to evidence given to the Committee by the business and professional
communities. This evidence maintained that further amendment to the corporations
law was not necessary and that company directors were having a difficult time coming
to grips with changes to the law brought about by the newly introduced national
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regulatory scheme and the creation of the A S C . Further amendments, therefore,
should be delayed (Australia, 1992b, p4109).

The extensiveness of changes to the corporations law since 1989 was raised in the
Senate in the following December. The Corporations Bill 1989 contained almost
1,000 pages. Amendments required in the aftermath of the constitutional challenge
contained some 300 pages. A series of other amendments followed. These included
the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991, the Corporations Legislation
Amendment Bill (No 2) 1991, the Corporations (Unlisted Property Trusts)
Amendment Bill 1991, the Corporations Legislation (Evidence) Amendment Bill 1992
and the Corporate L a w Reform Bill (No 2) 1992 (Australia, 1992e, p5296). These
amendments were described in the Senate as complex and directed towards achieving
a nationalregulatoryscheme (p4109).

It appears the business and professional communities had valid grounds for complaint
Such frequent amendments also raise doubts about the purpose of the legislation. The
business and professional communities' claims to be having difficulty in coming to
grips with existing legislation would tend to give them an excuse not to apply it
particularly when it is likely to be changed at any time. In rum, frequent and complex
changes in legislation can make enforcement difficult This point was also raised in
the Senate (p4109). A s will be discussed below, difficulties of enforcement m a y result
because theregulatorsthemselves lack expertise. With an ever changing set of rales,
gaining expertise is unlikely to be an easy task. This point was raised in evidence
before the Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities in August 1992. Tony
Hartnell, then chairman of the A S C , stated that problems were encountered by the
A S C in training staff because the complexities of the corporations law made training a
very long, slow process (Australia, 1992c, pi3). Inexperience was also suggested as a
reason for the ASC's preference for civil remedies as opposed to criminal proceedings
during the years that Tony Hartnell was chairman. It was claimed in the financial
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press that Hartnell had a commercial background and had both a distaste for and lack
of familiarity with criminal law (Gray, 1992, pl2).

The question of enforcement was also raised in the Senate with regard to the progress
of the A S C and prosecutions arising out of the corporate failures of the 1980's. Early
in its existence, the A S C identified 16 "big" cases which were to be investigated. B y
June 1992, some $4.7 million had been spent on these investigations but only two
convictions had resulted. Even though there were a number of matters pending,
progress cannot be said to be apparent. The Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) complained that the A S C was not referring matters to it for
prosecution and, as a result it had underspent its corporate prosecutions budget by
$1.5 million (Australia, 1992d, p5289).

Dissension between the DPP and the ASC became very public during 1992 with a
series of articles appearing in the press (eg. Gray, 1992, pl2; Pheasant 1992, p4;
Spiers, 1992a, pl-2; 1992b, pl-2). A s a result of the dispute becoming public,
hearings were held with both parties before the Joint Statutory Committee on
Corporations and Securities in October 1992. The report of this committee dealt with
apparent conflicts between the A S C and the D P P . In defence of the ASC's failure to
conclude investigations into alleged serious criminal corporate activity and initiate
prosecutions, the report m a d e reference to the backlog of complex investigations "an inherited mess not of its o w n making" - and the inexperience of the newly created
ASC's investigators - "many of w h o m were new to the task" (Australia, 1992d, pp34).

The investigation into the collapse of the Bond group in 1989 provides an example of
the difficulties inherent in Australian corporate regulation. A Ministerial Council
appointed enquiry was established in March 1990. In 1991, the enquiry was taken
over by the A S C and a management committee comprising members drawn from the
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A S C , the Federal Police and the D P P . A s of July 1994, the investigation is still
incomplete. In the intervening years, there have been a number of changes in the
membership of the management committee including the ASC's chairman and national
co-ordinator of enforcement and therepresentativefrom the Federal Police. These
changes in the membership team were cited as one reason for the delay in bringing the
investigation to a conclusion (Williams, 1994b, pl5).

In an accounting context Walker also lends support to Doyle's view. In an evaluation
of the A S R B and accounting regulation policies that affected its progress, Walker
stated that between 1978 and 1985, the formative years of the Co-operative Scheme,
the N C S C and the A S R B , the Ministerial Council had undergone some thirty changes
in composition (1987, p281). Furthermore, there had been changes in a number of
"key players" since the establishment of the A S R B . The "key players" identified by
Walker included N S W Attorney-General, Frank Walker, Commonwealth AttorneyGeneral, Gareth Evans, N C S C foundation chairman, Leigh Masel and senior public
servants. Changes in the positions held by these individuals and the introduction of
new "players" influenced the policies affecting company regulation. According to
Walker these changes in players worked to the profession's advantage which, in
contrast to the regulators, had arelativelystable leadership:
The reshuffling of portfolios in both State and Commonwealth
arenas, the retirement of Masel, and the reassignment of public
servants led to a lack of continuity of involvement by leading
participants in the government sector, and accordingly some
volatility in policies. O n the other hand, there was a high level of
continuity in the leadership and staffing of the two accountancy
bodies. In this environment the profession found that when
lobbying about the A S R B or the future of Schedule 7, it did not
need to take 'no' for an answer (1987, pp284-285).

As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the inability of the profession to
c o m e to a firm decision regarding the translation methods to be used for translating
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the financial statements of foreign subsidiaries and the treatment of gains and loss
arising on translation and the treatment of gains and losses on foreign borrowings
allowed companies to select the method most suited to their purposes. The result
being that there was inconsistency not only from company to company but in the
accounting methods adopted by individual companies.

S o m e companies were

inconsistent in the application of accounting methods on a year by year basis and also
from transaction to transaction.
3. Lack of Authority
Legislation m a y also be deficient in that it fails to provide a regulatory body with
sufficient powers to effectively carry out its duties. Alternatively, the powers and
duties m a y not be clearly defined leaving theregulatorybody open to challenge on its
right to undertake certain activities. There are at least three areas in the Australian
regulatory system where this weakness is either still evident or has been until recent
times.
a. The Co-operative Scheme
A s already noted, the Co-operative Scheme and the N C S C were criticised by the
Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs for administrative and
general inefficiency (Australia, 1987, paragraph 3.8). The Co-operative Scheme was
also criticised on the ground that responsibility for the Scheme was vested in the
Ministerial Council, composed of members from each State Government and the
Federal Government rather than a Federal Minister w h o would then be answerable to
Parliament (paragraph 3.8). This had two consequences. From the point of view of
the Committee it led to "lowest c o m m o n denominator decision-making" which cast
doubt on the quality of administration of the Scheme (paragraph 3.8). It also took
control of company legislation away from Parliament and vested it in a small group
which was subject to frequent change and had diverse political ideologies. This in
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turn led to delay in enacting amendments to the legislation and additional
administrative costs:
... the Ministerial Council virtually puts us, as the National
Parliament in a position of legislating in accordance with its
wishes.
... w e have to sit back and wait for six State Attorneys ... to
come to some agreement, with all the delay, the excess
administration and the burden that imposes . . . (Australia, 1985,
pp385, 386)

The adoption of Federal corporate legislation may have removed this particular barrier
to a certain extent in that the Corporations L a w is administered by specified Ministers
appointed by and answerable to the Parliament

However, as already indicated, the

necessity to frequently amend the legislation makes it clear that the national scheme
has not removed all of the problems v/ithin theregulatorysystem.

b. The NCSC/ASC
Under the Co-operative Scheme, the role of the N C S C was to administer company
legislation in Australia. The State and Australian Capital Territory Corporate Affairs
Commissions were to act as delegates of the N C S C . However, as Grabosky and
Braithwaite have noted, the N C S C was to "have regard to the principle of m a x i m u m
development of a decentralized capacity to interpret and promulgate the uniform
policy and administration of the scheme" (1986a, pi2). A s a consequence, the N C S C
had no control over the allocation of resources within the scheme and while it was
able to provide guidelines and refer cases to its delegates, it could not initiate
prosecutions or interfere in enforcement policies at State level (1986a, pl2).
Grabosky and Braithwaite describe therelationshipbetween the N C S C and its State
delegates as poor and co-operative in name only:
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W e send what w e think are good cases to the states because w e
don't have the resources to do them ourselves. In fact most time
is spent on sending good stuff we've picked up and two or three
years later we're still writing letters begging them to reply as to
what they've done.
In very few cases we have resources to go in and say look . . .
give us a report on that W e want a report The report then
comes over and they say there is no case to answer . . . and you
could go through this report and their interviews and there was a
prima facie case there. Y o u could go in and prosecute them on
the documents (1986a, pl3, interview with senior N C S C official.
Emphasis in original).

The administration and functions of both the Co-operative Scheme and the NCSC are
characterised by what Grabosky and Braithwaite term "layering", that is, the
delegation of enforcement of regulation to various administrative layers (1986b, p88).
The purpose being that the more layers a prosecution must transit, the less likelihood
of it ever being completed. While the extension of this process to legislation under
the Co-operative Scheme may be beyond the scope that Grabosky and Braithwaite
saw for the term "layering", it clearly has the same impact as indicated in the
parliamentary debates previously cited.

Further evidence of layering within the area of corporate regulation is the relationship
between the NCSC's successor, the ASC, and the DPP. The ASC has authority
under section 49 of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 to initiate
prosecutions for offences against the Corporations Law. Given the experience of the
NCSC in terms of the delegation of prosecutions to State Corporate Affairs
Commissions, the decision to delegate prosecutions to the DPP appears at first to be
somewhat puzzling. However, a review of the evidence given by Tony Hartnell to the
Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities in 1992 provides the answer to this
riddle. Apparently, the legislation which created the DPP contains a provision stating
that the DPP can undertake corporate prosecutions. According to Hartnell, the DPP
informed the ASC that if it did not willingly send prosecutions to the DPP, the
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legislation would be invoked and the D P P would undertake the prosecutions whether
the A S C liked it or not (Australia, 1992c, pl8). O n the basis that the difficulties
inherent in the splitting of the regulatory function in this w a y were known, the
inclusion of such a provision in the D P P legislation is questionable.

Grabosky and Braithwaite found that regulatory agencies that used the State Crown
L a w Offices or the D P P in the case of Commonwealth agencies, often experienced
delay and other problems in the conduct of prosecutions:
The most common complaints were the failure of prosecutors to
understand technical problems, according low priority to
regulatory work compared to 'cops and robbers' cases, entering
into plea bargains without consulting the agency, delays, and
failure to c o m e to grips with theregulatorystrategy of the agency
(1986a, p200).

The long delay in the Bond investigation briefly referred to above suggests the same
problems still exist

In addition, as already noted, there has been open conflict

between the two bodies giving rise to a series of hearings before the Joint Statutory
Committee on Corporations and Securities in 1992. Both sides to the conflict
attributed blame to the other for delays in the conclusion of investigations.

The DPP criticised the ASC's preference for seeking civil remedies instead of criminal
prosecutions even in instances of serious corporate wrongdoing (Australia, 1992d,
p6-7, 1.17-1.20). This, of course, could be the ASC's back lash to the DPP's demand
to undertake criminal prosecutions rather than allowing the A S C to follow through on
its investigations. However, there is no evidence to support this. In response to the
D P F s criticisms, the A S C argued that evidence arising from civil proceedings m a y
giveriseto criminal charges (p5, 1.14, 1.15). Even if such evidence emerges, it may
prejudice subsequent crirriinal prosecutions. The prejudice problem was identified by
Rogers J in one of the m a n y Cambridge Credit hearings
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... it is an affront to the usual concepts of justice that, 13 years
after the events in question, factual material should be denied to
the Court and to the parties because the possibility remains of
criminal charges being laid at some future date. ... I have . . .
attempted to refrain from expressing any view on the propriety of
the conduct of the directors in order to ensure that if they should
be brought to trial on some criminal charge, nothing I say should
hinder them from getting a fair trial (Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd
& Another v Hutcheson & Others (1985) 3 A C L C 263 at 268).

The question of prejudice was also extensively dealt with in a Cambridge-related case,
Cooke v Purcell; Cooke v Whitbread and Others; Attorney-General v Purcell and
Others (1988) 14 N S W L R 51. This was an appeal against an earlier decision that
criminal charges which had been laid against the auditor and directors of Cambridge
be permanently dropped. The appeal was disallowed on the grounds, inter alia, that
the possibility of a fair trial was in doubt due to prejudice arising from the time which
had elapsed since therelevanttransactions had taken place and the laying of charges
some ten years after the collapse of Cambridge. Relevant considerations identified by
the court included fading memories of the respondents and witnesses, the deaths of
one co-accused and some potential witnesses and the fact that some of the
respondents had given evidence in civil proceedings which was n o w to be used against
them in criminal proceedings.

The ASC further argued that the DPP wasted resources by pursuing only a small
number of charges arising from A S C investigations and/or requiring additional
evidence before proceeding with prosecutions (1992d, pplO-11, 1.29-1.34). The
Committee recognised that the problem here was the separation of investigators and
prosecutors particularly when there was no liaison between the two until the
investigation was completed (pl2, 1.35-1.36). The desirability of both investigators
and prosecutors working together from the outset of an investigation was recognised.
However, the separation of the two bodies, in effect, layering, provided "a check on
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over-enthusiastic investigators and prosecutors and protected the rights of the
individual. . ." (ppl2-13, 1.36). The stalemate in the Bond investigation highlights
the difficulties of separating investigators and prosecutors even if there is liaison
between the two.

As noted previously, the investigation into the Bond collapse is now in its fifth year
with no apparent end in sight The investigation is being managed by a committee
comprising representatives from the A S C , the Federal Police and the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions. Members of the legal community are also working
with the committee in a consultative capacity. The investigation team has been
described as "bureaucratic and top heavy" (Williams, 1994b, pi5).

The major

problem flowing from this is lack of agreement as to the scope of the investigation,
charges to be laid and the amount of evidence required to instigate prosecutions
(Williams, 1994a, ppl, 10; 1994b, pl5).

The Federal Attorney-General's solution to problems of this nature was the
establishment of yet another layer in the regulatory process. A National Steering
Committee on Corporate Wrongdoing was established to, inter alia, resolve disputes
between the A S C and the D P P (1992d, Appendix II). The problem with this is that it
will add to the time taken to complete investigations which n o w has legislative and
judicial complications.

Under section 1316 of the Corporations Law, prosecutions for criminal offences
identified within the Act must be undertaken within five years of the relevant event
taking place. At the currentrateof progress, it appears unlikely that prosecutions will
eventuate regardless of the findings of the investigation unless the consent of the
Minister responsible for administration of the

Act (section 80A(2) provides this

definition of "the Minister") is obtained. In other words, even if sufficient evidence is
gathered to support a prosecution, this must be achieved within five years or yet
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another layer of theregulatorysystem must be negotiated to even bring the matter to
court

Even if the five year statute of limitations is waived, the courts may not be prepared to
accept prosecution on the basis of natural justice.

A s already indicated, the

Cambridge Credit case provides evidence of this. Criminal charges involving c o m m o n
law conspiracy to cheat and defraud investors and potential investors, were laid
against three company officers and the auditor of Cambridge in March 1985, some ten
years after the collapse of Cambridge. A permanent stay of proceedings was granted
on appeal to the N e w South Wales Supreme Court (Whitbread & Others v Cooke &
Others; Purcell v Cooke & Others (No 2) (1987) 5 A C L A 305). In coming to its
decision, the court stated that the guilt or innocence of the directors and auditor were
not at issue. The only point to be decided by the court was whether or not the delay
in bringing charges was an abuse of process (p313). Almost two years later, the case
was effectively thrown out of court on the basis that to bring charges after such a
length of time was "harsh and oppressive and an abuse of process" (p327).

c. The ASRB
The A S R B , while perhaps not technically aregulatoryauthority, was also impeded in
its work by lack of statutory mandate. The A S R B was not created by statute but by a
resolution of the Ministerial Council. Its powers and duties were also conferred upon
it byresolutionof the Ministerial Council. A s noted previously, frequent changes in
the composition of the Ministerial Council and others involved in policy decisions
regarding the workings and function of the A S R B led to a lack of continuity in these
areas. The profession was also able to use the ASRB's lack of statutory powers to
impede its activities. A s indicated in Chapter 3, the original intention of the
Ministerial Council was that the A S R B was to have the power to determine priorities
and commission the development of high priority standards for review by the Board.
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The profession questioned the Board's power to commission the development of
accounting standards:

... the questions of whether the Board had these powers became
the source of conflict between the Board andrepresentativesof
the profession, and the question of whether the 'commissioning'
power should be exercised became the subject of some
disagreement within the Board itself (Walker, 1987, p272).

The Australian Securities Commission Act appears to have been designed to eliminate
problems of this nature. Section 224 of the Act establishes the Australian Accounting
Standards Board (replacing the A S R B ) and section 226 confers certain functions and
powers on the Board. These powers include the review of proposed accounting
standards and the sponsorship and development of proposed accounting standards.
The Board m a y also change the form and content of proposed accounting standards.
A s will be discussed in a subsequent section, the success of these provisions will, to a
certain extent depend upon the membership of the Board and its commitment to the
promulgation of impartial and effective accounting standards. This, in turn, will
depend on the ability of Board members to withstand pressure from interest groups.
The Act specifies that members must have knowledge of, or experience in, the fields
of accounting, law or business (section 225(3) but says nothing of any affiliations
members m a y have with interest groups such as the accounting profession or business.
The discussion in Chapter 3 indicates that the A A S B m a y be independent in form
alone as it relies on the A A R F for all research and only accounting standards
emanating from the A A R F have been approved.
4. Lack of Funding
While not directly related to legislation, funding is also an example where the
government may, either intentionally or inadvertently, circumvent its o w n legislation.
If insufficient funds are provided to monitor compliance with or enforcement of
legislation, it becomes little more than an exercise in publicrelationsor deception.
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The government can point to the legislation and claim that it has provided the
necessary measures to protect the public. A s has been pointed out by Charles
Williams, as deputy chairman of the N C S C , legislation is cheap but enforcing it is
another matter (cited by Bowerman, 1990, pi). The question of resources available
to enforce legislation was raised in the 1991 report of the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Australia, 1991c, pp32-33).
During the course of hearings givingrisetothe report, evidence of a lack of resources
for the administration and enforcement of corporate legislation was presented to the
Committee by the Attorney-General's Department and the former chairman of the
N C S C , Henry Bosch (pp32-33). Details of the evidence was not provided in the
report However, the financial press published part of Bosch's evidence in August
1990 (Sculky, 1990, p25). Bosch told the Committee that during 1987 the N C S C
received a constant stream of complaints from shareholders about the activities of
certain companies. The media and the Commission itself also detected a number of
matters worthy of attention by the N C S C . However, due to a lack of resources, the
Commission had only been able to consider about one-tenth of the matters brought to
its attention (p25). The lack of activity by the N C S C was also raised by Tony
Hartnell before the Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities in 1992. Hartnell
claims that when the A S C took over from the N C S C , the press and Australians, in
general, thought the N C S C were actually pursuing a number of "notorious" matters.
According to Hartnell, virtually nothing, in fact, was being done and in some cases,
files had not even been opened (Australia, 1992c p7).

As was evident in some of the quotes from the previous section, funding was also a
problem for the State Corporate Affairs Commissions.

In addition, it has been

disclosed that lack of resources meant that only one third of 1,168 casesreferredto
the N e w South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission in 1975 were pursued. M a n y
of these cases were subsequentiy dropped.

Corporate Affairs Commissions in

Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have
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also complained that lack of resources had forced them to either drop cases or
accumulate substantial backlogs of cases with little prospect of catching up (Grabosky
8c Braithwaite, 1986a, pp24-25). The issue of funding was also raised before the
Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities in the dispute between the
A S C and the D P P . The A S C is required to fund both the cost of investigation and
prosecution. This situation was described by the Committee as "almost designed to
produce hostility" (Australia, 1992d, pll, 1.31). This is evident in the complaints by
the A S C that the D P P oftenrejectsthe evidence gathered or requires more extensive
investigations. O n the other hand, the D P P complained that it was hampered in its
prosecution function by decisions made by the A S C as to the amount of resources to
commit to a particular investigation and prosecution (pplO-11, 1.29-1.32).

Lack of resources was identified as an element in the long delay between the collapse
of Cambridge Credit Corporation and the laying of criminal charges against the
auditor and three directors of the company (Whitbread & Others Cooke & Others;
Purcell v C o o k e & Others (No 2) (1987) 5 A C L C 305 p318). Maxwell J provided
explicit details of the resources required but not supplied to facilitate completion of
the investigation (pp318-321). These included lack of supervision by senior legal staff
of the Corporate Affairs Commission, lack of legal officers, investigators and clerical
staff to conduct the investigation and equipment such as computer and photocopying
facilities. Maxwell J concluded that the delay in commencing criminal proceedings
was unjustified and further stated
... the relevant evidence of the team's activities is . . . that of an
ill-equipped, rudderless ship sailing without a competent master..
. . The team's problems were compounded by the lack of
adequate facilities and the failure of the Commission and the
Government to provide the means by which the preparation of the
Commission's prosecution could have proceeded with due
expedition (p323).
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It would appear that funding is a political tool.

Research by Grabosky and

Braithwaite supports this view. A s evidence, they cite comments from Ministers to
requests by Corporate Affairs Commissions for additional resources such as "[t]he
more resources you have, the more matters you willfindto investigate" (1986a, p25)
and refusals of State treasuries to provide additional funding to support n e w staff
appointments (pi3).

Revelations such as these support the assertion by Parker, Peirson and Ramsay that
lack of funding was one of the factors which could prevent the N C S C from
successfully enforcing compliance with approved accounting standards (1987, p243).
However, they considered that the provisions of section 285 of the Companies Act
(Code) would mitigate this problem in so far as it required auditors to report noncompliance with the Code, including applicable approved accounting standards, to the
A S R B and the N C S C or State Corporate Affairs Offices (1987, p244). The N C S C
would then be able to investigate the matter and if necessary, prosecute offending
parties.

There is evidence, however, to suggest that auditors are not necessarily reporting
breaches of the company law including compliance with approved accounting
standards. In the NCSC's eighth Annual Report, concern was expressed about the
number of both reported and unreported instances of non-compliance with accounting
standards. The N C S C indicated its intention to pursue this matter by, in particular,
reminding auditors of theresponsibilityto shareholders imposed on them by company
law ( N C S C , 1987, p23). Part of this process was a policy statement issued jointly by
the N C S C and A S R B , reminding auditors of their duty to report instances of noncompliance and warning them of the possible consequences of failure to do so. The
policy statement was issued in the wake of an investigation which revealed that
auditors were neither reporting departures from accounting standards nor providing
an opinion on departures (Cooper, 1987, p38). A similar policy statement was issued
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in 1990 after the revelations of the Rothwells' investigation and the failure of the
National Safety Council of Australia. O n issuing this policy statement, the executive
director of the N C S C , D r Arthur M c H u g h , stated that he would be surprised if there
had not been instances of failure to report corporate misdemeanours connected with
some of the large corporate collapses (cited by Pheasant 1990, pi). A s indicated in
the previous chapter, this appears to be the case with Rothwells and the failure of the
auditortoreportConnell's extensive borrowings from Rothwells to Corporate Affairs.
Prosecutions, however, require funding so that even if auditors do report instances of
non-compliance with the law or fraud, it m a y m a k e little difference if the regulatory
agencies are unable, or unwilling, to take any action. In addition, the matter would
still require investigation by the A S C and the agreement of the D P P to initiate a
prosecution. The best that can be hoped is that an investigation m a y be instituted
before therelevantcompany fails.

In 1990, the Federal Budget provided for an increase in regulatory funding of $210
million over the next four years. This represented a 50 per cent increase in funding
(Boyd 1990, p3).

The n e w Australian Securities Commission was to receive $107

million for the first 6 months of operations and $123 million and $137 million
respectively for the following two years. In contrast, Government funding of the
N C S C and State Corporate Affairs Commissions amounted to some $70 million per
annum. These bodies, of course, also generated revenue but this was not necessarily
available forregulatoryactivities (Shanahan, 1990, p86). Given that the collapse of a
single company, Cambridge Credit in 1974,resultedin the loss of between $75 million
and $100 million of investors funds, one wonders whether the increase in funding,
which is supposedly aimed at protecting shareholders, is little more than a "drop in the
bucket". This question becomes very pertinent given the statement m a d e by Gavin
Campbell, group managing director of the Australian Stock Exchange:
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The financial difficulties of some well-known individuals and their
associated companies have caused the loss of at least $5 billion of
shareholders' funds during the past year (1990, p20).

Consideration also needs to be given to the plight of creditors. The collapse of the
National Safety Council of Australia ( N S C A ) is a case in point. It was recently
announced that unsecured creditors of the N S C A were told that they could expect
minimalreturnon the $276 million owed to them (Porter, 1990, p25).

As Bosch has also pointed out, the amount of regulatory funding available from the
government should be compared with the cost of special investigations into
companies activities. For example, the investigations into the Bond Group and
Rothwells have to date cost approximately $1 million and $2 million respectively
(Skulley, 1990, p25). These investigations are still in process and the costs mentioned
do not include the cost of any subsequent legal action.

Following the announcement of the increase in funding to the ASC, its chairman,
Tony Hartnell, stated that enforcement of the law and litigation arising from
investigations into recent instances of contravention of company law would be the
first items on the agenda for the A S C . However, as was indicated above, progress on
these investigations has been slow due to the inexperience of some members of the
A S C and the conflicts with the D P P . A further problem has been the wording of
relevant statutes and accounting standards which m a y be so ambiguous or flexible that
prosecutions m a y not be initiated or proceeded with due to fear of losing them
anyway.
5. Ambiguous & Flexible Legislation & Standards
Legislation and accounting standards m a y be specifically designed to permit noncompliance by making provisions ambiguous or flexible. O f course it is also possible
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that the drafters of the legislation were not able to foresee difficulties with the
provisions or lengths to which theregulatedmight go to avoid the legislation.
1. Legislation
Prime examples of ambiguous and flexible statutory provisions are the accounts, audit
andrelatedprovisions in the former Companies Act (Codes) and the Corporate Law.
The provisions of the Companies Act (Codes) required, inter alia, directors to have
prepared for eachfinancialyear a profit and loss account and balance sheet giving a
true and fair view of the company's profit or loss and state of affairs (section 269(1),
(2) & (3)) and for auditors to express an opinion as to the truth and fairness of the
accounts and other matters covered by section 269 (section 285(3)).

The Act

required compliance with the provisions of the Act, Schedule 7 (now replaced by
Schedule 5) and applicable approved accounting standards (section 269(8),(8A))
unless compliance would not show a true and fair view(section 269(8B)). In other
words, true and fair was a statutory over-ride in that non-compliance with both
standards and the provisions of the Act was permitted if this meant the accounts
provided a true and fair view.

The term "true and fair view" or similar versions such as "true and correct" and "full
and fair", have a long history in terms of application to financial reports. The origin of
these terms is usually taken to be the U K Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 and
1856. However, Chambers (1989) has traced the history to the beginning of the 18th
century where similar terminology was employed in Acts governing both publicly and
privately owned ventures (1989, pp2-3).

In spite of its relatively long history, the term has never been given a statutory
definition. The profession's position, in general, has been that compliance with
accounting standards provided evidence that accounts show a true and fair view.
A P S 1, Conformity with Statements of Accounting Standards, paragraph 1 states:
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The National Councils believe that if there is to be a fair
presentation of an entity's financial position and performance, then
accounting standards must be consistently applied in preparing
financial statements. The National Councils also believe that
application of the Statements of Accounting Standards is
necessary for those entities whose financial statements are
required by Statute or otherwise to give a "true and fair view".

A New South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) Report in 1978 supports
this interpretation by stating that non-compliance with accounting standards is prima
facie evidence that accounts may not show a true and fair view. The courts, however,

while declining to define true and fair have not freely accepted the profession's or the
CAC's interpretation. For example, in CAC v A & T Barton (1977) ACLC 40-343,
Berman SM stated:
. . . each case must be considered on its own merits. Proper
attention must be paid to the opinions of auditors and accountants
but their views are not binding. Pre-determined principles must
b o w to the requirements of the particular case (p29,471).

On the other hand, Berman SM cited with apparent approval another view expressed
by F J O Ryan, then New South Wales Commissioner for Corporate Affairs "... there
are as many 'true and fair' views as there are viewers" (p29,471).

A similar interpretation of the meaning of true and fair in UK legislation was put
forward in 1983 by Hoffman and Arden. As was the case in Australia, the true and
fair view concept in the UK is a statutory override (Hoffman & Arden, 1983, pl54).
According to Hoffman and Arden, however, non-compliance with accounting
standards suggested accounts did not show a true and fair view because what was
true and fair depended upon the expectations of users of financial reports. These
expectations were influenced by past experience "... because by and large they will
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expect to get what they ordinarily get and that in turn will depend upon the normal
practices of accountants" and accounting standards "crystallise professional opinion"
(1983, pl55).

Earlier, Flint offered an interpretation of true and fair based on society's perceptions
which in rum were influenced by perceptions of social morality and ethics (Flint
1979, p490). True and fair was contextual in that what was useful to one group of
users, for example, historical cost, m a y not be useful to another (p489).

These interpretations of "true and fair" are indicative of the uncertainty the term
engenders.

This uncertainty can be seen as a fundamental weakness in the

enforcement of the accounts and audit provision of company legislation. A s Bosch
has observed "[t]he trouble with true and fair is that not only can w e not define it but
w e do not always k n o w w h e n w e are looking at an example" (1987a, p3).

Bosch and at least one other member of the NCSC have alluded to the difficulties
"true and fair" presents when regulators contemplate a prosecution for noncompliance with company legislation and/or accounting standards. Henry Bosch, as
chairman of the N C S C , publicly announced the Commission's intention of finding a
suitable case of creative accounting and bringing legal action against the perpetrators
(Bartholomeusz, 1987, p25). Such a case was found. Bosch described the company's
accounts as being so creative as to be outrageous. However, on seeking legal advice,
the response was very negative and the case was not pursued. Part of the problem
was apparently the fact that the company auditors were one of the then Big Eight
accounting firms. True and fair comes d o w n to a matter of professional judgment and
advisers indicated that it would be very difficult tofirstfindexpert witnesses w h o
would be prepared totestifythat accounts signed as "true and fair" by a member of
the Big Eight did not, in fact, show a "true and fair view". Second, even if such
witnesses were forthcoming, it m a y be difficult to prove to the court that the opinion
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expressed by the N C S C witnesses were superior to those of the auditor of the
accounts (Bosch, 1987a, ppl8-19). The nature of this problem was identified by
Salmon LJ in Odeon Associated Theatres Ltd v Jones (1971) 2 W L R 331:
. . . sometimes there is evidence of two parallel but conflicting
principles of commercial accounting. In such cases the courts
must do the best they can without evidence, or choose between
the conflicting evidence, or decide which is the most appropriate
principle of commercial accounting to adopt (pp336,337).

A former member of the NCSC research staff, Ian Langfield-Smith, has also
suggested that the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of "true and fair" has led
regulators, on legal advice, to institute prosecutions under the general criminal law
rather than the companies legislation because of therelativelygreater certainty of the
outcome (1990, p25). O n the other hand, as Bosch has indicated, the standard of
proof under the criminal law is "beyond reasonable doubt" and when the outcome of a
prosecution is likely to turn on the conflicting evidence of expert witnesses, this
standard m a y be difficulttoachieve (Bosch, 1987a, ppl8-19).

This point of view is not new. In 1977, F J O Ryan used an example which had come
before the N e w South Wales Commission for Corporate Affairs earlier that year to
demonstrate the inadequacies of "true and fair". The matter concerned a company
which had reported a half yearly profit of $81,247.

The auditors, however,

considered the appropriate accounting principles to be applied in the circumstances
would have shown a loss of $1.6 million. Nonetheless, they were unable to prove to
the Commission's satisfaction that the profit of $81,247 was not an honest or
reasonableresult(1977, p560). A s noted by Ryan:
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The principal point of concern is not the disparity of $1.7m
between the twofigures.Rather it is the fact that it arose from the
absence of enforceable and universally accepted standards, so that
in any given case the difference can be open-ended. This leads to
the result that where a contest as to the truth and fairness of
accounts can be m a d e to turn upon a difference of opinion
between directors and auditors as to the appropriate principle to
be applied a prosecution will only succeed in those cases where
no reasonable m a n could possibly have arrived at the same figure
as the directors (1977, p560).

In a bid to overcome the problems outlined above, the Corporations Legislation
Amendment Bill 1991 amended the "true and fair view" requirement. In essence, the
amendment requires the preparers of financial statements to comply with requirements
of the Corporations Law and approved accounting standards and if it is considered

that a true and fair view will not result, additional information is to be provided in t
notes to the accounts (section 297(1), section 298(1) and section 299(1)
respectively). The purpose of this amendment is to reduce
... the scope for some companies to use some dubious
accounting treatments in reliance on the more general, and vaguer,
true and fair test rather than comply with a relevant appropriate
accounting standard (Australia, 1991b, pp4214-4215).

In the inevitable debate over this amendment it was not surprising to find that the
director of the AARF, Warren McGregor, was in favour of the amendment As the
research arm of the AASB, and therefore an integral part of the standard setting
machinery, the AARF would have much to gain from what amounts to the legislation
of accounting standards. The corporate failures discussed in Chapter 4 indicate that
practising accountants and auditors have varying viewpoints as to what are acceptable
accounting methods. Some of the methods used were clearly questionable but others
were supported by the ASA report on corporate failures in the 1960's (ASA, 1966).
Therefore, an argument against the elimination of the true and fair view statutory
override is that accountants may see part of their function being downgraded to
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mechanical application of technical rales with little or at least reduced scope for the
exercise of "professional judgment". Auditors, on the other hand, could perhaps, be
seen to welcome the amendment as it would provide them with a defence in a legal
action. Previously, mere compliance with accepted accounting practices was not
sufficient to constitute a true and fair view. A s Craig and Clarke have observed
"professionalism was traded for protection" (1993, p56, emphasis in original).

However, the true and fair concept is not the only culprit in this area of regulation as
is clearly evident from the decision in C A C v A and T Barton (1977) A C L C 40.343.
This case dealt with charges brought under the Securities Industry Act 1970 and
section 176 of the Crimes Act which, inter alia, makes it an offence for any person to
knowingly m a k e a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular. The
court held that a prima facie case had not been m a d e out under section 176 because
... the difficulties and the honest differences of opinion inherent
in the concepts of 'profit', 'true and fair', and 'ordinarily accepted
accountancy principles'

meant
. . . there was not sufficient cogent evidence to establish that the
profit statement was false (p 129.466)

Clearly, any flexibility inherent in both accounting standards set by the profession and
approved accounting standards promulgated by the A A S B will only serve to diminish
any gains m a d e by the legislative attempts to overcome the difficulties posed by the
lack of definition of true and fair. In this regard, Flint's comments regarding
accounting standards and statutory requirements are particularly pertinent
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Compliance with statutory requirements of disclosure and
presentation and with accounting principles or accounting
standards will not of itself ensure achievement of a true and fair
view unless these requirements, principles or standards have been
well conceived within the context of what are understood to be
the criteria of a true and fair view.
[These requirements, principles or standards] are the means to the
end and not the end itself (1978, p488).

Similar observations apply to the profession's claims to serve the public interest by
developing accounting standards which will facilitate an efficient allocation of
resources. Unless standards are consciously formulated to achieve this, it is unlikely
they will do so except by coincidence. As the following will endeavour to show,
accounting standards are flexible and have the potential to be manipulated to achieve
the view desired by management
2. Accounting Standards
The majority of accounting standards contain what Henderson calls "weasel words"
which allow "accountants to wriggle out of compliance with a standard" (1988, p9).
Weasel words such as "should", "beyond reasonable doubt" and "reasonable
assessment" are justified by the profession on the grounds that not all companies are
the same and therefore accountants must be able to use their "professional judgment"
(1988, p9). Further support for this view is available from Henry Bosch. In an article
in the May 1987 edition of The Chartered Accountant in Australia, Bosch is reported
to have stated:
.. . there are too few (accounting standards) and those that there
are, have too many loopholes and . . . these loopholes are
capitalised upon by the personal interpretation of the accountant
(The Chartered Accountant in Australia, 1987, p46).

Unfortunately, the evidence provided to investigators into the collapse of Reid
Murray Holdings, Cambridge Credit Corporation and Rothwells suggests some
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accountants appear to use their professional judgment somewhat capriciously. While
this obviously brings the profession into disrepute and creates an aura of uncertainty,
it also makes it difficult forregulatorsto "mount a successful prosecution" (LangfieldSmith, 1990, p25).

Flexibility in accounting standards can also lead to what has been termed "creative
accounting". Creative accounting allows a variety of treatments of substantially the
same transaction and thereby allows management to manipulate results to suit
particular purposes. It follows that creative accounting extends not only to failure to
comply with accounting standards but also in their application (Clarke, 1988, p64;
English, 1989, pl5; Clarke and Dean, 1992, pl86). The practice is clearly evident in
Australia as indicated in Chapter 4. This is supported by a research report issued in
1990 by the Australian Bankers Association which sets forth the proposition that
a m o n g the factors contributing to corporate failures, inadequate accounting standards
and low corporate morality figured prominently (1990, pl5).

As indicated above, Henry Bosch, while chairman of the NCSC, launched a campaign
for eradication of creative accounting but with variable success due to the difficulties
inherent in the true and fair view concept. The potential for this difficulty to arise is
still present due to the scope for professional judgment in accounting standards.
While it is not possible to cover the inadequacies of each and every standard, a few
examples of some of the problems which flexible accounting standards can create will
be given.

A prime consideration for the application of a standard to a particular item is
materiality. A A S 5 Materiality in Financial Statements, provides both qualitative and
quantitative guidelines to assist preparers of financial reports to determine whether or
not an item is material and therefore to be included in thefinancialreports (paragraphs
8-12). However, it is clear that the overall criterion is professional judgment in each
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circumstance. There is no approved accounting standard dealing with materiality.
Instead, each A A S B standard contains its o w n materiality provision. The potential
for conflict arises because of the scope for differences of opinion as to what
constitutes a material item. Secondly, and perhaps, more importantly, m a n y standards
allow for choices of accounting methods. A s already indicated, this flexibility and
scope for professional judgment has the potential to m a k e it difficult forregulatorsto
successfully argue that published accounts are misleading.

The previous AAS 20 Foreign Currency Translation, provides a good example. A
detailed history of the foreign currency debate will be provided in the next chapter.
Therefore, only a brief overview of the problems inherent in the standard will be
provided here.

In its original form, AAS 20, allowed companies to either recognise foreign exchange
losses immediately or to defer and amortise them possibly w h e n the foreign currency
translation rate was more favourable. This allowed for the possibility of manipulating
profits and was described by Langfield-Smith as an "extremely creative" accounting
technique (1987, p7). A s the A W A case discussed in Chapter 4 shows, this allowed
the company's foreign exchange dealer to hide losses on foreign currency transactions
but report profits in the financial statements. Bosch also levelled criticism at the
former A A S 20:
Despite the existence of an accounting standard on the subject
there are considerable differences in the w a y in which companies
are treating this matter and substantial sums are involved ...
The effect of all this is to m a k e the concept of profit elastic
(1987a, pp5-6).

The following examples taken from actual financial reports were used to illustrate the
point:
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C o m p a n y H . . . wrote off the bulk of its unrealized foreign
currency losses of $170M. C o m p a n y I appeared to ignore, for the
purposes of c o m m e n t large unfavourable movements which
occurred after the balance date but before the directors signed the
accounts. C o m p a n y J amortized both 'realized and unrealized
gains and losses on long term borrowings'. C o m p a n y K used the
'defer and amortize' approach recommended by the standard and
proudly lists as assets deferred foreign currency losses. This is
surely a perverse use of terminology (1987a, p6).

In September 1987, A A S B

1012 (formerly A S R B

1012): Foreign Currency

Translation, was introduced. A A S B 1012requiresforeign exchange gains and losses
to be accounted for as part of operating profit in the period in which the exchange
rates change. The deferral option is no longer available except in the case of costs
incurred on assets under construction (qualifying assets) and hedge transactions
dealing with the purchase or sale of specific goods or services. A A S 20 was
subsequendy amended to conform with approved accounting standard A A S B 1012.
However, there is still flexibility within both standards which m a y allow holding
companies to manipulate consolidated results. The standards prescribe two methods
for the incorporation of foreign-based operations into the accounts of the holding
company - the temporal method and the current rate method.

Considerable

differences in financial results can occur between these methods. The appropriate
method depends on whether the subsidiary is a self-sustaining operation or an
integrated operation. While guidelines are provided for purposes of identifying selfsustaining operations, there is scope for differences of opinion. A s Langfield-Smith
has stated
... the presence of foreign exchange gains and losses can only be
determined once the benchmark question of integrated or selfsustaining has been answered, a test which seems to allow a
considerable degree of latitude (1987, pl2).

322

Furthermore, even if the distinction between self-sustaining and integrated operations
is correctly applied not all gains or losses resulting from foreign currency translation
will be recognised in the accounts since "... the temporal method . . . excludes the
recognition of potentially significant foreign exchange gains and losses" (1987, pi 2).

Langfield-Smith identified three other areas of the standard which allows options
which may provide scope for "creative" accounting or "abuse" of the relevant
provisions. Briefly, these areas deal with

qualifying assets whereby gains or losses associated with these
assets m a y be used to adjust the cost of the assets;
hedging transactions The standard permits the netting of gains or
losses arising from hedging transactions'. T o the extent that gains
and losses on hedged transactions and hedging transactions cancel
each other out, full disclosure of the impact and possible risk
associated with foreign trade are not made;
branch or subsidiary operations The definition of "foreign
operations" implies that only those reporting entities required to
prepare accounts or groups accounts would be classified as
"foreign operations". Furthermore, the accounts or group
accounts must be prepared in a foreign currency. If these criteria
are not met, it could be argued that translation differences need
not be accounted for (1987, ppl2-15).

Another problem area is provided by AAS 1/AASB 1018 Profit and Loss or Other
Operating Statements which calls for a distinction to be made between operating
profit or loss including abnormal items and extraordinary gains or losses. The NCSC
has found that some companies adopt a selective approach where income from the
sale of capital items is included in operating profit but losses on similar items are
disclosed as extraordinary (Bosch, 1987a, p4).

Given the lack of certainty surrounding the meaning of true and fair view and the

flexibility inherent in accounting standards, it is not unusual to find a lack of judicial
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precedent on these matters or on the accounts provisions of the Companies Act
(Codes). A search of company law cases found no entries dealing with the accounts
provisions, including true and fair view, of the Companies Act (Codes) 1981 and very
few with the legislation's predecessor, the Uniform Companies Act 1961/62. S o m e
eight cases between 1967 and 1982 m a d e mention of true and fair but not necessarily
within the context of the relevant accounts provisions of the legislation. O n e such
case was the previously cited C A C v A and T Barton in which it was stated that the
accepted differences of opinion within the accountancy profession m a d e it impossible
to establish whether or not a particular profit statement was misleading ((1977)
A C L C 40.343 at p29,466).

In light of this decision, even from a Magistrates Court, it is not surprising that advi
to members of the N C S C was to pursue prosecutions under the general criminal law
rather than the Companies Legislation which relies upon the true and fair view
concept. Similarly, given the evidence arising from the special investigations into
Reid Murray Holdings, Cambridge Credit Corporation and Rothwells Ltd and the
conclusions of the investigations that the accounts of these companies were
misleading and did not give a true and fair view, it is surprising that no charges were
laid under the accounts and audit provisions of the company law. O n the other hand,
the lack of criminal prosecutions in such cases provides evidence of the difficulties
inherent in such prosecutions.

Further evidence is provided by Craig and Clarke who argue that the variations
permitted in approved accounting standards give rise to a staggering number of
"acceptable" permutations (1993, p59). In support of this contention, Craig and
Clarke use as an example, a company which must apply twenty approved accounting
standards. The example further assumes, conservatively, that each standard permits
two alternative treatments of particular accounting items. O n this basis, the number
of acceptable accounting outcomes is 1,048,576 (pp59-60). This result is patently
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inconsistent with the sentiments expressed by Vic Prosser as executive director of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia:
The Accounting Standards Board of the AARF is aware of and
committed to the need for a base of consistent logical and
effective accounting standards to aid the standard and uniformity
of financial reporting and the public understanding and use of
financial statements (1983, p91).

The foregoing has attempted to identify some of the problems inherent in company
regulation in Australia. The question that must n o w be addressed is why, after almost
100 years of company regulation of some sort, do these problems still exist? For
example, "true and fair" has had an even longer life-span than company legislation but
its meaning is no closer to being clarified than it was 100 years ago. Flexible
accounting standards or practices have been used to distort or manipulate profits and
other accounting numbers with theresultthat the accounting profession in Australia
has

been discredited since the turn of the century. W h y is there flexibility and

ambiguity in corporate regulation? Answers to questions such as these are difficult to
find because it essentially requires knowing what the individuals involved think. The
best that can be achieved is to draw inferences from actual events and try to analyse
them for cause and effect relationships.

This will be the task of the balance of this chapter. In particular, an analysis of the
power relationships between the regulators and the regulated will be undertaken.
This analysis will draw on experiences of the accountancy profession in Australia, the
U K and the U S A in an effort to demonstrate h o w elements of dissidence and
resistance can threaten hegemonic domination of the regulation of corporate
reporting. W h e r e possible, the profession's responses to such threats and the activities
undertaken to maintain domination will be outlined. It will be argued that the desire
to maintain domination helps explain weaknesses in regulation.
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RESISTANCE, DISSIDENCE AND SYSTEM CLOSURE
Chapter 2 developed a power framework which was used in Chapter 3 to explain how
the accountancy profession achieved hegemonic domination of the regulation of
disclosure in external financial reports. In particular, it was suggested in Chapter 2
that the setting of accounting standards which are binding on members of the
professional accounting associations and preparers of financial reports is an example
of the exercise of power at the episodic agency level of the power framework. It was
further stated that the episodic agency level of the power framework was
characterised by resistance or dissidence which m a y challenge the profession's
exercise of power or control of the obligatory passage points. Thisresistanceor
dissidence will bereflectedin both the dispositional and facilitative power levels of the
framework.

Achieving dispositional power at the level of social integration is contingent upon the
formation of alliances and agency relationships. The formation of professional
associations organised on the altruistic premise of ensuring that practitioners are
highly educated, skilled and ethical has facilitated the profession's achievement of
dispositional power. The promulgation of accounting standards that are proclaimed
to be aimed at achieving an efficient allocation of resources has also been part of this
process in that the profession has effectively set itself up as an agent of the public.
Chapter 4 was aimed at demonstrating the profession's attempted agency relationship
with the public and showing instances where members of the profession had clearly
failed in serving the public interest by the publication of financial reports which did
notresultin an economic allocation of resources. It will be argued in this section of
the study that the underlying causes of the unexpectedness of corporate failures and
losses is in part attributabletodissidence and resistance to the profession's domination
of the determination of appropriate accounting standards and practices.
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Dissidence and resistance m a y arise from both endogenous and exogenous sources
and can weaken alliances and agency relationships established at the level of social
integration because it m a y result in the creation of conflict between the various
elements within a system. Therefore, as the accountancy profession represents only
one element within the regulatory system, it must be mindful of the possibility that the
standards and practices it advocates m a y have an adverse impact on other elements of
the system, in particular, business interests. This adverse impact m a y exist in fact or
be simply perceived. Conflict m a y also arise from within the profession itself. The
long drawn out battle for a Royal Charter detailed in Chapter 3 is an example of
dissidence and resistance within the profession itself. This conflict m a y be resolved
within either the social integration level of the power framework or at the level of
systems integration.

The level of systems integration is the level at which facilitative power or domination
is achieved or, possibly, lost because activities at this level create an institutional order
or change an existing institutional order. For example, if the accountancy profession
fails to "fit in" with the other elements in the regulatory system, it m a y be replaced by
another element such as a government sponsored and controlled standard setting
organisation. This is consistent with the concept of autopoiesis also developed in
Chapter 2.

As discussed in Chapter 2, an autopoietic system is autonomous and is
organisationally closed in that it produces its o w n boundaries, processes and
structures and determines its o w n rales and laws. It is, however, cognitively open
because an autopoietic system must be compatible with its environment In addition
to the need for congruence or structural coupling with its environment there must
also be compatibility between the structures within the autopoietic system. Therefore,
the environment can trigger changes in it but change is determined by the system itself
and is directed only towards the survival of the autopoietic system. It was argued in
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Chapter 2 that accountancy is, at the very least a virtual autopoietic system because it
provides a unique function in the determination of accounting practices but there are
mutual feedback loops between accountancy and other elements in the environment in
which it exists.

This section of the study will identify some instances of resistance and dissidence
which have challenged the profession's position in the institutional order it helped to
create during the course of this century. Dissidence or resistance m a y be both
reactive and proactive. It also m a y be manifested in a variety of ways such as
attempts by another element in theregulatorysystem to encroach upon the exercise of
power by an already dominant group by gaining control of obligatory passage points
or threatening to do so unless the dominant group modifies theregulationit is seeking
to impose. T o demonstrate the forms dissidence or resistance has taken and the
responses the profession has m a d e in order to maintain its position, examples will be
drawn from the experiences of the accountancy profession in Australia, the U S A and
the U K .

It is acknowledged that there are differences in the regulatory systems in Australia,
the U S A and the U K and in therelativeposition of the accountancy profession within
each. Furthermore, some of the examples used and the outcomes of them suggest
that the profession in Australia has been more successful at avoiding or combating
dissidence and resistance than its U S A and U K counterparts. However, it could be
that as an autopoietic system, accountancy in Australia has learned h o w to survive.
Hence, what happens in other environments m a y be communicated to the accountancy
profession in Australia which then reacts in order to avoid or rninimise conflict
between itself and other elements within its o w n environment

Evidence was

provided in Chapter 3 to support the contention that the profession in Australia was
influenced by the activities of accounting professional bodies in the U K .

The

following chapter will provide further evidence of this and also that the experiences of
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the U S A profession, in particular, are relevant to the decisions of the Australian
profession.

This study maintains that the profession's responses to dissidence and resistance are
aimed at the survival of the accountancy profession and its dominance in the standard
setting area of corporate regulation. As noted by Horngren with regard to the
standard setting bodies in the USA
Survival is mankind's primary motivation. Standard-setting bodies
in the private sector have had various useful lives . . . The useful
life of the F A S B is not going to rest on issues of technical
competence. The pivotal issue will be the ability of the board to
resolve conflicts among the various constituencies in a manner
perceived to be acceptable to the ultimate constituent, the 800pound gorilla in the form of the federal government, particularly
theSEC...(1981,pp88-90).

The same comment is applicable to Australian standard setting organisations.
1. Government Interference • the formation of the ASRB
Chapter 3 traced the origins of the accountancy profession in Australia including a
brief history of the standard setting process. A major barrier to the exercise by the
profession of episodic agency power in the form of enforceable accounting standards
was the lack of a statutory mandate. This was achieved with the establishment in
1984 of the ASRB but at the apparent expense of the profession's autonomy. As

discussed in Chapter 3, the profession's preferred option was that statuary backing be
given to standards developed by its research arm, the AARF. However, under
pressure from the New South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission and the NCSC,
the ASRB was intended to be independent of the accountancy profession. The
establishment of the ASRB could be seen, therefore, as a prime example of
government interference in the standard setting arena. Craig and Clarke consider that
the basis of this interference was the Federal Government's desire to ensure its own
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political survival. The accountancy profession was effectively m a d e the scapegoat for
corporate failures on the grounds that it was unable to develop effective selfregulatory standards (1993, p56).

As noted in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, the two major professional
accountancy bodies, the A S C P A and the I C A A , embarked on a series of approaches
to un&rmine and thwart the activities of the A S R B in order to regain domination of
the standard setting process. These included using the ASRB's lack of statutory
authority to tetermine priorities and commission the development of high priority
standards for review by the Board (Walker, 1987, p272). It appears that what the
profession was attempting to do was control the standard setting agenda. Controlling
the agenda could be seen as almost the ability to control the standard setting process
itself. A s Horngren observed with regard to the F A S B :
. . . With social choice being conducted in a multi-period setting,
the agenda is important... the power to control the agenda may
be far more critical to the status and life of the F A S B than the
nature of the technical framework (1981, p90).

The two professional bodies also effectively delayed the approval of accounting
standards by the A S R B .

In June 1985, the president of the ICAA, Bruce Edwards,

lamented the lack of progress of the A S R B stating
Regrettably, due to the complexity and difficulty of the issues
involved, no accounting standards have been approved to date and
indications are that none will be approved in time to be applicable
to financial accounts for the year ending June 30,1985 (1985, p6).

What Edwards did not do was make it clear that the complex and difficult issues were
created by the two professional bodies. O n e of the difficult issues was copyright of
accounting standards promulgated by the A A R F prior to the establishment of the
A S R B . The profession argued for the rights to copyright and, thereby, royalties on
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sales of accounting standards approved by the A S R B (Journalist, 1985, p84; Durie,
1985, p 6; Walker, 1987, p274; 1988, pl8). The Ministerial Council eventually
bowed to pressure from the professional bodies. Copyright to approved standards
remained the property of the A S R B but the professional bodies were given a licence
to the copyright allowing them to benefit from arrangements with publishers to
reproduce the standards (Durie, 1985, p6; Walker, 1987, p275; 1988, pl8).

Even with this issue resolved, the ASRB's problems did not end. The professional
bodies effectively prevented the A S R B approving standards by failing to offer any for
consideration. The final settlement of this issue saw the introduction of what was
termed "fast track" procedures which effectively meant the A S R B rubber-stamped the
standards which had already been issued by the two professional bodies (Walker,
1987, p280; 1988, pl8).

As noted in Chapter 3, the AARF provides the AASB's research base. In addition, in
1988, the professional associations successfully negotiated the merger of the then
A S R B and the Accounting Standards Board of the A A R F on the grounds that such a
merger would facilitate the setting of accounting standards by having only one
standard setting body instead of two ( A S A 8c ICAA, 1993, p43). As aresult,the
membership of the A S R B was increased from seven to nine. The additional members
were to be nominees of the professional associations. Under these arrangements, the
profession nominated four out of nine members of the A S R B . The A A R F would
continue to provide assistance, including research, to the A S R B (p43).

The

profession had successfully negotiated the translation process and had regained the
initiative for determining accounting standards. A s Walker has claimed:
... the accounting bodies have won a victory of sorts, after a
dogged (and somewhat devious) campaign to reduce government
involvement in standard setting.
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It seems a fair guess that the board will be dominated by the
profession (1988, ppl8-19).

In 1991, membership of the ASRB was increased to eleven members and renamed the
Australian Accounting Standards Board ( A A S B ) . The extended membership was
premised on the need to provide greaterrepresentationfrom user groups. Craig and
Clarke argue, however, the standard setting process in Australia is still "a joint
venture between the accounting bodies and the Commonwealth Government" (1993,
p58).

It should be noted, however, that the threat of government interference still exists.
The Australian Securities Commission Act, section 224, established the A A S B and
section 226 conferred certain functions and powers on it. These powers include the
review of proposed accounting standards and the sponsoring and development of
proposed accounting standards. The Board m a y also change the form and content of
accounting standards. The composition of membership of the Board and its research
base remains as outlined above. However, even though the accountancy profession
may be seen to dominate the standard setting process, the Federal Parliament may
disallow standards approved by the A A S B . One example of this was A A S B 1024
Consolidated Accounts that will be discussed in the next section. There is also the
possibility that subsequent legislation m a y alter the present institutional order. Even if
the Government does not make visible inroads into the standard setting process, there
is evidence that it can effectively intrude into determining the content of accounting
standards.
2. Government Interference - Content of Accounting Standards
(i) Inflation Accounting - The UK Experience
The inflation accounting debate in the U K is a prime example of government
intervention in the standard setting process.

In 1968, the I C A E W published
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Accounting for Stewardship in a Period of Inflation which advocated supplementary
financial statements prepared using current purchasing power (CPP) accounting. This
was followed by ED 8 issued in January 1973 by the Accounting Standards Steering
Committee (ASSC) also recommending CPP supplementary statements. ED 8 formed
the basis of what was to have been SSAP 7. However, in July 1973, the government

effectively "pulled the rug out from under the profession" by announcing its intention
to appoint a committee to study the question of inflation accounting. This move was
apparently totally unexpected by the profession:
... the government which had been fully consulted about the
C P P proposals whilst they were being formulated, suddenly
decided to pull the rag out from under the feet of the Accounting
Standards Steering Committee ... (Stamp, 1975, p411)

It is also unclear w h y this step was taken. According to Stamp it was because the
Government had
... become alarmed at the prospect of accountants throughout the
country making detailed measurements of the impact of inflation.
The Government feared that this would upset their deliberately
balanced prices and incomes policy ... (1977, D12)

Similarly, Whittington considers ". . . there was a fear of the possibly explosive
consequences of indexation ... CPP can be regarded as a form of indexation" (1981,
p71).

Whittington also provides evidence of "representations from industry":
... of the companies who commented on ED 8, only one-third
supported C P P and the remaining two-thirds were divided
between replacement cost accounting and other methods and there
were indications that the Government had been lobbied by a
number of companies against the introduction of a C P P standard .
(1981, p71, fn 8, cited from personal correspondence with
Douglas Morpeth).
333

As a consequence of the announcement of what was to become known as the
Sandilands Committee, S S A P 7 was issued as a "provisional" standard in M a y 1974
pending thereportof the Government sponsored committee.

The Sandilands Committee issued its report in 1975 and rejected CPP in favour of
current cost accounting ( C C A ) based on Bonbright's concept of value to the owner.
The report also recommended the establishment by the Accounting Standards
Committee (ASC, formerly the A S S C ) , of a Steering Group to implement the findings
of the Sandilands Committee by 24 December 1977 (Morpeth, 1981, p46). The
Inflation Accounting Steering Group, under the chairmanship of Douglas Morpeth,
was subsequentiy formed and began work in January 1976. The profession was
thereby effectively forced to abandon its preferred C P P accounting and develop an
inflation accounting standard based on C C A . A s Morpeth notes:
The Steering Group and the ASC were thus being asked to
implement a government-sponsored committee report for the
introduction of a new method of accounting to replace historical
cost accounting within an extremely short time span and in the
context that the A S C had few teeth with which to enforce
standards. The initiative had been returned to the profession with
a vengeance, but with express limitations on the choice of method
(1981, p48).

The profession accepted the situation because in Slimming's view it was keen to
introduce some form of inflation accounting and therefore: "[w]e were prepared to
accept less than the whole loaf in order to get something" (1981, p22).

In other words, the profession was prepared to compromise in order to maintain its
position in the standard setting area.
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This compromise led to the issue of S S A P 16 in March 1980, some 2 years later than
envisaged by the Sandilands Committee. However, it appears that the Committee did
not envisage the extent of the profession'sresistanceto C C A .

SSAP 16 was preceded by two exposure drafts, ED 18 and ED 24. ED 18 was issued
in December 1976 but was rejected on the grounds, inter alia, that it was too
permissive and

. . . bringing with it considerable subjectivity and discretion to
directors of a company in the calculation and assessment of what
should be distributable profit and what should be set aside to
reserve for the maintenance of the business (Morpeth, 1981, p51).

It was also criticised because it was "... too complicated, too quick and too costly
implement" (Morpeth, 1981, p52).

The death knell of ED 18 was a special meeting of the ICAEW which, by vote of the
membership, rejected the introduction of any form of compulsory current cost
accounting (Myddleton, 1981, p91).

ED 24 was issued in April 1979. It was apparently considered more acceptable than
E D 18 to all parties concerned and was subsequentlyre-issuedwith little alteration as
S S A P 16 in March 1980 (Morpeth, 1981, pp57-59).

This, however, was not the end of the story. SSAP 16 was, in Whittington's terms,
"an awkward compromise" between two extreme views of inflation accounting, C C A
and CPP. Nonetheless, Whittington, and no doubt others including the A S C , thought
that inflation accounting was permanently ensconced in U K accounting standards.
The Inflation Accounting Steering Group was disbanded following the issue of S S A P
16 (Morpeth, 1981, p59). Whittington considered that
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The introduction of current value into accounting statements
represents a considerable revolution in accounting practice, and,
once this is accomplished it seems unlikely that it will be reversed
(1981, p80).

This prophecy proved to be invalid. SSAP 16 was originally introduced on a trial
basis for three years. During this time, there was substantial non-compliance with it
The fact that the A S C had no powers of enforcement and that the Stock Exchange
failed to impose sanctions on those w h o failed to comply with S S A P 16, would
appear to have facilitated its demise. Auditors eventually declined to qualify their
reports for non-compliance.

In the face of resistance of this nature, work on

improving S S A P 16 was dropped.

S S A P 16 remained in force until March 1985

when it was m a d e non-mandatory (Taylor and Turley, 1986, p87).
(ii) The Profession, The Government & Business - The USA Experience
In the U S A , the Accounting Principles Board (APB), had similar experiences with the
investment tax credit and accounting for business combinations and goodwill. These
experiences provide prime examples of proactiveresistanceand of the influence of
lobby groups on the government which, in turn, can prevent the exercise of episodic
power.

In 1962, legislation was passed in the USA which allowed companies purchasing new
depreciable assets, other than buildings, to reduce their income tax liability by up to 7
per cent of the purchase price of the asset in the year the asset was commissioned.
The objective of the investment tax credit was to provide an incentive to business to
purchase assets other than buildings. Three methods of accounting for the tax savings
were identified. Firstly, it could be taken into account in the year the benefit was
received.

This was k n o w n as the "flow through" method.

Alternatively, the

"deferral" method whereby the credit was spread over the useful life of the asset could
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be used. A third alternative was the "cost reduction" method whereby the cost of the
asset was reduced by an amount equal to the amount of the tax saving. The A P B
opted for a combination of the "cost reduction" and "deferral" methods which was
consistent with the practice of spreading benefits over the useful life of assets and
issued an exposure draft to this effect in November 1962. The Board's position
attracted considerable debate and in Zeff s view was probably the first time that"... a
controversial issue was coloured by public-policy" (1971, pl79). B y the time of its
meeting to m a k e a final decision in December, the Board had received some 594
letters more or less equally divided on the issue (1971, pl79).

Corporate

management four of the Big Eight and the S E C were either directly opposed to the
cost reduction and deferral method or considered the "flowthrough" method to be
equally acceptable. In a lettertothe A P B , the S E C stated:
that any release published at this time should recognize the
propriety of the [flow-through] method of accounting for the
credit This Commission would prefer this method but would
not in appropriate circumstances, take exception to the position
taken in the Board's exposure draft as it relates to the
determination of income (cited by Zeff, 1971, pl79)

In spite of this, the Board maintained its stand and issued APB Opinion No 2 which
prescribed the "deferral method". Three of the Big Eight firms, Price Waterhouse,
Haskins & Sells and Ernst 8c Ernst prompdy made it clear that they would not require
their clients to adopt the deferral method (1971, pi80). Business also successfully
lobbied the S E C which in 1963 issued A S R 96 allowing either the deferral method or
the flow through method of accounting for the investment tax credit on the grounds
that both had "substantial authoritative support" (1971, pl80). This was an attempt
by the Board to exercise episodic agency power by narrowing areas of difference and
take the lead in thinking on unsettled and controversial issues. The actions of the
S E C in releasing A S R 96 effectively thwarted the A P B in its endeavours and forced it

337

to abandon its position. In 1965, the A P B issued A P B Opinion N o 4 which allowed
all three accounting methods.

When the investment tax credit was again introduced in the 1970's, the APB was
effectively precluded from issuing a standard dealing with accounting for the tax
savings by Congress.

Under the 1971 Revenue Act, a particular method of

accounting for the tax saving on the investment tax credit could not be enforced.
According to Miller and Redding this action by Congress was theresultof lobbying
by business interests (1988, p98). Even though the investment tax credit has lapsed,
the provisions of the Revenue Act will continue to prevent the issue of an effective
accounting standard dealing with the tax saving.

The long drawn out debate over the appropriate accounting treatment of business
combinations provides another example ofresistanceto the power of the profession
to ctetermine appropriate accounting treatment of specific issues. This has been
described as "the most time-consuming and extensively discussed problem the A P B
faced" (Wolk, Francis and Tearney, 1989, p64). The controversy spanned some eight
years, from 1963 to 1971, and resulted in a less than satisfactory compromise and was
significant in the decision to institute a review of the process of setting accounting
principles and the subsequent demise of the A P B .

Briloff describes the 1960's as the "Decade of the Twin Congs". The Viet Cong being
one and conglomerates the other. The handling of both causing dissension among
different factions in the community (1972, p59). The debate on accounting for
business combinations centred on pooling of interests as opposed to treating the
transaction as a purchase and amortising any goodwill arising. Pooling of interests
was apparendy preferred by many companies because it allowed them to artificially
inflate their earnings (p65).
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The controversy began in 1963 with the publication of A R S 5, A Critical Study of
Accounting for Business Combinations in which the author concluded that the
pooling of interest method should not be followed. Furthermore, goodwill could be
divided into two parts, one to be amortised and the other to be carried forward
indefinitely. This conclusion was contrary to existing accounting practice. In 1968,
to add to the confusion, A R S 10 Accounting for Goodwill was published which
contended that goodwill was not an asset and should be deducted from shareholders'
equity. These particular accounting problems generated considerable interest not only
from members of the profession and affected corporations but also thefinancialpress,
the S E C , the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Government as evidenced by
the interest of "at least three Congressional committees" (Zeff, 1971, p213). The
debate highlights the very pohtical nature of determining accounting principles and
serves to emphasise the impact of this on the eventual survival of bodies formed for
this purpose. This point wasreadilyapparent in an address by A I C P A Vice President
Leonard Savoie in 1969:
The Accounting Principles Board was bom in crisis and has been
continually beset by crises ... the prospects for Board progress in
the 1970s will be greatly influenced by its response to a current
crisis. This one involves accounting for business combinations
and goodwill (cited by Briloff, 1972, p89).

Savoie let it be known that the Board was considering the issue and expected a draft
to be issued which would abolish the pooling of interests method and prescribe the
amortisation of goodwill. H e further stated:
Anything less than this solution will mean simply a
"repositioning" of the abuses which have become so rampant in
recent years.
... If this solution is not reached, then I predict little progress for
the profession in the development of accounting principles in the
1970s (cited by Briloff, 1972, p89).
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A s subsequent events showed, Savoie's prophecy about the future progress of the
profession was correct in so far as the A P B was concerned. A s indicated by Savoie,
the A P B issued its first draft Opinion under which the pooling of interests method was
to be eliminated and goodwill amortised over a m a x i m u m of 40 years. T w o of the
Big Eight voiced their opposition to the draft outright.

The Federal Trade

Commission agreed with the elimination of the pooling of interests method but not the
amortisation of goodwill. In its view, "... the establishment of goodwill accounts
should be discouraged" (Zeff, 1971, p214). In 1970, the A P B issued yet another draft
Opinion allowing the pooling of interests method to be used in some circumstances
but stillrequiringthe amortisation of goodwill over not longer than 40 years. The
Board was still unable to get the required two-thirds majority to issue afinalOpinion.
Eventually, the A P B came up with a compromise solution. T w o separate Opinions
were issued. Opinion N o 16 dealt with Business Combinations and Opinion N o 17
dealing with Intangible Assets.

This politicised solution was required because,

according to Briloff, the Board needed the vote of one of the larger firms which was
prepared to accept the Business Combination Opinion but not the goodwill issue
(1972, p89).

These examples indicate that in order to maintain episodic agency power it is
necessary to repeat some of the stages of translation so that it is clearly an on-going
process. It also demonstrates that the profession m a y be forced to accept a situation
that it does not consider optimal accounting practice in order to maintain its position
of dominance in the standard setting process. A s Gerboth has noted:
The defeats [of the APB] arose . . . from conflicts with other
powerful interests, w h o acted to ensure that they had strong
voices in formulating accounting rales of consequence to them
(1973, p284).

340

The A P B did not survive the 1970's. Following the debacles of the investment tax
credit and

business combinations and the criticism it attracted over its research

studies, the Board avoided controversial issues and, during its lastfiveyears, did not
undertake any n e w research studies (Moonitz, 1974, pp27-28). It was replaced by the
F A S B as the profession again instituted the phases of the translation process in a bid
to maintain its position. The replacement of the A P B with the F A S B is an example of
bifurcation. Accountancy could not resolve or overcome the elements of resistance
and dissidence that were threatening its domination so a n e w organisation was
created.

(Hi) The Australian Experience
The profession in Australia has not to date, suffered affronts of this significance to its
domination of the standard setting process.

The closest it has c o m e would be the

furore surrounding the issue of S A C 4: Definition and Recognition of the Elements
of Financial Statements. This matter will be discussed in more detail in the context of
conceptual framework projects. Another example which demonstrates the potential
for government interference in the standard setting process is A A S B

1024

Consolidated Accounts.

AASB 1024 was the first Australian accounting standard dealing with consolidation.
W h e n it was issued in December 1990, it was not gazetted. In other words, it did not
have statutory backing. The reason for this being that the definitions of subsidiary,
group of companies and group accounts in the corporations legislation of the time
were inconsistent with the thrust of A A S B 1024. For example, section 266 of the
Companies C o d e permitted a choice in the form of group accounts which could be a
set of consolidated accounts for the entire group, two or more sets of consolidated
accounts for particular members of the group, separate accounts for each company
within the group or a combination of consolidated accounts and individual accounts.
In addition, there were two approaches to the determination of a holding
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company/subsidiary relationship These were based on either ownership or control.
Control was premised on the ability of the holding company to control the board of
directors or more than half of the voting power of the subsidiary. Ownership was
determined by reference to the issued capital. O n e company was considered to be the
subsidiary of another where more than half of the issued share capital was held except
where ownership rights did not extend to a right to participate in a distribution of
capital or profits beyond a specified amount

The solution was determined in favour of the profession's preferred position. The
Corporations L a w was amended so that definitions in relevant accounting standards
apply also to provisions of the Act dealing with consolidated accounts (section 294A
(3)). The provisions of accounting standards in terms of one entity's ability to control
another also apply for purposes of the Act (section 294B(3)). Finally, the Act has
been further amended to be consistent with the standard in terms of what constitutes
an entity. Section 294 A (4) specifies that an entity is
(a) a company
(b) a recognised company
(c) any other corporation
(d) a partnership
(e) an unincorporated body
(f) a person in a capacity as trustee that has only one trustee

The logic of changing the law to be consistent with the standard is readily apparent
from cases such as Cambridge Credit where, as discussed in Chapter 4, the accounts
were successfully manipulated for years by the failure to recognise the relationship
between the parties to transactions.

Hence, even though many of the companies

within the Hutcheson Conglomerate were controlled by and financially dependent on
Cambridge, their accounts were not consolidated with those of Cambridge because
the view taken by management was that consolidation was only necessary where more
than 50 per cent of voting shares were held. In addition, share ownership was
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manipulated by the use of nominee rather than beneficial ownership and the backdating of joint-ownership agreements ( N e w South Wales, 1979, p22,2.10).

The amendments to the legislation were clearly based on a recognition that some
companies were using theflexibilityin the corporations law to manipulate accounts by
not including trusts and partnerships in the preparation of group accounts. Group
accounts, even if prepared for allrelatedparties, did not reveal the extent of intragroup transactions (Australia, 1991a, p2414; b, p3509). Hartnell claimed before the
Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities in 1992, that intracorporate
transactions were a major factor in the corporate failures of the 1980's (1992c, ppl516). It could be argued, therefore, that the government's response was not so much
because the profession possessed superior knowledge or skill but because the
evidence arising from investigation into corporate failures indicated the validity of the
profession's stance.

The subject of equity accounting, however, was not resolved in the profession's
favour. A A S 14 Equity Method of Accounting, was originally issued by the two
professional bodies in July 1983. In its original form, it required equity accounting to
be applied in the preparation of the consolidated accounts of holding companies or the
financial statements of other companies.

However, the N C S C ruled that equity

accounting did not comply with the provisions of the Companies legislation and that it
was not to be included in group accounts other than as supplementary information
( N C S C , 1987, pp23-24).

AAS

14 was subsequently amended to require

supplementary disclosure as prescribed by the N C S C ( A A S 14, paragraph 4;
Appendix 1).

AASB

1016 Disclosure of Information about Investments in

Associated Companies similarly requires the disclosure, in the notes to the accounts,
of financial information about investments in associated companies. This information
is to be prepared using the equity method of accounting ( A A S B 1016, paragraph .03,
Statement of Purpose).
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3. Conceptual F r a m e w o r k Projects

The above provide examples of government interference in the setting of accounting
standards often at the behest of business interests. These examples also demonstrate
dissidence and resistance within the profession. In the face of interference, dissidence
and resistance or its threat the profession has endeavoured to develop a theoretical
core or conceptual framework. Such endeavours can be seen as serving two related
purposes. The first of these purposes is as a defence against interference:

... a coherent theoretical base on which to erect accounting
standards is an essential weapon in the armoury that can defend
accounting from political interference. It m a y not give complete
protection; but it m a y ward off some attacks and lessen the
damage done by others (Solomons, 1983, pi 12).

The second purpose can be seen as an effort to legitimise the profession's dominance
of the standard setting process. For example, in December 1976, the F A S B released
a Discussion M e m o r a n d u m Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and
Reporting Elements of Financial Statements and Their Measurement

in which the

need for a conceptual framework and its purpose were stated:

Perhaps because accounting in general and financial statements in
particular exude an aura of precision and exactitude, m a n y persons
are astonished to learn that a conceptual framework for financial
accounting and reporting has not been articulated authoritatively .
.. ( F A S B , 1976, Preface to Discussion M e m o r a n d u m )

The purpose of a conceptual framework as indicated in the two preceding quotes is
similar to Goldstein's perception of a profession referred to in Chapter 2.
Professionalism implies the existence of an "intellectual core" which facilitates the
monopolisation of a particular area of knowledge as well as the maintenance of the
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"prestigious social niche" a professional group has created for itself (Goldstein, 1984,
pl75).

While perhaps not so explicit the Australian profession have also recognised the
defensive and legitimising benefits of a conceptual framework. For example, ASRB
Release 100 states, inter alia:
The Board is of the view that its decision-making during the
development of Approved Accounting Standards would be
enhanced by the application of an agreed framework of broad
accounting concepts, and that the promulgation of such a
conceptual framework would be of assistance to preparers and
auditors in accounting for those transactions and events which are
not the subject of particular Standards
The conceptual framework will comprise a series of Statements of
Accounting Concepts . . . The Concepts Statements will set out
the general concepts which should be followed in the preparation
and presentation of general purpose financial reports. They will
define the nature, subject purpose and broad content of general
purpose financial reporting. The Concepts Statements will assist
constituents in understanding the broad concepts which govern
the decisions of the Board reflected in proposed Approved
Accounting Standards ( A S R B Release 100, paragraphs 8 and 9).
(i) The USA Experience
The need for a conceptual framework, a theory of accounting or a set of agreed
accounting practices has been recognised from as early as the 1930's. As noted in
Chapter 3, the first efforts were those of the accountancy profession in the USA and
included principles studies by American Accountancy Association (AAA) in 1936 and
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1938 and a
study of accounting standards by Paton and Littleton in 1940. The major purpose of
these studies was to describe existing practice rather than prescribe accounting
practice. An attempt to formulate a prescriptive framework was not made until the
efforts of the APB in the 1960's.
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During its lifetime, the A P B sponsored a number ofresearchprojects but priority was
given to studies of basic postulates and broad principles of accounting. Most of them
did not gain wide acceptance and four attracted substantial criticism.

The first of these studies, The Basic Postulates of Accounting, was undertaken in
1961 by Maurice Moonitz, the then Director of Accounting Research. It was divided
into three sections: the postulates, thefieldof accounting and the imperatives. There
was little response to the study at all which could be construed as indirect support.
However, as the author has stated, the A P B and the profession in general "were
clearly waiting for the research study on 'principles' which appeared in 1962"
(Moonitz, 1974, pi8). In addition, as Zeff explains:
... a study of this sort had few precedents in the accounting
literature . . . m a n y readers, not to exclude the Board, did not
k n o w quite what to m a k e of it. Seldom had accountants
formalized their conceptual schemata in terms of postulates,
whether or notrigorouslyderived (1971, pl74).

The "principles" study, Accounting Research Study No 3, received a somewhat
different reception. It apparently was too far ahead of its time in that it implied that
merchandise inventories, plant and equipment should be disclosed in financial
statements at current values and accounts payable and receivable should be disclosed
at present values. At this point in time, the profession obviously was not prepared to
accept change even though the Special Committee responsible for the formation of
the A P B had implied the need for such change by specifying that the written
expression of generally accepted accounting principles should be "more than a survey
of existing practices" (cited by Moonitz, 1974, pi7). The study was rejected by the
A P B even before it was circulated. A P B Statement N o 1, which appeared as part of
A R S 3 m a d e the APB's view quite clear:
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The Board believes, however, that while these studies [ie., the first
and third research studies] are a valuable contribution to
accounting thinking, they are too radically different from present
generally accepted accounting principles for acceptance at this
time (cited by Moonitz, 1974, pi8).

Moonitz, w h o was co-author of the third study, expressed the view some years later
that the Board had, by its action, made it impossible for its members to use the studies
even in those areas which were in line with accounting practice (1974, pi8). While

recognising that it was difficult to be objective about Studies 1 and 3, Moonitz felt t
APB should not have rejected them out of hand. Rather [fjhe studies should have
been left to circulate for a time, such as a year, to see if they floated or sank (1974,
pl9).
Chambers provided a detailed critique of technical aspects of both the postulates and
principles studies (1964). With regard to the Postulates Study, Chambers considered
the number of postulates too small with the result that there were a number of
"unspecified" postulates underlying the 14 statements presented as postulates:
The things which are represented in accounting statements and the
ways in which they are represented are varied and complex.
Measurement communication and interpretation, preliminary to
action, are all complex, and not self-evident or self-descriptive
operations. The technical names given to events and objects are
numerous and require to be defined within the system they are to
serve. For all these reasons it seems improbable that the number
of postulates (including definitional postulates) will be small.
... It will be apparent that the "postulates" are really complex
statements presuming a series of more fundamental statements
which are not given (1964, p42).

The "postulates" were also shown not to meet the criteria of the nature of postulates:
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... w e are given no indication of the implications of the postulates
presented in the Study. The postulates singly or in various
combinations m a y be expected to yield a variety of conclusions ..
. There is no comparable demonstration in the Postulates or
Principles Studies (1964, p43).

The Principles Study was criticised on various grounds including the failure to provide
an analysis of the needs of users of accounting statements even though the principles
were said to be designed to address these needs. The Study was also criticised for its
vagueness and lack of relationship with the Postulates Study:
The study purports to rest on the Basic Postulates . . . However
the references to the Basic Postulates are so few as to be
negligible, and there is no demonstration of the manner in which
the principles are derived from the postulates (1964, p44).

At a more general level, Chambers saw the studies as a compromise (1964, p53).
This is consistent with the view that in order to achieve agreement, it is often
necessary to accept "second best" solutions. However, as Chambers has stated, this
should not have been the purpose of the studies:
Compromise is essentially a political action, by which conflicting
views are sought to be reconciled. The pursuit of knowledge is an
entirely different operation. At the level of inquiry one does not
want to reconcile conflicting views; one wants to find a way of
understanding things. Conflicting and contradictory views m a y be
held by others about those things, but this should not cloud or
divert the attention of the searcher. The end of inquiry is
explanation, not compromise (1964, p53).

The next attempt to formulate a statement of generally accepted principles was that by
Paul Grady in 1965. Accounting Research Study No 7, Inventory of Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises was one of the longest and
most highly demanded studies undertaken. It does not appear, however, to be what
the APB was looking for. In fact, it was more like what they said was not wanted, "a
survey of existing practice". More than half of it was made up of "reproductions of
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pronouncements on accounting principles and terminology" (Zeff, 1971, pl95).
Moonitz described it as "... a safe and sane, conservative codification of generally
accepted accounting principles" (1974, p21).

A subsequent Special Committee on Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board
called it"... a giant step forward ... a comprehensive statement of the accounting
principles which appear to be generally accepted" (cited by Moonitz, 1974, p21).

Although Study No 7 did not attract the same storm of protest as Studies 1 and 3, it
was, nonetheless, accorded the same treatment by the A P B - it was not adopted.

The next and final, attempt by the APB to fulfil its charge to develop a statement of
generally accepted principles underlying financial statements was A P B Statement N o
4. This statement was theresultof a recommendation of the Special Committee of
the A I C P A . The Special Committee on Opinions of the Accounting Principles was
appointed in 1964 to determine the authority of Board pronouncements and a means
of ensuring compliance with them. Its recommendations included
At the earliest possible time, the Board should:
(a) Set forth its view as to the purpose and limitations of published
financial statements and of the independent auditor's attest
function.
(b) Enumerate and describe the basic concepts to which
accounting principles should be oriented.
(c) State the accounting principles to which practices and
procedures should conform (Report to the Council of the
American Institute of CPA's, as cited by Moonitz, 1974, p21).
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The Committee on the Fundamentals of Financial Accounting was appointed and,
largely using Paul Grady's Inventory' as a base, produced APB Statement No 4 five
years later.

Moonitz described the statement as "... a reasonably good research study ..." (p22).
Other members of the profession were not so complimentary:
This is a masterpiece in double talk on accounting. No document
could be issued that would more aptly qualify for therecenttitle
of a magazine articlerelatingto the effort to improve accounting "Words, Words, Words". This Statement is a 30,000 word
document that can be read only with difficulty and determination.
It is full of meaningless statements, obvious elementary
observations, or plain misleading statements (Address delivered by
Leonard Spacek to the Conference Institute, November 19, 1970,
"The Significance of Recent and Pending Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board", pi6 as cited by Briloff, 1972, p34).

Although indirect the most telling criticism of all, from the APB's point of view, is the

decision to issue the study as a Statement rather than an Opinion. As such ". . . it is
binding on no one for any purpose whatsoever..." (Moonitz, 1974, p22).

The failure of the A P B to produce the profession's long sought after theoretical core
and its experiences with the investment tax credit and business combinations saw it
replaced by the FASB in 1973.

The F A S B continued the search for a theoretical core which it dubbed a "conceptual
framework" and described as
A conceptual framework is a constitution, a coherent system of
interrelated objectives and fundamentals that can lead to
consistent standards and that prescribes the nature, function, and
limits of financial accounting . . . ( F A S B 1976, Preface to
Discussion Memorandum).
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T o date, six Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC'S 1-6) have been
issued:
SFAC
SFAC
SFAC
SFAC
SFAC

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

S F A C 6:

Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises
Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information
Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises
Objectives of Reporting by Non-Business Organizations
Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business
Enterprises
Elements of Financial Statements

Unfortunately, it appears that the goal of developing a conceptual framework will not
be achieved The conceptual framework developed to date has been criticised on the
grounds that it is internally inconsistent (Agrawal, 1987, pl69), riddled with
compromise and inconclusive (Miller, 1985, p51). A major problem appears to be an
apparent lack of agreement or dissidence within the profession, particularly amongst
the members of the F A S B involved in the recognition and measurement phase of the
conceptual framework project. The debate devolved to historical cost versus some
form of inflation accounting (Miller & Redding, 1988, pi 17-119). As in the U K and
Australia, no progress was made on the matter. S F A C 5 does no more than describe
existing practice without providing any guidelines for which should be used or when
alternatives might be adopted (Miller, 1985, p51; Agrawal, 1987, pl68).

SFAC 5 was the last scheduled document in the FASB's conceptual framework
(FASB Status Report, December 31, 1984, p2).

S F A C 6 was essentially a

modification and reissue of S F A C 3 andreallydid not cover any new ground. The
Board has not officially closed the project so the door is still open for further work to
be undertaken. It appears that, as in the U K ,

the question of measurement in

financial statements of business enterprises, is a divisive issue not only within the
profession but for government and the business community. As will be discussed
later, the profession in Australia has yet to address this issue in its conceptual
framework project. Its o w n experience in gaining acceptance of research and inflation
accounting can be seen as a reason for avoiding the measurement issue.
351

In 1977, Taylor stated:
The profession identified the central financial accounting problem
as "the need to narrow the areas of inconsistency in financial
statement reporting practices" as early as the 1930's and the
solution is still being sought today. Various approaches to
accounting theory have emerged over the years, but none have
gained deliberate widespread adoption because consensus within
the profession as to the appropriate approach has never been
reached (1977a, ppl9-20).

Taylor then went on to examine some of the different approaches to the developmen

of accounting theory including the inductive, deductive and objectives approaches

An extension of the objectives approach, the objectives-standards approach was us

by Kenley and Staubus in a study of objectives of accounting undertaken on behalf

the Accounting Research Foundation. Taylor criticised the study on the ground tha

appeared to be "two separate, unrelated studies" (1977a, p21). The primary object
of financial reporting was "disclosure of all information necessary to provide a
and fair view". However, the "true and fair view" concept was then rejected as
"unrealistic" and "impracticable" and replaced with the objective to provide
information useful in decision-making but no elaboration of the type of decision
what purpose was made (1977a, p21). The study was never applied in the
formulation of accounting standards.
(ii) The Australian Experience

(a) Measurement Models
A similar fate befell the Accounting Standards Review Committee under the
chairmanship of Professor Ray Chambers. The Committee was appointed in
November 1977 by the New South Wales Government to undertake a study of
Australian accounting standards. The effect of its recommendations was to reject
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existing standards and those then under consideration and replace them with standards
based on current cost accounting using exit prices. In other words, standards should
be based on Chambers' inflation accounting model, Continuously Contemporary
Accounting or CoCoA. In the introduction of an article highly critical of both the
Report and of CoCoA, Booth and Lyons stated:
It is perhaps unique in the field of accounting, where
procrastination is almost a revered principle, that this Committee
was able to absorb, reflect upon and reject current accounting
standards and exposure drafts; to carry out or examine the
empirical research aimed at determining the needs of users of
reports; to determine the function of accounting reports in relation
to these users; to gain a succinct appreciation of the intention of
the legislature as expressed in the Companies Act; to state a
precise definition of "true and fair" and to suggest a general
accounting standard in respect of both companies and groups of
companies - all within a period of six months and without any
differences in opinion (1979, pl5).

Their conclusion was equally biting:
If the Attorney-General in New South Wales wishes to make a
serious attempt to improve the standards of corporate reporting in
the State, any committee entrusted with the responsibility of
reviewing the current situation and of recommending changes in
current legislative and professional requirements should at least
represent the major parties with interests that are affected by
corporate reports (1979, p21).

In response to such criticism, it is possible to say that there is also no evidence to
suggest that a committee drawn from interested parties will achieve a workable
solution. In fact, the evidence would contradict this. While not given in rebuttal of
the above comments, Chambers' views regarding the work of committees is relevant:
A committee is unable, by its nature, freely to engage and
disengage from its immediate attention particular clusters of ideas
in the search for worthwhile conclusions...

... a committee has not one mind. It has many minds. . . each
member will have his o w n set of ideas in the back of his mind,
waiting to be drawn upon, and each will tend to value his o w n
ideas differently from those of other members... Committees .. .
tend to brush aside evidence; or, when evidence is adduced, each
member can be depended upon to meet specific evidence with
specific counter-evidence since each member is concerned more
with the impact of bis o w n specific experience on himself than
with the general import of his experience and the experience of
others (1976, pp5-6).

Chambers' committee comprised three people with similar backgrounds which may
account for the speed with which it produced its report. Chambers also had vast
accounting experience and knowledge of accounting theory. It could also be said
that committees, the membership of which is intended to represent a cross-section of
views, will face the obstacles to agreement outlined above and the following :
... there is no evidence to the effect that any of these gestures of
co-operation for collaboration have brought the different groups
closer to the clarification, rationalization or integration of
accounting principles (p9)

A s has been suggested already, the outcome of co-operation and collaboration has
often been compromise which should not be the end result of enquiry (Chambers,
1964, p53).

Chambers* study was not Australia's only excursion into the inflation accounting
debate. The editorial notes appearing in the Guidance Notes on Statement of
Accounting Practice SAP 1 Current Cost Accounting provide a listing of

investigations and studies which clearly indicates an extensive Australian interest in

the area of accounting for changing price levels. Some six bulletins, papers or theory
monographs issued by the Society or the AARF between 1968 and 1985 are listed. A
series of exposure drafts is also listed beginning with ''Preliminary Exposure Draft"
ED 7 Accounting for Changes in the Purchasing Power of Money in 1974 and
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culrninating in the issue of S A P 1 in November 1983. A Working Guide to S A P 1
was issued in 1984.

It is apparent from the title of the 1974 ED 7 and that of SAP 1 that there was a
change in the preferred method of accounting for inflation from current purchasing
power to current cost accounting. According to the editorial note to S A P 1, this
change in stance was as aresultof responses to E D 7. In June 1975, E D 9 A Method
of Current Value Accounting was issued. It m a y be coincidence, but the timing of the
issue of E D 7 and its replacement with E D 9, is consistent with the release and
subsequent withdrawal of the proposed U K statement prescribing current purchasing
power.

Apart from amendments to pagination, page numbers and the introduction in 1989,
there have been no significant changes to S A P 1. There has been no apparent m o v e
to give S A P 1 standard status and its application remains optional. A n introductory
note to S A P 1 states:
To advance the adoption of improved accounting methods to cope
with the effect of changing prices, the accounting bodies strongly
recommend that from the date of issuance of this Statement, all
entities publish C C Afinancialstatements on a basis supplementary
to conventional financial statements (Institute of Chartered
Accountants in Australia and Australian Society of Certified
Practising Accountants, 1989).

The question of the acceptability of SAP 1 is clearly evident in that it has not been
included in the Australian conceptual framework. In fact, the issue of measurement
has, to date, been skirted. This is clearly evident in early statements by the A S R B
dealing with the criteria for evaluating accounting standards and the assumptions
underlying those criteria and the failure of the A A R F to publish the research
monograph dealing with measurement
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In 1985, the A S R B issued Release 100: Criteria for the Evaluation of Accounting
Standards. This statement included nine assumptions underlying these criteria. A
tenth assumption was added with the issue of A S R B Release 101: Evaluation of
Accounting Standards - Assumption 10: Application of Measurement Procedures. In
Release 101, the Board recognised the contentious nature of measurement and
valuation procedures and stated that it did not intend attempting to deal with the issue
at that time (paragraph 7). Instead, the Board expressed the view that the valuation
process was not an end in itself but was directed towards providing useful information
to users of financial statements. The appropriate method of valuation could vary
depending on the particular organisation, its market setting at a given time and the
decisions faced by users or potential users of the financial statements (paragraph 6).
The tenth assumption set forth in Release 101 did not prescribe any particular
measurement or valuation method. It simply stated that valuation methods should be
applied to individual assets and liabilities as opposed to overall groupings of items and
that such methods were not aimed at valuing the business (or businesses) carried on
by the entity (paragraphs 10 and 11).

This result is not surprising given some of the submissions received by both the ASRB
and the A A R F . The conflicting views expressed make it clear that the issue of current
cost or value accounting is as contentious here as in the U S A and the U K .

One

submission to the A S R B considered the present modified historical cost based system
to be inadequate for "informed decision making". Another expressed the view that
current cost accounting had the potential to provide misinformation and confusion
and should have a low priority unless it was to be adopted for taxation purposes. In a
submission to the A A R F on recognition criteria, opposition to accounting for assets
based on "valuations" was expressed as it represented a "significant change".
Therefore, the matter should be subjected to extensive discussion.
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The approach adopted by the A A R F in developing its concepts statements has been to
initially sponsor the publication of a monograph on the topic of a proposed concept
statement

This procedure was followed with the A A R F s measurement project.

However, it appears that there is some area of contention in the monograph,
Measurement in Accounting. The author has stated that the A A R F was so impressed
with it, they failed to publish it (Warrell, 1989).

To date, no further progress on the measurement aspect of the conceptual framework
has beenreportedby the A A R F . This m a y be because the framework itself provides a
further example of dissidence within the profession.
(a) The Australian Conceptual Framework
In February 1984, the newly created A S R B issued Release 400 which gave rise to the
initial version of Release 100: Criteria for the Evaluation of Accounting Standards.
Release 400 called for submissions, amongst other things, for suggestions in relation
to the development of a conceptual framework.

The number of submissions received was not large but was in excess of 50 and range
from the very brieftodetailed opinions.

In general, support was expressed for the idea of a conceptual framework although,
in the U S A in the 1930's and 40's, many considered that such a project would be time
consuming and the review and approval of standards should not be delayed.
Therefore, suggestions were also made that either the Board adopt the FASB's
conceptual framework when completed or support the project then being undertaken
by the A A R F . Concern was also expressed about the cost and potential benefits of
such a project in light of the lack of support the FASB's efforts were receiving.
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Comments were also m a d e about the appropriate basis of such a framework. For
example, one submission suggested that a "decision-oriented" framework such as the
FASB's was like chasing moonbeams because "it will never achieve a set of defensible
boundaries within which operational definitions can be usefully framed".

In

retrospect this view could well be valid given that the F A S B has been unable to gain
acceptance of its conceptual framework. If the basis of the conceptual framework is
not accepted or is defective in some way, then this will flow through the rest of the
project A s will be discussed shortly, it has also been suggested that the A A R F s
conceptual framework, which is also based on decision-usefulness, has been criticised
for being based on too broad an objective.

The political nature of standard setting and the development of a conceptual
framework were also identified.

O n e submission agreed with the need for a

conceptual framework to simplify standard setting and help ensure that standards
were logical and consistent both within themselves and as a group However, if an
agreed conceptual framework could be developed, it would no longer be needed
because "... the major arguments would be over, the battles would be w o n or lost".

This could well be the reason why agreement on a conceptual framework is so
difficult to achieve because it could mean there m a y no longer be a need for an
accountancy profession.
communication.

A n autopoietic system survives by conversation and

If agreement on a conceptual framework could be achieved,

conversation and communication in accounting would no longer be necessary.
Survival of accountancy could, therefore, be seen to be contingent on the balance of
the above quote
This may be acceptable if there were just two groups of
contestants, each quite sure of the issues. Instead w e have more
like 2 2 ill-defined groups of contestants, many of w h o m do not
understand full where the battle is, let alone what it isreallyabout.

358

Apart from a partial conceptual framework issued as part of Release 100, the A S R B
has not developed a conceptual framework. Part of the explanation for this could be
that the A S R B was not given its o w n research facilities. The A A R F provided its
research base. Therefore, it is logical that the conceptual framework of the A A R F has
continuedratherthan an A S R B project.

To date the AARFs conceptual framework consists of a series of Statements of
Accounting Concepts (SACs): S A C 1 Definition of the Reporting Entity, S A C 2
Objective of General

Purpose

Financial Reporting, S A C

3 Qualitative

Characteristics of Financial Information and S A C 4 Definition and Recognition of
the Elements of Financial Statements. These S A C s originated from a series of
exposure drafts dealing with the objectives of financial reporting (ED 42A),
qualitative characteristics of financial information (ED 42 B ) , definition and
recognition of assets (ED 42C), definition and recognition of liabilities (ED 42D),
definition of equity, revenue and expenses (ED 4 6 A & B reissued as E D 5 1 A
Definition of Equity and E D 5 IB Definition and Recognition of Expenses).

Each of these exposure drafts contained an invitation to interested parties to comme
on them. A s with the submissions the A S R B received with regard to the conceptual
framework project the comments received by the A A R F contain some interesting
insights into attitudes toward some potentially contentious issues and suggest that this
conceptual framework may be as futile as the FASB's effort in terms of gaining
acceptance. For example, one submission stated:
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I accept that there is a need for clarification of fundamental
concepts used in accounting standards. It would be risky,
however, to believe that such concepts are so fundamental as to
be independent of the standards to be based on them. Indeed,
m a n y of the concepts are preconceptions of a particular time,
culture and political standpoint based on some sweeping
assertions.

Others considered that the objective was too broad:
Decisions that the owners make as a result of the information they
receive will affect the allocation of scarce resources, but this does
not m e a n that the objective of the financial report should be to
provide information to all users that is useful for making and
evaluating decisions on such allocations.

O n a technical note, the N C S C submission considered that the definitions of assets
and liabilities could lead to creative accounting:
We are concerned that the definition of "probable" in paragraph
34 in the Assets Statement and 24 in LiabUities could provide
scope for "creative accounting" by permitting both the omission of
items which should be included, and the inclusion of some items
which are overvalued.

The most contentious of the concepts statements has been S A C 4 which was issued
by the AASB and the PSASB in March 1992. The objectives of SAC 4 as outlined in
paragraph 6 are:
... to establish definitions of the elements of financial statements
and to specify criteria for their recognition in financial statements
that are consistent with the objective of general purpose financial
reporting.

W o r k on this Statement extended over at least five years with the issue of E D 4 2 C
and ED 42D in December 1987. In spite of this lengthy gestation period and the
opportunity for public comment and debate on some five exposure drafts, SAC 4 was
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greeted with a hail of protest from the business community.

The derogatory

comments directed at S A C 4 werereminiscentof those made about the FASB's S F A C
5. For example, the general manager corporate and director of one Australian
company slated S A C 4 as

Confusing, internally inconsistent lacking practicality and a threat
to the publicreputationof the accounting profession in Australia
(cited by C P A News, April, 1993, pi).

Section 226 of the Australian Securities Commission Act specifies the functions of
A A S B . These functions include the development of a conceptual framework. This
framework is stated to be " . . . for the purpose of evaluating proposed A A S B
standards". A s noted previously, while the A A S B conceptual framework project has
not proceeded, the A A R F project has and, presumably, it is expected to be used for
the purpose detailed in the Australian Securities Commission Act. This givesriseto
one of the complaints regarding S A C 4 and that is that the definitions in S A C 4
conflict with some existing accounting standards and practices (Sims, 1992;
Shanahan, 1992; Stevenson, 1992a, 1992b; C P A News, April, 1993; Lonergan,
1993).

Furthermore, APS 1 - Conformity with Statements of Accounting Concepts and
Accounting Standards makes the application of the concepts set out in S A C s
mandatory for members of the two professional bodies except where there is a
conflict with an accounting standard (paragraph 9). The mandatory status of S A C 4
was also criticised ( C P A N e w s , 1993, pi).

Whatever the merits of SAC 4 or the validity of the claims against it, the furore
has been most effective. W h e nfirstreleased,S A C 4 was to be effective from 1
January 1994 ( S A C 4, Editorial Note, 1993, pl23).

In response to mounting

criticism, the A A S B has deferred the operative date to 30 June 1995 (SAC 4,
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Editorial Note, 1994, p57). In addition, in July 1993, the two professional bodies
announced the withdrawal of the mandatory status of S A C s .

The backlash to SAC 4 could not be said to be the result of some haphazard thought
processes on the part of the A A R F . A s indicated above, the development of the
statement involved the issue for public comment of a number of exposure drafts and
was at least five years in process. The explanation for the deferral of the operative
date of the statement and the withdrawal of the mandatory status of S A C s generally
can only be described as a defence measure on the part of the profession aimed at
restoring compatibility between it and business interests within its environment
Persistence with criteria not acceptable to these interests could ultimately lead to
destruction of the profession's hegemonic domination of accounting. Furthermore,
sending S A C 4 back to the drawing board, so to speak, achieves two other purposes.
First it provides the profession with more scope for conversation and communication
until the recognition criteria are established, if ever. Second, it means that tackling
the measurement question has been delayed once again.

The extended gestation period for the development of SAC 4 and its temporary
withdrawal for further consideration is not unusual and is attributable to what is
termed, due process. Like the conceptual framework, due process can be seen to
serve as both defence and legitimising strategies.

4. Due Process
In 1985, Henry Bosch criticised Australia's paucity of accounting standards stating
Under the present system and at the present rate of progress it
m a y be reasonable to fear that w e will not have a comprehensive
set of enforceable Australian standards until early in the 21st
century (1985, p20).
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Bosch compared Australia's progress with that of the F A S B which was established in
1973 and by 1985 had produced some 83 standards (1985, pl9). Australia's standard
setting history began just one year after that of the F A S B but had only 18 standards to
its credit by 1985. Bosch further added that it had taken the A S R B 19 months to
approve two standards (1985, p20). In Bosch's view, the cause of much of Australia's
delay in developing standards was aresultof the due process procedures adopted by
the A A R F which meant that more than three years often elapsed before a proposed
standard was submitted to the A S R B for detailed consideration (1985, p22). Bosch
described the standards resulting from this process as "rather loose" and questioned
the necessity for such extensive exposure when major legislation was sometimes
passed on the basis of a single exposure (1985, p23). In making the comparison of
the A S R B with the F A S B , Bosch did not take into consideration the fact that the
F A S B had a full time staff to work on such matters. Nonetheless, the criticisms over
the length of time taken to issue standards or concept statements are asrelevanttoday
as they were in 1985. S A C 4 istestamentto the length of time taken by the A A R F to
produce a concepts statement only to have it rejected by the business community.

The due process procedures outlined by Bosch are essentially the same as those in
place today. These procedures include the preparation of a discussion paper, draft
exposure draft and general exposure draft The exposure drafts are subjected to
selective and general distribution for comment and are amended on the basis of
submissions received before being circulated again for further comment. The existing
procedures also allow for both public and private hearings at which interested parties
m a y put their point of view. Even after the A A S B considers the standard or concepts
statement should be approved, the National Councils of the A S C P A and the I C A A ,
the Federal Attorney-General and the A S C have 30 days within which to make
comment. The proposed standard or concepts statement may be amended again on
the basis of such comment. Finally, approved accounting standards must be tabled in
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Federal Parliament which m a y disallow the standard ( P S A S B & A A S B , 1993, Policy
Statement 1, paragraphs 21-34).

While due process may be seen as detracting from the profession's autonomy in
determining accounting standards and practices, it is argued here that due process is
essential to maintaining the profession's hegemonic domination of this aspect of
regulation. Achieving hegemonic domination of the obligatory passage points
requires the formation of alliances and agency relationships. Since accounting
standards prescribe and, in some cases, proscribe, the accounting methods to be used
in the preparation of financial statements, it is reasonable to expect that both preparers
and users of financial statements will have an interest in the determination of those
methods. If all parties are in agreement, the process is straight forward. However,
such consensus is unlikely. Not only is there the possibility of conflict between
groups but also within groups. A s Gerboth puts it
In common with other essentially political activities, accounting
rule-making must overcome as its chief obstacle not the
inscrutability of nature, but rather the conflict between interest
groups (1973, p479).

In addition, a standard setting body cannot be perceived as consistently serving the
interests of one particular group. If this occurs, the legitimacy of its activities will be
questioned and it m a y ultimately lose its position in the regulatory system.

A

perception that the A P B was dominated by the audit section of the profession, and,
thereby, their clients, was one of the reasons for its demise (Bums, 1974, pl9, p84,
pp90-94). Gibson argues that such a perception also existed in Australia prior to the
joint establishment by the I C A A and the A S C P A of the A A R F (1980, pi50).

Due

process is a w a y in which standard setters m a y be seen to consider the views of all
those with an interest in accounting standards. For example, Miller and Redding
define due process as
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... the steps used to assure that an administrative matter is given
the careful consideration necessary to adequately protect the
interests of those involved (1988, p56).

Similarly, Rahman considers due process to be an integral feature of a democracy
(1991, p28). In addition to the need to be seen as considering all points of view, due
process procedures also appear to have arisen as a result of the recognition that
accounting standards can have economic consequences. Zeff describes economic
consequences as

... the impact of accounting reports on the decision-making
behavior of business, government unions, investors and creditors .
. . theresultingbehavior of these individuals and groups could be
detrimental to the interests of other affected parties . . .
accounting standard setters must take into consideration these
allegedly detrimental consequences w h e n deciding on accounting
questions (1978, p56).

Benston and Krasney divide economic consequences into direct and indirect effects
(1978, ppl62-164). Direct effects arise from items such as taxes and accounting
requirements which have a direct impact on the allocation of resources (1978, ppl62163). Indirect effects flow from the manner in which items are reported and do not
directly affect cash flow but may have an impact on the way in which a particular
company is perceived (1978, pl63). As will be discussed in the chapters dealing with
the foreign currency standard, one reason offered against the temporal method of
accounting for the translation of the financial statements of foreign subsidiaries was
the mandatory recognition in the profit and loss account of translation gains and
losses. It was argued that recognition of gains and losses as incurred caused wide

fluctuations in reported profits. Over time, these fluctuations were cancelled out, but
companies were still concerned at the short term volatility of income patterns. The
result being that accounting standards in the UK, USA and Australia all provide for a
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choice between the current rate method, which allows translation gains and losses to
be taken toreserves,and the temporal method.

This result is not surprising given that earlier experience showed that powerful
interest groups could effectively use arguments that rales determined by the
accountancy profession were contrary to government policy to thwart particular
accounting standards. The experience of the A P B with the investment tax credit is a
case in point It could well be argued that government interference in this issue was
justified on the grounds of the public interest A s Savoie put it
Businessmen and professional accounts (sic) went directly to
Congressmen with the story that the A P B was trying to remove an
economic incentive granted by Congress. N o amount of
accounting logic about matching costs and revenues could
overcome this economic argument and legislative challenge (1974,
p325).

Economic consequences were also implicit in the decision of the UK government to
appoint the Sandilands Committee to study the question of inflation accounting on the
eve of the issue of a profession-sponsored standard requiring the use of current
purchasing power in the preparation of financial statements. According to Stamp, the
government was fearful of the effects which detailed measurement of inflation in the
accounts of companies might have on their prices and incomes policy (1977, D12).

DISSIDENCE, RESISTANCE & SURVIVAL
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 accountants have used their claim to specialised
knowledge and skill which is to be used in the public interest to help them achieve
hegemonic domination of the determination of accounting standards and practices.
However, if it could be argued that the rales determined by them were not in the
public interest, for example, where compliance with such rules could be perceived as
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having adverse economic impacts on companies or the economy, then there would be
grounds to vest the standard setting process in another group Therefore, it could be
argued that due process serves not only to legitimise the profession's domination but
to preserve it In other words, due process is a survival strategy.

It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that an autopoietic system does not exist in a vacuum
Its survival depends on its ability to be compatible with other elements within its
environment

In the regulatory environment this means that ability, skill and

knowledge are necessary but not sufficient There must also be acceptance by the
business community and other elements within theregulatoryenvironment of the rales
imposed by accountancy. For example, it has been suggested that the replacement of
the A P B with the F A S B was not due to any "structural deficiencies" but to resistance
to its proposed rules:
Some of the APB's opponents were not satisfied with defeating
the A P B on business combinations. They precipitated meetings
which resulted in formation of the Wheat Committee early in
1971. In so doing, their determination to bring d o w n the structure
rather than submit to a professional pronouncement was apparent
(Savoie, 1974, p325).

Gerboth takes this further and suggests that the demise of the APB was attributable,
in part at least toresistance,on the part of "powerful interest groups", to its control
of the standard setting process and that it was threatening to succeed in imposing
rales determined by it on those interest groups (1973, p481).

The role of due process as a survival strategy is obvious. Chambers is quite open
about the nature of such activities and describes them as "bargaining exercises":

367

The whole business of receiving submissions, holding hearings,
issuing exposure drafts and tentative statements is a process of
polling opinions to see just h o w far it is possible to go, or just h o w
little it is necessary to do, in any specific, critical setting. It is a
means of getting the greatest satisfaction (the least disturbance of
the accounting status quo - in technique or prestige) for a given
sacrifice (1976, pp258-259).

Standard setting, and the development of accounting concepts upon which standards
are based, is clearly both a technical and political process and while Bosch appeared
to imply that due process procedures such as these should not be followed, they have
effectively become institutionalised.

Section 226(l)(d) of the Australian Securities

Commission Actrequiresthe A A S B
to engage in such public consultation as may be necessary to
decide whether or not it should make a proposed accounting
standard.

The Act does not prescribe the nature or extent of such public consultation. This has
been left to the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board of the Australian
Accounting Research Foundation ( P S A S B ) and the A A S B which have further
institutionalised the procedures outlined above in Policy Statement 1.

The

Development of Statements ofAccounting Concepts and Accounting Standards which
was issued in 1993. Policy Statement 1 has effectively extended the due process
procedures outlined above by the inclusion in the standard and concept setting
process of a " ... broadly-constituted Consultative Group to increase the involvement
of various interested groups in the standard-setting process" ( P S A S B and A A S B ,
1993, paragraph 16). T h e procedures prescribed in Policy Statement 1 are essentially
the same as those adopted by overseas standard-setting organisations (1993, Preface).

The removal of the mandatory status of SACs and the outcome of the APB's battles
over the investment tax credit and business combinations appear to suggest that
standard setters are more susceptible to the wishes of business than of others with an
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apparent interest in accounting standards. A s already noted, both the A P B and the
Australian profession prior to the formation of the A A R F were considered to be
dominated by the audit section of the profession. However, as will be discussed
shortly, there is no evidence to support the contention that business interests
consciouslyreceivemore consideration by standard setters. It is possible, however,
mat business interests carry more weight in due process procedures by default

One explanation can be found in the idea of isomorphism discussed in Chapter 2. In
discussing claims that the A P B was not independent, Horngren agreed that this was
possible but not in any conscious manner. Accountancy firms have many clients.
Over the years members of these firms discuss accounting issues with clients and
other members of the firm w h o also have spoken with clients. In this way, view
points are influenced and should a member of an accountancy firm be appointed to a
standard setting board, this view point in turn, is likely to influence any resulting
standard (Burns, 1974, pp94-95).

A second reason is that larger business firms have been found to be more likely to
lodge submissions in response to exposure drafts of proposed accounting standards.
This was verified by theresultsof Australian studies published in 1985 (Coombs &
Stokes), 1986 (Morris) and 1989 (Gavens, Carnegie & Gibson). These studies also
verified that standard setters are sensitive to views expressed in submissions as
evidenced by those views beingreflectedin subsequent accounting standards. There
was, however, no evidence to suggest that Australian standard setters issued
standards which favoured any particular industry group (Coombs & Stokes, 1985,
p44). A s pointed out in the 1985 and 1986 studies, only formal, written submissions
were included in the analyses. Other forms of lobbying such as public or private
meetings or phone calls were not included (Coombs & Stokes, 1985, p44; Morris,
1986, p48). The implication of this is that standards m a y be biased in favour of those
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companies which are sufficiently organised to lodge formal submissions dealing with
proposed accounting standards.

Such results are consistent with the concepts of power and autopoiesis adopted for
purposes of this study. A diffusion model of power would argue that the standard
setters b o w to pressure from big business because they have the power to ensure a
particular view point is adhered to. The circuits of power framework, however,
argues that the exercise of power through the promulgation of accounting standards is
theresultof the formation of alliances and agencyrelationships.Maintaining control
of the standard setting process, that is, survival, requires standard setters to consider
the impact of rales on those w h o must comply with them. If only certain members of
the regulatory system convey their views to the standard setters, then clearly, only
those views are likely to be taken into consideration in the development of accounting
standards.

In addition, due process, whether formal or informal, can be offered as reason for the
flexibility inherent in accounting standards. In order to have accounting standards
accepted by parties w h o feel they m a y be affected by them, it is often necessary for
the standard setter to promulgate standards which represent a compromise position
rather than one that is seen as being best accounting practice.

The inflation

accounting debate and the furore over S A C 4 are evidence of this. It will be shown in
the next chapter that pressure from business resulted in the foreign currency
accounting standard allowing two methods of translating the financial statements of
foreign subsidiaries and the effective watering d o w n of the ban of the deferral and
amortisation of translation gains and losses on the financing of non-monetary assets.

The purpose of this chapter was to identify some of the weaknesses inherent in the
Australian regulatory system and provide an underlying explanation for those
weaknesses. These weaknesses included Australian federalism which prevented the
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establishment of Federal corporate legislation for almost ninety years; frequent
changes in legislation; lack of authority and funding of regulatory bodies and
ambiguous and flexible legislation and standards.

This study maintains that the

weaknesses in the regulatory system identified in this chapter are the result of the
desire of those w h o have achieved hegemonic domination of particular areas of that
system to maintain their position. The experiences of the accountancy profession in
the U S A , the U K and Australia provide evidence to support this.

These experiences show that in some instances, there has been resistance to the
profession's exercise of episodic agency power in the promulgation of accounting
standards and concepts to be used in the preparation of external financial reports.
There has also been dissidence both from within the profession and from external
sources such as government Dissidence from government sources appears to have
been in response to lobby groups which suggests that the government

also

endeavours to use its available resources to form alliances and agencyrelationshipsin
order to maintain its dominant position. The actions of the U K government with
regard to the inflation accounting issue demonstrates its ability to protect itself from
the possible consequences of public documents which show the impact of inflation on
companies and, thereby, the economy. The inflation debates in the U K , the U S A and
Australia, the investment tax credit accounting for business combinations fiascos in
the U S A and the conceptual framework projects in the U S A and Australia also
provide evidence of dissidence within the profession itself.
dissidence is particularly damaging because achieving

Such endogenous

alliances and agency

relationshipsrequireseffective organisation. Therefore, it is not only necessary for
the profession to compromise in order to have its rales accepted, it must also
compromise to achieve compatibility within its o w n structure.

The next chapter will undertake a detailed examination of the development of the
foreign currency translation standard in order to provide a comprehensive example of
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the political nature of standard setting and the impact this has on the resulting
standards.
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DOMINATION, AUTOPOIESIS AND REGULATORY FAILURE:
THE ACCOUNTANCY CONNECTION

VOLUME THREE

CHAPTER 6
ACCOUNTING FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY
TRANSLATION

This chapter will undertake a detailed examination of the accounting for foreign
currency debate and the development of the accounting standard dealing with this
issue. Increases in foreign trade and foreign investment coupled with the floating of
m a n y of the world's currencies provided the profession with an opportunity to justify
its domination of the standard setting process. A n opportunity was also provided for
the profession to exercise episodic agency power by the promulgation of an
accounting standard prescribing the translation methods to be used in accounting for
foreign currency transactions, in the translation of the financial statements of foreign
subsidiaries and the treatment of translation gains and losses. O n the other hand,
dissidence within the profession arising from disputes over appropriate accounting
methods and treatments and resistance by business interests to the profession's
proposed solutions to accounting for foreign currency translation and fluctuations,
had the potential to put its domination in jeopardy. T o safeguard domination, the
profession was put in a position of compromising its principles and then finding a w a y
to justify its actions. In terms of the circuits of power, the expansion of foreign trade
and investment and activities in the foreign m o n e y market changed the environment in
which m a n y corporations operated. A s evidence from the Australian financial press
will demonstrate, the n e w environment and its impact provided scope for
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manipulation of financial statements.

This, in turn, attracted criticism of the

accountancy profession (eg. Peirpont, 1977; Staunton, 1978; Bosch, 1985).

The response of the profession, in general, was to attempt to establish the most
appropriate method(s) of accounting for the effects of this n e w environment In the
U S A , the F A S B issued F A S B 8 Accounting for the Translation of Foreign Currency
Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements (hereafter referred to as
F A S B 8), which effectively removed all flexibility in foreign currency accounting.
Australia and Canada subsequendy followed suit with exposure drafts that closely
followed the F A S B standard. However, there has beenresistanceto the profession's
solution:
The former profusion of methods so useful to managements but so
confusing to analysts, has given way to a single method which
n o w infuriates many managements (Editorial Commentary, 1976,
p9).

There was also dissidence within the profession on the issue. For example, in 1972
two profession-sponsored research projects dealing with accounting for foreign
currency translation m a d e totally different

recommendations.

Furthermore,

accounting standards and exposure drafts issued between 1973 and 1988 showed
marked differences of opinion and changes in opinion in relatively short spaces of
time.

The F A S B , for example, issued two entirely different foreign currency

standards in the space of five years. A s discussion of the events leading to the issue of
the second standard in 1981 will show, this was not surprising. At the same time, it
shows the profession's willingness to compromise between what it sees as sound
accounting practice and having its accounting standards accepted by those w h o are
bound by them.

This is particularly so given the stated objective of each statement

was rejected in the other. The same situation prevailed with exposure drafts and
standards issued in Australia between 1973 and 1987.

374

The question that must be asked and answered is was this about face due to the
perception by the F A S B that it had m a d e an error in its first standard and the second
standard corrected it or was it that the F A S B bowed to pressure and permitted
flexibility, albeit on a reduced scale. Accounting standard setters in other countries,
including Australia, followed the lead of the F A S B which raises the same question in
regard to them. It is intended to show that pressure from the business community, in
particular, was the primary cause for the FASB's change of stance and adoption of
that same stance by other western accountancy bodies including the Australian. In
this sense, the foreign currency issue is a classic example of the workings of the
circuits of power and autopoiesis models. The profession rated survival higher than
principle.

The purpose of this chapter initially is to outline:

1. the nature of the accounting problems arising from an increase in both
foreign trade and investment in foreign corporations

2. alternative methods proposed for accounting for foreign currency
translation including weaknesses in the various methods as identified in
the media, professional journals, profession sponsored studies,
exposure drafts and accounting standards

3. the profession's response to perceived weaknesses in accounting for
foreign currency translation in the form of accounting practice notes,
exposure drafts, accounting standards and revisions to them.

This section of the study demonstrates the political nature of accounting standard
setting and explains w h y flexible methods of accounting for the translation of foreign
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subsidiary accounts and for gains and losses on foreign currency loans has been
advocated. For this purpose, m u c h of the first part of the chapter will be essentially a
review of profession-sponsored studies undertaken in the U S A and Canada, journal
articles and newspaper reports dealing with appropriate methods of accounting for
foreign currency translation and the impact of foreign currency fluctuations and
accounting methods on firms and their management It is acknowledged that m u c h of
this review represents ground that has already been well covered in the literature.
However, the use of this material is justified on the grounds that it shows the
development of a discourse on accounting for foreign currency translation and the
extremely contentious nature of the issue. The use of studies, newspaper reports and
articles from not only Australia but from other countries is also justified on the basis
that the approach to the foreign currency issue adopted by the Australian standard
setters was influenced by what had occurred in other countries and in the U S A in
particular. O n e need only look at progressreportson Australian accounting standards
in issues of Australian professional journals in the early 1980's (eg. Stevenson, 1980,
plO; Pound, 1983, p 20; Stevenson, 1983b, pl8) where it was repeatedly stated that
work on the foreign currency standard had been suspended pending the outcome of
deliberations on the matter in other countries.

For this reason, heavy reliance is placed in this chapter on the USA experience up to
the issue of F A S B 52. The U S A has been selected in preference to the U K because
the F A S B was the first standard setting body to attempt to impose a single method of
accounting for foreign currency translation. Furthermore, a broad focus is justified
because accounting for foreign currency translation is, by its nature, a world-wide
problem. The growth of multinationals has meant that it is very difficult for the
standard setters in one country to totally ignore the views of standard setters in other
countries. Accounting methods prescribed in a country m a y influence investment and
financing decisions by companies in other countries. There has also been a m o v e
towards harmonisation of accounting standards throughout the world.

Australian
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accounting standards also include a section stating whether the standard is consistent
with comparable International Accounting Standards. Australia's reliance on

accounting standard setters in other parts of the world is exemplified in the followin
The Foundation has deferred the issuance of a standard subject to
action being taken by the U S , U K and Canada, as foreign currency
is one area where it would be highly desirable to have international
uniformity. Following the release in December last year of a
standard by the F A S B and an exposure draftreleasedby the U K in
October, the Foundation has proceeded to prepare a first draft of
a proposed Statement of Accounting Standards (Stevenson, 1982,
pll).

It is, therefore, considered appropriate to draw on a wide selection of literature
dealing with foreign currency rather than a narrow Australian focus.

At a practical level, while Australia issued one of the first accounting exposure draf
dealing with foreign currency accounting, the major studies dealing with selection of
appropriate foreign currency accounting methods were conducted in the USA and
Canada. In light of the attention directed to the impact of foreign currency
fluctuations on Australian companies during the 1970's (evidence of this will be

provided from newspaper reports) it is somewhat surprising to find so little attention
given to the issue in professional publications. As Chambers commented in 1983:
Accounting for foreign operations, balances and interests does not
seem to have attracted as m u c h attention as the scale of
international business suggests it deserves (1983, pl4).

Once the arguments for and against the major methods of accounting for foreign

currency translation have been outlined, the events which led to the eventual adoption
of two methods within one standard will be discussed. The focus of the discussion
initially will be the USA and the replacement of FASB 8 (which eliminated all
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flexibility) with F A S B 52 (which allowed a choice of accounting methods). The
FASB's rationale behind adopting a flexible approach will be questioned by reference
to FASB-sponsored studies which demonstrated that F A S B 8 did not have significant
adverse economic consequences for firms adopting its provisions. Given that research
in general did not support industry claims that the application of F A S B 8 would cause
income volatility and adversely affect share prices andreturns,the FASB's decision to
change the standard can only be explained as a compromise arrived at to avoid further
conflict between standard setters and business interests.

The promulgation of the Australian standard and its various amendments will then be
examined in light of the FASB's experience and also by reference to submissions on
proposed accounting standards or revisions to existing standards received from
industry and other interested parties. The analysis of submissions is not intended to
provide irrefutable evidence that the views expressed therein had a substantial impact
on the decisions of standard setters in response to exposure drafts. Submissions are
only one form of lobbying activity. Nonetheless, analysis of submissions is considered
useful because it provides some evidence of views held by those with an interest in a
particular accounting standard. Furthermore, the analysis undertaken for purposes of
this study does provide some evidence to support the research discussed in the
previous chapter that standard setters are responsive to submissions received in
response to exposure drafts of proposed accounting standards. Responses to the
1973 and 1979 exposure drafts have not been analysed. Prior to 1979, responses to
exposure drafts were confidential and are not available for public scrutiny. The
responses to die 1979 exposure draft have been archived and are notreadilyavailable
for examination. For this reason, secondary sources have been used. In addition,
following the withdrawal of F A S B 8, the Australian profession announced its
intention to suspend its o w n work on a foreign currency standard pending the
outcome of further investigation in other countries (eg. Stevenson, 1980, plO; 1982,
pll). This would suggest the responses to the 1979 exposure draft were not a
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consideration in the standard setters' decision to amend the requirements in the
proposed standard.

The flexibility inherent in the present foreign currency standard will also be examine
from the perspective of regulators w h o have argued that flexible, vague and
ambiguous accounting standards make their lot very difficult in terms of prosecution
for the publication of misleading financial statements. Specificreferencewill be made
to A W A Ltd v Daniels (1992) 7 A C S R 759. In this case there was no suggestion of
deliberate publication of misleading financial statements. The case is used in the
context of demonstrating the need for executive management to possess a high level
of knowledge of foreign exchangeriskmanagement and theresultof failure to ensure
mat foreign exchange managers also have this knowledge and are stricdy supervised.
It also shows the result of the lack of an accounting standard dealing with speculative
dealings in foreign currencies. A n issue not yet addressed in an Australian accounting
standard.

The technical merit of the various methods of accounting for foreign currency
translation will not be an issue other than to show the extent of disagreement within
the profession itself and between the standard setting bodies and the business
community as to what is the appropriate method of accounting for foreign currency
translation. The overall analysis of the foreign currency debate will be undertaken
within the power and autopoiesis frameworks developed in Chapter 2.

NATURE AND SOURCE OF THE FOREIGN CURRENCY PROBLEM
Accounting problems associated with foreign currency translation fall essentially
under two headings: foreign trade (including international financing arrangements)
and foreign investment
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The immediate problem arising from foreign trade is that there is no unique
international currency. In general, countries have their o w n currency which is not
readily negotiable in other countries. Therefore, a corporation m a y be required to
convert units of its o w n currency into that of another country for purposes of settling
a transaction. If settlement has not been m a d e at balance date, there is the additional
problem of determining the appropriate measurement of assets or liabilities arising
from the transaction. If settlement of the transaction is to be in the domestic
currency, this does not present a problem. However, if the transaction is expressed in
terms of a foreign currency, a means of translating the measurement to the domestic
currency must be determined. There are two reasons for this. First, using two
currencies in one set of financial statements would be meaningless. Secondly, it is not
unusual for company regulation to require the domestic currency to be used in the
preparation of external financial reports. For example, in Australia Schedule 5 Part 1
4(2) (Regulations to the Corporations Act) states: "In accounts and consolidated
accounts all amounts must be expressed in Australian currency".

A similar problem arises with foreign investment when a parent company/subsidiary
relationship exists. However, the situation is even more complex because, in order to
prepare consolidated accounts, all of the financial statements of the subsidiary have to
bere-statedin terms of the domestic currency of the parent company.

The solution to the purchase or sale of goods and services is not difficult The
exchange rate prevailing at the time of settlement determines the consideration to be
paid or received. The more complex issues arise when determining h o w to account
for differences in the exchange rates between the time the transaction takes place and
settlement. Should any gain or loss be included in the calculation of profit or loss for
the year? Should it be taken to a reserve? Should any gain or loss on foreign debt be
taken into consideration in determining the book value of an asset acquired with the
proceeds of the loan? The question becomes even more pertinent and complex when
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settlement has not taken place at balance date. H o w should the asset or liability be
valued in the balance sheet and, as the gain or loss on exchange has not yet been
realised, h o w should it be accounted for particularly w h e n exchange rates are likely to
change again before settlement? Similar problems arise when adjusting the accounts
of foreign subsidiaries to the domestic currency of the holding company for purposes
of consolidation. The problem of accounting for unrealised exchange gains and losses
is potentially even greater in this situation than in that of international trade because
n o w the exchange problem is not confined to a small number of transactions but to all
profit and loss and balance sheet items.

While there is still some debate on the matter (eg. Chambers (1983) who advocates
using exit prices for assets and liabilities in the same manner as his proposed C o C o A
model; Clarke (1977) w h o outlines arguments for and against the use of purchasing
power parities for translation procedures and Lorensen (1972) w h o also oudines
proposals to use a "constructed rate approach" based on an index of changes in the
general price level) in general, it has been accepted that foreign currency exchange
rates should be used to account for international transactions and to translate profit
and loss account and balance sheet items of foreign subsidiaries to the domestic
currency of the parent company. However, there is less agreement on what the
appropriate rate should be or h o w gains or losses arising on translation should be
accounted for. Herein lies the real problem with the translation of foreign currency
transactions and foreign currency financial statements as the selection of exchange
rate and treatment of translation gains and losses can have a significant impact on the
reported earnings and financial position of a company. Quite often, gains and losses
and assets and liabilities arising from foreign currency translation and reported in
financial statements, have little connection with operations and arise purely from the
translation method adopted. Flexibility in accounting for foreign currency translation,
therefore, provides ample scope for manipulation of financial statements. Parkinson
states the problem as follows:
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The combination of . . . choices for translating asset and liability
accounts, together with a degree offlexibilitywithin each choice,
coupled with a wide choice for disposing of translation gains and
losses, produces an almost infinite range for computing and
recording the exchange gains and losses appearing in published
statements (1972, p97).

The volatile nature of foreign exchange markets resulting from the decision to float
the major world currencies in the late 1960's early 1970's added a n e w and difficult
dimension to company management with the result that the management of many
companies m a d e m a x i m u m use of the various methods and combination of methods
available to account for foreign currency movements.

TRANSLATION METHODS
Four methods of translation of foreign currency financial statements based on foreign
currency exchange rates have been identified either as being used in practice or as
recommended by professional bodies.

This is not to suggest that companies

necessarily select one translation method to the exclusion of other methods. It is not
u n c o m m o n to find a combination of the following approaches being used in practice
either n o w or in the past:

current/non-current classification
monetary/non-monetary classification
current rate (also referred to as closing rate)
temporal method

A number of methods of accounting for foreign currency gains and losses have also
been either recommended or found to be used in practice, for example, the Australian
exposure drafts, Translation of Amounts

in Foreign Currencies issued in 1973
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(hereafterreferredto as E D 1973) and Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions
and Foreign Currency Financial Statements in the Context of Historical Cost
Accounting issued in 1979 (hereafterreferredto as E D 1979), identified 5 alternative
methods of accounting for translation gains and losses (paragraphs 17 and 13
respectively). For purposes of this study, consideration will be given to the following
on the basis that these methods have been the most c o m m o n methods used in
practice:

immediate recognition in the profit and loss account
defer and amortise
transfer to reserve

The first three of the four translation methods listed above were used in practice to
varying degrees prior to the adoption by the A I C P A of the temporal method which
was developed as a result of A I C P A
Operations of US Companies

Research Study N o 12 Reporting Foreign

in US Dollars which was published in 1972. A brief

description and history of each translation method and the accounting treatment of
translation gains and losses will be given followed by an analysis of the accounting
standards dealing with foreign currency translation. The purpose of detailing the
major translation methods and treatment of gains and losses is to demonstrate both
the diversity of accounting practice adopted overtime and the diversity of views as to
appropriate accounting practices within the profession itself.

This diversity

contributes to the contentious nature of the foreign currency debate and provides a
basis for the view that resolution of the issue will not be founded on technical merit
but on expediency.
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1. Current/Non-Current M e t h o d

This approach applies the current exchange rate (that is, the rate prevailing at balance
date) to all current assets and liabilities and the historic rate to all other assets and
liabilities.

This method has the longest history of the four approaches under

consideration. It was described by Lorensen as "traditional", having been oudined
and recommended in an A I C P A report, Foreign Exchange Losses issued in 1931
(1972, p6).

In areport,Memorandum

on Accounting for Foreign Exchange Gains,

in A I C P A Bulletin 117 issued in 1934, the method was again recommended. These
recommendations were essentially repeated in Accounting Research Bulletin N o 4
Foreign Operations and Foreign Exchange

issued in 1939; the Committee on

Accounting Procedures' Accounting Research Bulletin 43, Revision and Restatement
of Accounting Research Bulletins (1953) and A P B Opinion 6, Status of Accounting
Research Bulletins (1965) (Lorensen, 1972, pp6-7).
Devaluation

- Institute Recommendation

The I C A E W ' s Accounting for

on Accounting

Treatment of

Major

Changes in the Sterling Parity of Overseas Currencies (1968) also argued that it was
an acceptable method of foreign currency translation (Henderson & Peirson, 1988,
p722). However, it is no longer recommended by any standard-setting body (p697).

The major criticism of this approach is that it effectively revalues current items in
balance sheet due to changes in the exchange rates rather than changes in economic
conditions or in the items affected. T w o areas in particular, long term debt and
inventory, have been the focus of criticism.

Long term debt, being a non-current item, would be valued at balance date at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time the debt was incurred. If the exchange rate rises,
the debt will be undervalued at balance date because the amount that would have to
be paid to settle the debt at that date would be the foreign currency value of the debt
times the current exchange rate. The rationale for this argument lies in the fact that
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the debt represents an obligation to pay a fixed number of foreign currency units
regardless of the foreign currency exchange rate.

The arguments regarding inventory valuations are similar. In other words, because
inventory is a current item, it would be translated at the exchange rate current at
balance date. A n y change in the exchange rate between time of purchase and balance
date would bereflectedin a change in the recorded measurement of inventory. This is
a contradiction of the historical cost concept and does not provide a meaningful
measurement of the value of inventory in the financial statements as it does not
represent the acquisition cost of the inventory, its replacement price or its selling
price. The resulting measurement of both long term debt and inventory cannot be
explained in terms other than as the multiplication of two unrelated numbers.

A further criticism offered by Lorensen is that the current/non-current classification
assets and liabilities does not provide a theoretical basis for the application of
particular exchange rates because translation is for measurement purposes rather than
for classification of items disclosed in financial statements (1972, p32).
2. Monetary/Non-Monetary Method
This approach prescribes the current rate for monetary items, for example, cash,
accountsreceivable,accounts payable and debentures and the historical rate for nonmonetary items including inventory and most non-current assets. The monetary/nonmonetary distinction is based on the idea that monetary items are fixed to the
obligation to pay or the right to receive a specified "number of foreign currency units"
whereas the value of non-monetary items will vary with exchange rates.

While this method has never been prescribed by a standard setting body, it has
received some support from the profession.

For example, Baxter and Y a m e y
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described the monetary/non-monetary method in 1951 and stated that "any properly
primed examinee" could "rattle" off the rules for consolidating branch returns when
the exchange rate was not excessively unstable (1951, pi 17).
credits the method's comprehensive development and

Lorensen, however,

refinement

to Samual

Hepworth (Reporting Foreign Operations, 1956) and the National Association of
Accountants ( N A A ) (Research Report, N o 36, Management

Accounting Problems in

Foreign Operations, 1960) (1972, pp7, 33). According to Lorensen, at the time the
N A A report was released, most companies used the current/non-current method.
However, the N A A report precipitated a trend away from the current/non-current
method in favour of the monetary/non-monetary method. B y 1972, companies used a
mixture of methods including a combination of the current/non-current and
monetary/non-monetary methods (p7).

The arguments used to justify this method are similar to those used in support of the
current purchasing power model for inflation accounting, that is, the purchasing
power is the relevant measure. Therefore, current and non-current monetary items
should reflect the purchasing power in terms of the domestic currency after
translation. In other words, if a foreign currency is revalued upwards, the domestic
equivalent of the foreign currency will increase because the foreign currency will n o w
purchase more of the domestic currency. If a company's foreign currency monetary
assets exceed foreign currency monetary liabilities, a foreign currency gain will result
O n the other hand, net borrowers will record a loss because the domestic equivalent
of both monetary assets and liabilities will increase when a relevant foreign currency
increases relative to the domestic currency.

The opposite will occur with a

devaluation.

Non-monetary items and shareholders' equity, however, are not fixed monetary
amounts. Their value will vary with changes in exchange rates. For this reason, the
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monetary/non-monetary method requires translation to be based on the exchange rates
prevailing at the time items are recorded or revalued in the company's books.

While using it as the basis of the temporal method, Lorensen rejected the
monetary/non-monetary method on the grounds that "... a comprehensive principle
of translation cannot be derived solely from the monetary/non-monetary distinction"
(p33).

There are two reasons for this view. First, assets and liabilities may have both
monetary and non-monetary characteristics. S o m e marketable securities carry a
contractual right to a fixed amount of money on maturity which makes them
monetary items. However, these securities can also be traded on the open market
where prices tend to vary over time and mis makes them non-monetary items. A
decision has to be m a d e as to which characteristic isrelevantfor reporting purposes
before the appropriate exchange rate can be selected and applied. This gives rise to
Lorensen's second objection to the monetary/non-monetary method
. . . The developers of the monetary-non monetary method have
implied that non monetary items are measured solely on the basis
of historical cost (p34)

While historical cost may be the most commonly used method of measuring financial
statement items, it is no longer the only method. Accounting has long recognised the
lower of cost and net realisable value measurement of inventories (for example, A A S
2 & A A S B 1019 - Measurement and Presentation of Inventories in the Context of the
Historical Cost System) and therevaluationof depreciable assets to the lower of cost
and recoverable amount ( A A S 10 & A A S B 1010 - Accounting for the Revaluation of
Non-Current Assets). Other proposed measurement methods include replacement
cost (Edwards & Bell) and current exit price (Chambers). Unless pure historical cost
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is used in the preparation of the foreign subsidiaries financial statements, the
monetary/non-monetary method is not appropriate.
3. Current Rate Method

Under the pure form of this approach, all balance sheet and profit and loss items a
translated at the exchange rate prevailing at balance date. A variation of this method
(which has been adopted for purposes of accounting standards in Australia and
elsewhere) translates assets and liabilities at the exchange rate current at balance date;
owners' equity and revenue and expense items are translated at historical rates.

This method has received substantial support from the profession over time. For
example, E D 1973 advocated the use of the current rate method on the basis that it
was "relevant... to the users of. . . financial statements of an Australian company"
(paragraph 13). W h y the current rate method was considered to be more relevant
than the current/non-current approach or the monetary/non-monetary approach which
the exposure draft identified as the other main methods used in practice, was not
really explained. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) also
recommended the adoption of the current rate method on the basis of a research
study, Translation of Foreign Currencies (1972), sponsored by the C I C A .

The

conclusions of the study seemed to be based more on pragmatics than on sound
accounting practice. In the Preface to the study, its author, R M Parkinson, states
that while the conclusions of the study were not in accord with what was then current
accounting practices in Canada, they were justified on the basis that the majority of
companies in the United Kingdom and the United States of America used the current
rate method (Preface, 1972).

Flower contends that this is the prime reason for

acceptance of the method in other countries, too (1981, p306). Similarly, the current
rate method appears to have been adopted in Australia on pragmatic grounds.
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A study of the top 100 Australian companies at 30 June 1982 revealed that 69 per
cent had foreign subsidiaries. It is interesting to note, that of the 69 per cent with
foreign subsidiaries, 83 per cent used the current rate method (Wise & Wise, 1985,
pl6, citing Kanga). At a practical level, advocating the use of a particular accounting
method on the basis of its widespread use can be dangerous. The Royal Mail Case
[1932] 1 K B 442 provides evidence that a widely accepted accounting practice will
not necessarily be recognised by the courts as sound. While professional opinion and
accepted practices provide guidelines to the courts, the ultimate decision as to the
appropriateness of accounting practices lies with the courts (Pacific Acceptance
Corporation v Forsyth and Others (1970) 92 W N ( N S W ) 29; U S v Simon (1969);
Escott v Bar Chris Construction Corp (1968)).

At a pohtical level, the profession's

acceptance of an accounting method on the basis of its extensive use in practice could
be seen as a means of avoiding conflict andresistanceboth within the profession and
from corporations which m a y be required to adopt an alternative accounting practice.
This issue will be returned to later in the chapter.

Other arguments in favour of the current rate method include its ease of use and
understanding; preservation in the group accounts of therelationshipsbetween items
in the financial statements of the subsidiary; and that this methodreflectsthe holding
company's net investment in the foreign subsidiary (Flower, 1981 p307; Henderson &
Peirson, 1988, p699; Wise & Wise, 1985, pi6). The validity of these claims have
been questioned.

The claim that the current rate method is easy to understand has shortcomings. As a
starting point, the claim seems unsubstantiated by empirical evidence. Research into
users of financial statements and their information needs in general are not difficult to
find but research on this specific area is not apparent. In addition, it has been argued
that while the current rate m a y be simple to understand in the sense that the same
exchange rate is used for all financial statement items which has the additional
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advantage that therelationshipsbetween financial statement items are maintained on
translation, the result defies understanding (Storey, 1972 pl07; Flower, 1981 p307;
Wise & Wise, 1985, pl6) . In other words, it is meaningless other than as the product
of two unrelated numbers. A s Storey further elaborates
Multiplying the historical cost of a machine ... by a current
exchange rate that differs from the rate at date of acquisition
produces a number that is not historical cost in dollars . . .
replacement price ... sales price . . . N o r is it any other measure
of cost or value in dollars ... it cannot be added to the dollar cost
of domestic machines to obtain a number that m a y validly be
called a total acquisition cost of machines in dollars (1972, pl07).

It follows that simplicity versus complexity alone should not be grounds for adoption
of a particular accounting method. W h a t is important is the impact of the accounting
method on the validity of theresultingfinancialstatements. This gives rise to another
criticism of the current rate method in that not only areresultingfinancial statement
values meaningless but they are subject to revaluations consistent with changes in
exchange rates rather than by any change in economic conditions or in the properties
of the items concerned (Henderson & Peirson, 1988, p699; Storey, 1972, pl09; E D
1979, Appendix 1). Furthermore, when a country is experiencing high inflation
relative to other countries, the exchange rates m a y deteriorate to such an extent that
translation of assets, liabilities and owners' equity effectively reduces them to
insignificance (Wise & Wise, 1985, pi6).

In spite of these criticisms, support for the current rate method is still very stron
will be taken up in more detail in the discussion of accounting standards dealing with
foreign currency translation.

To overcome the perceived limitations of the above translation methods, the temporal
method was developed.
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4. Temporal M e t h o d
The temporal method is a variation of the monetary/non-monetary approach. It was
developed by Lorensen in Accounting Research Study N o 12, Reporting Foreign
Operations of US Companies in US Dollars, published by the A I C P A in 1972.
Lorensen considered that it was essential to effective translation that the original
measurement methods in the accounts of the subsidiary be retained on translation.
For this reason the appropriate exchange rate is based on the attributes of the items
being measured:
Money and receivables and payables measured at the amounts
promised should be translated at the foreign exchange rate in
effect at the balance sheet date. Assets and liabilities measured at
money prices should be translated at the foreign exchange rate in
effect at the dates to which the money prices pertain (1972, pl9).

The temporal method of translation has received considerable support from within the
profession but its adoption has been stronglyresistedby the business community
wherever it has been proposed. In 1975, the F A S B issued F A S B 8. F A S B 8 made
application of the temporal method obligatory. In June 1977, the C I C A apparently
disregarded the findings of Parkinson's 1972 study and issued an exposure draft
which prescribed the temporal method. Similarly, in 1979, the Australian standard
setters issued an exposure draft prescribing the temporal method.

A s already

indicated, both the U K and International Accounting Standards Committees were
prepared to accept both the current rate method and the temporal method. This
approach has also been adopted n o w by Australia, U S A and Canada.

The major advantages of the temporal method are that it can be used regardless of th
measurement method used in the financial statements of the foreign subsidiary (ppl718) and that these measurement models are retained on translation (Flower, 1981,
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p302). A de facto revaluation of assets does not occur as under the current rate
method.

The major disadvantage appears to be that different exchange rates are applied to
balance sheet items.

For example, non current assets and owners' equity are

translated at rates prevailing at time of purchase, revaluation or entry into the
accounts while m a n y monetary items are translated at the current rate. This has
implications for ratio analysis and also reported profits or losses depending on the
degree and direction of changes in exchange rates. For example, depreciation
expense is a function of the measurement of depreciable assets. Under the temporal
method, depreciation will be based on the cost or revaluation amount of the asset
translated at the historic rate. If the domestic currency of the subsidiary company
weakens relative to that of the parent company, profits recorded by the subsidiary
m a y well be reduced or, at the extreme, converted to a loss on translation. In
response to this apparent weakness in the temporal method, Flower argues that
translation is to facilitate consolidation and consolidated financial statements should
not be used to determine ratios or performance of the subsidiary (1981, pp308-310).
The accounts of the subsidiary should be used for this purpose.

Consolidated

financial reports are prepared from the perspective of the shareholders of the parent
company. The acquisition of a foreign subsidiary represents a "financial sacrifice" by
the shareholders of the parent company. Fluctuations in currency markets contribute
to the extent of this sacrifice:
When ... the foreign currency falls in value relative to the home
currency, the sacrifice m a d e by the holding company's
shareholders will become valued rather more highly . . .hence the
paradox of a profit being translated into a loss (Flower, 1981,
p310).

It should be clear from the foregoing, that the issue of foreign currency translation
highly contentious and, as with accounting for inflation, is unlikely to be resolved to
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the satisfaction of all concerned. At least the scope for potential conflict has been
reduced to the extent that two translation methods only are n o w prescribed by
professional accounting bodies, the current rate and the temporal method. However,
the selection of the appropriate translation method is only part of the issue. The
treatment of foreign currency gains and losses is arguably the more contentious aspect
of the issue. T h e reason for this being that while the translation method selected will
have an impact on the financial statements, the treatment of translation gains and
losses have the potential for a greater impact

TREATMENT OF FOREIGN CURRENCY GAINS AND LOSSES
Foreign currency gains or losses arise when exchange rates change between the time a
transaction is entered into or recorded in the books of the company and the date of
settlement or, alternatively, the date of translation for purpose of consolidation of
financial statements. The extent of the gain or loss on individual items will obviously
be governed by the exchange rate used for translation and the degree of change in
rates. If historic rates are used for translation, no gain or loss will be recorded
because exchange rate changes are irrelevant However, if current exchange rates are
used for translation purposes, a gain or loss will be recorded. The total foreign
exchange gain or loss will be the net change from one accounting period to the next in
the assets and liabilities subject to translation at the current rate.

Before undertaking an examination of the accounting treatment of foreign currency
translation gains and losses listed previously, it should be noted that each of these
methods treats gains and losses consistently whether realised or unrealised.

In

Accounting Research Bulletin N o 43 it was considered that unrealised translation
gains should be taken to a "suspense" account but unrealised losses be included in the
determination of operating profit. Parkinson argued that this approach was unduly
conservative and possibly misleading to users of financial reports:
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The . . . requirement that translation losses be recorded in the
income statement covering the period in which there is an
exchange rate movement establishes the fact that the information
is pertinent - that it is something a reader of a financial statement
should know. It should be obvious that information concerning a
translation gain is of equal significance... (1972, p50).

Similarly, Parkinson argued that there should be no distinction between realised and
unrealised gains and losses becauserealisationof a gain or loss is not synonymous
with settlement of an obligation (p52). Realisation of a foreign currency gain or loss
occurs w h e n the exchange rate changes.

The idea of treating exchange gains and losses differentiy was also specifically
rejected as inconsistent in the 1973 and 1979 Australian exposure drafts dealing with
foreign currency translation (paragraphss 17 and 14 respectively). E D 1979 made an
implied distinction betweenrealisedand unrealised gains and losses. The proposed
accounting standards (paragraphs 50 and 51) dealt only with unrealised exchange
gains and losses. The 1983 exposure draft made no reference to eitherrealisedor
unrealised translation gains and losses.
1. Immediate Recognition of Gains & Losses in the Profit and Loss Account
This approach appears to have been favoured by professional bodies from the time the
first exposure draft on the matter was issued. E D 1973 recommended this practice as
being the only method to provide "adequate accounting and disclosure". Similarly,
F A S B 8 issued in 1975 prescribed this treatment. However, there is a distinction to
be made. The 1973 exposure draft recommended the use of the current rate method
of translation which means that the translation gain or loss is measured in terms of net
assets. F A S B 8 prescribed the temporal method so that gains and losses would be
measured only in terms of net monetary items. The implications of this difference will
be returned to later.

Parkinson also recommended the immediate recognition
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approach but only when the change in exchange rate is significant and it is reasonable
to assume it will not reverse in subsequent periods (1972, p54). The rationale behind
the latter restriction on immediate recognition is that when exchange rates are subject
to reversal, it is not possible to reliably estimate the ultimate gain or loss (p55).
Eddey supports this argument with regard to long term monetary items:
... for long-term monetary items exposed to floating exchange
rates, the probability that a cash flow equivalent to the unrealised
gain or loss will occur is not high enough to meet normally applied
accrual tests for gain or loss recognition (1985, p21).

This view appears to be part of the major argument against the immediate recognition
approach that in times of widefluctuationsin exchange rates, there is likely to be a
parallelfluctuationin reported profits (or losses) (Kenley, 1978, p38; Eddey, 1985,
p22; E D 1979 paragraph 14). Evidence of this is available from the financial press
and various research studies and will be discussed in more depth later. However, one
example will serve for illustrative purposes here. In February 1978, the Financial
Times m a d e the following comment with regard to Utah Development
The profit was boosted by exchange gains on overseas
borrowings, caused by spasmodic upward revaluations of the
Australian dollar. In the previous year, Australia's devaluation had
caused a large exchange loss (cited by Staunton, 1978, p56).

Two points should be made here. First, as already indicated, FASB 8 required the
gain or loss on translation to be measured in terms of net monetary assets which is
consistent with the temporal method. E D 1973 specified immediate recognition based
on the current rate translation method which measures the gain or loss on net assets.
The two approaches are likely to give vastly different results which will also vary from
company to company depending on the composition of assets and liabilities. This is
evident in the Utah Development example to a certain extent and alsorelatesto the
second point, namely that the gain or loss will depend on changes in exchange rates
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over time. The respective translation gains and losses of Utah Developmentrelatedto
overseas borrowings. If Utah Development had been a lender rather than a borrower,
the timing of the gain and loss m a y have been reversed. However, if the exchange
rates had notfluctuatedfrom year to year, no gain or loss would have been recorded.
With regard to this point it is perhaps useful to note the variations in preferred
treatment of translation gains and losses overtime.

In 1974-75, of 93 Australian companies surveyed, 34 per cent recognised gains or
losses in the profit and loss account immediately. This represented the dominant
accounting treatment of translation gains and losses of the companies surveyed
(Kenley, 1978, p40). However, in a survey of the top 20 Australian companies (by
market capitalisation) in 1985, Eddey found the defer and amortise option was the
preferred accounting treatment of translation gains and losses at least with regard to
long-term monetary items (1985, p22). Part of the explanation for this is perhaps that
in 1974-75, there was less volatility in exchange rates than in the mid 1980's.

In December 1983, the recommendations of the Campbell Committee (Australia,
1981) were implemented beginning with the floating of the Australian dollar. In
addition, the finance market was progressively deregulated. The floating of the
Australian dollar saw an increase in speculative dealings in the belief that the dollar
would appreciate against the U S dollar. This increase in speculative activities did not
necessarily provide the gains expected because the dollar did not appreciate to the
extent that speculators expected (Lovett, 1983, pll). In general, having reached a
peak in 1972, the Australian dollar subsequendy declinedrelativeto the world's major
currencies (Minchin, 1986, p48). Figures 1, 2 and 3 in the appendix to this chapter
clearly illustrate the peak of the Australian dollar in 1972 and its persistent decline
thereafter. This in itself could be seen as a reason to abandon the immediate
recognition method and adopt the defer and amortise approach.
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The rise in speculative dealings and volatility in exchange rates was not confined to
Australia. The 1980's saw the emergence of a progressively more sophisticated
foreign exchange market which not only increased speculation and volatility of
exchange rates but lessened the depth andresilienceof the foreign exchange market.
In world-wide terms, trading on the foreign exchange market doubled from $ U S 7 5
billion per day in 1979 to $ U S 1 5 0 billion per day in 1985 ( A P - D o w Jones, 1985,
p46). B y August 1986, trading was estimated at $ U S 2 0 0 billion per day. Australian
dollar trade accounted for $ A 3 billion of this daily rate (Behrmann, 1986, p26). This
comparatively small proportion of Australian dollar trade suggests that the Australian
dollar was far from being a major world currency. The implication is that Australian
borrowers and traders would generally be required to denominate their dealings in a
currency other than the Australian. Given that the Australian dollar has a history of
devaluation, it is not surprising Australian companies preferred to defer and amortise
gains or losses on long term monetary items.
2. Defer and Amortise
The defer and amortise method was recommended by Parkinson in the 1972 Canadian
research study and subsequently adopted in modified form in the CICA's 1977
exposure draft and subsequent accounting standard issued in 1983. This approach
was also supported by the International Accounting Committee in IAS 21 issued in
1983 and in the 1979 and 1983 Australian exposure drafts and A A S 20 Foreign
Currency Translation issued in 1985.

Initially, Parkinson's recommendation appears to have been applicable to unrealised
gains or losses arising on translation of all "receivables and payables" (1972, p57).
Arguments to support the recommendation, however, appear to be aimed at long term
monetary items rather than short term. There were two reasons for Parkinson's
proposed solution. A s already indicated, Parkinson considered immediate recognition
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was only appropriate w h e n exchange rate changes were permanent (p55). Given that
exchange rates historically were subject toreversal,translation gains or losses may
never be realised (p57).

However, deferral of exchange gains or losses until

realisation would be to keep "readers of financial statements in the dark" and deny
them information needed to predict results and assess management performance
(p57). The compromise solution was deferral and amortisation on a proportionate
basis. The proportion allocated to each accounting period was to be determined by
the likelihood of the gain or loss materialising. This in turn would generally be
determined by the date of maturity of the item concerned. Hence, the closer the
maturity date, the greater the likelihood of the gain or loss materialising and,
therefore, the greater the charge to be m a d e against profit or loss in accounting
periods immediately prior to settlement. Should settlement not be expected until the
distant future, the smaller the proportion of the gain or loss recognised.

This proposal was adopted for long-term monetary items in the 1979 and 1983
Australian exposure drafts and in A A S 20 issued in 1985. The justification for this
method was that immediate recognition of gains and losses on such items "may cause
undue fluctuations in the resultsreportedfrom period to period" ( E D 1979, paragraph
14). It was further argued in E D 1979 that unamortised exchange gains and losses
had the characteristics of deferred revenue and deferred borrowing costs respectively
(paragraphs 17 and 18). Unamortised exchange losses were to be classified in the
balance sheet as intangible assets while deferred exchange gains would be shown as
deferred revenue. At the time the 1979 Australian exposure draft was issued, the
defer and amortise method was already widely used by Australian companies, for
example, B H P , Comalco, ICI, Hamersley Holdings Limited and Conzinc Riotinto of
Australia Limited (Philip, 1980, p29). The arguments against accepting an accounting
method purely on the basis of its wide spread use have already been outlined and are
relevant here. Furthermore, this treatment of translation gains and losses can be seen
as arbitrary and as a method of income smoothing. Three examples drawn from
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Australian experience demonstrate the deficiencies of the defer and amortise method
of accounting for foreign exchange gains and losses.

In 1977, BHP altered its accounting policy for the treatment of foreign exchange
gains and losses and turned a 25 per cent fall in net earnings into a 41.2 per cent
increase in profits. This was achieved by adopting the defer and amortise approach in
place of immediate recognition in the profit and loss account used previously. S o m e
$20 million in foreign exchange losses due to the devaluation of the Australian dollar
relative to the U S dollar were deferred (Byrne, 1977, pl7). Henry Bosch, then
chairman of the N C S C , used two companies, C R A Ltd and C S R Ltd, to highlight the
problems presented to those w h o wished to compare financial statements of different
companies of what he considered
option (1985, p88).

arbitrary application of the defer and amortise

Early in 1985, the Australian dollar suffered a "major

depreciation" (Coombe, 1985, p24) which by July of that year amounted to a 25 per
cent drop from the previous year (Bushnel, 1985, pi). C S R Ltd wrote off unrealised
exchange losses on the basis that the devaluation was permanent. C R A Ltd continued
to defer and amortise unrealised exchange losses. According to Bosch, C R A Ltd
would have shown a net loss of approximately $178 million if it had adopted the
immediate write off policy instead of a $22 million profit under the defer and amortise
approach. Similarly, C S R Ltd would have recorded a profit under the defer and
amortise approach instead of its reported $63 million net loss due to writing off $156
million exchange losses (Bosch, 1985, p88).

While the two approaches produced significantly different results and supports
Bosch's claim that such diversity makes inter-company comparisons meaningless, it
was pointed out in thefinancialpress that the balance dates of the two companies
were 3 months apart. C R A Ltd balanced its books prior to the devaluation of the
Australian dollar while C S R Ltd balanced after the devaluation. Hence, it could be
argued that the different approaches were justified. It is interesting to note, however,
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that in 1987, C R A Ltd wrote off unrealised foreign exchange losses of $173 million
(Killen, 1987d, p24). This amount represented losses accumulated up to the end of
1985. C R A argued that it still supported the defer and amortise approach but
considered the Australian dollar had reached its peak and the write off of accumulated
losses to 1985 would "protect its foreign currency debt portfolio". The balance of $15
million foreign exchange losses would continue to be amortised (Killen, 1987a, pl4).

Clearly, the BHP, CRA and CSR examples support the argument that the deferral and
amortisation of foreign currency gains and losses is arbitrary and also suggests that
diversity in accounting methods reduces the comparability of financial statements not
only from company to company but also for one company from year to year. This is
more evident from a further analysis of the C S R example. At the time of its 1984-85
write off of foreign exchange losses, C S R did not apply the same principle to
accumulated losses of $385 millionrelatingto a $1.3 billion debt Instead, the loss
was amortised by a mere $13 million. Later in 1985, C S R announced its intention to
retire the debt in full within 6 months (Buduls, 1985, ppl, 8). This approach seems at
odds with both the treatment of other losses and with the intentions of the 1983 E D
which recommended the defer and amortise method on long term monetary items with
the proviso that
Care would need to be exercised in carrying out such an allocation
to ensure that this procedure is achieving its objective, and not
simply forestalling the recognition of mounting gains or losses
(paragraph 11).

CSR could, of course, have argued that when the decision was made to defer and
amortise the loss, it did not intend to retire the debt.

In addition, the

recommendations of the E D 1983 were not binding and, therefore, were irrelevant.
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Lorensen argued that defer and amortise practices meant

gains and losses were

reported in the balance sheet but not in the income statement which is inconsistent
because it both denied and affirmed the gain or loss at the same time (1972, p61). It
also does not provide users of financial statements with information needed to
evaluate management performance (p61; Parkinson, 1972, p57). Finally, it is not
consistent with traditional accounting concepts "such as matching costs with revenue"
( E D 1973, paragraph 18) and can distortreportedresults( E D 1979, paragraph 14).
A n explanation for this apparent about-face by the profession in general will be
offered later.

3. Transfer to Reserves

Under this approach, all translation gains and losses are recorded in a foreign currenc
translationreserve.Reserve accounting of this nature has, in general, beenrejectedas
unacceptable because it "tends to hide therealsituation" ( E D 1973, paragraph 18); it
is not consistent with the all-inclusive concept of profits particularly as losses would
effectively be shown in the balance sheet as a deduction from share capital and
reserves which is "tantamount to a write off of the loss directly againstreserves";and
gains and losses m a y never be reported in the profit and loss account even when
realised ( E D 1979, paragraph 14, 17). A s will be taken up later, this final argument
appears to be most relevant to the present A A S 20 and A A S B

1012 Foreign

Currency Translation.

Evidence suggests, however, that reserve accounting was in existence in Australia
during the 1970's. For example, G. E. Crane effectively adopted reserve accounting
for foreign currencyfluctuations.Losses of $751,574 arising from a Swiss franc loan
taken up in 1972 were not recognised in the profit and loss statement

Instead,

shareholders' funds were reduced by the loss. O n settlement of the loan in 1977, part
of the total loss of $937,540 was reported as an extraordinary item in the profit and
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loss statement The balance, amounting to $751,574, was charged directly against
unappropriated profits (The Australian Financial Review, 1977b, p45). Bougainville
Mining also accounted for foreign currencyfluctuationsthrough a reserve pending
settlement of debts (Dawson-Grove, 1972, pi6).

Lombard Australia adopted a

similar practice (Ogg, 1977a, p27).

The foregoing provides some insight into the controversial nature of the foreign
currency translation debate. N o matter h o w compelling the arguments of proponents
of one method m a y consider their arguments to be, opponents will probably not be
convinced. In addition, as will be discussed shortly, a solution will not be found by
reference to accounting theory or sound accounting practice. Rather, the solution or
compromise solution, will be determined on the basis of the perceived economic
consequences of the various alternatives.

The next section will examine Australian attempts to develop a foreign currency
standard - a process spanning some 12 years from September 1973 to September
1985. Even after such a lengthy gestation period, thefirststandard, A A S B 1003:
Foreign Currency Translation - Disclosure was subsequently withdrawn and replaced
in 1987 with A A S B 1012 Foreign Currency Translation which was revised in July
1988. The profession sponsored standard, A A S 20 Foreign Currency Translation,
was issued in October 1985 and amended in 1987. A history such as this and the
recent A W A v Daniels case ieaffirms the contentious nature of the issue and indicates
the debate is not yet resolved.

FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSLATION IN AUSTRALIA

The purpose of this section is to highlight the events which led to attempts by the
accountancy profession in Australia to formulate a foreign currency accounting
standard.

These events included the changing nature of foreign trade and
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international money markets. A s evidence from the financial press suggests, these
changes had a substantial impact on the financial statements of many Australian
companies. For users of financial statements, therelativeimpact on a particular
company compared with others was not necessarily discernible as companies were at
liberty to adopt the accounting method(s) of their choice. This led to criticism of the
profession and calls for the promulgation of an accounting standard. The profession's
inability to produce a standard within what some (eg. the N C S C and the financial
press) saw as a reasonable length of time brought further criticism of the profession.

While this is a history of the Australian foreign currency standard, extensive refere
will be m a d e to the standard setting efforts in other countries, in particular, the U S A .
The reason for this is that the Australian standard setters were greatly influenced by
what was occurring in other countries. Evidence of this concern for developments in
the foreign currency debate in other countries will be provided where applicable.
The Development and Demise of ED 1979
A s with the rest of the world, the Australian search for an accounting standard for
foreign currency translation began in earnest in the early 1970's. The reasons for this
flurry of activity at this particular time can be attributed to the rise in foreign
investment (Lorensen, 1972, pi) and foreign trade including financing arrangements
and changes in international monetary developments (Kenley, 1972, p47) such as
abandonment by the U S A of the exchange of gold for dollars as a means of
mamtaining the stability of world currencies (Lorensen, 1972, pp4-5; Kenley, 1972,
p47); the realignment of major currencies in the wake of the U S A decision and the
"Smithsonian" agreement in Washington D C in December 1971 under which
currencies would be permitted to "float" within 2 1/4 per cent, as opposed to the
former 1 per cent of the official rate set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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(Kenley, 1972, p47, Lorensen, 1972, p3, Parkinson, 1972, Preface) and the
progressive unrestricted floating of many of the world's major currencies.

The exposure drafts and accounting standards issued by professional bodies in the
early 1970's reflect concern with the issues outlined above. For example, ED 1973
states:
The continuing expansion of international business activities,
combined with the many significant changes occurring in the
relative values of world currencies inrecentyears, has highlighted
the problems of translating (or converting) into Australian
currency amounts which are initially recorded in foreign currencies
(paragraph 1).

The F A S B expressed similar views adding that opinions to date (refer to discussion of
methods) were no longer relevant as a consequence of changes in the nature of
business and in the foreign exchange markets:
... the accounting pronouncements for translation of financial
statements of foreign entities were formulated before overseas
capital investments and foreign currency borrowings of U S
corporations became extensive, and before significant changes in
the world monetary system, including two devaluations of the U S
dollar, took place (Monthly Notes, 1974, p54).

The decision to promulgate an accounting standard on foreign currency translation

and transactions is a problematisation process. It is clear from the discussion of the
various translation methods and the treatment of foreign currency gains and losses
that the issue of how to account for foreign currency fluctuations was considered

from as early as the 1930's. It is also clear that a variety of "solutions" to the fo
currency problem had been developed and, in many cases, adopted overtime. The
"problem" which business and users of financial statements now faced and for which
the profession sought to provide a solution was the diversity of methods for
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translating transactions and foreign financial statements. In other words, on the basis
of its superior and specialised knowledge, the profession sought to determine, from
the range of methods available, the most appropriate method to be used, and thereby
eliminate the diversity problem. Clearly, if the need to translate foreign currency
transactions and financial statements is increasing and there is a plethora of translation
approaches, the scope for diversity inreportedresultsis also increasing which makes
inter-company comparisons impossible. W h e n firms alter accounting practices from
year to year, intra-company comparisons on a year by year basis are also impossible.
A s Kenley illustrated this was indeed the case in Australia, the U K and the U S A
(1972, p47).
Evidence of Diversity in Accounting for Foreign Currency Translation
In 1972, Kenley surveyed six Australian companies (Australian Consolidated
Industries Ltd, John Lysaght Australia Ltd, Esso Australia Ltd, Philips Industries
Holdings Ltd, Comalco Ltd and C o m e n g Holdings Limited). Diversity in accounting
for foreign currency translation was found across companies and within companies.
O n e company used the current rate for translation of all assets, liabilities and profit
and loss items except for one long term liability which was translated at the historic
rate. S o m e companies adopted immediate recognition of gains and losses in the profit
and loss account but even then companies were not consistent as some companies
disclosed translation gains and losses as extraordinary items while others included
them in operating profit. Others deferred recognition untilrealisationeither by taking
therelevantamounts to a foreign currency reserve or to a liability account

A review of relevant literature in the UK and the USA revealed similar variations.
O n e U K company cited by Kenley m a d e exchange adjustments in respect of fixed
assets directly against the relevant assets (p49). Other exchange adjustments were
debited to "share premium and surplus".
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Both the U S A and Australia issued exposure drafts dealing with foreign currency
translation in the early 1970's. Neitherresultedin the promulgation of an accounting
standard. The A P B issued its exposure draft in December 1971 but did not proceed
with the issue pending the outcome of the Lorensen research study. Kenley suggests
that one reason for the failure of E D 1973 to proceed to the standard stage was the
change occurring in the international monetary and exchange system which began in
the late 1960's and gained m o m e n t u m throughout the 1970's (1978, p 38). Corsi was
more cynical and considered the urgency of developing a standard abated in line with
the decline in volatility of the exchange market which had characterised the early
1970's (1987, p8). This meant that the issue could be deferred thus avoiding the
problems inherent in achieving consensus on what was becoming a highly contentious
issue or, as Pierpont put it"... they [the accountancy profession] . . . dropped it into
the too-hard

basket..." (1977, p88).

It could also be the profession in Australia decided to await the outcome of research
studies undertaken by Lorensen ( U S A ) and Parkinson (Canada).

In June 1979, the AARF issued Australia's second foreign currency exposure draft,
E D 1979. The diversity of accounting methods had continued to be a problem during
the 1970's. Evidence of this was again found by Kenley in two separate surveys of
100 randomly selected companies.

The first survey covered 1975-1976 financial

statements while the second survey dealt with accounts for 1976-1977. The same
companies were not necessarily included in each survey. In addition to diversity, the
1976-77 survey revealed an increasing trend for companies to change their accounting
methods from year to year. In some instances, changing accounting methods had "...
important effects on disclosedresults"(Kenley, 1978, p40).

In a similar vein, but without providing empirical evidence, Pierpont stated

406

. . . one vexed point this season is going to be the treatment of
foreign exchange fluctuations. There is no uniformity a m o n g
companies in their treatment of this item...
Unrealised gains and losses are a more difficult area and subject to
wide variation in treatment (1977, p88).

Pierpont went on to note that exchange markets were again volatile (1977, p88).

This point was also noted in ED 1979
The increase in international business activity, combined with
significant and frequent changes in the relative values of world
currencies, has highlighted difficulties arising from translating into
Australian currency amounts initially expressed or recorded in
foreign currencies (paragraph 1).

The significance of foreign currency fluctuations for companies during the 1970's is
evident from the financial press. In the early 1970's, the Australian dollar was strong
relative to other world currencies. Where foreign debt was to be settled in a foreign
currency, the strengthening Australian dollar meant windfall foreign currency gains for
Australian net borrowers but losses to net lenders. Importers also benefited from
effectively reduced prices while exporters faced srrrinking markets. Australian
companies with foreign subsidiaries also found that group profits declined when
subsidiaries whose original financial statements were expressed in weaker currencies
were translated for purposes of consolidation. On the other hand, Australian
subsidiaries with foreign parents benefited when dividends were paid in weaker
foreign currencies. When the Australian dollar was devalued in 1974, the opposite
situation was likely to occur. The changing foreign exchange market had the potential
to make the flexibility in accounting for foreign exchange very attractive.
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Bougainville Mining Ltd provides an example of foreign exchange gains arising from
overseas loans taken out before the Australian dollar was revalued in 1971. The
Australian Financial Review of March 21,1972 reported
The currency revaluation last year helped reduce Bougainville
Mining Ltd's $184 million loan bill almost five per cent
It meant a windfall gain to the company of nearly $9.2 million ...
(Dawson-Grove, 1972, pl6)

However, Bougainville Mining Ltd also provides an example of the flexibility in
accounting treatment prevalent at the time. After the exchange rate realignment the
company decided to translate loans at the rates prevailing at balance date rather than
following the prior practice of using historic rates. This treatment was not adopted
consistently as all other accounts continued to be translated at historic rates. The gain
of $9.2 million was credited to an exchangefluctuationaccount for subsequent profit
and loss recognition on settlement of the debt (pi6).
Fickle Exchange Rates and Changing Fortunes
In December 1972, the Australian dollar was again revalued. Early in 1973, The
Australian Financial Review again reported windfall gains to Australian companies
arising from overseas loans repayable in foreign currencies. Gains of up to $1.5
million were reported by Hooker Corporation Ltd, Network Finance Ltd, Commercial
and General Acceptance (Ingram, 1973, ppl5, 16), Weeks National Resources Ltd
(Dawson-Grove, 1973, p28), Consolidated Gold Fields Australia Ltd (Perkins, 1973,
pl7), Newbold General Refractories Ltd (Hornstien, 1973, pl9) and Matheson and
C o (Australia) Pty Ltd (The Australian Financial Review, 1973d, p33). Lombard
Australia Ltd reported a $6.5 million gain (The Australian Financial Review, 1973f,
p31).

However, as will be discussed shortly, the capriciousness of the foreign

exchange market saw Lombard reporting foreign currency losses in 1976 and 1977
(Ogg, 1977a, p27).
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General Motors-Holden ( G M H ) also announced a currency windfall on the payment
of a dividend to its U S parent General Motors. According to Sykes, the decision to
pay the dividend m a y have been influenced by an 18 per cent revaluation of the
Australian dollar against the U S dollar since the December 1972 realignment (1973,
p40). O n the other hand, G M H expressed concern that the realignment of the
Australian dollar m a y have a negative impact on G M H ' s export business (p41).

Alcoa of Australia Ltd expressed similar concerns over the future of Australian
exporters in light of currency realignments. However, as with G M H , reductions in
income due to the upwards revaluation of the Australian dollar were offset by
currency gains on overseas debt

In 1973, Davis Consolidated expressed the same reservation about the upwards
revaluations of the Australian dollar:
The recent variations in exchange rates have already placed many
exporters, including our company, at a severe disadvantage and it
is sincerely hoped the situation will not be aggravated by any
further appreciation of the Australian currency . . . (cited from
Davis Consolidated Interim Report in The Australian Financial
Review, 1973a, p29).

In March 1974, directors of Davis Consolidated reported that their fears were being
realised. Sales had increased by 22.9 per cent but exchange variations had restricted
profit growth to 10.5 per cent. Directors further argued that had it not been for
variations in the Australian dollarrelativeto the currencies of Canada, the U K , U S A
and South Africa, the increases in group sales and net profits would have been 25 per
cent and 13 per centrespectively(The Australian Financial Review, 1974, p24). The
failure torealisethe higher increases was attributed to both reductions in sales and the
profits of overseas subsidiaries which were effectively reduced on translation.
409

The Queensland sugar industry also argued that the upwards revaluation of the
Australian dollar in December 1972 would have unfavourablerepercussionson export
markets (The Australian Financial Review, 1973b, p30).

In September 1974, the Australian dollar was devalued. This turn of events saw a
consequential reporting of foreign exchange losses on overseas borrowings and
translation of financial statements as evidenced by reports in the financial press.

For the year ended December 31, 1974, Ciba-Geigy Australia reported a foreign
currency loss of $1,588,712 on Swiss franc loans. The lossresultednot only from the
devaluation of the Australian dollar in September 1974 but also an increase in the
Swiss franc (The Australian Financial Review, 1975, p30).

Lamson Industries Australia Ltd claimed the devaluation of the New Zealand dollar
reduced its operating profit before tax by $173,000 for the year ended December 11,
1975. They further claimed that N e w Zealand profit was reduced by $73,000 due to
the impact of exchange fluctuations on overseas borrowings (The Australian
Financial Review, 1976a, p28).

Robe River Ltd reported foreign exchange losses of $540,308 as a result of the
devaluation of the Australian dollarrelativeto the U S dollar. The loss related to
foreign loans used to finance acquisition of fixed assets (The Australian Financial
Review, 1976b, pll). Similarly, in the six months to November 1976, B H P recorded
a $20 million lossresultingfrom the devaluation of the Australian dollarrelativeto the
U S dollar (Byrne, 1977, pl7).

As already indicated, Lombard reported a $6.5 million foreign currency gain in 1973.
However, for the 6 months to March 31, 1977, Lombard reported a foreign currency
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loss of $987,000 on the valuation of foreign currency loans due to a fall in the value
of the Australian dollar (Ogg, 1977a, p27).
Diversity, Criticism and ED 1979
Fluctuations in foreign exchange rates around the world, coupled with the lack of
guidelines for appropriate accounting treatment of the effects of these fluctuations
brought criticism of the profession for its lack of activity in this area:
About five years ago the accounting bodies circulated an exposure
draft on foreign currencyfluctuations,but since then they have
spent their time playing games with current cost accounting
systems instead.
. . . they might have spent their time better doing a little hack
work on something less glamorous.
Like foreign currencyfluctuations(Pierpont 1977, p88).

While Pierpont's criticism may have some validity, it should be pointed out that the
foreign currency issue has direct links to inflation accounting. M a n y of the arguments
over the appropriate method of accounting for foreign currency fluctuations are
related to the inherent limitations of historical cost accounting (eg. Eddey, 1985;
Flower, 1981). Hence, it could be argued that the profession was not ignoring the
foreign currency debate because it was not glamorous but because a solution to
inflation accounting would also help solve the problems of accounting for foreign
currency fluctuations. At present the important point is that the profession was under
attack for the apparent diversity of methods being used to account for foreign
currency fluctuations.

Kenley referred to accounting for effects of foreign translation as "one of the most
pressing problems facing the profession ..."

and, given the diversity found in

practice, and the often large amounts involved m e a n t " . . . the urgency of having a
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definitive standard ... has become extremely pressing" (1978, p38). It was against
this background that E D 1979 was released.

ED 1979 followed the lead of FASB 8 and prescribed the use of the temporal method
for translation of foreign currency financial statements (paragraph 49). F A S B 8
mandated immediate recognition of foreign currency gains and losses in the profit and
loss account. E D 1979 departed from this approach and provided that unrealised
exchange gains and lossesrelatingto long term receivables and payables be deferred
and amortised over the life of the item (paragraph 50). The commentary section of
E D 1979 indicated that unamortised exchange losses should be shown in the balance
sheet as intangible assets. The Proposed Accounting Standards of E D 1979 stated
that unamortised exchange gains and losses were to be disclosed in the balance sheet
as deferred income or deferred expenses respectively (paragraph 53 b, c). The
adoption of this method is in direct contradiction to the views expressed in E D 1973:
There is no logical accounting basis, such as matching costs with
revenue, for deferring recognition and spreading gains or losses
over future accounting periods (paragraph 18).

While not denying this, ED 1979 permitted the deferral and amortisation of unrealised
exchange gains and losses in respect of long term receivables and payables on the
grounds that it provided consistent treatment of gains and losses, was prudent and did
not distortresults(paragraph 16). It was further argued that the defer and amortise
method provides an appropriate matching of the cost of borrowed funds with the
benefits arising from the use of those funds. T o achieve this, any gains or losses on
foreign borrowings were to be amortised over the period to settlement of the loan.
Unless the duration of the loan coincided with the useful life of any asset purchased
with the borrowed funds, matching of costs with benefits would not occur which
makes this argument invalid. In addition, the defer and amortise option only applied
to long term monetary items so that if a short term loan was used to finance a long
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term asset the application of the defer and amortise method would not apply which
could be seen as inconsistent

ED 1979 did not provide any guidelines on appropriate accounting for long term debt
payable by instalment In the absence of any such guidelines, a strict interpretation of
the defer and amortise option to long term monetary items and the immediate
recognition of short term monetary items adds the potential for complexity in the
situation where repayment of the loan is progressive. Under such a situation, gains or
losses would need to be allocated between instalments falling due in the short term
and the balance of the loan to be paid in subsequent periods. Gains or losses on the
short term portion would be dealt with in the profit and loss statement while the
balance would continue to be amortised.

As implied by the wording of paragraph 16, the defer and amortise method is also a
form of income smoothing:
. . . many believe that the inclusion in the results for a period of
material unrealised gains and unrealised losses on long term
monetary items whenever an exchange rate changes produces
results which are distorted...

This is inconsistent with a further argument presented in paragraph 16 that
amortisation results in
.. . matching the income from lending with the risk attaching to a
lending of funds.

One may well ask how an income smoothing device can achieve such a matching?
The volatile and unpredictable nature of the foreign exchange market and the impact
in terms of gains and losses arising from exchange variations, on foreign debt was well
established by the end of the 1970's (some examples have already been given, others
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will be outlined in subsequent discussion in this chapter). The implication is that the
proposed accounting standard had the potential to allow management to conceal
errors in judgment as to the risk associated with foreign borrowings by deferring
losses incurred on them. While it m a y be true that subsequent foreign currency gains
will offset losses, the pattern of the Australian dollar'srelativevalue compared to
those of other world currencies, particularly those favoured for foreign borrowings,
would suggest that losses are more likely to be incurred than gains. Figures 1, 2 and
3 in the appendix to this chapter show clearly that the trend of the Australian dollar
has been consistently downward since the early 1970's. Admittedly, these graphs are
based on yearly averages so gains could have been made in short term. Furthermore,
it could be argued that losses on foreign borrowings could also have been offset by
gains on overseas lending.

However, Figure 4 in the appendix clearly shows that

borrowing by Australian companies has far exceed foreign lending since at least 1980.
The losses reported by Australian companies suggests that overall, companies
reported losses.

Figure 5 also shows a marked increase in interest payable by

Australian companies on foreign debt. Overall the increasing levels of foreign debt
coupled with rising interest charges and exchange losses, would suggest that users of
financial statements are entitled to information regarding foreign borrowings and the
impact of exchange rate changes in the interests of management accountability.
Management Accountability and Foreign Currency Loans
In spite of thefluctuationsin exchange rates and the impact of suchfluctuationson
foreign currency loans, there was some support for "concealment", in the short term
at least from some quarters. For example, Barron's Editorial Commentary of
November 1,1976 considered the provisions of F A S B 8 meant
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. . . projects which formerly were undertaken in the knowledge
that their expense could be delayed until they began to produce
revenues n o w must be considered in a different light H o w , for
example, do their potential, often speculative, benefits rate against
the drawbacks of their drain on earnings, theresultantimpact on
the price of a company's stock and its need and ability to raise
capital (p9).

However, is this valid in the Australian context? The losses incurred by some
Australian companies, as already demonstrated, were substantial and, in many cases
have continued to be so. Surely those w h o deal with corporations are entitled to
k n o w management policies for raising foreign debt and the impact this has on financial
statements. O n e wonders if management would be so keen on income smoothing if
theresultswere profitable?

The financial press had also commented on the impact of exchange variations on the
cost of financing loans (eg. Pierpont 1977, 1978; Haselhurst, 1978; Mumford, 1985a,
1985b). In some instances, management subsequently sought to lay the blame for
these losses on either the auditor or the bank responsible for advising the incurrence
of foreign debt (the A W A & Citibank cases provide relevant examples and will be
discussed later). Once again, given the fact that there was already clear evidence of
the risks associated with foreign-currency denominated debt, one has to ask firstiy
whether management has any valid claim against auditors and financial advisers and
secondly whether an accounting standard should permit them to effectively hide their
mistakes by allowing exchange losses to be deferred and amortised. The first question
is a matter for the courts to decide and will be discussed briefly later in the chapter.
The second point could be evidence of the political nature of standard setting. Given
the lack of consensus dealing with appropriate accounting measurement techniques, as
evidenced by the total lack of a conceptual framework in the area of accounting
measurement and the debates on the issue of inflation accounting outlined in the
previous chapter, the possibility that lobbying on the part of management must be
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considered.

This is particularly so given the arguments presented in the exposure

draft do not adequately explain the standard setters' change in attitude towards the
defer and amortise approach.

Uther (1983) analysed submissions on ED 1979 but did not raise this issue. However,
submissions dealing with subsequent exposure drafts indicate that management in
general argued that as Australian corporations were net borrowers, the defer and
amortise option was more acceptable than the immediate write-off of exchange gains
and losses. In addition, the defer and amortise method was widely used by Australian
companies (Philip, 1980, p29). This, however, was not offered as a reason for
advocating the method. The question of the political nature of the defer and amortise
option will be discussed further in subsequent sections of the chapter as the
proponents of the method successfully withheld opposition to the method until 1987.
Confusing Terminology and Other Issues
A further problem is the proposed treatment of deferred gains and losses. Under the
exposure draft's proposals, deferred losses would appear in the balance sheet as
intangible assets. Deferred gains would effectively be disclosed as a liability (refer
paragraphs 17, 18, 53 b, c).

The logic of such classification is debatable.

Theoretically, h o w can a deferred loss be classed as a future benefit and a future gain
be classified as a future consumption of economic benefits? In addition, while the
commentary section of E D 1979 suggests deferred losses should be classified as
intangible assets, the Proposed Standard section simply requires classification as
deferred income (paragraph 53c).

Apart from the matter of the defer and amortise option, the standard was criticised on
other technical and non-technical grounds within the ranks of the profession (eg. Leo
& Grundy, 1980; Wise and Wise, 1985) and in the 72 submissions in response to the
A A R F s request for comments on the draft standard. ( E D 1979 can be considered
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exceptional if for no other reason than the large number of responses received by the
A A R F . ) The major technical grounds of complaint were the lack of provisions
dealing with hedging contracts and the adoption of the temporal method (Uther,
1983). The temporal method was the most contentious of these issues. According to
Uther 19 of the respondents stated a preference for the current rate method (p62).
Given that a total of 72 submissions were received, 19 does notreallyrepresent
substantial opposition. However, it should be remembered that submissions are not
the only avenue for lobbying.

At a non-technical level, 19 respondents stated that overseas developments,
principally those in the U S A , should be followed (p63). A s will be discussed shortly,
the desire to follow developments in the U S A is consistent with the preference for the
current rate method as by the time E D 1979 wasreleased,moves were being made to
amend the FASB's foreign currency standard and permit either the current rate
method or the temporal method. Opposition to the temporal method and the change
in stance by the F A S B appear to be key factors in the Australian profession's decision
to drop E D 1979 (Prosser, 1985, pl5; Roberts, 1981, pi; Uther, 1983, p59; Wise &
Wise, 1985, pi6). This m a y be explained in part as a flow on of the barrage of
criticism levelled at F A S B 8 (to be discussed shortly). However, the reason m a y be
more in keeping with Flower's observation of the approach adopted by the U K and
International Standards Committee (1981, p303-305). In other words, companies did
not want to be forced to change accounting methods.

The results of surveys in 1974-75 and 1978-79 clearly show the current rate method
was favoured by a majority of Australian companies (Corsi, 1987). In contrast,
Kenley's survey of 100 Australian companies for the 1975-76 financial year found
only one company using the temporal method (1978, p40). A s already indicated,
Kenley's research also showed considerable diversity

in accounting for foreign

currencies both across companies and within companies. Clearly, the prescription of
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the temporal method as the one and only acceptable method would mean that
companies would not only be faced with adopting a n e w accounting method but
would also be precluded from applying differential accounting policies from item to
item and from year to year.

Prescription of the temporal method was also a departure from ED 1973 which had
advocated the current rate method. However, this is not as significant a departure as
the defer and amortise method because at the time E D 1973 was issued, the temporal
method had only recently been developed. O n e possible explanation for the standard
setters'reversalof opinion on the defer and amortise method is that thisrepresenteda
compromise.

Rather than forcing management to change both the method of

translation and the method of treating gains or losses on long term debt, there was a
trade-off which eliminated flexibility in the former and permitted income smoothing in
the latter. Compromises such as this point to the political nature of accounting
standard setting and raises questions as to the usefulness of the final standard as a
regulatory device. Stauntonraisedthis issue with regard to the furore over F A S B 8:
What is the test for financial accounting standards - timehonoured traditional fashions even if they lack credibility or a
search for truth? Would the heated corporate protests be based
on a wish to disclose the true situation or on a wish to preserve
the status quo in which particular pressure groups held sway?
(1978, p56)
ED 1979 & Criticism of FASB 8
The removal offlexibilityin accounting for foreign currency translation and the ability
to smooth income patterns over time appear to be the major underlying factors in the
furore which erupted in the wake of F A S B 8:
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Intended to bring some order out of the chaotic variety of
methods used to translate the results of foreign operations, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board's Standard N o 8 has
instead substituted a n e w chaos of its own. (Editorial
Commentary, 1976, p9).

The overall criticism of F A S B 8 was that when currencyfluctuationswere erratic
profit patterns were also erratic and the adjustments required under FASB 8 were
confusing to users of financial statements (Merjos, 1976, 1977; Forbes, 1976;
Rodriguez, 1977; Copeland and Ingram, 1978; Staunton, 1978). These arguments
were summed up in Forbes just six months after the release of FASB 8:
... [FASB 8] may make your quarterly reports look like a profile
of the Swiss Alps...
That sort of thing baffles investors and even sophisticated analysts
... by obscuring therealtrend of a company (Forbes, 1976, p37).

In addition, it was argued the impact of the provisions of F A S B 8 on the financial
reports of multinationals would deter investment in those corporations (p40). Similar
claims were made in Barrons:
The new standards have created some serious economic problems.
Investment by multinationals is likely to have been curtailed and
the allocation for a given volume of investment distorted.
It's tough to say how the stock market will adjust to the more
erratic earnings patterns likely to be fashioned by the rulings
coming d o w n from the F A S B . But instabuity and lessened
predictability aren't the stuff that usually make for extravagant
price-earningsratios(Editorial Commentary, 1976, p8).

The Forbes article went on to provide examples of the variations in reported quarterly
earnings of some companies. Increases of up to 1200 per cent were recorded by
some companies while reductions of up to 60 per cent were reported by other
companies. It was claimed that half, if not more, of the variations on previous
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earnings were attributable to the application of F A S B 8. This meant, for example,
that a company with high operatingresultsbutrelativelyminor foreign currency gains,
m a y show a lower overallresultthan a company with high foreign currency gains and
a lower operatingresult(1976, pp37-40).

As the following discussion will demonstrate, evidence suggests, with the exception
of the impact of F A S B 8 on quarterly earnings, the claims of management as to the
effects of F A S B 8 were unfounded.

The impact of the provisions of FASB 8 were claimed to be felt in four areas in
particular: depreciation of non-current assets, cost of goods sold, long term debt and
immediate recognition of gains and losses on translation of financial statements of
foreign based operations. The first three itemsrelatedirecdy to the temporal method
of accounting for foreign currency translation and, as such, are most relevant to E D
1979. E D 1979 did not require immediate recognition of gains and losses on long
term items in the profit and loss account so it could be claimed the arguments raised
with regard to this issue and F A S B 8 m a y not be entirelyrelevantto the decision of
Australian standard setters to abandon E D 1979. O n the other hand, the arguments
m a y berelevantto an understanding of w h y E D 1979 took the rather softer option in
allowing gains and losses to be deferred and amortised.
FASB 8, Depreciation and Cost of Goods Sold
The major criticisms of the impact of the temporal method on the depreciation of noncurrent assets and cost of goods sold revolve around the costs of implementing the
change in accounting method. Recall that under the temporal method, inventory and
non-current assets are translated at historical rates. Research by Evans and Folks
(1979) suggests one pragmatic reason for resistance to the temporal method.
According to their survey, 63 to 68 per cent of responding firms would be required to
change from translation of inventories at the current rate to translation at the historical
420

rate (pp34-35). T o facilitate this change, additional clerical, managerial and audit
costs are likely to be incurred. In addition, translation at historical rates means when
the foreign currency weakensrelativeto the domestic currency, depreciation and cost
of goods sold will be higher than if the current exchangeratewere used for translation
purposes.

The opposite occurs when the foreign currency strengthens.

The

translation of inventory and depreciation of non-current assets held by a foreign
subsidiary will continue to have an impact on group accounts until such time as the
inventory is used and relevant non-current assets fully depreciated or disposed of.
These arguments would be applicable to the Australian situation because, as already
indicated, research by Kenley and others found widespread use of the current rate
method by Australian companies.

FASB 8 and Long Term Debt
Prior to the issue of F A S B 8, most U S companies translated long term debt at the
historical rate. The temporal method prescribed by F A S B 8 requires long term debt
to be translated at the current rate (Rodriguez, 1977, p42). Again, there is the
potential cost to the firm of changing accounting methods and, also, a potential
income effect If exchange rates remain stable the use of the current rate does not
present a problem. In the 1970's, as now, foreign currencies were not stable. W h e n
a debt is expressed in a foreign currency which strengthensrelativeto the domestic
currency, liabilities increase on translation because the amount of domestic currency
that the borrower has to pay to settle the debt has increased. In this case, the
borrower would report a foreign currency loss on translation. The opposite occurs
when a foreign currency weakensrelativeto the domestic currency. Similarly, net
lenders in a foreign currency would face a currency gain when the foreign currency
strengthens and a loss when it weakens.

A further complaint against FASB 8 relates to both non-current assets and long term
debt. Where a long term debt has been incurred in order to finance acquisition of a
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non-current asset it has been argued (for example, Joseph Connor, senior partner of
Price Waterhouse & Company) the translation of these items should be at the same
rate rather than the current rate for the debt and historical rate for the asset as
prescribed by F A S B 8:
It (FASB 8) requires accounting to separate business activities
which are completely intertwined in their conception and
implementation and to treat them as unrelated events (Connor,
1979, p78).

It must be pointed out, that the extent of the gains or losses incurred by companies
with foreign operations or borrowings depends on the composition of the balance
sheet for example, debt versus equity, the size of the relevant accounts and the
turnover of debt and inventory. For example, according to Rodriguez, if FIFO (which
Rodriguez claims is the most c o m m o n valuation method used by multinationals to
value inventory) is used and inventory turnover is rapid, say three months, the impact
of exchange ratefluctuationsis not likely to be great. O n the other hand, where
inventory turnover is slow, the potential increases for a large difference between the
historical rate and current rate and a consequent impact on net profit through cost of
goods sold (1977, p43). T o a certain extent, management can control these factors
and large gains or losses resulting from foreign operations or borrowings m a y be
more aresultof poor management than exchange rates.

The impact of FASB 8 will not only depend on the size of the debt but the difference
in exchange rates between the time the debt was taken up and balance date.
Obviously, if the exchangerateremains stable, no exchange gain or loss will occur. A
further consideration is the relative strength of the domestic currency compared to
that in which the debt is expressed. Hence, companies that borrow overseas when the
domestic currency is weak will tend to show foreign currency losses. The extent of
these losses overtime would in turn depend on the strength of the foreign currency.
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Rodriguez uses the example of long term debt denominated in Swissfrancscontracted
in 1971. In 1974, the debt would have appreciated by more than 40 per cent (1977,
p44). Recall the situation was the same in Australia as evidenced by Ciba-Geigy
Australia which in 1974 reported a $1,588,712 foreign currency loss on a Swiss franc
loan.

O n the other hand, not all world currencies were as consistently strong as the

Swissfrancso that loans denominated in less stable currencies could easilyresultin a
loss one year and a gain in the next. Currencyfluctuationsin 1976 and 1977 provide
evidence to this effect In 1976 the Australian dollar and the British pound fell
relative to the U S dollar by some 13 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. The
following year both currencies strengthenedrelativeto the U S dollar (Merjos, 1977,
p22). While management cannot control currencyfluctuations,the potential for
exchange variations should be a consideration in formulating overseas borrowing and
lending policies.
Empirical Research, Management and the Temporal Method
Several studies into the impact of the temporal method on financial statements and
company management have been undertaken. Thisresearchsuggests that in response
to F A S B 8, management of U S multinationals did alter policies with regard to debt
and inventory management (Griffin, 1979, pi2). Hence, as Rodriguez suggests F A S B
8 has at least alerted the business world to the potential impact of foreign operations
on reported earnings (1977, p47). This does not necessarily mean, however, that the
response by management has had either a positive or adverse impact. O f the 13 major
studies collated by Griffin, none were able to conclude that practices altered in
responsetoF A S B 8 had an adverse affect on companies' cash flows (1979).

It also appears the cost of compliance with FASB 8 in terms of clerical, managerial
and audit activities were not significant (Evans and Folks, 1979, pp35-37).
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Finally, Rodriguez concluded that while F A S B 8 caused short term variations in
earnings due to adjustments in inventory (usually positive) and long term debt (usually
negative), in the long run positive variations tended to exceed negative variations
(1977, p44).

The major criticism of FASB 8 appears to be its abolition of flexibility in the treatm
of foreign currency translation gains and losses (Editorial Commentary, 1976, p7;
Merjos, 1976, pll; Evans & Folks, 1979, p33; Rodriguez, 1977, p40). This in itself
m a y not have been a problem, however, as already indicated, F A S B 8 required all
gains and losses to be reported in the profit and loss account in the period in which
the change in foreign exchange rate occurred. In a world offluctuatingcurrencies,
this meant that reported profit would alsofluctuatein accordance with the changes in
exchange rates.

It appears, however, that the abolition of flexibility argument is not entirely valid.
Evans and Folks report that prior to F A S B 8 the majority of firms included in their
survey already recognised gains and losses in current income. O n the other hand,
there was evidence offlexibilityin accounting for gains and losses with some 37 per
cent of respondents adopting deferral options under unspecified criteria (1979, pp3536). In addition, research suggests the treatment of gains and losses prescribed by
F A S B 8 did cause earnings fluctuations but only on an interim basis (Editorial
Commentary, 1976; Merjos, 1976, 1977; Rodriguez, 1977; Copeland and Ingram,
1978; Griffin, 1979).

From a survey of 40 companies reportedly significantly affected by FASB 8, Merjos
concluded in December 1976 that the impact of F A S B 8 had been "considerable in all
cases" (1976, p24). O f particular concern, according to Merjos, was the lack of
comparability within companies from year to year. American Brands, for example,
reported a $26 million foreign currency loss in 1976 compared with a $6.1 million
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gain in 1975 (1976, p24). Similarresultswere reported by a number of companies
including A r m c o Steel, Continental Group, Exxon, Heinz, Xerox (1976, pp24-26). In
a follow up survey in 1977, Merjos found while the impact of F A S B 8 continued to
be "substantial" on a short term basis for the 1976-1977 year, it tended to be "benign"
(1977, pll). In some cases, companies reporting foreign currency losses on a
quarterly basis in 1976, reported gains for the same period in 1977. Other companies
continued to report losses but in many cases, reported losses were substantially
reduced. The 1977 Merjos survey showed, for example, that F W

Woolworth

reported a $3.6 million loss in the quarter to April 1976 compared with a $5 million
gain in the like 1977 quarter (pi 1).

An earlier study of 70 US multinationals conducted by Rodriguez showed the impact
of F A S B 8 was not substantial for the majority of firms adopting its provisions in
1975. A comparison of reported earnings after application of F A S B 8 in 1975 was
made with pre-FASB 8 (1974)results.Only 23, less than one third, of the surveyed
companiesreporteda significant impact on earnings. The impact of F A S B 8 on ten of
those companies was less than 5 per cent of earnings for the year and, in many cases,
the impact was positive. O n the other hand, one company reported a negative impact
of 38 per cent (1977, p41).

As with inventory, non-current assets and long term debt, the extent of the impact on
profit patterns of immediate recognition of gains and losses depends on the
composition of the balance sheet which again raises the question of the efficacy of
management policies. However, Merjos contends F A S B 8 will have little if any
impact in the long term because positive and negative adjustments will offset each
other (1976, p25; 1977, p22).
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FASB

8, Share Prices and Foreign Investment

A s already demonstrated, the results of studies into the impact of F A S B 8 have
generallyrefutedthe concerns expressed about its effect on income variations at least
in the long term. Similar conclusions have been made concerning share prices and
returns and foreign investment Four of the studies examined by Griffin found no
statistically significant impact on security returns beyond the 5 per cent level of
probability (1979, pl2). Where lower returns were found, for example, the Dukes
study showed lower returns in 1975-76 for companies with substantial foreign
interests compared with companies with similarriskbut smaller foreign interests, the
weakening U S dollar could have been as m u c hresponsibleas F A S B 8 (1978 pl02).

Shank, Murdock and Dillard provided evidence to support this hypothesis. Their
study showed decliningreturnsand declining price/earningsratiosfor firms in general
not just multinationals (1979, p90). Similarly, the study

by Shank, Dillard and

Murdock found some evidence to suggest that multinational companies lost market
favour after F A S B 8 was issued (p90). However, as with declining returns, it is
possible these were caused by economic factors such as "...floatingexchange rates,
volatile foreign inflation rates, taxation of foreign-source earnings and widespread
politicalratherthan by accounting considerations" (p90).

From the foregoing, it is evident that FASB 8 did not have adverse economic
consequences. It is somewhat puzzling, therefore, that in 1979 the F A S B abandoned
its previously firm stance on the appropriateness of F A S B 8 and appointed a task
force to consider amendments to it (News, 1979, pl2). It is even more puzzling when
two of the research studies cited above, Dukes and Evans, Folks and Jilling, were
sponsored by the F A S B itself and refuted claims that F A S B 8 had adverse economic
consequences on companies caught by its provisions.
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The Demise of FASB

8 - An Explanation?

The impetus for change appears to have been initiation of a research programme in
April 1977 into the economic consequences of F A S B standards issued to date and a
decision in M a y 1978 to institute post enactment review of those standards. The
FASB's concern at the criticism aimed at F A S B 8 is evident considering two of four
projects initiated and funded by the Board in 1977 dealt with F A S B 8. As already
discussed, the study undertaken by Dukes found F A S B 8 had no significant impact
The second study, The Impact of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 8 on
die Foreign Risk Management

Practices of American Multinationals: An Economic

Impact Study, was undertaken by Evans, Folks and Jilling. The Evans and Folks
paper, previously cited, was based on this study and, as already indicated, found there
had been an increase inriskmanagement practices adopted by multinationals in the
wake of F A S B 8 (1979). However, Evans, Folks and Jilling were unable to come to a
conclusion regarding the economic impact of these practices (News, 1979, p22).
Given that FASB-sponsored research did not support the claims of adverse
consequences arising from F A S B 8, it must be concluded that there was another cause
for the FASB's actions. That cause appears to have been pressure from management
and suggests that actual economic consequences are not as important as perceived
consequences. Additional research supports this.

In response to the FASB's post enactment review process, some 205 written
submissions were received (Evans and Folks, 1979, p41). Most of the submissions
were critical of F A S B 8 (Evans and Folks, 1979, p41; Flower, 1981, p303).
Furthermore, whilst the market-based studies of Dukes, Evans, Folks and Jilling,
Merjos and Rodriguez (all previously cited) found F A S B 8 had no adverse economic
consequences, opinion-based surveys by Choi et al (1978) and Stanley and Block
(1978) showed that management believed F A S B 8 did have economic consequences.
Furthermore, Evans and Folks (1979, p37-38) and Shank, Dillard and Murdock
(1979, pp86-89) found firms adopted a number of strategies to lessen the perceived
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impact of F A S B 8. The identified strategies included borrowing in weaker currencies,
changes in dividend policy (for example, paying dividends when the domestic
currency of the holding company was weak relative to that of the subsidiary's
domestic currency) and using forward contracts (Evans & Folks, 1979, p37). The
strategies identified by Shank, Dillard and Murdock included altering the source of
debt financing (1979, p86), increased hedging activities in the form of forward
contracts (pp86-87), increased use of outside consultants (p87) and altered
management reporting and control systems (pp87-89). Griffin also found evidence
that firms adopted risk management practices (1979, ppl2,18).

In addition, Shank, Dillard and Murdock found that at least 80 per cent of the firms
in their survey considered thefinancialimpact of F A S B 8 was significant because of
the increase in management time and attention directed towards foreign currency
accounting (1979, p89). However, in light of the minimal direct impact of F A S B 8 on
earnings, share prices and returns, management was not justified in incurring this
expenditure. Griffin also points out that while risk management practices were
adopted, none of the surveys could demonstrate the effect of these practices was
positive (1979, pl8).

It could be speculated that management could have spent resources more productively
by adopting policies in these areas which would take foreign currency variations into
account.

O n the other hand, it could also be speculated that management adopted

risk management policies to demonstrate their concern at F A S B 8 and to use the
expenditure incurred as a lever to persuade the F A S B to provide a more flexible
approach to foreign currency. Evans and Folks found that more than 60 per cent of
firms surveyed wished to have such a flexible approach (1979, p41).

Finally, the influence of management and others is best exemplified by a comment by
F A S B Chairman, Donald Kirk, that the foreign currency issue required "rapid and
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immediate consideration" by the F A S B in response to concerns expressed by
constituents (Journal of Accountancy, 1979a, pp20,22).
Uniformity Abandoned, Diversity Endorsed
A 14-member task force was subsequently appointed to consider amendments to
F A S B 8 (Journal of Accountancy, 1979b, pl2). The outcome of this task force was
an exposure draft Foreign Currency Translation, issued in August, 1980. This
exposure draft abandoned the notion of a uniform approach to accounting for foreign
currency translation. It introduced the concept of "functional currency" as a basis for
determining the application of either the current rate method or the temporal method
and the treatment of translation gains and losses. Briefly, companies are required to
determine the functional currency of foreign subsidiaries on the basis of the
relationship of each subsidiary to the parent company. Where the subsidiary is
independent (self-sustaining), essentially meaning there is no cash flow between
parent and subsidiary, the functional currency of the subsidiary is its o w n domestic
currency. The currentratemethod would be used to translate the subsidiary's financial
statements for purposes of consolidation. Where there is a closerelationshipbetween
the parent and subsidiary such that the subsidiary is effectively an extension of the
parent (an integrated operation), it would be expected that frequent cash flows
between the two entities would occur. The functional currency of the subsidiary
would be the same as that of the parent and the temporal method of translation would
be used.

The determination of the functional currency also determines the disposition of
translation gains and losses. If a subsidiary is independent, gains and losses on
translation are not part of the ordinary operations of the group and are taken to a
foreign currency reserve. Conversely, gains and losses of dependent subsidiaries are
reported in the profit and loss account
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The 1980 exposure draft was revised in response to opinions expressed in submissions
and at a public hearing held in December 1980 (Roberts, 1981, p7). A further
exposure draft was issued in June 1981.

This exposure draft maintained the

functional currency concept but provided, inter alia, for additional guidelines for its
determination. A n e w standard, incorporating the provisions of the 1980 and 1981
exposure drafts, F A S B 52 Foreign Currency Translation, was issued in December
1981.

Management had achieved two things. Firstly, it achieved flexibility in the applicatio
of translation methods to foreign operations.

Secondly, and perhaps more

importantly, for companies adopting the current rate method on the basis that its
subsidiaries were independent or self-sustaining, management had achieved a method
of reporting gains and losses which would tend to show gains rather than losses even
if the domestic currency was weak compared to the currencies of foreign subsidiaries.
This arises because, under the current rate method, the risk associated with currency
fluctuations is measured in terms of the net investment or net assets of the subsidiary.
This figure is usually positive which means a foreign currency translation gain would
be reported. Whether a gain or loss was recorded, the profit and loss account is not
affected because the activities of self-sustaining operations are not considered as part
of the operations of the group and are therefore taken to a foreign currency
fluctuationreserve.O n the other hand, the temporal method, which would be
appropriate for companies whose subsidiaries were classified as integrated, measures
risk in terms of net monetary assets. For a net borrower, net monetary assets would
be negative and a foreign currency translation loss would be recorded when the parent
company's domestic currency weakensrelativeto that of the subsidiary. W h e n the
functional currency of the subsidiary is deemed to be the domestic currency of the
parent foreign currency translation gains and losses are included in the calculation of
profit or loss. It is obvious that management could have a clear incentive to classify
subsidiaries as self-sustaining.
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Due Process or Survival
While mis result could be seen as the working of due process procedures, it is also
consistent with the thesis of this study. The accountancy profession is prepared to
compromise its o w n principles in order to maintain its hegemonic domination of the
standard setting process. A s discussed in Chapter 5, dissidence and resistance can
threaten domination particularly where those w h o are dissatisfied have an alternative.
B y ignoring management's unjustified behaviour with regard to accounting for foreign
currency, the F A S B ran the risk of a repeat of the investment tax credit and business
combinations issues and a management lobby to the government. Should this occur
and management achieve its purpose, as it did in the past, the F A S B could have
suffered the fate of its predecessor, the A P B , and been replaced with yet another
profession-sponsored standard setting body.

Alternatively, in the face of what

probably would have been a very public conflict the government m a y have opted to
have the S E C exercise its mandate and take over the setting of accounting standards.
The profession stood to lose no matter which way it jumped and, perhaps, a flexible
standard, suitably justified on theoretical grounds, was the lesser of the two evils. In
other words, discretion was the better part of valour and rather than simply
capitulating, the F A S B attempted to use theoretical arguments to justify its actions
even though the major argument used was a direct contradiction of the philosophy
underlying F A S B 8.

The release of FASB 52 could also be seen as an associative strategy. It appears the
F A S B initially was determinedtoretainF A S B 8 in the face of arguments that it would
produce income volatiUty. According to the chairman of the committee responsible
for the development of F A S B 8, it was anticipated that earnings would be volatile
under the provisions of the standard when foreign currency rates fluctuated widely.
However, the F A S B obviously considered users offinancialstatements were entitled
to k n o w the impact of foreign investment when exchange rates changed:
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It's not the function of accounting to minimise reported
fluctuations in earnings. Past rate changes are historical facts, and
the Board believes that users of financial statements are best
served by recognising exchange gains or losses when they occur.
O n the contrary, it's the deferring or spreading of those gains and
losses that is artificial . . . (Donald Kirk, cited in Forbes, 1976,
p40)

It appears the Board still adhered to this view two years later
... the Board does not perceive that smoothing fluctuations in
reported earnings should be a function of accounting standards,
and S F A S 8 explicitlyreflectsthat view. There is no question that
S F A S 8 has increased the potential for volatility in earnings. That
was a conscious decision made by the Board (Donald Kirk, cited
by Copeland & Ingram, 1978, pl6).

Perhaps in making this conscious decision and then maintaining it in the face of
mounting criticism the FASB was attempting to demonstrate both its superior
accounting skill and knowledge and its domination of the standard setting process.
When the criticism did not abate, the possibility of management withdrawing its
support for the FASB meant that action had to be taken to regain or maintain that
support FASB 52 was a means of doing this. Nonetheless, the contentious nature
of the issue and the FASB's response is highlighted by the fact that FASB 52 was
passed by a bare majority of 4 to 3.

In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising the A A R F deferred further consideration
of the foreign currency issue pending the outcome of the deliberations in the USA,
UK and Canada (Stevenson, 1980, plO). Furthermore, FASB 52 was in line with the
provisions of ED 27 Accounting for Foreign Currency Translations issued in the UK
by the Accounting Standards Committee in October 1980. It was also similar to
recommendations considered by the IASC in 1980. The profession in Canada was
also undertaking a review of its foreign currency standard, Section 1650 Translation
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of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements
which was similar to E D 1979.

Australia, Isomorphism & ED 1983

Despite the emergence of what was clearly an international consensus of opinion, the
reluctance of the Australian standard setters to come to a decision is evidenced by the
elapse of 3 years before a further exposure draft was issued. (It should, however, be
recalled that the early 1980's saw the establishment of the A S R B and a considerable
amount of the profession's energy during this time was devoted to its battle with the
government over copyright to existing standards and the functions of the A S R B .
Obviously, setting accounting standards took a back seat to the battle over dominance
of the standard setting process.)

In 1981, a report on AARF Standards Research speculated that a revised standard
would be issued incorporating provisions similar to those specified in the U S , U K and
I A S C exposure drafts (Roberts, 1981, plO). The September 1983 progress report
stated that work on an Australian exposure draft was "well advanced" following
progress on the topic by standard setters in the U S A , U K , Canada and the I A S C
(Stevenson, 1983c, p530).

A n exposure draft, Foreign Currency Translation,

(hereafterreferredto as E D 1983) was issued in September 1983. A s predicted, it
closely followed the approach of overseas standards and adopted the functional
currency approach. However, as with E D 1979, E D 1983 followed the Canadian
approach to foreign currency transactions as opposed to foreign statement translation
and permitted the deferral and amortisation of gains and losses. This method was also
acceptable under the I A S C standard. Both the U S and U K standards required
immediate recognition of these items in the profit and loss account
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ED 1973,1979 & 1983 Compared
A s with F A S B 8 and F A S B 52, E D 1979 and E D 1983 expressed different objectives
of translation. E D 1979 was based on the premise that the underlying accounting
principles adopted in the preparation of the foreign subsidiary's financial statements
should be the same after translation as before (paragraph 25). The current rate
method was explicitlyrejectedbecause it did not achieve this purpose (Appendix 1).
E D 1983, on the other hand, adopted the view that the translation method used
should "reflect the financial and other operationalrelationshipswhich exist between
the reporting entity and its foreign operations". This objective justified the use of
different accounting methods in different circumstances (paragraph 14). Clearly, as
with the standards issued in other countries, all semblance of uniformity in practice
was foregone except that the exposure draft further stated that self-sustaining
operations were expected to be more c o m m o n than integrated operations (paragraph
19). Just w h y this expectation existed was not explained but it appears there was no
empirical justification for it In an article explaining the exposure draft, the then
director of the A A R F stated
It will ... be interesting to see whether integrated foreign
operations are more c o m m o n in Australia than has been found to
be the case overseas (Stevenson, 1983d, p707).

As will be discussed in more detail later, there is evidence to suggest that in the
absence of quantitative guidelines, U S multi-nationals have deliberately weighted the
criteria to enable subsidiaries to qualify as self-sustaining. This would suggest that
self-sustaining operations are not as c o m m o n as the A A R F asserted them to be.

By advocating the current rate method, the standard setters had returned to the
position adopted in E D
accounting, E D

1973.

However, whereas E D

1973 rejected reserve

1983 permitted translation gains and losses for setf-sustaining

operations to be accounted for through a "foreign currency translation reserve"
434

(paragraph 18). Because the foreign operation does not expose the parent company
to foreign exchange risk on a day to day basis, foreign exchange gains and losses
relating to a self-sustaining operation are only of significance when the interest in the
subsidiary is reduced through sale, liquidation, dilution of interest or other capital
transactions ( E D 1983, paragraphs 18 & 39). Where such a reduction occurs, an
adjustment to thereservem a y be m a d e through the profit and loss account (paragraph
39). This approach is a de facto "deferral untilrealisation"concept which was
rejected by Lorensen (1972) and Parkinson (1972) and in previous Australian
exposure drafts:
... the inclusion of the total gain or loss in the results of one
period, ie. the period of settlement, can cause distortion of the
resultreportedfor that period ( E D 1979, paragraph 14).

In addition, this approach would mean that gains and losses would offset each other
over time and would have an impact on shareholders' equity which was also rejected
in E D 1979 (paragraph 17).

O n e further deficiency of the exposure draft in this

regard is that it did not provide for a dilution of interest arising from operating losses
(Jansz, 1984, p40,41).

ED 1983 overcame one of the perceived deficiencies in ED 1979 by providing for the
treatment of hedge contracts (paragraphs 22 - 36; 56 - 62). However, the provisions
were not altogether without flaw. For example, Jansz argued that the exposure draft
permitted management to hide speculative dealings (1984, pp40-41). The rationale
behind this argument is based on the concept of a self-sustaining foreign operation
which, by definition, does not expose the parent company to foreign exchange risk on
a day to day basis (paragraph 15). If this is the case, then hedging the net investment
in a self-sustaining operation could be nothing more than a speculative transaction.
Therefore, Jansz argues that management should be required to disclose the hedge
activity. This issue was also raised in a submission on E D 1983. However, paragraph
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1 of the exposure draft specifically excludes speculative dealings which would mean
that if hedging a self-sustaining operation is purely speculative, it is not covered by the
standard anyway.

A further inconsistency lies in the separate transaction philosophy underlying the
treatment of short term monetary and long term monetary items. Paragraph 8 states
and paragraph 10 implies that the purchase of an asset and exchange differences
arising from the financing of those assets are two separate transactions. Therefore,
exchange differences should not be included in the measurement of the relevant assets.
The separate transaction concept, however, is not applied to hedges of specific
commitments relating to the price of goods or services to be purchased or sold
(paragraph 29 (a)). E D 1979 specifically proscribed the offsetting of deferred gains
and losses in the balance sheet (paragraph 19). E D 1983 did not include this
provision and allowed for the offset of gains and losses arising on hedging
transactionsrelatingto foreign currency payables and receivables against the relevant
monetary item (paragraphs 29, 31).

ED 1979 (paragraph 4(g)) also included a definition of "settlement date" which was
relevant to the amortisation of long term monetary items. E D 1983 continued to
permit the defer and amortise option but did not provide a definition of "settlement".
Instead, E D 1983 permitted the defer and amortise option on long term monetary
items having "fixed or ascertainable lives" (paragraph 10). Exchange differences on
such items were to be amortised on a "systematic basis over the remaining life of the
monetary item". However, E D 1983 failed to define "remaining life of the monetary
item" which left open the possibility of never bringing exchange differences to account
by rolling-over the debt. The implications of this will be discussed in more detail in
relationtothe A W A v Daniels case.
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E D 1979 required deferred gains and losses to be shown as intangibles in the balance
sheet (paragraphs 17 and 18). E D 1983 paragraphs 10 and 11 also required gains and
losses on long term monetary items to be deferred and shown as either deferred
income or deferred expenses. The deficiencies of the defer and amortise option
outlined previously were still valid and continued to be an area of contention until the
option was withdrawn in 1987.

ED 1983 and Lobbying Activities
The submissions received in response to E D 1983 are enlightening in that they
suggest the validity of the research undertaken by Coombes and Stokes (1985),
Morris (1986) and Gavens, Carnegie and Gibson (1989) that standard setters are
influenced by submissions received. A total of 38 written submissions were received.
Responses to the exposure draft were broadly classified as industry (13), individual
(9), accountancy firm (7), government/regulatory bodies (5), professional association
(2) and other (2).

The question of the treatment of gains and losses on short term and long term
monetary items featured strongly in the submissions. With regard to short term
monetary items, thirteen respondents considered gains and losses on short term
monetary items should always be brought to account in the profit and loss account as
incurred. Nine submissions disagreed. T w o of these were qualified in that the
respondents did not think gains should be brought to account. A third submission
considered gains and losses should be included in the cost of purchases. This could be
seen as a vote for the concept of qualifying assets introduced in A A S 20 and Release
406. Fifteen respondents m a d e no comment on this issue.

On the issue of long term monetary items, only ten respondents agreed that gains or
losses should always be deferred and amortised over the remaining life of the relevant
item. Twenty respondents disagreed but there was not universal agreement on h o w
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these items should be treated. The majority considered gains and losses should be
recognised immediately. O n e indicated a preference for reserve accounting and two
were clearly in favour of a flexible approach.

The third question addressed in ED 1983 appears to be what gave rise to the
introduction of the concept of qualifying assets. It asked whether exchange gains or
losses on short term and long term monetary items should ever be included in the cost
of the asset This question is in direct contradiction of paragraph 8 of the exposure
draft which, as discussed previously, adopts the view that the purchase of the asset
and its financing are two separate transactions.

Ten respondents indicated a

preference for this treatment Six disagreed while one wanted a flexible approach.
The majority of submissions did not respond to this question.

One industry submission argued strongly for the inclusion of gains and losses on long
term monetary items to be included in die measurement of an asset which has been
financed by overseas borrowings if the relationship between the two could be
positively identified. The basis of the argument was that if interest on overseas
borrowings could be capitalised up until the commencement of production, then gains
or losses on overseas borrowings should also be capitalised and amortised over the
life of the project

A counter argument was put forward in a submission from an individual who argued
that there was a difference between interest and gains and losses on overseas
borrowings. Australian companies did not have to raise finance in other countries.
W h e n they did, they were effectively speculating on movements in the foreign
currency. Therefore, companies should account for the economic consequences of
their decisions. However, the industry argument w o n the day. The concept of
qvialifying assets was introduced in A A S 20 and its A S R B identical twin, Release 406
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Foreign Currency Translation, and became part of accounting for foreign currency
transactions.
Foreign Currency Management, Financial Disclosure & Criticism
E D 1983 wasreferredback to the A A R F for further consideration. It was to be 1985
before an accounting standard was issued.

Surprisingly, after all the years of

indetermination, two foreign currency standards were issued in 1985. In the interim,
the profession was criticised for its lack of progress on the issue. S o m e measure of
the dissatisfaction with the profession was given when the N C S C took matters into its
o w n hands and issued a practice note dealing with foreign exchange disclosure.

The increase in foreign trade and raising of foreign debt and the inherent risks were
also being recognised. O n e of the successes of the time was B H P . The Australian
Financial Review of April 4, 1984 carried the headline, "BHP's Quiet $700 Million
Foreign Exchange Coup" (Hubbard, 1984a, pi). The article clearly highlighted the
risks involved in foreign currency dealings also the need for a high level of skill, not to
mention, luck:
The operation involved highly secret deals in the local market to
avoid spooking already nervy forex traders and pushing the
exchange rate against the company, followed by a complex series
of short-term investments with more than 22 Asian banks, and
finally the marshalling of all the funds and transferring them to
N e w York (pi).

The lack of disclosure in financial statements of foreign currency gains and losses wa
also causing concern particularly given the amounts involved as well as the risk.
Bond Corporation for example, was challenged by the N C S C for failing to disclose
foreign exchange losses. Bond Corporation argued that foreign exchange losses were
included in the calculation of profit but were not disclosed separately because they
were not material (Buduls, 1985a, p58). O n efinancialjournalist questioned whether
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Bond Corporation was consistently and precisely applying existing accounting rules
for the determination of profit (Coombe, 1985a, p52).

Robert Gottliebsen also levelled criticism at the profession for "dithering" and fail
to produce a foreign currency accounting standard (1985a, p6).

Gottliebsen

contended that the delay in producing a foreign currency standard was because there
were too many people to please (1985b, p6). In commenting on paper foreign
currency losses of $200 million and $50 million for C S R and Bond Corporation
respectively, Gottliebsen added
Neither has seen the light of a profit and loss account. I suspect
that there will be other paper losses which, if no rules are set, will
be festering away on corporate balance sheets (1985a, p6).

During the early months of 1985, the value of the Australian dollar deteriorated by 20
per cent B y July 1985, the devaluation stood at 25 per cent (Bushnell, 1985, pi). As
a result many Australian companies showed increasing foreign currency losses
(Mackay, 1985, p59). O n e such company was Santos which increased its estimate of
foreign currency losses from $86 million to $300 million (Loudon, 1985, p64).
Santos clearly was not alone. Statisticsreleasedby the Australian Bureau of Statistics
in July 1985 showed that Australian companies had lost more than $3800 million on
foreign borrowings since the Australian dollar began its decline in February 1985
(McCrann, 1985, p25).

At the end of July 1985, the NCSC released a practice note dealing with disclosure of
foreign currency transactions. O n issuing the practice note, the N C S C said it was
concerned with the diversity of accounting and disclosure policies with regard to
foreign currency dealings and the impact these practices had on reported results
(Wilson, 1985, p40; Bushnell, 1985, pi; Uren, 1985, pl3). In taking this action, the
N C S C demonstrated its irritation with the profession's failure to produce a standard
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by pointing out that an exposure draft was issued in 1979 but that a standard was
unlikely to emerge before the end of 1985 (Bushnell, 1985, pi). Even when the
profession's long awaited standard did materialise, it was not have immediate
application (Wilson, 1985, p40).

The move by the NCSC was seen by some as an intrusion into a profession dominated
area. For example, one commenter stated
The practice note is likely to provoke a controversy in accounting
circles as it is the boldest step the commission has yet made into
theterritoryof accounting standards, which the accounting bodies
regard as their o w n legitimate preserve (Uren, 1985, pl3).

The profession's response, as expressed through the then executive director of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Vic Prosser, was to defend its o w n
lack of progress on two grounds. First, E D 1979 was issued shortly before "a change
in world accounting andreporting"(ie. from the temporal method to the current rate
method). Given the need for consistency between Australian and overseas standards,
the A A R F did not proceed with E D 1979. Second, the profession's standard setting
machinery had been "held up" by the establishment of the A S R B (Prosser, 1985, pi5).
Prosser also criticised the N C S C for introducing another source of accounting
requirements for financial reporting (pi5).
The Profession Responds - Release 402
Perhaps to avoid the situation where preparers of financial statements were required
to adhere to rules set by the A A R F , the A S R B , the stock exchange and n o w the
N C S C , the A S R B issued A S R B 1003: Foreign Exchange Disclosure. A S R B 1003
was the NCSC's practice note in a slightly modified form. Another likely explanation
for the rapidreleaseof A S R B 1003 is that the profession did not wish to have the
N C S C seen as usurping its position as the source of accounting standards and
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practices even if the NCSC's practice note was based on the profession's o w n
exposure draft dealing with the issue. S o m e support for this contention is that the
NCSC's practice note was issued late in July 1985. A S R B 1003 was approved a mere
two months later. The A S R B went through itsregularreviewprocess of issuing an
exposure draft Release 402 Foreign Exchange - Disclosure, for public comment
There was little time for considered comment or for analysis of comments. Release
402 was issued in August with a closing date for comment being September 16.
A S R B 1003 was approved on September 27. In the history of the promulgation of
Australian accounting standards, particularly on the foreign currency issue, this is
extraordinary to say the least even if A S R B 1003 was only an interim measure!

In spite of the decidedly short time allowed for comment, the ASRB received 36
submissions. Equalrepresentationcame from companies and chartered accountancy
firms with ten submissions being received from each classification. Five submissions
came from universities or colleges. The remaining submissions came from individuals,
insurance companies, superannuation funds, directors' groups and the Securities
Institute.

The major criticism (more than half of the respondents) was that Release 402 was
confined to disclosure. M a n y of those critical of the proposed standard on this basis
(approximately one third) considered its requirements were already covered in
existing accounting standards (eg. A A S 6

Accounting Policies: Determination,

Application and Disclosure and A A S 5 Materiality in Financial Statements),
Schedule 7 (now Schedule 5) and the N C S C practice note. In other words, the
standard was redundant. Others considered that as the standard only dealt with
disclosure, it did not meet the evaluative criteria of Release 100. However, a
c o m m o n response was that the proposed standard was a necessary interim measure
pending thereleaseand approval of the profession's standard, A A S 20.
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The financial press also questioned the necessity for the standard, particularly as it
would not apply for some months (Coombe, 1985b, p24). A n alternative, according
to one journalist would have been to amend Schedule 7 to include the provisions of
A S R B 1003 (Coombe, 1985b, p24). This option would no doubt have been quite
valid given that Schedule 7 already provided extensively for disclosure and format of
the profit and loss account and balance sheet

However, one wonders if the

profession would not have seen this as an even more dangerous intrusion into their
domain. The profession had already made overtures to the N C S C to scrap Schedule 7
andreplaceits contents with approved accounting standards (Masel, 1983, p549).

AAS 20 Foreign Currency Translation was issued by the professional bodies in
October 1985. A proposed approved accounting standard, Release 406, Foreign
Currency Translation was issued by the A S R B two months later. Release 406
contained identical provisions to A A S 20 (Release 406). The issue of Release 406
was the beginning of yet another marathon battle over disclosure and measurement of
foreign currency transactions. O n e of the major areas of contention was the treatment
of foreign currency gains and losses on long term debt. The controversy was not as
heated as that surrounding the temporal versus current rate method but it successfully
delayed A S R B approval of A A S 20 for almost two years.
AAS 20 and Release 406 - The Defer & Amortise Saga
In response to Release 406, the ASRB collated 39 submissions. Of these, a total of
35 submissions were actually analysed. Of the remaining four, two submissions were
missing and two recorded in the 39 figure were duplicates. From a review of these
submissions, the most contentious aspect of Release 406 was the definition of
"settlement". E D 1979 contained a brief definition of "settlement date" meaning
... the date on which a receivable is, or is due to be collected, or
a payable is, or is due to be, paid (paragraph 4 (g)).
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A s already discussed, E D 1983 did not define either "settlement" or "settlement date".

The concern with Release 406 was that it required any unamortised gain or loss on
long term monetary items to be brought to account in the determination of profit or
loss in the year in which "settlement" occurred (clause .13). Settlement was defined
as
(i) extinguishment by repayment (in currency or otherwise), except where
the monetary item is immediately rolled over within an existing
formalised credit arrangement containing a firm commitment to
continue to provide funds at least equal to the amount of the monetary
item rolled over; or,
(ii) remission; or
(iii) uncollectability (of a receivable)

Part (i) of this definition meant that the defer and amortise option was available wher
a loan w a s rolled over but not where there was a renegotiation or re-financing of debt
This was apparently a departure from therestrictivereleaseexposure draft of A A S 20
issued for confidential comment in April 1985. According to one submission, the
definition of settlement in that draft included "reconstruction by renegotiation of
terms". O f the 35 submissions reviewed, 19rejectedthis definition and argued that a
renegotiation or re-financing of debt should be treated in the same manner as a
rollover. In general, those w h o disagreed with the definition of settlement and the
treatment of unamortised gains and losses which flowed from it, considered that the
n e w facility should continue to be amortised. There was some disagreement over the
appropriate period of amortisation but the most favoured time span was over the
shorter of the original and n e w life of the monetary item. The major arguments
presented in favour of this approach centred on economic consequences and
commercial reality. M a n y respondents argued that the international m o n e y market
was becoming increasingly sophisticated and a wide variety of credit arrangements
and facilities were emerging. The provisions of Release 406 were likely to deter
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management from taking advantage of alternative credit facilities offering lower
interest rates because of the impact on the profit and loss account of bringing
unamortised gains or losses on the old arrangement to account. In addition, some
respondents considered Release 406 would limit access to major sources of capital as
well as increase the cost of borrowing.

Some respondents noted that the standard made no attempt to justify the defer and
amortise method and failed to provide detailed guidelines on the amortisation method
to be used. A s discussed in connection with E D 1979, the defer and amortise method
is a form of income smoothing. This point was also raised with regard to the
provisions of Release 406.

As already discussed, a common disagreement with the defer and amortise method
and the treatment of deferred gains and losses is the classification of these items in the
balance sheet Five submissions disagreed with these items being shown as assets
(deferred losses) and liabilities (deferred gains).

The arguments against this

classification were based on the failure of deferred gains and losses to meet the
criteria for assets and liabilities which meant that balance sheets and financial ratios
would be misleading.

There was not, however, universal agreement on the

appropriate treatment of these gains and losses.

There were three suggested

solutions: immediate recognition in the profit and loss account; allocation to a reserve
as part of shareholders' equity; and disclosure as intangible items as indicated as
appropriate in the commentary of E D 1979.

One justification for the adoption of the defer and amortise method appears to be a
contradiction of views expressed by respondents to E D 1979. Uther's study of E D
1979 submissions revealed a marked inclination to follow overseas practice,
particularly that in the U S A (1983).

S o m e respondents to Release 406 considered

that the immediate recognition of gains and losses on long term monetary items as
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prescribed by the U S A and U K standards was not valid in the Australian situation.
The reasons being that Australia is an importer of capital and also that the Australian
dollar was a minor currency on world markets. Both of these factors put Australian
companies in a different position to companies in the U S A or the U K . This is yet
another example of attempts to influence accounting practice on the basis of
expediency rather than logic.

Harmonisation with other countries was a valid

argument when the result was aflexiblestandard, that is, the choice between selfsustaining and integrated operations which had the added advantage of minimising the
impact of foreign exchangefluctuationson accounting profit.

However, it would

seem that harmonisation was not acceptable when it had the potential to reduce
discretion and causefluctuationsin profit figures.
Further Criticism of AAS 20
A A S 20 also attracted attention in the academic and financial press. For example, in
the Chartac Accounting Report of April 1986, it was claimed opposition to and
support of the standard was in a ratio of 6:1 (1986, pl8). The basis of this opposition
was not disclosed. However, it was further claimed that the standard would mean
that many Australian companies would be forced to change accounting methods and
the cost of this change would be borne by shareholders (pi8). In February 1986, The
Australian Financial Review reported the results of research which supported the
second of these claims (Ansley, 1986, p25). A paper detailing the research and its
findings was published in 1990 (Taylor, Tress & Johnson, 1990).

Taylor et al analysed the annual reports of 200 of Australia's largest companies (by
market capitalisation) and found that in 1982/83, ninety-one of these companies had
foreign subsidiaries (1990, p8). Forty-six of these companies accounted for gains and
losses through the profit and loss account (p4). Under A A S 20, such gains or losses
would be allocated to a foreign currency translation reserve. This was the treatment
adopted by 45 of the companies surveyed (p4). The researchers' claim to The
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Australian Financial Review that those companies which accounted for gains and
losses in the profit and loss account would be forced to change accounting methods
was apparently based on the assumption that their subsidiaries would all be selfsustaining operations. Kevin Stevenson, as director of the A A R F , questioned this
assumption and argued that if the subsidiaries were integrated operations, there would
be no need to change accounting methods (Ansley, 1986, p25). This is something of
a contradiction on Stevenson's part given that w h e n E D 1979 wasreleased,he stated
that the subsidiaries of most Australian companies would be self-sustaining. Neither
Stevenson nor the researchers pointed out that A A S 20 provided no quantitative
guidelines to distinguish between integrated and self-sustaining operations. This left
companies with the opportunity to weight the criteria to achieve the classification
most suited to their purposes. Research in the U S A where F A S B 52 does not provide
quantitative guidelines to facilitate identification of self-sustaining or integrated
operations supports this view (Doupnik & Evans, 1988).

Taylor, Tress and Johnson argued that given the complexity of accounting for
integrated operations, it was a "safe bet" all the companies surveyed by them would
classify their subsidiaries as self-sustaining (Ansley, 1986, p25). The implication is
that A A S 20 promotes flexibility in the classification of subsidiaries depending on
management's objectives. According to Taylor et al companies had "economic"
reasons for selecting whether to allocate translation gains and losses to reserves or
take them into determination of profit (Ansley, 1986, p25). Reserve accounting was
more likely to be selected if:

1. translation gains or losses were large relative to operating income
2. the company was large so that wide income fluctuations due to
currency variations were likely to attract adverse political attention
3. the company auditor had international affiliations
4. the company had a broad based share holding
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N o n e of these reasons provide a theoretical justification for using a particular
accounting method. The researchers also found that "almost all large companies"
used the current rate to translate financial statements of subsidiaries (Ansley, 1986,
p25). This provides a further reason w h y these companies would wish to classify
subsidiaries as self-sustaining. Furthermore, as already discussed, the self-sustaining
method of translation is more likely toresultin a translation gain than a loss because it
is measured in terms of net assets which would tend to be positive. However, the
rationale underlying the setf-sustaining method is that the subsidiary does not expose
the parent company to foreign exchange risk on a day to day basis and, therefore, it is
not appropriate to include exchange gains and losses in the profit of the group

The treatment of unrealised gains and losses on foreign debt was also the subject of
discussion. The ever increasing propensity for companies to raise foreign debt and the
decline of the Australian dollar, as illustrated in Figures 1 to 4 in the appendix, meant
that the treatment of these gains and losses (usually losses) was becoming a more
important issue than the method used for translating the financial statements of
foreign subsidiaries.
The Definition of Settlement, Renegotiated Debt & Rollovers
In The Chartered Accountant in Australia of June 1986, the definition of "settlement"
in A A S 20 was the subject of discussion by John Miles, chairman of the Accounting
Standards Board (Miles, 1986). A s discussed in relation to submissions in response
to Release 406, more than half of the respondents wanted this definition modified to
include renegotiation orre-financingof debt as well as rollovers. According to Miles,
the rollover exception in the definition of "settlement" was included "following a
number of submissions" (1986, p31). It seems, however, that the A A R F had backed
away from an even more permissive approach which would have extended the
rollover exclusion torenegotiationof terms of loans. The renegotiation of terms was
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part of the definition of settlement in the exposure draft of A A S 20 restrictively
circulated for comment in April 1985 (Submission on Release 406). Miles did not
provide explicit details of w h y therenegotiationexclusion was dropped. S o m e of the
problems with the rollover exclusion were outlined which help explain the A A R F s
reluctance to extend the exclusion torenegotiationor re-financing. These problems
included the possibility that the rollover m a y be in another currency, another facility,
with another lender and m a y not follow immediately after settlement of the original
debt (1986, p32). A s the analysis of submissions on Release 406 has already
indicated, commercial reality was a c o m m o n ground for extending the rollover
exclusion to renegotiation and re-financing. Miles acknowledged the arguments
appeared reasonable but there was no simple answer (1986, p32). The picture was
further clouded by the fact there was no clear consensus as to the treatment of foreign
exchange gains and losses on long term debt.

However, the view towards

"settlement" adopted by the Accounting Standards Board appears to have been that
while the defer and amortise option was justified in terms of the matching concept, it
was more difficult to extend the argument to what was effectively a n e w loan (Miles,
1986, p32).

A lobby of 14 companies headed by Western Mining Corporation approached the
A A R F in a bid to have the "settlement" definition extended but failed (Newsitems,
1986, pi8). The Accounting Standards Board maintained there was no precedent for
the treatment of renegotiated or re-financed loans in the accounting standards of other
countries or in terms of generally accepted accounting principles dealing with realised
gains and losses (pi9). This is a valid attitude but it casts some doubt on the A A R F s
adherence to the defer and amortise approach which had only marginal support in
international accounting standards.

The introduction of the concept of a qualifying asset in AAS 20 and Release 406
appears to have slipped in unnoticed and unchallenged.
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Foreign Debt (Mis) Management

- Diversity in Disclosure

During 1986, the vagaries of the foreign exchange market and the losses incurred by
companies were beginning to raise questions about the propriety of the defer and
amortise approach. A n article in the Business Review Weekly of August 29, 1986
highlighted the inherent problems with the deferral and amortisation of gains and
losses on foreign debt (Thomas, 1986a, pl25).

The article reported that Alcan

Australia had written-off $69 million of its unamortised foreign exchange losses
incurred on overseas borrowings. Comments by Alcan's finance controller support
the view expressed that the defer and amortise approach permitted management to
conceal increasing foreign exchange losses:
Our treatment may well bring into the open a problem among
companies that previously has been hidden away (cited by
Thomas, 1986a, pl25).

Thomas went on to note that in terms of the defer and amortise approach, AAS 20
was not consistent with U K and U S standards and was
. . . looking increasingly controversial, especially with many big
companies about to enter a recessionary phase with their balance
sheet strength already eroded by injudicious overseas funding
(pl25).

The difference in treatment of deferred losses by CSR and CRA discussed earlier in
the chapter add further evidence of the doubtful validity of the defer and amortise
approach. A s Thomas also noted, C S R had written-off $400 million in foreign
exchange losses earlier in 1986 (pl26). In September 1986, another journalist D o u g
Jukes, described A A S 20 as a "lenient standard" because it permitted the deferral and
amortisation of unrealised losses which was "out of kilter" with overseas practice
where gains and losses on long term monetary items are written-off as incurred (1986,
pl44). Jukes also claimed "confusion reigns" because some companies were writing450

off the "now c o m m o n " losses to clear the deck so to speak before A A S 20 became
operational at October 31, 1986 (pl44). There would have been less confusion if all
companies were using the same method but this was not the case. Alcan wrote its
losses off to reserves (Thomas, 1986a, pi25; Jukes, 1986, pi46). Other companies,
including C R A , Comalco and C S R wrote-off losses through the profit and loss
account but did not include them in operating profit This approach is questionable
given that by thistime,foreign borrowings were a normal part of Australian business
activity so that foreign exchange losses could hardly be termed "extraordinary".
Santos capitalised $286.5 million in deferred exchange losses by including them as a
component investments (Jukes, 1986, pl46).

Given the risks involved in raising foreign-currency denominated debt, the suitability
of the defer and amortise approach in providing useful information to those w h o deal
with companies participating in such activities must also be questioned as must the
profession's adherence to this approach. A s already demonstrated, these risks were
well known by the end of the 1970's. Thefloatingof the Australian dollar in 1983 and
the deregulation of Australian finance markets added to the problems and gave an
element of gambling to the raising of foreign debt by Australian companies (Gill,
1987, plO; Justice Rogers, 1990, p204). B y 1986, there could be no doubt as to the
need for caution on the part of Australian business in taking out foreign loans. The
profession itself was obviously aware of this. In 1982, the Australian Society of
Accountants commissioned Graham Cocks, Director, Elders Finance Group Ltd to
write a course on Foreign Exchange Risk Management (Cocks, 1987, plO). The
Australian Accountant of February 1986 included three articles on foreign exchange.
T w o of these articles (Goss, 1986, pp44-46; Minchin, 1986, pp47-48) were written
by bankers with a knowledge of foreign currency risk management and outlined the
risks associated with raising foreign debt and some of the ways in which the risks
could be minimised, for example, currency swaps, hedging, options contracts and
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basket borrowings. The third article dealt with thetechnicaldetails of accounting for
hedges (Stevenson, 1986, pp51-54).

The Goss article reproduced a table and graph commonly used to promote offshore
borrowings (1986, pp44 & 46respectively).These illustrations purported to show
the trade-off between low interest on foreign borrowings and the potential
devaluation of the Australian dollar. The graph prepared in 1985 suggested that low
interest rates over the life of the loan would more than compensate for "expected"
depreciation of the Australian dollar. However, as a subsequent graph (p46) showed,
during 1985 the actual decline of the Australian dollarrelativeto the Swiss franc was
far greater than thefirstindicated. In fact it took only six months for the depreciation
of the Australian dollar to reach the level predicted for 1990 (p45). The volatility of
the foreign exchange market and the difficulties inherent in attempting to predict
exchange rate variations are obvious. A s already indicated, this volatility in exchange
rates was aresultof a world-wide increase in foreign exchange trading m u c h of which
was speculative (Behrmann, 1986, p26). Under such circumstances, "herd instinct" is
probably as good a predictor of future trends in exchange rates as any scientific
model

According to John Phillips, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of

Australia, volatility and unpredictability of exchange rates go hand in hand (1987, p2).
This is because market participants can influence the market by buying and selling.
Therefore, a change predicted tomorrow m a y in fact occur today because of the
activities of market participants in expectation of the change.

Hence, Phillips

contends it is just as likely for exchange rates to rise as it is for them to decline (p3).
There is no certainty one w a y or the other.

Despite this, raising foreign debt continued. Minchin, then General Manager Victoria
and International Banking Director of Australia, Barclays Bank Australia Limited,
ranked Australia with some third world countries in terms of foreign debt (1986,
p48). Furthermore, Minchin claimed that many companies did not manage foreign
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risk exposures (p48). Gill concurs stating it is normal to hedge foreign exchange risk
but since 1985 hedging is all but non-existent and has been replaced with "swap
trading" and speculation in the spot market Gill used the turnover in the spot market
and forward contract which had increased on a daily basis from $4 billion to almost
$32 billion and $800 million to $6.3 billionrespectivelyto demonstrate the change
from hedging to speculation in the Australian market (1987, plO).

Phillips likened

some senior management or directors to the emperor prancing around in his new
clothes. If profits were being made or their foreign exchange managers were being
highly paid, then the managers must be good and should be left alone (1987, p5). The
A W A foreign exchange debacle is prime evidence of this.
Gains to Losses - The Case of AWA
A W A Ltd v Daniels [7 A C S R 759] (hereafter referred to as A W A Case) was a
landmark case in auditors' liability but has important implications for the present
discussion.

It clearly demonstrates the need for experienced foreign exchange

managers and the need for adequate means of ensuring the accountability of executive
management to those w h o deal with companies involved in foreign exchange dealings.
Hearing of the case ran in excess of 60 days and the length of the decision, almost 120
pages, are testament to the depth and complexity of the issues involved. From the
judgment it appears that the Chief Executive of A W A relied on senior executives in
most areas and in particular, financial matters ( A W A Case, p770). It further appears
that this reliance was justified except with regard to the management of foreign
exchange dealings where senior executives were almost entirely inexperienced and,
furthermore, were directed to treat the foreign exchange manager "with kid gloves"
(p772). The basis for this "kid glove" treatment sounds very m u c h like what Phillips
was referring to (1987, p5). In spite of being warned that the foreign exchange
manager had to be involved in highly speculative dealings which could as easily lead
to losses as to profits ( A W A Case, p829), the Chief Executive and senior executives
involved in finance management took no action for fear of losing their foreign
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exchange "expert" w h o was making large profits for the company (pp772, 830, 876).
O n the basis of these large profits, the foreign exchange dealings were extended to
covering up to a year's imports (p829).

As it turned out, the so-called "expert" had no foreign exchange experience prior to
joining A W A as a trainee accountant (p779). The large profits, reported as early as
October 1981 (Peers, 1986, p30) and continuing until February 1987 proved to be
either "flukes" (Blue, 1987, p59) or arising from limiting reporting to profits while
concealing losses by either rolling them over or paying them out of unauthorised
foreign loans ( A W A Case, p765). Almost one year to the day after announcing an
undisclosed but "very large" foreign exchange profit (Peers, 1986, p30), it was
announced that A W A had incurred a $49.8 million foreign exchange loss (Upton,
1987, pi). This was almost $20 inillion more than the loss foreshadowed in July
1987.

From October 1986, the foreign exchange profits reported to the board of directors
had ranged from $8.3 million to November of the 1986-87 financial year to a peak
$12 million for the month of January 1987 ( A W A Case, p823). In February the total
for the financial year to date reportedly stood at $26 million. The Chief Executive
accepted these figures in spite of being warned by the company's banks and other
advisers that the company had unrealised foreign exchange losses of $50 million
(p816). It would seem that the focus on profits was more enticing than the possibility
that the foreign exchange manager was taking excessiverisksand was not accurately
reporting the actual state of the company's foreign exchange dealings.

The treatment accorded foreign currency gains and losses by AWA's foreign exchange
manager can, to a certain extent be blamed on accounting standards. A s one
journalist reported, exchange managers claimed accounting standards contributed to
foreign exchange problems "because they were lagging behind the increasingly
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complex foreign exchange transactions" (Knight, 1987, p28). A A S 20 excluded
rollovers from the definition of settlement which meant that A W A ' s treatment of
losses was acceptable even if selective given that profits were recognised. Secondly,
much of A W A ' s transactions were speculative and A A S 20 specifically excluded
speculative dealings.
Management & Risk • Further Evidence
While not suggesting incompetence in foreign exchange management there is evidence
of poor management of foreign risk exposures provided by the losses reported by
companies such as C R A , C S R , Comalco and Santos. B H P , on the other hand, has
not recorded similar losses. According to Thomas this is because B H P has provided a
natural hedge against currency variations by matching its overseas debt with overseas
assets (1986c, pl32). Boral also took this precaution (Thomas, 1986b, pl26).

In yet another article dealing with foreign currency debt, the decline of the Australia
dollarrelativetothe Swiss franc and its impact on Australian borrowers were detailed
(Meagher & Tingle, 1986). Australian companies and individuals w h o borrowed
Swiss francs in 1984 saw both their principal and interest payments almost double by
1986 (pi8). W h e n a West Australian hotelier took out a Swiss franc loan in 1984, the
Australian dollar bought 2.1 Swiss francs. B y September 1986, the devaluation of the
Australian dollar was such that it would only buy .9 of a franc (p20). The scope for
losses, depending on the size of the original debt, is obvious. The article focused
more on small business and farmers w h o had been caught by the devaluation of the
dollar. Nonetheless, the plight of these borrowers was much the same as that of
larger companies and is clear evidence of the problems and inherent risks faced by
Australian borrowers seeking lower interest rates than those available in Australia and
the need to effectively manage foreign risk exposure through hedging activities
(Tingle, 1986, p66).
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The result of the continued decline of the Australian dollar and the consequential
losses incurred by Australian borrowers was an increase in litigation against banks for
failure to provide adequate advice to borrowers (Skotnicki, 1986, p59; Meagher &
Tingle, 1986, pp20, 22; Hotline, 1986, pl3). The outcome of these cases has
implications for both management and standard setters. In Lloyd v Citicorp Australia
Ltd (1987) 11 N S W L R 286, Justice Rogers found that each case should be
determined on the basis of facts including the background of the individual borrower.
Hence in the Citicorp Case, the plaintiff failed in a negligence action against the bank
on the grounds that he was an accountant with a business background and was well
aware of the risk of taking out an unhedged foreign currency loan. In a similar case in
1991, Justice Cole found in favour of the Australian Bank because the plaintiff "was
an experienced businessman w h o was aware of therisks"(Hudson, 1991, p48). The
point in using these decisions is that if businessmen should be aware of the risks
involved in raising foreign debt then so should the standard setters. If this is the case,
w h y did the Australian profession continue to permit companies to defer and amortise
losses on foreign debt and effectively hide the results of managements' poor
judgment?
Release 411 - The Saga Continues
While AAS 20 continued to be binding on members of the professional bodies, the
A S R B was not prepared to accept it as an approved accounting standard without
further deliberations and consultation with interested parties. In December 1986,
Release 411 Foreign Currency Translation - Key Issues Questionnaire was issued.
Responses were requested by 2 February 1987. The questionnaire addressed nine
issues including the treatment of unrealised andrealisedforeign exchange gains and
losses and the definition of settlement
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A total of 36 submissions was received. Six submissions were confidential leaving 30
submissions for analysis. For purposes of analysis, the submissions were classified as
companies (14), banks & bankers' associations (4), accounting firms (4), government
authorities (4), professional groups (2),regulatorybodies (1) and individuals (1).

In response to the question of treatment of unrealised gains and losses, one
submission did not address this issue.

A total of 9 respondents supported the

immediate recognition approach although 5 respondents qualified their response. The
major exceptions being that immediate recognition should not apply where
transactions were hedged or in respect of qualifying assets. Respondents supporting
the immediate recognition approach represented a cross-section of

the above

classifications being companies (4), banks and bankers' associations (2), accounting
firms (1),regulatorybodies (1) and other professional groups (1).

Twenty submissions supported the defer and amortise approach. Of these twenty, six
considered there should be a measure of flexibility such as the adoption of immediate
recognition where there is a major and permanent realignment of the Australian dollar.
A s already demonstrated, some companies were already adopting this approach which
was also consistent with A A S 20 paragraph 11 which provided inter aha:
The unamortised balance of any deferred foreign exchange losses
carried in the balance sheet as deferred expense ought to be
reviewed regularly and written d o w n to the extent that the balance
is considered not to be recoverable.

Those supporting the defer and amortise approach were classified as companies (9),
government authorities (4), accounting firms (3), banks and bankers' associations (2)
professional groups (1) and individuals (1).
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The question regarding the treatment of unrealised gains and losses also asked h o w
"settlement" should be defined. This issue was important because the definition
excluded rollovers and, by implication, included renegotiation and re-financing of
loans. This meant that where a loan was renegotiated orre-financed,any unamortised
gains or losses were to be taken immediately to the profit and loss account. Four
submissions did not address this issue. O f the remaining submissions, 11 supported
the A A S 20 definition while 15 consideredrenegotiationandre-financingshould be
treated in the same manner as rollovers.

Early in March 1987, the ASRB held a meeting with what was described as "a select
group of respondents" to Release 411 (Killen, 1987a, pl4). This select group
included B H P , Westpac Banking Corp, C R A , M I M Holdings, the Securities Institute
of Australia and Price Waterhouse. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
contentious issues arising out of accounting for foreign currency transactions (Killen,
1987a, b) in particular, the defer and amortisation method and definition of
settlement
ASRB Media Release 87/1 - The Saga Ends
O n April 3 1987, the A S R B issued Media Release 87/1 which requested the
profession-sponsored A A R F resubmit a foreign currency standard providing for
immediate recognition of gains and losses on long term monetary items. The Media
Release stated its decision was based on consideration of international accounting
standards, especially those of the U S A and the U K and submissions received in
respect of Release 411 and at the discussion forum held in March ( A S R B 1987a, pi).

Given what it saw as a lack of consensus on the defer and amortise issue, it appears
the A S R B m a y have effectively skirted the definition of settlement issue by opting for
the immediate recognition method. Again, there was no clear consensus as to what

458

constituted "settlement" but if the definition was to remain or be extended to
renegotiation or re-financing, there would be even more scope for manipulation of
accounts. In the extreme, gains or losses m a y never be brought to account

In a bid to counter the possible backlash from companies with substantial unamortised
gains or losses, Media Release 87/1 stated that the eventual approved standard would
provide for the writing off of unamortised losses against the opening balance of
retained profits. Media Release 87/1 also stated that, subject to the consequences of
the adoption of the immediate recognition approach, the requirements of the approved
standard would be the same as A A S 20 (p2). This meant that gains and losses on
hedges relating to specific commitments and qualifying assets would be capitalised
and would not be subject to immediate recognition in the profit and loss account

Media Release 87/1 also announced the ASRB's intention to extend the approved
standard to speculative dealings (pi). A S R B 1003 was to be withdrawn on approval
of the new standard which was to cover both accounting and disclosure requirements
(p2).

The decision by the ASRB to drop the defer and amortise provisions of AAS 20 and
also its exclusion of speculative dealings was a slap in the face for the profession's
o w n Accounting Standards Board which for the second time in the space of 18
months was being dictated to on the foreign currency issue. However, this "slap in
the face" m a y have been more apparent than real. The ASRB's Media Release 87/1
was not a surprise to the A A R F . The Accounting Standards Board of the A A R F met
late in March to discuss proposals put forward a week earlier by the A S R B (Killen,
1987c, pl4). In what appears to be a bid to pre-empt the ASRB's mediarelease,the
A A R F issued its o w n pressreleaseon April 2 - just one day ahead of Media Release
87/1.
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The A A R F ' s pressreleasecalled for submissions on the ASRB's proposals to drop the
defer and amortise method of accounting for long term monetary items and the
extension of the standard to speculative dealings. The number of submissions or
comments received in response to the A A R F s pressrelease,74, is testament to the
contentious nature of these issues. O f the 74 responses, four were either classified as
confidential or a non-response. This left 70 submissions to be analysed. A s before,
the submissions were classified into broad categories as being companies (17),
government authorities (16), individuals (13), accounting firms (7), banks & bankers'
associations (5), academics (5), professional associations (3), other (3) and
regulators (1).

The application of the standard to the public service accounts for the relatively lar
number of submissions from this group While the speculative dealings issue was of
concern to many of the respondents, the defer and amortise versus immediate
recognition was clearly the most contentious of the two issues. O f the 26 submissions
expressing agreement with the immediaterecognitionof gains and losses on long term
monetary items there were individuals (5), companies (4), academics (4), government
authorities (3), accounting firms (3), banks and bankers' associations (3), other (20),
professional associations (1) and regulators (1).

Four of these respondents, however, did not give unqualified support. Two
respondents would have preferred a more flexible approach but if this was not an
option, immediate recognition was preferred over the defer and amortise approach.
The third submission expressing a qualification to immediate recognition accepted this
approach in order to have consistency between the profession's standards and those of
the A S R B . A fourth qualifier stated that the choice of method was irrelevant to them
but they did have a preference for the immediate recognition method.
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Thirty-five submissions preferred the defer and amortise approach. These represented
submissions from companies (12), government authorities (12), individuals (6),
accounting firms (2), professional associations (2) and banks and bankers' associations
(1).

Four of these respondents did not express unqualified support for the defer and
amortise method. O n e expressed a clear preference for the defer and amortise method
but recognised that the immediate recognition approach had the merits of being
compatible with U S A and U K accounting practice and avoided creative accounting.
In addition, this respondent considered that where there was a major realignment of
the Australian dollar which was expected to be permanent, unamortised losses should
then be written off. This same view was expressed in response to Release 411. T w o
other submissions considered the defer and amortise method should only be applied
where the company had hedged the relevant transaction.

Another submission

considered the gain or loss should be amortised over the life of the asset not the loan.
A further submission, which was not included with respondents in favour of the defer
and amortise approach, did not directly answer the question but implied support for
this method.

Five submissions expressed a preference for a flexible approach whereby reporting
entities could select the method appropriate to their o w n situation. Three submissions
did not address the issue at all.

Speculative Dealings
A s opposed to the immediate recognition and settlement issues, there was m u c h
stronger support for the extension of A A S 20 to speculative dealings.

Six

submissions did not respond to this issue. Eighteen submissions expressed the view
that A A S 20 should include provisions for speculative dealings. Five submissions
were opposed to the suggestion while one submission considered the matter should be
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the subject of a separate standard. The breakdown of those in favour of extending
A A S 20 to speculative dealings were companies (9), government authorities (3),
accounting firms (3), professional associations (2) and individuals (1).

Those against the extension of AAS 20 to speculative dealings were banks and
bankers' associations (3) and companies (1). The major objection of the banks and
bankers' associations appears to have been based on their position as foreign currency
traders. In general, the respondents considered authorised foreign currency dealers
should be exempt from the requirements of both A A S 20 and the approved standard.
The standards do not provide the exemption. However, authorised dealers have been
exempted by an N C S C class order from the A S R B 1012 paragraph .60 (d)
requirements to disclose unhedged current and non-current assets and liabilities
(Comments by Technical Editor, A S R B 1012: Foreign Currency Translation).
ASRB 1012 and the Re-Issue of AAS 20
On September 30 1987, ASRB Media Release 87/4 announced the approval of ASRB
1012 which was to apply to companies as of January 1, 1988. A A S 20 was re-issued
by the A A R F in December 1987. A s expected, both standards prescribed the
immediate recognition of gains or losses on long term monetary items.

Both ASRB 1012 and AAS 20 require disclosure of methods used to translate
speculative dealings but neither standard deals with the translation methods to be
used. In the second half of 1987, the Australian Merchant Bankers' Association
( A M B A ) submitted to the A S R B

a proposed accounting standard covering

speculative dealings (Killen, 1987e, p28).

The A M B A argued that only disclosing

foreign currency amounts was too simplistic and misleading. Therefore, the A M B A
proposed a more comprehensive standard aimed attighteningup accounting practices
with regard to speculative dealings (p28)

T o date, however,

none of the
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recommendations put forward by the A M B A have been included in either A A S 20 or
A S R B 1012 (Langfield-Smith, 1987, pl7).

When AAS 20 was re-issued in December 1987, the guide to the re-issued standard
stated that when the standard was reviewed by the A A R F in 1988, the issue of
speculative dealings would be addressed (p3). N o changes to A A S 20 have been
forthcoming. Media Release 87/4 indicated the method of accounting for speculative
dealings would be added to the standard at a future date (p2). A S R B 1012 was
reviewed and reissued in July 1988.

However, with the exception of minor

amendments to the requirements dealing with specific commitments (paragraph .34)
and disclosure during application of transitional provisions (paragraphs .71 and .72),
no significant changes were made.

The failure of both standards to prescribe methods of accounting for speculative
transactions is clear evidence that this is still a contentious issue which will
undoubtedly have to be addressed at some time. Even though the A W A case did not
address accounting methods, the publicity the case generated might have been the
catalyst to bring the foreign currency debate, in particular, accounting for speculative
dealings, into the limelight once again. T o date, this has not occurred.
The Defer & Amortise Debate - An Analysis

At a first glance it may seem that the profession and the standard setters effectivel
over-ruled majority opinion when prescribing the immediate recognition of gains and
losses on long term monetary items. However, this is not necessarily the case. There
was not what could be termed an overwhelming preference for the defer and amortise
approach even though the majority of submissions supported this view. O n the other
hand, some of the submissions were confidential so the views expressed in them were
not included in the analysis. With regard to A A S 20, a restrictive circulation exposure
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draft was issued by the A A R F and the responses were not available for public
scrutiny. Obviously, the views expressed in these submissions were not included in
the analysis. However, given that A A S 20 introduced the concept of a qualifying
asset a method of accounting for gains and losses on foreign currency loans used to
finance the purchase of assets by including them in the cost of those assets, which was
in direct contradiction of the separate transaction philosophy set forward in E D 1983
paragraphs 8 and 10, it is possible that the responses to thisrestrictivecirculation
gave rise to this innovation. Also, the number of submissions received in response to
the various exposure drafts and media releases was not large by any stretch of the
imagination.

Formal submissions are also only one form of lobbying behaviour.

Hearings were held with select groups by both the A S R B and the A A R F . Finally,
non-publicised meetings between the standard setters and interested parties m a y well
have taken place. For these reasons, publicly available submissions cannot be judged
as entirelyrepresentativeof public views.
Qualifying Assets & Hedging - Uniformity v Compromise
In addition, the exceptions to the immediate recognition method relating to qualifying
assets (first introduced in A A S 20 and Release 406) and hedges of the purchase of
goods and services (first introduced in E D 1979) could be seen as compromises built
into the standard in anticipation of the eventual need to conform with overseas
standards. Both exceptions provide scope forflexibilityin the application of the
immediate recognition method.

Qualifying assets are defined in AASB 1012 as
... in relation to the inclusion of exchange differences in the cost
of acquisition thereof, an asset (a)
under construction or otherwise being m a d e ready for
future productive use by the company in its o w n operations; or
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(b) being constructed for the use of another entity pursuant to
a construction contract (paragraph .06)

Paragraph .13 provides that exchange differences arising in respect of monetary items
reasonably attributed to qualifying assets are to be included in the cost of acquisition
of the asset This is almost identical to a proposal put forward in a submission in
response to E D 1983. There are two provisos, however. The first is that exchange
differences can only be included in the cost of the asset up until the time it ceases to
be a qualifying asset (paragraph 13(b)). The second proviso is that the asset cannot
be carried at an amount in excess of its recoverable amount (paragraph 13). The
word "reasonably" is what was described in an earlier chapter as a "weasel" word.
W h a t does it m e a n and in whose opinion?

It provides scope for "professional

judgment" which m a y or m a y notresultin creative accounting.

For similar reasons, the treatment of hedges of certain specific commitments builds
flexibility into the accounting for these transactions. A A S B 1012 Paragraph .33
provides that a hedge can only be classified as applying to a specific foreign currency
exposure if it is expected to continue to be effective. "Expected" is another weasel
word and the same arguments as to other "weasel" words also applies here. This
provision is also contradictory in that the standard includes as specific commitments
hedges on the net investment in self-sustaining operations (paragraph .35)

Hedging is defined in the standard as
. . . action taken, whether by entering into a foreign currency
contract or otherwise with the object of avoiding or minimising
possible adverse financial effects of movements in exchange rates.

Gains or losses on such hedges are to be brought to account as exchange rates vary
but are to be transferred to a foreign currency translation reserve on consolidation
(paragraphs .12 and .35). However, if a foreign subsidiary is self-sustaining, by
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definition, it does not expose the parent company or group to foreign exchange gains
or losses (paragraph .06). If this is the case, it is questionable whether a hedge would
be necessary.

As discussed in the previous chapter, flexibility or ambiguity in accounting standards
can m a k e it very difficult for regulators to launch a successful prosecution for the
issue of misleading financial statements.

The flexibility allowed by the self-

sustaining/integrated operation dichotomy and in the financing of hedges and so-called
qualifying assets provide management with potential means of manipulating financial
statements to achieve a desiredresultand avoid prosecution if theresultis considered
misleading by regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities would have to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accounts were misleading. W h e n this comes d o w n
to a matter of professional opinion or judgment history has shown that prosecutions
are unlikely to be undertaken or, if undertaken, are unlikely to succeed.

In terms of the circuits of power and autopoiesis, the compromises in the foreign
currency standard are means of avoiding resistance to the standard. In other words,
the profession had the foresight to build these measures offlexibilityinto the
immediate recognition method to facilitate acceptance of this approach in place of the
defer and amortise method.

POLITICS, THE PRESS AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The purpose of this chapter was to use the issue of accounting for foreign currency
transactions and translation of financial statements as an example of the political
nature of standard setting. It is clear that standard setting, while it m a y be dominated
by the profession, is more political than technical. The participants in the process
include financial journalists, academics, individual members of the public, regulatory
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bodies, government authorities, professional associations (including those of the
accountancy profession) and standard setters.

The financial press clearly plays a key role in the process by reporting not only the
activities of the standard setters but also raising public awareness of problem areas.
The examples used in this chapter have included the reporting of foreign currency
fluctuations and increases in the raising of foreign debt, the impact of these
fluctuations and debt on companies in terms of gains and losses incurred and in some
cases the accounting treatment of these gains and losses, the responses of the
profession and standard setters to these matters and criticism by companies,
academics and other interested parties of these responses. In some cases, newspapers
and journals have used selective placing of text to surreptitiously link issues. For
example, The Australian Financial Review carried an article outlining the lack of
security and internal controls which contributed to the foreign exchange losses
incurred by A W A

The article included a comment that deficient foreign currency

accounting standards contributed to the loss (Knight, 1987, p28). Immediately below
this article was another which mentioned the A W A problems and announced a new
foreign currency standard dealing with speculative dealings had been proposed by the
A M B A (Killen, 1987e, p28). The Age used a similar tactic in reporting the approval
of A S R B 1012 (Haigh, 1987, p21) next to a further article dealing with A W A ' s
foreign currency losses (Upton, 1987b, p21).

To take the political nature of media involvement in this issue a step further, the
question should be addressed as to what was the source of the information
subsequendy printed in the press. In some cases, press or media releases are issued
by participants in the standard setting or regulatory process, for example, the N C S C ,
the A S R B and the A A R F . At other times, it would seem that those w h o are not
satisfied with the outcome of lobbying activities, such as the lobby group of 14 headed
by Western Mining, m a y take their dissatisfaction to the press.
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Just what makes something newsworthy is debatable but the possibility of purely
political influences cannot be discounted. This raises another question in regard to
what is not reported in either thefinancialpress or journals. The issue of accounting
for speculative transactions is still not covered by an accounting standard but this does
not appear to be attracting m u c h attention. The A W A case generated debate over
the issues of the liability andresponsibilityof auditors and directors but no attention
to the speculative foreign exchange dealings which gave rise to the case. Is this an
oversight or is it simply not considered newsworthy that companies can take excessive
risks with shareholders' m o n e y and not disclose it?

To take the political aspects even further, what prompted professional accountancy
associations to consider the foreign currency issue in thefirstplace? It has been
argued that the changes in the international m o n e y market and the progressive floating
of world currencies provided the catalyst for this activity. However, foreign currency
had clearly been of interest long before the late 1960's and early 1970's when standard
setters and professional associations began to consider the matter in some detail. It
was not a n e w area. O n the other hand, it was around this time that formal
accounting standards were beginning to be promulgated by the professional
associations of countries such as the U S A , U K and Australia and also by the
International Accounting Standards Committee. Perhaps foreign currency was seen
to be an issue "ripe" for promulgation of an accounting standard. Theresistancethat
was to be encountered m a y not have been fully anticipated. For whatever reason,
foreign currency was clearly an agenda item for the accountancy profession as a
whole.

The resistance to the standard was also pohtically motivated. The opposition to both
the temporal method and immediate recognition of gains and losses on long term
monetary items was based more on the impact these approaches had on profits rather
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than on any accounting theory. Indeed, the absence of a theory of measurement
provided de facto support for a profit based argument in place of a theoretical
justification.

In the final analysis, a compromise was struck. Flexibility in accounting for foreign
currency translation was reduced but not eliminated. The accountancy profession had
maintained its domination of the standard setting process but at a cost. That cost was
the flexibility which permitted management to select the method of translation of
subsidiaries' financial statements and also select either the defer and amortise
approach or the immediate recognition method with regard to monetary items
attributable to qualifying assets and certain hedges of specific commitments. O n the
other hand, this could be seen as a bonus to practising members of the profession in
that professional judgment is required to help management m a k e the appropriate
choice so that theflexibilityin the standardre-enforcesthe need for accountants. This
has the added advantage of shrouding the work of accounting professionals in an aura
of mystique. In addition, it adds yet another dimension to accounting work in the
form of advisers to those w h o consider becoming involved in the foreign currency
market It also leaves the foreign currency debate open along with the opportunity to
generate further accountancy work. Not only is there scope for debate as a result of
theflexibilityin the present A A S B 1012 and A A S 20, the whole issue of accounting
for speculative transactions is still unresolved. A s long as there is scope for debate,
conversation and communication will continue and the profession will have the
opportunity to re-enforce and perhaps add to its domination of the standard setting
process.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT
The purpose of this study was to propose an explanation for the on-going pattern of
regulatoryreform,regulatoryfailure that has characterised the Australian corporate
environment for more than one hundred years. In particular, the focus has been on
unexpected corporate failures where the unexpectedness arose because the companies
concerned had invariably published audited financial statements suggesting the
companies were profitable and well managed.

Investigations into these companies

have revealed that the audited financial statements were misleading in that accounting
practices were used selectively, and, in some cases, creatively, to produce the picture
management wished to present to the world.

This situation has brought criticism of the accountancy profession on two counts.
The first being that accepted accounting practices were so flexible, vague and
ambiguous that management could produce such misleading financial statements and
secondly, that external auditors were prepared to attest to the truth and fairness of the
statements. This study maintains that the explanation for the in-built flexibility and
indetermination in accounting practice and standards lies in the manner in which the
accountancy profession achieved hegemonic domination of auditing and the
determination of accounting practices and its desire to maintain its position in society.
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T o demonstrate this, a translation model of power has been adopted in preference to a
diffusion model. At first glance, a diffusion model m a y seem to be appropriate
because, as was discussed in Chapter 5, there is evidence to suggest that accounting
standard setters are responsive to lobbying by large business concerns. However, on
further analysis, it has been found that this bias occurs because large business
concerns are more likely to m a k e formal submissions regarding the provisions of
proposed accounting standards. Further, there is no clear consensus on what business
sees as appropriate accounting practice in a given circumstance. This was evident in
the analysis of submissions received in response to the various exposure drafts dealing
with foreign currency translation in Chapter 6.

The translation model adopted for purposes of this study is based on the works of
Callon (1986), Latour (1986) and Clegg (1989). It argues that the accountancy
profession used its claim to specialised knowledge and skill to form alliances and
agency relationships with business interests and the general public to achieve
hegemonic domination of corporate regulation through the accounting and audit
provisions of company law. This domination extended not only to work of an
accounting nature but also to the determination of w h o could undertake this work and
the principles and practices to be applied. Chapter 3 demonstrated the manner in
which the accountancy profession in Australia achieved this.

However, the achievement of domination is one thing, maintaining it is another.
Elements of dissidence and resistance from both within accountancy itself and from
external sources have threatened this dominance from time to time. The power
framework adopted for purposes of this study maintains that dissidence and resistance
threaten the stability of control of the obligatory passage points and, thereby, the
exercise of power. Dissidence and resistance are countered at the levels of systems
and social integration.

Elements of dissidence and resistance explain w h y

accountancy has undertaken activities such as research and the promulgation of
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accounting standards to demonstrate its superior knowledge and skill and justify its
continued domination. It is at this point, that autopoiesis is introduced to complement
and enhance the power framework.

Autopoiesis is a theory of living systems first developed by Maturana and Varela
(1988). It has been adapted by authors such as Luhmann (1986; 1988a, b), Teubner
(1988a, b) and Robb (1989a,b; 1991) to explain the activities of social systems such
as the law and accountancy. Autopoiesis provides an explanation for the emergence
of accounting as an operationally closed but cognitively open system. A s an
autopoie tic system, it has created a boundary to distinguish itself from other systems
in the regulatory environment and has recursively reproduced itself through
conversation and communication. It has also expanded its boundary by conversation
and communication with other systems in its environment such as the legal system and
business organisations. Through double entry bookkeeping, it became part of the
operations of business organisations and was one of the means by which those
business organisations achieved structural coupling with other elements in the
environment The concepts developed as part of the double entry system became part
of the language of business and enabled double entry bookkeeping to become
accounting (Baecker, 1992). This, in part, was achieved through therelationshipsof
bookkeeping to the company, the company to the law, and bookkeeping to the law.
Theserelationshipshave, overtime, given rise to accounting concepts such as the
going concern, the distinction between assets and liabilities and the distinction
between capital and profits.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the first laws granting general incorporation and limited
liability included the keeping and annual audit of accounting records. O n e of the
purposes of these provisions was protection of those w h o dealt with corporations.
Audited financialreportswere seen as a means by which management was answerable
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for resources entrusted to them, that is, they facilitated structural coupling between
business organisations and those w h o dealt with them.

To maintain its autopoietic state, however, accountancy itself must be compatible
with the other elements of its environment This study maintains that it is this need to
remain compatible that has resulted in the inherent flexibility and indetermination of
accounting practices. Accountancy has achieved its domination by the grace of
legislative enactments including those requiring the keeping of records and the
preparation and audit of financial statements. In Australia, additional legislation has
created the Australian Accounting Standards Board that has responsibility for the
development and promulgation of approved accounting standards.

Under the

legislation, most public companies must comply with applicable approved accounting
standards. This study has argued that the accountancy profession dominates the
standard setting process in Australia but this domination is tentative. It can be
removed at any time and control of the standard setting process can be vested by the
government in another organisation.

To maintain its position, accountancy has formed alliances with a number of groups
including business interests. Business interests play a leading role in the determination
of accounting practices.

A s noted previously, double entry bookkeeping, and

subsequendy, accounting and its concepts have become part of the language of
business so there are shared meanings between business and accountancy.
Accountancy is one of the means by which business achieves structural coupling with
its environmental partners including government, current and potential employees,
investors and creditors, lenders and depositors and the general public. Financial
statements provide a means by which business is accountable to these groups for not
only the resources that have been entrusted to them but whether these resources have
been used efficiendy, effectively and in the interests of the community.

476

In an environment where there is competition forresources,there is an incentive for
business to want to project a positive image of itself. Such an image is likely to
include profitability and being well managed. Business, therefore, is likely to prefer
flexibility in accounting practices to enable it to project the image it feels will maintain
and encourage the inflow of resources. Experience has shown that where the
accountancy profession has endeavoured to remove flexibility in accounting practices,
business interests have successfully campaigned against such moves.

These

campaigns have included lobbying the government and arguing that accounting
practices imposed by the profession are detrimental to business activities and, thereby,
not in the public interest. History also makes it clear that some governments have
perceived proposed accounting practices as detrimental to their image or, at least, the
public perception of their policies. In such instances, there has been either direct
government interference or the threat of interference in the determination of
accounting standards and practices. A s an autopoietic system, accountancy has
learned from these experiences. Theresulthas been compromise so that flexibility in
accounting practices has become the norm rather than the exception.

Flexibility in accounting practice serves to maintain autopoiesis in other ways.
Conversation and communication are the means by which an autopoietic system
creates and maintains its structures. It is not the purpose of conversation and
communication to arrive at consensus. If consensus was reached, there would no
longer be a need for conversation and communication. The system would cease to be
autopoietic because without conversation and communication to recursively
reproduce the structures of the system, it would effectively die.

In an accounting context, flexibility creates indetermination in the application of
accounting concepts. It is this flexibility and indetermination in accounting practice
that helps to maintain the dominance of the accounting profession and its members
within the regulatory framework. Without flexibility and indetermination, there would
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be no need for furtherresearchor searches for conceptual frameworks of accounting.
Indeed, it is questionable whether accounting standards would be required.
Accounting, including auditing, would be reduced to a set of mechanical steps. There
would be no need for expert skill and knowledge or the exercise of professional
judgment There would be no need for an accountancy profession.

THE APPROACH
Demonstrating the view outlined above has been undertaken in a number of stages.
First the means by which the accountancy profession in Australia achieved hegemonic
domination of accounting were illustrated by undertaking an examination of the
professionalisation processes used. These included the formation of professional
associations by incorporation and Royal Charter and, in the later stages of
development the formation of a research organisation separate and distinct from the
professional associations but sponsored and funded by them.

Finally, the

professionalisation process and domination were completed with the achievement of
legislative backing of approved accounting standards developed and promulgated by
an organisation, while ostensibly independent of the professional associations, was
effectively dominated by them.

The platform upon which the professional associations argued for incorporation,
Royal Charters and domination of accounting and the standard setting process was
that the public interest would be served if only those qualifying for membership of
such associations undertook work of an accountancy nature and determined the
appropriate level of skills required as well as the practices to be used. Before an
evaluation of accountancy's performance in this regard was undertaken, it was
necessary to establish what was meant by "the public interest". Given the difficulty
encountered in defining "the public interest", emphasis was placed on h o w the public
interest is served. T o do this, the profession's o w n concept statements were used to
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establish that in the profession's view, accounting served the public interest by
developing practices that would produce relevant and reliable information for the
making of decisions that would facilitate an economic allocation of resources.

Once this was done, evidence was presented to demonstrate that accountancy has
contributed to the unexpectedness of some spectacular corporate failures and/or the
reporting of losses on activities that were formerly portrayed as being profitable. T o
the extent that audited financial information encouraged an allocation of resources to
these corporations, the public interest was not served. It was further contended that
the examples used were not isolated events. Unexpected corporate failures and losses
have triggered criticism not only of accountancy but also of the regulatory system in
general. In turn, this criticism has prompted action on the part of regulators
supposedly aimed at ensuring such events do not recur. History, unfortunately, shows
all too clearly that progress in regulatory reform has been more apparent than real.
The same problems emerge time and again and often with the same disastrous
consequences for those directly involved and for the community at large.

Explanations for regulatory failure are often premised on a diffusion model of power
that would suggest that powerful interest groups are able to influence the content,
scope and application of regulatory measures to their benefit

The regulatory

framework is w e a k by the design of powerful interest groups. The contention of this
study is instead, that weaknesses evident in the regulatory system in Australia are a
response to dissidence within and resistance to the existing institutional order. T o
overcome this dissidence and resistance and to minimise any adverse consequences,
accountancy, for its part in the system, is prepared to b o w to endogenous and
exogenous pressures and promulgate standards with in-built flexibility. This ensures
the survival of the profession because it alleviates pressures directed at placing control
of accountancy in another organisation and also the monopoly that individual
members of the profession have over work of an accounting nature. It also ensures
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the survival of accountancy by providing scope for further conversation and
communication.

The accounting for foreign currency translation standard was used to demonstrate the
profession's readiness to compromise an ideal directed towards uniformity in
accounting for foreign currency transactions and translation of financial statements.
Instead, the accounting standard eventually promulgated allowed for a choice of
methods to be used in translating foreign currency financial statements and scope for
flexibility in accounting for gains and losses on foreign debt and hedge transactions.

The following sections will seek to summarise, explain and justify the various
components of this study.
1. Professionalisation
The processes of professionalisation adopted by Australian accountants were studied
because it is contended that such activities provide the key to flexibility and
indetermination in accounting practices.

The first professional accountancy

association in Australia, the Adelaide Society of Accountants, was founded in 1886.
It was rapidly followed by a succession of other professional associations including
the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, the Federal Institute of
Accountants and the Australasian Corporation of Public Accountants. The stated
purpose of the formation of these professional organisations was invariably premised
on a desire to serve the public interest by ensuring that only those with specialised
skill and knowledge, as determined by the professional association, carried out work
of an accounting nature.

At this stage in the development of accounting, there was not what could be clearly
distinguished as a body of accounting knowledge. Nonetheless, there was a long
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history of the keeping of records and progressive operational closure of this process.
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the evolution of record keeping from ancient
civilisations through to the emergence of the accountancy profession in the United
Kingdom. The purpose of this overview was to establish the knowledge base claimed
by the emerging professional bodies and the role of the double entry system in
effecting the closure of accounting.

While operational closure of accounting was discernible from as early as 3500BC with
the introduction of complex tokens representing abstractions such as the provision of
services and the quality and nature of goods and services, the emergence of double
entry bookkeeping accelerated this process. Drawing on the work of Baecker (1992),
it was shown that double entry bookkeeping is characteristic of an autopoietic system.
First of all, the principles of double entry bookkeeping m a d e a distinction between
assets (debits) and liabilities (credits). At the same time double entry bookkeeping
created its o w n reality in that for every asset there must be a corresponding hability.
In other words, double entry provided a means by which an asset could be looked at
as a liability (ppl63-164). The duality of the system shows both the ability to pay and
the inability to pay. This duality also means that for every debit there must be a
credit

The system ctetermines the corresponding accounts without reference to

anything outside the books, that is, it is self-referential (pi64).

Double entry bookkeeping created a further reality in that the record books
themselves are abstractions of transactions and events. The entries recorded in the
books represent observations of economic events that have been reduced to
classifications as assets and liabilities (pi66).

The rules for determining these

classifications are determined by the system itself.

Initially, these records were a combination of domestic and business events. As the
spirit of adventure and the pursuit of trade for profit spread, the double entry system
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expanded and facilitated the separation of the owner from the business organisation.
This was needed because ownership of business ventures was becoming increasingly
diverse with the formation of large partnerships m a d e up of partners actively involved
in the ventures and silent partners w h o invested resources to be used and managed by
others. The emergence of banking and lending activities as opposed to investment
also provided impetus for the expansion of the double entry system. Double entry
bookkeeping facilitated the making of a distinction between individual business
concerns and also between individual concerns and the environment

Double entry bookkeeping reacted to stimuli in its environment and expanded its
boundaries by taking in energy and information from outside sources and using it to
create further structures. Through the process of conversation and communication
between the double entry system and other element in its environment, the language
of the system became the language of business and, with the help of the legal system,
further refinements in the double entry system emerged including the distinction
between income and capital. This distinction was a further abstraction from the
distinction between assets and liabilities whereby the wealth of the firm was both a
liability to the owner(s) and an asset of the business organisation (pi69).

Double entry bookkeeping became a system of communication not only within the
business organisation but also as a means of communicating theresultsof operations
to absentee owners. Again, the legal system was to play a part in this process. With
the advent of general incorporation of the limited liability company, double entry
bookkeeping m a d e its transformation to accounting. From its earliest beginnings,
record keeping was a means by which those entrusted with resources were
accountable to the owners of those resources be they the state, the church or
individuals. General incorporation with limited liability created an abstract entity
completely separated from its owners. A s an abstract entity, it had no feelings of
obligation to its owners, no concept of right or wrong or h o w to use resources
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effectively and efficiently in the interest of the community. It acted only through its
directors and management

Accounting became the means by which directors and

management were answerable for the activities of the company to ownership interests,
others w h o dealt with it and to the general community.

The emergence of the modem corporate form was not the only impetus for the
formation of professional accountancy associations. Nonetheless, it was a significant
event in that it provided a platform on which to argue for the merits of entrusting to
qualified accountants the role of ensuring that the financial information about the
activities of corporations communicated to those w h o dealt with them was not
misleading.

In order to demonstrate an ability to serve the public interest

professional associations required prospective members to take examinations on
prescribed areas of knowledge. Specified periods of training in public accountancy
firms was also required by some organisations.

The formation of professional organisations was not sufficient to effect exclusion of
the "unqualified" from the practice of accountancy. Closure of accounting in this
sense has never been fully achieved.

Even the granting of a Royal Charter to

Australian public accountants did not preclude the unqualified from accountancy
work. However, it was shown in Chapters 3 and 5 that the profession in Australia has
achieved this to a certain extent by the use of identifying appellations and through
control of the process of setting accounting standards. The manner in which this was
achieved was by using a claim to expert knowledge and skill and forming alliances and
agency relationships.

Evidence of the formation of alliances was given in Chapters 2 and 3. The examples
included the alliances forged between the accountants, lawyers and merchants of
Scotland in a bid to defeat legislation proposed by factions in London which would
have given the courts control over the management of bankrupt estates (Walker,
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undated, p21). In Australia, the pioneers of the accountancy profession forged
alliances with members of parliament, the judiciary, the press, the business community
and other professional associations in both Australia and the U K . Specific examples
of alliances identified in the study include Brenmall's claim as early as 1910 that
financial reports prepared by public accountants would

enhance investment from

other countries because absentee lenders would be able to rely on them. Because
Australia was a young country, it would need such investment to exploit its
"illimitable resources" ( A C P A , 1910a, pl34). In more recent times, the I C A A has
m a d e submissions to the government and regulatory authorities on a variety of
matters of interest to companies including depreciation allowances and double
taxation of dividends ( I C A A Annual Report, 1982, p7). Initially, alliances appear to
have been aimed at overcoming criticism of accountants and financial reports
stemming from the collapse of several companies in the aftermath of the Victorian
land boom. Later, alliances were formed in a bid to overcome opposition to the
granting of a Royal Charter to Australia's accountants in public practice.

The various Royal Charter bids provide clear evidence of the compromises the
profession has been prepared to m a k e almost from its inception in order to achieve
and maintain a dominant position in the regulatory environment

A s discussed in

Chapter 3, the opposition, or resistance, to the granting of a Royal Charter came from
a number of sources including accountants not in public practice, members of
Parliament and chartered accountants in England. It was a battle that spanned almost
a quarter of a century and raised issues such as appropriate education and training, the
use of specified designations and the pride of a newly created nation. Victory was
achieved at the expense of most of the ideals of the originators of the charter bid.

In the history of the accountancy profession, it appears that the formation and
maintenance of alliances, or structural coupling, has played a more important role in
the strategies of the profession than the public interest platform upon which their
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original claim to domination was based. Although it could be argued that these
alliances were m a d e in order to put the profession in a position to serve the public
interest, this study argues that it is the need to maintain these alliances that has given
rise to the flexibility and indetermination of accountancy practice. The question then,
is does this flexibility and indetermination serve the public interest or only the self
interest of the accountancy profession?
2. Wither The Public Interest?
a. The Public Interest and Financial Information
Chapter 4 dealt initially with h o w regulation and accountancy, in particular, serves the
public interest According to the profession's o w n pronouncements, S A C 2 and 3,
general purpose financial statements are the means by which management of business
entities is accountable to resource providers and the public for the manner in which
resources entrusted to them have been used. Furthermore, general purpose financial
statements are meant to providerelevantand reliable information that will be used to
m a k e decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. This interpretation of
accountability has its origins in the religious basis of stewardship whereby all things
were created by G o d to be used for the c o m m o n good of humanity. W h e n the use of
resourcesrequiresownership or propertyrightsand management of thoseresourcesis
entrusted to an agent, stewardship has two aspects. The primary stewardship function
is to society, the secondary function is accountability to the owner or principal (Chen,
1975). In other words, accountability to ownership interests, or resource providers, is
secondary to socialresponsibility.There is, however, a link between accountability to
resource providers and social responsibility.

Resource providers, current and prospective, must make decisions about the
allocation of resources. W h e n this allocation is economical, that is, resources are
directed towards organisations that will use them more efficiently and effectively than
other organisations, the public interest will be served. This is because the economy
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itself will be more efficient and effective by the provision of goods, services and
employment opportunities that in turn, result in further resource allocation. This is
what is meant by accounting being the means of structural coupling between business
organisations and the environment

This interpretation of the public interest and how accounting is to serve it is consiste
with the role ofregulationof financial markets as articulated in the reports of at least
two government appointed enquiries, the Rae and Campbell Committees (Australia,
1974; 1981), by a Deputy Chairman of the N C S C (Williams, 1987) and by authors
such as Chambers, Ramanthan and Rappaport (1978) and Friend (1976).
b. Management Accountability and Accounting - The Reality?
The balance of Chapter 4 was concerned with an evaluation of accountancy's
performance in serving the public interest by facilitating an economic allocation of
resources. The analysis focused on the reports of investigations into three of
Australia's most notable and unexpected corporate collapses, Reid Murray Holdings,
Cambridge Credit Corporation and Rothwells. The selection of these three companies
was not based on any substantial pre-existing knowledge of investigators' reports or
commentaries dealing with the companies and subsequent investigations provided in
the press or by academics. In fact, m u c h of the literature dealing with these three
particular corporate failures was deliberately ignored in order to allow an independent
assessment of the investigators' reports. The selection of these three particular
companies was based on factors such as the timing of the failures in terms of the
development of the accountancy profession and the spectacular nature of the failures
in terms of their unexpectedness and the size of the losses incurred.

While the analysis began with the collapse of Reid Murray Holdings in 1963, this is
not to imply that Australia was devoid of significant corporate failures prior to this
time. Reid Murray was chosen because the losses incurred in the collapse were an
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Austalian record at the time (Sykes, 1988, p322). In addition, the criticism of the
profession arising out of this particular case, saw, for the first time, an Australian
professional accountancy association issue its o w n report on corporate failures and
defending its practices and making recommendations for actions to ensure such
events did not recur (ASA, 1966).

The investigators' reports for all three companies criticised the auditors and branded
the financial statements as misleading not only for the year immediately prior to
collapse but for several years before. This suggests that during those years, there was
not an efficient or effective allocation of resources because resource providers were
deceived by the financial statements.
(i) Reid Murray Holdings
The investigation into Reid Murray Holdings did not reveal anyfraudulentactivity but
it did show that management was keen to present a public image of a well managed
and profitable concern (Victoria, 1963, p9). The financial statements for 1958, 1959
and 1960 did precisely that. Financial statements for 1961 showed a profitable
organisation but that profits had declined. Nonetheless, directors were optimistic that
this was only temporary.

Investigators considered that the positive corporate image conveyed by the financial
statements prompted a substantial inflow of cash from debenture issues with some
$46.6 million being subscribed between October 1959 and M a y 1960. After this, the
inflow of debenture funds declined but by M a y 1962 a further $34 million was
subscribed (Chambers, 1972, pi89). Cash was also derived from credit facilities
m a d e available to the group presumably on the strength of the generous dividends
paid by the group and the glowing profit reports.
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The reality was that the Reid Murray Group was not well managed. In fact, it had a
no management policy with each company in the group being left to its o w n devices
(Victoria, 1966, p62). Emphasis was placed on increasing sales,firstofretailgoods
and, subsequently, land and housing. Most of these sales were on credit but with little
or no control over credit terms. Goods were sold on no deposit terms with the result
that credit sales increased.

O n the other hand, because sales personnel were

remunerated on the basis of sales and not on debt collection, little effort was
expended in this direction. In spite of this, most members of the group did not
provide for bad and doubtful debts. Hence, even though sales were increasing, these
activities were probably not as profitable as they appeared and assets, in the form of
accounts receivable, were probably overstated. In addition, because of the slow
turnover in accounts receivable, Group members faced liquidity problems.

The decision to enter the land market also paved the way for the "creation" of profits.
Subsidiaries were set up specifically to enter the land market with another company
being established to finance the acquisition of land. A s already noted, emphasis was
on sales and these were invariably on credit terms and usually over long periods.
There was no control over the granting of credit even though Group members had to
repay acquisition costs with interest and pay for the development of land for resale.
Nonetheless, profits were taken into account at the time of sale. This occurred even
where the contract could be avoided. In some instances, profits were recognised
when agreements to build houses were entered into even though building had not
commenced. O n the other hand, interest and development costs were capitalised
rather than expensed. Therefore, not only were profits and assets overstated because
bad and doubtful debts were not accounted for but also because expenses were
capitalised and added to the book value of land. The financial statements were further
misleading because no disclosure was m a d e of the extent to which interest and
development costs were capitalised.
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Profits were further inflated because land developments were financed by borrowings
from Reid Murray Holdings. The loans from Reid Murray Holdings were, in turn,
financed by Reid Murray Acceptance Limited. Subsidiaries notionally paid interest on
these loans to Reid Murray Holdings and Reid Murray Holdings notionally paid
interest to Reid Murray Acceptance Limited. Reid Murray Holdings m a d e "profits"
on these transactions because the interest "paid" to Reid Murray Acceptance Limited
was less than that "received" from subsidiaries.

Clearly, the accounts of the Reid Murray Group were misleading. The Group was far
from being well managed and was not profitable. It also had liquidity problems
arising from poor management policies. These factors were not apparent from the
audited financial statements. Furthermore, investigators considered that the inflation
of profits by less than conservative accounting policies encouraged investors and
creditors to provide the cash necessary to fuel the Groups expansionist activities. If
funds from investors and creditors had been less, these activities m a y have been
checked and the Group m a y never have failed. Accounting policies and tolerant, lazy
or timid auditors did not provide a check on management activities.

In addition to the liquidity problems arising from poor management of the retail and
land activities, Reid Murray Holdings faced liquidity problems arising from its
debenture issues. The Group had used incoming debenture subscriptions to fund its
expansion and also meet the payment of interest on earlier subscriptions. However,
consistent with the evidence of poor management in the retail and land market
activities of the Group, there was no management plan for the retirement of
debentures. Cash was spent as quickly as it came in with no regard for h o w the
Group would meet its future commitments.

W h e n a downturn in the economy

diminished the inflow of debenture subscriptions, the expansionist activities were
checked but so was the Group's ability to meet commitments toretiredebentures or,
indeed, pay interest. It was the failure of Reid Murray Holdings to meet a $1.2
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million debenture interest payment in October 1962 that saw it placed in receivership
on 10 January 1963. A government sponsored investigation was appointed in April
1963.
(ii) Cambridge Credit Corporation Limited
There were striking similarities between the events leading to the demise of the Reid
Murray Group and that of Cambridge Credit and affiliated companies. Cambridge
Credit was placed inreceivershipwhen it failed to meet a commitment to pay interest
to debenture and note holders in 1974. Like Reid Murray, Cambridge and its related
companies had a history of liquidity problems and had survived by virtue of public
borrowings through Cambridge.

O n a reconstruction of Cambridge accounts,

investigators concluded that Cambridge had been in a precarious position since at
least 1966. Not only this, but Cambridge had also been without borrowing capacity
since 1966. These matters were not evident from the audited financial statements or
audit reports included in prospectuses. In fact, just two weeks before Cambridge
defaulted on the $2 million interest payment a pressreleaseannounced a record profit
in excess of $3 million.

Unlike Reid Murray, there was no evidence of poor management It appeared that
Cambridge's difficulties were attributable to its increasing activities in real estate
development. These activities required large capital outlays with little prospect of
cash inflows until development of the projects was completed and they were sold.
These difficulties were exacerbated by diversification into other areas including share
trading, film production and hotel management These ventures proved unprofitable
and added to Cambridge's liquidity problems.

Maintaining the inflow of debenture

funds required public confidence and public confidence was considered to require
profitability. T o this end, profits were engineered by selective use of accounting
methods.
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Cambridge devised a method whereby it was able to recognise profits at early stages
of the development of land projects. Companies were formed by Cambridge with the
sole purpose of forming joint or tri ventures with Cambridge to purchase land. A
second joint venture would be formed to buy the land from the first A m e m b e r of
one of the ventures financed the development of the land and also its subsequent sale
to outside parties (pp.52-53, 4.9; pp69-70, 4.52). Cambridge recognised profits on
these transactions even though it invariably held an interest in the members of the joint
and tri ventures and frequently financed the various transactions (p.52, 4.7). Had
consolidated accounts been prepared, the profits on these transactions would have
been eliminated.

Cambridge management however, took the view that unless

ownership of companies exceeded 50 per cent consolidation was not necessary.
Control and financial dependency were conveniently ignored.

The financial

statements did not provide any indication of the inter-relationships of the parties to
these transactions. The auditors also ignored the fact that some joint venture
agreements and sales transactions were backdated to allow Cambridge to recognise
profits in particular years.

Profits on front end transactions were also determined on an ad hoc basis. At least
three methods of calculating profits were used for virtually identical transactions.
These methods were the cash and profit emergence and accrual bases. In addition,
these methods were used in an inconsistent and arbitrary manner (ppl40, 8.8; pl42,
8.16). These methods were deliberately used to maximise profits, tailor profits to a
pre-determined target or to rninimise profit fluctuations from one period to the next
(pl40, 8.8). In one particular instance, a $3 million profit was allocated over ten
years using the profit emerging basis. It was stated in evidence that this method was
used because it was the largest six months profit ever m a d e within the group.
Furthermore, it was derived almost entirely from one transaction (an intra-group
transaction, at that) and no one would believe a profit of that magnitude had been
earned (p210,9.55). Finally, it was a deliberate decision to smooth income or, more
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appropriately described, to distort the profits of future periods. In the economic
climate of the time, it was likely the group would be trying to find profits in the future
(p210,9.56).

Investigators estimated that for the year ended 30 June 1974, front end transactions,
failure to eliminate intra-group transactions and changes in accounting methods
resulted in an overstatement of profits after tax of at least $3,732,629. Reported
profits after tax were $3,055,635. It was further contended that the accounts of
Cambridge and its affiliates were misleading because the method of calculating profits
was not disclosed (pl79, 8.152)

In addition to the charge of misleading financial statements, investigators maintained
that Cambridge had been insolvent since 1966 and had exceeded its borrowing
capacity under the terms of debenture trust deeds since at least that time (p226, 10.2;
p251, 10.39; N S W 1979, p277, 6.5, 6.6). The lack of borrowing capacity was
concealed by failure to disclose the relationship between Cambridge and related
entities. In particular, advances to related entities were included at full value in the
accounts and, thereby, as liquid assets for purposes of determining the borrowing
capacity of Cambridge under the debenture trust deed.

It also became apparent during the course of the investigation that shareholders' funds
were deliberately manipulated to allow Cambridge to issue a prospectus in M a y 1974.
Cambridge's borrowing capacity was limited to the lesser of three quarters of liquid
assets or five times shareholders' funds (p20, 2.23). Prior to M a y 1974, the operative
limit had been shareholders' funds. At the end of 1973, shareholders' funds were
inflated by a revaluation of allrealestate and assets held by the group (pp226-227,
10.4). The result was a net surplus of $43 million (p227, 10.5). This amount,
however, was not included in the accounts but was disclosed in a note to overcome
any adverse taxation complications. Nonetheless, the revaluation was used to inflate
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shareholders' funds so that the operative borrowing limit became liquid assets. This
fact was not disclosed in the accounts. The auditors apparently failed torealisethat
therevaluationhad this effect or even that this was the purpose of the revaluation.

As noted previously, Cambridge continually faced liquidity problems and relied on the
inflow of debenture funds to meet interest and redemption commitments. W h e n the
inflow of debenture funds diminished in the wake of yet another downturn in the
economy, Cambridge was faced with the prospect of not being able to meet its
commitments. Local banks and finance companies also refrained from extending
further credit

Cambridge began negotiations to raise finance overseas. It was

admitted in evidence to the investigation that the desire to promote debenture income
and safeguard the success of the loan negotiations had prompted the September 1974
press release announcing record profits (pl91, 9.14; pl92, 9.15). Ironically, only
fourteen days later, Cambridge went into receivership.

The reports of the investigations into Reid Murray and Cambridge make it obvious
that accounting methods were used to deceive those w h o dealt with these companies.
The purpose of the deception was to encourage investment or the granting of credit.
T o the extent that the deception was successful, there was not an economic allocation
of resources. The fact that not only shareholders, but also debenture holders and
creditors lost m o s t if not all, of the resources entrusted to the companies is testament
to this.

There are also elements of the Cambridge disaster that raise questions about the
commitment of the accountancy profession, or at least individual members, to
safeguard not only those w h o deal with companies but also the public interest. For
example, with regard to both companies, it was stated that the failure to disclose
accounting methods m a d e the accounts misleading.

The A S A report (1966)

recognised that the use of different accounting methods was potentially misleading yet
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the auditors of Cambridge did not m a k e any statement concerning the use of different
methods even though they were aware that the changes were directed towards
achieving the profitable image desired by management

The investigators into Reid Murray criticised management's policy of recognising
profits on credit transactions at the time of sale and suggested a more appropriate
method m a y have been to recognise profits as payments were received. The A S A
report defended the accrual method stating that the profits or cash emerging bases
were contrary to m o d e m accounting practice (1966, pi2). Further, the A S A argued
that accounting methods should not be adopted simply because they were
conservative (p46). Yet the management of Cambridge used both the profits and cash
emerging methods of calculating profits and justified this on the grounds that they
were conservative. The auditor did not m a k e any comment regarding this.

In addition, the ASA report had recommended the elimination of the effect of intragroup transactions on the basis that the results of individual companies could be
manipulated if such transactions were not eliminated (1966, pi9). Evidence to the
Cambridge investigation m a d e it clear that members of the audit firm considered
consolidation should be determined on the basis of beneficial ownership not actual
ownership as espoused by Cambridge management

The auditor in charge of the

Cambridge audit conveyed this view to management but did not pursue the matter.
A s investigators concluded, the auditor appears to have been more interested in
catering to the interests of Cambridge management rather than to ensuring that the
results conveyed in thefinancialstatements were not misleading (p276,5.64).

A further point suggested by the elimination of the effects of intra-group transactions
is that both the legislature and the accountancy profession were less than interested in
ensuring that manipulation of accounts did not occur by a failure to eliminate intragroup transactions. A n accounting standard dealing with consolidation and based on
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the notion of control rather than ownership was not forthcoming until 1990 - some
fifteen years after the collapse of Cambridge and more than twenty years after the
A S A report The legislature did not act to close this loophole until 1991. Until this
time, consolidated accounts were not mandatory. Consolidated accounts were only
one means of preparing group accounts.

A s noted in Chapter 5, intra-group

transactions were implicated in m a n y of the corporate failures of the 1980s. In a
regulatory environment premised on protection of participants in capital markets and,
thereby, an efficient allocation ofresources,one wonders w h y it took so long for this
reform to be introduced.
(iii) Rothwells Limited
The third Australian corporate failure examined was the merchant bank, Rothwells
Limited.

Investigations into the events that led to Rothwells being placed in

liquidation on 3 November 1988 suggest that the financial statements effectively
deceived not only investors, creditors and depositors but also a team of would-be
rescuers, including the West Australian Government that attempted to ease Rothwells
through a liquidity crisis in the aftermath of the October 1987 share market crash.
The special investigator, McCusker, maintained that if the audited financial statements
issued shortly before the launch of the rescue had not misrepresented Rothwells'
situation, the rescue would not have taken place and Rothwells would have been
placed in liquidation a year earlier. The losses incurred would, thereby, have been
less.

However, it was not simply a matter of the 1987 financial statements

misrepresenting Rothwells' financial position. Evidence to the investigation revealed
that the bank had been incurring substantial losses, but reporting profits since at least
1985.

In McCusker's opinion, the failure of Rothwells was directly attributable to poor
management of its major asset, its receivables portfolio (Australia, undated, p26,2.2).
A s in the case of Reid Murray, the investigation revealed that there was a lack of
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control and supervision of credit facilities. Rothwells was described as a lender at the
high risk end of the market in that it lent to ventures that other banks would not
consider.

In spite of this, an independent review of the receivables portfolio

undertaken prior to the ultimate collapse of Rothwells showed that in approximately
60 per cent of the files, there was no documentation as to terms of repayment or
security for loans. There was also a lack of formal application approval (pp276-277,
11.3). Furthermore, for most of the years under investigation, 1985 to 1988, either
no provision was m a d e for doubtful debts or the provision was grossly inadequate. In
addition, examination of the receivables portfolio found that unpaid principal and
interest were rolled over and capitalised, thereby further inflating thereportedvalue of
the asset Unpaid interest was taken to account in the calculation of profit in each
year even though it was obvious the debts were non-performing. T o the extent that
bad and doubtful debts were not provided for or written off and interest was
capitalised, profits were also overstated.

Perhaps of greater concern was that the executive director of Rothwells, Laurie
Connell, effectively treated Rothwells as his private bank. During the years 1985 to
1987 Connell, through two family companies, borrowed some $35 million, $138
million and $324 millionrespectively.It was estimated that by mid-1988, just prior to
Rothwells' collapse, Connell's debt to Rothwells amounted to some $500 million.
However, this was not evident in the financial statements. Indeed, at the time of the
1987 "rescue" of Rothwells, rescuers were told that Connell-related debt was less
than $20 million (p237,10.6). The financial statements supported this contention.

The facts were, however, that Connell-related debt was systematically removed from
the accounts by a series of sham orfictitioustransactions at or near each balance date
andre-instated,sometimes in a slighdy different form, during the subsequent financial
year. T h e major method used to effect these transactions was an assignment of debts
from Connell family companies either to Rothwells or to $2 shelf companies. The
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debts assigned to Rothwells were substituted for Connell-related debt. W h e n debts
were assigned to $2 shelf companies, Rothwells financed the transaction. The debt of
the $2 shelf company was then substituted for Connell-related debt. The purpose of
these transactions was to obviate the need to disclose the extent of Connell's debt to
Rothwells. Such disclosure was mandated by the corporations legislation and the
stock exchange listing requirements.

Apart from the deliberate ploy to thwart the legal and stock exchange requirements,
these transactions raised other serious questions. First of all, the assignments were
never completed. Mainly because the debts themselves were usually fictitious. In
some circumstances, directors of the $2 shelf companies did not k n o w of the
purported assignment or the consequential indebtedness to Rothwells. Even if they
did know, being shelf companies with share capital of $2, there was no w a y these
companies could repay their debt to Rothwells.

In addition to the overstatement of profits and assets brought about by the
capitalisation of interest and the roll over of unpaid principal and inadequate provision
for doubtful debts, the investigation found that procurement and management fees
were recorded as income by Rothwells. It was invariably found that the transactions
giving rise to these fees had not been completed at the time of inclusion in the
accounts or, once again, the directors of the companies purportedly owing the fees
denied the liability.

The auditors of Rothwells, in particular, the auditor in charge, was accused by
McCusker of not only failing to be independent but of being deliberately blind.
Evidence was given that two independent reviews of Rothwells' loans portfolio
conducted prior to its collapse, revealed that the records and files were totally
inadequate but on conservative estimates, by 1987, an adequate provision for doubtful
debts or the write off of bad debts would have eliminated all of shareholders' equity.
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This view was confirmed by a review conducted by a senior m e m b e r of Rothwells'
staff. O n a reconstruction of the accounts by the accounting firm engaged by
McCusker to assist with the investigation, by 1987, there was a deficit in
shareholders' funds of $58,351,000. Most of this was attributable to the write off or
the making of provisions for bad and doubtful debts.

In spite of this, the accounts never received an audit qualification. The auditor in
charge was aware, in some years at least, that Connell-related debt was being
systematically removed from the accounts. In the years where there was a claimed
ignorance of this, the auditorrealisedthat the records were inadequate and therefore,
relied on discussions with management to determine the adequacy of provisions for
doubtful debts. It is ironic that the two people relied upon by the auditor were the
very people responsible for the creation of the lists offictitiousdebts used to remove
Connell-related debt from Rothwells' books. Where the audit team at least went
through the motions of verifying debts by the sending of audit confirmation letters,
those sent to debtors on the assignment lists contained a different wording to those
sent to other debtors. In particular, debtors on the assignment lists were simply asked
to verify the debt facility not the debt itself.

The deception of investors, creditors and depositors was magnified following the
October 1987 share market crash. Like Reid Murray and Cambridge, Rothwells faced
persistent liquidity problems. Just as Reid Murray and Cambridge had survived
because the inflow of cash exceeded the outflow, Rothwells similarly survived until
the October 1987 share market crash precipitated a m n on the bank. T o help
Rothwells through what was seen as a temporary liquidity crisis, a rescue bid was
launched aimed at raising some $300 million being $150 million in share capital and a
$150 million overdraft facility. The need for speed precluded an in depth review of
Rothwells' financial position. However, Rothwells had recently issued its audited,
and unqualified, financial statements. These statements depicted Rothwells as a
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profitable and well managed organisation.

Furthermore, the accounts had been

audited by a m e m b e r of the "big six" accounting firms. O n this basis, the rescue was
effected

What was not known to the rescuers was that the financial statements were totally
misleading. Nonetheless, the deception was maintained and re-enforced with the
release of audited half yearly financial statements in January 1988. These statements
did not paint as bright a picture of Rothwells as had previous statements. Unlike
previous years, a substantial provision for doubtful debts of $100 million was raised
but otherwise it appeared that Rothwells was on the w a y to recovery. However,
Rothwells continued to be beset by liquidity problems. It had little or no income
because most of its receivables were non-performing.

Depositors were also

withdrawing funds.

Around June 1988, the West Australian Government and others involved in the rescue
became aware of the serious bad debt problem facing Rothwells. A further rescue
package was devised whereby the government and Alan Bond purchased an asset
from Connell for $350 million. The value of Connell's share in the asset was
estimated to be $50 million. The $350 million was to be used by Connell to purchase
the bad debts of Rothwells.

A further $15 million was provided indirectly to

Rothwells by the West Australian Government in October 1988 but to no avail.
Rothwells was insolvent and no further assistance was forthcoming. Liquidators were
appointed in November 1988.

From an analysis of the investigation into the collapse of Rothwells, it is clear that
there was an extensive allocation of resources to Rothwells on the basis of misleading
financial statements. This inefficient allocation of resources was not limited to the
"rescues" of Rothwells but also to each of the years from 1984. A reconstruction of
the accounts reproduced in Chapter 4 demonstrates that from this time onwards,
499

Rothwells reported profits when losses had actually been incurred. The methods used
to achieve this could not be said to arise from flexibility in accounting practice
although capitalisation of interest is permitted in some circumstances and the
adequacy of provisions for bad and doubtful debts is a matter of professional
judgment W h a t the Rothwells case demonstrates more than anything else is that
some members of the profession are more interested in pandering to the interests of
management than to those w h o deal with the organisations concerned. It follows, that
there is also a total lack of concern for the public interest

It was suggested in Chapter 4 that these incidents may not be generalisable. The
auditors and preparers of financial statements in the cases analysed m a y only be a
fringe element However, there is evidence to suggest that this is not the case. While
only a handful of authors were cited, Chambers (1973), Justice Rogers (1991) and
Clarke and Dean (1992), it is apparent that unexpected corporate failures have been a
persistent problem in Australia for some time. The unexpectedness of these failures is
frequently the result of financial statements depicting profitable and well managed
organisations sometimes issued within weeks of a company failing. Subsequent
investigation invariably has revealed the financial statements were not representative
of the position of the companies concerned. Others, including Cannon (1972) and
Sykes (1988; 1990), have also provided evidence of this from as early as last century.
There is also evidence that companies m a y not fail but activities once reported as
profitable subsequendy are revealed as unprofitable.

A W A ' s foreign currency

dealings are a case in point. Clarke and Dean provide similar examples (1992, pi86).

This situation has prevailed for more than one hundred years in spite of activities,
including legislation and accounting standards, purportedly aimed at preventing the
abuse of the corporate form and the provision of relevant andreliableinformation to
those w h o deal with corporations. The stated purpose ofregulationof this nature has
extended to safeguarding the public interest by ensuring an efficient and effective
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allocation of resources. So w h y has regulation failed? Chapter 5 was directed
towards providing an answer to this riddle.
3. Regulatory Failure - Accidental or by Design?
In Chapter 5, a number of weaknesses in the regulatory system in Australia were
identified. These weaknesses have contributed to regulatory failure. However, this
study maintains that these weaknesses are themselves theresultof factors explainable
within the frameworks of the circuits of power and autopoiesis. In other words, they
are theresultof a desire to maintain hegemonic domination and autopoiesis in the face
of dissidence and resistance. Dissidence andresistance,or conflictful relationships
and tensions, can weaken the relationships within and between dominant groups
within an organisationalfieldand threaten the control of obligatory passage points.

This study maintains that in-built weaknesses in regulation are defensive activities or
compensating measures adopted to minimise the adverse effects of dissidence and
resistance to regulation. At the same time, by introducing regulation, including
accounting standards,regulatorsare able to convey an impression that actions have
been taken to ensure fair dealings between corporations and those w h o deal with
them. Thus,regulationsappear to provide a means of structural coupling between
corporations and other members of the environment including the general public. O n
the other hand, the flexibility inherent in the regulations promotes compatibility
between the regulators and the regulated because the application of the regulations
will not impinge on the public image theregulatedwant to present A s the analyses of
Reid Murray, Cambridge Credit and Rothwells demonstrated, the need to maintain a
steady inflow of investment and credit necessitated a public image of a profitable and
well managed concern.

A further benefit of flexibility and indetermination to

regulators is that this guarantees their existence because at some future time, the
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results of the flexibility and indetermination will have to be addressed. In other
words, there will be a need for further conversation and communication.

There is support for the view that corporate regulation in Australia is characterised by
inherent weaknesses. Chambers, for example, has argued that the rules underlying the
financial information on company affairs have been "vague, toothless and often selfcontradictory" (1973, Preface, unpaginated). Similarly, Grabosky and Braithwaite
maintain that the enforcement strategies of business regulatory agencies in Australia
are ineffective because they are fragmented and unco-ordinated (1986a, p2).

As

indicated above, the weaknesses in corporate regulation m a y be by design. M c C r a w
has argued that regulation serves diverse and contradictory ends that m a y be
economic, political or cultural (1975, pl80). Furthermore, Cranston maintains that it
should not be assumed that regulation isreallyintended to alter company practices
(1982, p3). The outcome m a y be that legislation is little more than a symbolic gesture
but it enables governments and regulators to assure the public that something positive
has been done to ensure that activities detrimental to society will not occur or recur.

Specific weaknesses in the Australian regulatory system discussed in Chapter 5
included the uncertainties resulting from Australian federalism, frequent changes in
legislation and legislators, lack of authority of regulatory bodies and lack of funding.
It was argued that Australian federalism was identified as a weakness in the regulatory
system almost from the d a w n of federalism itself. For those w h o dealt with
companies, it meant they had to be familiar with the laws of the state of incorporation.
Given that Australia has six states, the task of knowing the intricacies of each, where
necessary, was potentially enormous but necessary because companies could
incorporate in the state with the most lenient rules. The potential problem was
greater still in that there were also federal ordinances governing the activities of
corporations in the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.
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Progressive steps have been taken during the course of the past century to overcome
the problem of Australian federalism but these have been characterised by variable
success. These steps included the introduction of uniform legislation in 1963, the cooperative scheme in 1978 and, finally, a federal corporate regulatory scheme in 1990.
Each of these has proven to be problematic. In particular, each system has called for
complex legislation, monitoring and enforcement structures. Under the uniform
legislation and

co-operative

schemes, each state had

to pass legislation

complementary to that in each other state and theterritories.The individual states
could have delegated to the Commonwealth their constitutional powers to makes laws
dealing with corporations. However, this has not happened and raises questions
about the commitment of individual State Governments to the effectiveness and
efficiency of the corporate regulatory system. This point is particularly pertinent
when it is considered that the states launched a successful, if limited, constitutional
challenge that has hampered the workings of the federal scheme.

As indicated in Chapter 5, some of the direct and indirect problems this has created
include frequent changes in legislation and legislators, lack of authority and lack of
funding

Frequent changes in legislation adds to the complexity of regulation,

involves expenditure of time and effort by legislators and also in the training and
retraining of not only staff of regulatory bodies but also the regulated. Apart from
this, where there are frequent changes inregulation,Doyle argues that there is an
incentive for the regulated to effectively ignore rules because the law is only
temporary (1981, p98).

The machinations of the accountancy profession in the promulgation of a foreign
currency standard were given as evidence of this. Because opinion as to the most
appropriate treatment of gains and losses on long term loans varied so frequendy,
business adopted the method most suitable to its o w n purposes. This occurred not
only from year to year but also from item to item. A further accounting example was
503

the manner in which the profession used frequent changes in membership of both the
Ministerial Council and the A S R B to thwart the activities of the A S R B and regain
control of the standard setting process (Walker, 1987, pp284-285). Frequent changes
in legislation and legislators or regulation and regulators is symptomatic of a lack of
organisation. Agencyrelationshipsand ultimate control of obligatory passage points
requires effective organisation. Also, lack of organisation can be seen as a lack of
structural coupling within the structures of an autopoietic system. Without structural
coupling or compatibility, autopoiesis cannot be maintained. The profession, on the
other hand, was effectively organised and had a stable leadership.

The profession also made the most of the ASRB's lack of authority. Because it was
not established by an act of Parliament but by a m e m o r a n d u m of the Ministerial
Council, there was no clear statement of its role, duties orresponsibilitiesin the
regulatory system. This m a d e it all the easier for the profession to use its superior
organisation to renegotiate the translation process and regain control.

Lack of authority and funding have been constant problems for Australian regulatory
agencies. Grabosky and Braithwaite cite interviews with members of regulatory
bodies in Australia evidencing a deliberate withholding of resources to prevent
investigations (1986a). Attempts to prosecute the auditor and some of the directors
of Cambridge Credit were also thwarted by lengthy delays in the completion of
investigations.

The court specifically criticised the N e w South Wales State

Government and Corporate Affairs Commission for failing to provide resources with
theresultthat it was ten years between the collapse of Cambridge and the laying of
charges. In this time, a co-accused and potential witnesses had died. Others had
given evidence in civil proceedings which could n o w be used against them in criminal
proceedings. T h e court ruled that the charges be permanently stayed.
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Other evidence was provided in Chapter 5 that suggests relationships between
regulatory bodies and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is less than ideal.
The antagonism is, in part,relatedto the lack of authority of the regulatory body to
undertake prosecutions meaning that recourse must be had to the D P P . O n the other
hand, the regulatory body must undertake the investigation and effectively build the
case. The cost of these investigations and the subsequent prosecution are borne by
the regulatory body.

There is a lack of liaison between those undertaking the

investigation and those w h o will ultimately direct the prosecution. Friction has arisen
because the D P P has, in some cases, refused to accept material prepared by the
regulatory body on the basis that it is not sufficient to support a prosecution. This
means that the regulatory body is effectively sent back to the drawing board. The
Bond case was used in Chapter 5 to illustrate the problems this poses.

These

problems include the length of time involved and, in turn, gives rise to problems such
as changes in membership of the investigating team. The Rothwells saga is another
example. A s discussed in Chapter 5 and above, Rothwells was placed in hquidation in
November 1988. A trial arising out of conspiracy charges against Laurie Connell, the
auditor and another former director of Rothwells is not expected to commence until
March 1995. It is estimated this trial will run for a year (AAP, 1994, p9).

Ambiguous and flexible legislation and accounting standards were also identified in
Chapter 5 as a weakness in the regulatory system because of the problems of
enforcement and prosecution arising from uncertainty engendered by such ambiguity
and flexibility. In particular, attention was focused on the statutory standard of a true
and fair view. Most of the arguments against true and fair are centred on its
qualitative nature and the lack of authoritative definition. This has led regulatory
bodies such as Corporate Affairs Commissions and the N C S C to prefer actions under
the general criminal law for the publication of misleading statements rather than
charges under the corporations law for failure to show a true and fair view. The
major reason for this being that when a decision in a case turns on professional
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judgment it is likely to be very difficult to convince the court that one professional
opinion as to what shows a true and fair view is better than another. The removal of
the statutory override on true and fair view was directed at overcoming this problem.
Compliance with applicable Australian standards n o w rates before the qualitative
requirement to show a true and fair view. Given that accounting standards are
flexible and ambiguous and that compliance with accounting standards are just as
likely toresultin creative accounting as non-compliance, it is unlikely that removal of
the statutory override will achieve anything. It m a y even be a retrograde step.

While it is obvious that there are weaknesses in the Australian regulatory system and
that these have contributed to regulatory failure, the underlying reasons for these
weaknesses is notreadilyapparent The problems arising out of Australian federalism
could be argued to be the result of State versus Commonwealthrivalries,in particular,
the preservation of State rights. Limitations in legislation and/or funding policies that
result in a failure to ensure that regulatory bodies have unassailable authority and
adequate resources to undertake their publicly proclaimed function such as the
effective conduct of investigations and expeditiously bringing miscreants to trial,
could be explained by reference to private interest theories. However, it has already
been argued that private interest theories do not provide an adequate explanation
because they do not provide an explanation for h o w power is achieved, maintained or
undermined.

In addition, not all private interests have c o m m o n objectives.

Therefore, it is argued that the explanation for weaknesses in regulation are
attributable to dissidence and resistance to the existing institutional order.

While dissidence and resistance affect, to some extent, all factions within the
regulatory environment specific attention was directed to instances where dissidence
and resistance have threatened accountancy's domination and control of the standard
setting process. A n extended focus was adopted and examples from the U K and the
U S A were used in addition to Australian experiences. The reason for this being that
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an autopoietic system learns to survive. It "remembers" past interactions and what
was and was not successful. Its reactions to triggers from the environment are
directed to maintenance of the autopoietic state. There is evidence that the Australian
accountancy profession monitors events in other countries. It tends to adopt what is
seen as acceptable in terms of accounting standards and desirable in terms of
conceptual framework projects. In other words, it appears that the Australian
accountancy profession learns or absorbs what it perceives to have worked in other
countries and emulates them.

Examples of dissidence and resistance, or conflictful relationships or tensions,
examined in Chapter 5 included the inflation debates in the U K and Australia, the
investment tax credit and accounting for business combinations in the U S A , the
Australian experience with S A C 4 and consolidation and equity accounting and the
conceptual framework projects of both the U S A and Australia. In all of these
examples, the tensions or conflictful relationships came from both within the
profession and outside parties including the government.

D u e process was also

discussed in Chapter 5 as not only evidence of dissidence andresistancebut a w a y to
minimise the detrimental effects of such tensions.

Due process allows those who will be affected by an accounting standard or who have
an interest in it to formally participate in its development

It recognises that

accounting standards can have economic consequences on the allocation of resources
arising from the w a y in which an organisation is perceived in the community and also
through more direct effects such as taxation and possible costs incurred in changing
information systems to accommodate n e w accounting methods prescribed in a
standard. D u e process provides an avenue whereby interested parties are able to
m a k e their views known. It also is political in that participation in the rale-making
process m a y ensure compliance with theresultingrules.
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Henry Bosch blamed due process for the slow progress in setting accounting
standards in the early 1980s (1985, p20). Gottliebsen has also suggested that the time
taken to develop the foreign currency standard was because there were too many
people to please (1985b, p6). While due process does extend the time taken to
promulgate an accounting standard, it would appear to be political suicide to do away
with it In this sense, due process is a means of effecting structural coupling within
the accountancy profession itself and with other members of the regulatory
environment in particular, government and business interests. Perhaps in recognition
of this, due process in accounting standard setting has been extended. Policy
Statement 1. The Development

of Statements of Accounting

Concepts

and

Accounting Standards issued in 1993 includes the requirement to establish a broadlyconstituted Consultative Group to participate in the standard setting process.

There is evidence in Australia to suggest that formal submissions, part of due process,
have had an impact on the standards developed (Coombs & Stokes, 1985; Morris,
1986; Gavens, Carnegie and Gibson, 1989). While there is no evidence to suggest
that the views of particular industry groups have been favoured, larger business
concerns are more likely to m a k e submissions so that theresultingstandards m a y be
biased Evidence of informal lobbying is also indicated by reports of private talks
between the standard setters and select interest groups. The extent to which informal
lobbying has an impact on resulting standards can only be surmised but its potential
significance cannot be ignored.

It is contended, here, that both formal and informal lobbying activities and the threat
of potential dissidence andresistanceto the profession's dominance of accounting are
the source of flexibility and indetermination in accounting standards. This threat is
perceived as being more detrimental than the potential harm caused by financial
information that has been manipulated by virtue of the flexibility in accounting
practices. Even where thisflexibilityclearlyresultsin a non-economic allocation of
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resources, the profession can take action to demonstrate its commitment to the public
interest With any luck, the public will have forgotten the last spate of corporate
failures and be reassured that the profession is doing its best to overcome regulatory
weaknesses.

Where there is criticism of the profession, as has occurred throughout the past
hundred years, the profession still has the safety net of its specialised skill and
knowledge.

The skill and knowledge of the profession and its demonstrated

organisational talents, not to mention its alliances with business interests, will assist it
to outmanoeuvre any would-be encroachers.

The ability of the profession to

undertake organisational outflanking activities aimed at undermining the newly
created A S R B is evident by the merger of the A S R B with the Accounting Standards
Board of the profession sponsored A A R F .
4. Flexibility and Indetermination - The Foreign Currency Standard
Chapter 6 provided an extensive analysis of the development of the Australian
accounting standard dealing with foreign currency translation. This standard was
chosen in preference to others because of the length of time taken to produce the
standard from the issue of thefirstexposure draft in 1973 through to the issue of two
standards, A S R B 1003 and A A S 20 in 1985. In 1987, an approved accounting
standard, A S R B 1012 was released. At that time, A S R B 1003 was withdrawn and
action taken to amend A A S 20 to m a k e it compatible with its A S R B counter-part.
The length of time to actually promulgate the standard is evidence of the contentious
nature of the topic not only within the membership of the accountancy profession but
for business interests.

The foreign currency standard was also chosen because it is an example of the
willingness of the profession to compromise the ideal of uniformity in accounting.
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For example, the need for a standard dealing with foreign currency translation was
recognised with the increase in foreign investment and trade coupled with the
progressive floating of m a n y of the world's currencies and deregulation of financial
markets. These events saw a variety of methods emerge for translating the financial
statements of foreign subsidiaries and transactions denominated in foreign currencies.
In addition, a number of methods of accounting for gains and losses on translation
emerged. The result was that financial statements were not comparable because
individual companies used different methods for different transactions from year to
year. It was difficult to assess management accountability particularly where foreign
debt was used in preference to local. O n the basis that Australian companies could
borrow on the local market an important aspect of accountability was an evaluation
of the propriety of the raising of foreign debt

In the early 1970's when the Australian dollar was strong relative to the currencies of
the countries with which Australian companies dealt, foreign exchange gains were
recorded by net borrowers. However, w h e n the Australian dollar began its decline in
1974-75, foreign currency losses began to be reported on foreign currency
denominated debt. In some cases, the losses incurred saw an effective doubling of
principal and interest repayments. Where companies had previously reported gains,
losses were n o w being incurred. However, this did not mean that losses were
reported. In previous years, there was a tendency for companies to recognise gains
and losses on foreign currency translation in the profit and loss account in the year in
which they were incurred. W h e n the economic environment changed and losses were
being incurred instead of gains, there was a marked tendency to adopt a variety of
methods of accounting for gains and losses. These methods included the deferral and
amortisation of gains and losses, capitalisation as part of investments, transfers to
reserves or writing gains and losses off against the opening balance ofretainedprofits.
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The foreign currency issue presented an opportunity for the accountancy profession to
re-enforce its domination of accounting by identifying the problem, that is,
inconsistency in the use of accounting methods, convince those involved that a
standard was necessary and develop the accounting standard.

In other words,

c o m m e n c e the translation process, negotiate the circuits of power through
problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. This process began with
the issue of an exposure draft in 1973. The period 1973 to 1987 w h e n the standard in
its present form was issued was characterised by a cycle of dissidence and resistance
to the profession's proposals, followed by apparent inactivity on the profession's part
until the financial press directed the spot light on the foreign currency debate, usually
by reference to the variety of methods being used by companies to account for foreign
currency gains and losses, aflurryof activity by the profession and further dissidence
and resistance to the profession's proposals.

The present standard is an improvement in that it has reduced the number of
acceptable methods of translating the accounts of foreign subsidiaries from four to
two, the current rate method and the temporal method. Companies must determine
the functional currency of each foreign subsidiary. This determination is based on the
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. If therelationshipis such that the
subsidiary exposes the parent to foreign exchange gains and losses during the course
of normal operations, the subsidiary is classified as an integrated operation and the
temporal method applies. Gains and losses on translation are accounted for in the
profit and loss account as incurred. Where the operations of the subsidiary are
completely separate from those of the parent, the subsidiary is classed as a selfsustaining entity and the current rate method applies. Under the current rate method,
gains and losses are taken to a foreign currency translation reserve. Quantitative
guidelines are not provided in the standard to determine the classification of
subsidiaries. The present foreign currency standard has also reduced the flexibility in
accounting for gains and losses on foreign debt in that all gains and losses are to be
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taken to the profit and loss account as incurred except where theyrelateto qualifying
assets or specific hedge commitments. Flexibility was reduced but not eliminated.

The path to this compromise position was long, complex and tortuous and an exercise
in ingenuity that saw the profession issue a succession of exposure drafts setting forth
diametrically opposed viewpoints. Part of this is, perhaps, explained by the Australian
profession's propensity to suspend action on difficult issues and wait to see what other
countries c o m e up with. For this reason, in order to trace the history of the
Australian foreign currency standard, it was necessary to also draw on the experiences
of other countries, in particular, the U S A . For example, the Australian profession
issued a foreign currency exposure draft in 1979 prescribing the temporal method of
translating foreign currency financial statements. This was consistent with F A S B 8
issued in the U S A in 1975 but in contradiction of its o w n exposure draft issued in
1973. E D 1973 prescribed the current rate method. According to E D 1979, the
temporal method was adopted because it meant that the underlying accounting
principles adopted in preparing the foreign currency financial statements would be the
same after translation as before (paragraph 25). E D 1979 did not call for the
immediate recognition of translation gains and losses on foreign debt as did E D 1973
and F A S B 8. Instead, it followed the Canadian model and opted for the defer and
amortise option.

Clearly ED 1979 was aimed at eliminating diversity in the translation of the accounts
of foreign subsidiaries but what was taken away with one hand was given back with
the other. A s revealed in the financial press, Australian corporate management were
making extensive use of foreign debt usually on the basis that the interest rates offered
were lower than those available in Australia. However, the declining value of the
Australian dollar often meant that any gains from lower interest rates were eclipsed by
increased interest and principal. The Parkinson study (1972), on which the 1977
Canadian exposure draft was based argued for the defer and amortise option on the
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basis that exchange rates historically were subject toreversaland, as a consequence,
exchange gains or losses would never berealised.However, as Figures 1, 2 and 3 in
the appendix to Chapter 6 indicate, the trend of the Australian dollar has been
downward since the mid-1970's. In addition, corporate Australia was a net borrower
(refer Figure 4 in the appendix to Chapter 6) so that gains on foreign exchange
lending were not available to offset losses on borrowings. Therefore, it would appear
that the Canadian viewpoint was notrelevantto the Australian situation. In addition,
E D 1973 specificallyrejectedthe defer and amortise option on the grounds that there
was no logical basis for deferring recognition and spreading gains and losses over
future periods (paragraph 18).

The only explanation for this apparent about face by the Australian profession appears
to be pressure from management who, as indicated previously, were making extensive
use of foreign debt at high cost. The defer and amortise option allowed them to keep
the cost of this debt out of the profit and loss account There was also evidence in the
financial press that the defer and amortise option was widely used by Australian
companies (Phillip, 1980, p29). While institutionalising the defer and amortise
method in an accounting standard m a y be seen as an alliance or a means of structural
coupling between the profession and business, it is questionable whether it was in the
interests of those w h o dealt with companies and entrusted resources to them. This
becomes particularly pertinent when evidence from the financial press makes it clear
the defer and amortise option was being used to manipulateresults.For example, one
company changed from the immediate recognition method to the defer and amortise
method and turned a 25 per cent fall in net earnings into a 41.2 per cent increase in
profits (Byrne, 1977, pl7). Other examples were given in Chapter 6.

ED 1979 was replaced four years later with ED 1983. ED 1983 was yet another
contradiction of previous professional opinion in that it n o w adopted the functional
currency approach and allowed the choice of either the current rate method or the
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temporal method. Maintenance of the underlying accounting principles in foreign
currency financial statements was no longer paramount. W h a t mattered was the
financial and operationalrelationshipbetween thereportingentity and its subsidiaries.
Uniformity was abandoned on the premise that different translation methods were
appropriate in different circumstances ( E D 1983, paragraph 14). The contradiction
was the greater because paragraph 19 of E D 1983 stated that self-sustaining
operations were more likely than integrated operations but no evidence was given to
support this. Therefore, even though E D 1983 prescribed the functional currency
approach, it virtually gave its blessing to the current rate method in lieu of the
previously prescribed temporal method.

Furthermore, E D 1983 was a direct

contradiction of E D 1973. E D 1973 specifically rejected the transfer of foreign
currency gains and losses to reserves. Under E D 1973, gains and losses were
accounted for in the profit and loss account The provisions of E D 1983 prescribed
that gains and losses on translation of foreign currency financial statements of selfsustaining organisations be transferred to a foreign currency reserve. The defer and
amortise option remained for long term foreign debt

In order to understand the vacillations of the Australian profession, it is necessar
look to thereceptionaccorded F A S B 8 in the U S A . That is not to say that there was
not opposition to the temporal method in Australia. The current rate method was
extensively used by Australian companies and the introduction of the temporal
method would have required a change in accounting methods. However, the FASB's
withdrawal of support of F A S B 8, and thereby, the temporal method, was also a key
factor in the decision to abandon E D 1979 (Roberts, 1981, pi, Uther, 1983, p59;
Wise & Wise, 1985, pl6; Prosser, 1985, pl5).

In the USA, the temporal method was subjected to severe criticism by companies and
in the financial press. For example, it was argued that because the temporal method
as advocated in F A S B 8 required translation gains and losses to be accounted for in
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the profit and loss account,fluctuationsin exchange rates made earning patterns
erratic. It was argued that erratic earning patterns would deter investment (Forbes,
1976, p37; Editorial Commentary, 1976, p8). It was also claimed that implementing
the temporal method would be costly because most companies used the current rate
method and adoption of the temporal method meant a change in translation rates used
for items including depreciation, cost of goods sold and long term debt. In addition to
the clerical costs involved, it was maintained that as these items could be controlled
by management whereas exchange rates could not be controlled, new management
policies were required at additional cost. Furthermore, audit cost would increase
because of these changes.

Research, however, did not substantiate these claims. For example, it was found that
management policies did change but whether these changes produced positive or
negativeresultswas not known (Griffin, 1979, pl2). Evans and Folks claimed that
theresultsof theirresearchshowed that the cost of compliance with F A S B 8 in terms
of clerical managerial and audit activities was not significant Rodriguez reported
that short term variations in inventory caused by adoption of the temporal method
were offset by long term variations on long term debt (1977, p44). Similarly, Merjos
found that the impact of F A S B 8 was substantial in the short term but over the longer
term, the impact was "benign" (1977, p. 11). Other studies showed that F A S B 8 did
not have an impact on share prices, returns or foreign investment (Griffin, 1979;
Dukes, 1979; Shank, Dillard and Murdock, 1979).

Even though research did not support management claims as to adverse consequences
of F A S B 8, it was replaced with F A S B 52 in December 1981. The reason given for
the review and subsequent replacement of F A S B 8 was the concerns of constituents
(Journal of Accountancy, 1979a, pp20, 22). It appears that perceived economic
consequences were more important than actual consequences. F A S B 52 introduced
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the concept of functional currency and management again had flexibility in the
translation of foreign currency financial statements.

The profession in Australia avoided extensive criticism of its preference for the
temporal method by following the lead of the F A S B . W h a t the profession in Australia
did not avoid was criticism for its procrastination in promulgating a foreign currency
standard and also the accounting treatment of hedge transactions. Hedging was
becoming a means by which companies could provide a cover against foreign
exchangefluctuations.However, there was also evidence that suggested that hedging
was being used for speculative purposes (Gill, 1987, plO). E D 1983 provided further
scope for this by allowing management an opportunity to further conceal errors in
foreign exchangeriskmanagement This was achieved by allowing the cost of hedges
for specific commitments, including gains or losses on foreign exchange, to be
included in the cost of the asset Furthermore, while E D 1979 paragraph 19 had
specifically proscribed the offsetting of deferred gains and losses in the balance sheet,
E D 1983 permitted gains and losses to be offset on some hedge transactions
(paragraphs 29, 31). A further area of inconsistency in the exposure draft was where
hedges wererelatedto foreign subsidiaries. Where subsidiaries were classified as selfsustaining, by definition they did not expose the parent company to exchange gains
and losses. Therefore, such hedges were purely speculative (Jansz, 1984, pp40-41).
E D 1983 did not address the issue of speculative transactions.

Two more years elapsed before further progress in the development of an Australian
foreign currency standard was evident. In this time, the Australian dollar continued
its decline recording devaluations of up to 25 per cent between February and July
1985. The financial press reported that Australian companies had lost some $3800
million in this time (McCrann, 1985, p25). C o m p a n y management and the profession
were criticised for the manner in which these losses were being accounted for
(Buduls, 1985a, p58; Coombe, 1985a, p52; Gottliebsen, 1985a, p6). In seeming
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irritation with the profession's obvious inability to produce an accounting standard,
the N C S C released a practice note aimed at eliminating diversity in the disclosure of
thereportingof foreign currency gains and losses (Wilson, 1985, p40; Bushnell, 198,
pi; Uren, 1985, pi3). Not surprisingly, both the profession and the A S R B managed
to produce accounting standards within months of the release of the N C S C practice
note.

ASRB 1003 Foreign Exchange Disclosure was little more than a modified version of
the N C S C practice note. A A S 20 Foreign Currency Translation was a modified
version of E D 1983. It still prescribed the functional currency method of determining
whether a subsidiary was a self-sustaining or integrated operation as well as providing
the defer and amortise option for gains and losses on long term monetary items. The
major area of controversy in A A S 20 was the definition of settlement. E D 1979 had
contained a brief definition of settlement which was effectively the due date of
payment

E D 1983 did not attempt to define settlement or settlement date even

though this was crucial in determining the period over which gains and losses could be
deferred and amortised. The definition of settlement contained in A A S 20 effectively
extended the defer and amortise time frame by including loans that were rolled over
but excluded loans that were renegotiated or re-financed. Management was granted
more scope to conceal mismanagement of foreign exchange risk but not as m u c h as
some apparently wanted.

A proposed approved accounting standard, Release 406 Foreign Currency
Translation, was issued two months after A A S 20. The provisions of Release 406
and A A S 20 were identical. Attempts to have Release 406 promulgated as an
approved accounting standard brought the defer and amortise and settlement issues to
a head. In the debate over these issues, the Australian profession was on its own.
The defer and amortise option was not allowed in either the U S A or U K standards.
This in itself is interesting because the profession steadfastly maintained that adoption
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of the functional currency model was justified in the interests of harmonisation with
other countries. However, harmonisation was not a valid argument when it came to
the treatment of gains and losses on long term borrowings.

The debate over the definition of settlement raged for more than a year. Half of the
submissions received in response to Release 406 called for the definition of settlement
to be extended torenegotiationsandre-financing.Apparendy the selectivereleaseof
A A S 20 had included renegotiations and refinancing of debt in its definition of
settlement even though the final version of A A S 20 did not A lobby group of 14
companies approached the A A R F in a bid to have the definition extended (Newsitems,
1986, pl8). The debate was effectively quashed when the A S R B announced in April
1987 that it would not approve a standard that allowed the defer and amortise option.
With the elimination of the defer and amortise option, the settlement issue became
redundant

It can only be surmised why the defer and amortise option was unceremoniously
dropped after almost eight years of mamtaining its propriety in the Australian context
However, it is possible that the criticism of the profession arising from the inherent
problems with the defer and amortise option was responsible. For example, one
company officer implied that foreign exchange losses of $69 million had effectively
been "hidden away" by the defer and amortise option until it was decided to write
them off in one period (Thomas, 1986a, pl25). Another company wrote off $400
million in unamortised foreign exchange losses during 1986 (1986a, pi26).

The

profession was criticised for issuing a "lenient standard" because it allowed the defer
and amortise option (Jukes, 1986, pl44).

The unpredictable nature of foreign exchange fluctuations was raised in the context of
foreign risk management (Goss, 1986; Minchin, 1986; Phillips, 1987; Gill, 1987).
For example, during 1985, the decline of the Australian dollar was such that in six
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months it reached a level not predicted before 1990 (Goss, 1986, p45). Clearly, any
company acting on this advice would have incurred m u c h heavier losses than
anticipated. S o m e companies and individuals w h o had incurred losses on foreign
currency loans took legal action against banks for failing to adequately inform them of
therisksinvolved (Skotnicki, 1986, p59; Meagher & Tingle, 1986, pp20,22; Hotline,
1986, pl3). In the two cases used as examples in Chapter 6, the court held that the
plaintiffs had a business background and should have been aware of therisks.In spite
of the unpredictable nature of the foreign exchange market, overseas borrowing
continued. O n e commentator placed Australia's foreign debt with some third world
countries (Minchin, 1986, p48).

The abolition of the defer and amortise option would seem to have been obligatory by
this time. A S R B 1012 Foreign Currency Translation was approved in September
1987. A A S 20 was modified to exclude the defer and amortise option and make it
consistent with A S R B 1012. The modified version of A A S 20 was issued in
December 1987.

Even though the defer and amortise option was eliminated per se, it was still there in
an indirect form in the provisions dealing with qualifying assets and hedgesrelatingto
specific commitments. It is notreadilyapparent where these options came from but
there is evidence that the qualifying asset concept owes its existence to lobbying
activity.

The idea of a qualifying asset was raised in E D 1983 where one of the

questions asked was whether foreign exchange gains and losses should be included in
the cost of the asset. Only one submission specifically addressed this issue and can
hardly be said to be the reason for the appearance of the qualifying asset provisions in
A A S 20. However, A A S 20 was released for selective comment before it was issued.
Private hearings and meetings were also held prior to the promulgation of A A S 20.
Once the idea of a qualifying asset appeared in A A S 20, it has all but been ignored
even though it represents a departure from the immediate recognition approach n o w
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embodied in both A A S 20 and A A S B 1012.

A s suggested in Chapter 6, the

profession, perhaps, had enough foresight to k n o w that the defer and amortise option
would eventually be replaced with the immediate recognition requirement. The notion
of qualifying assets could have been a peace offering aimed at avoiding a possible
backlash from the elimination of the defer and amortise option.

In the study of the development of the foreign currency translation standard,
submissions on a number of exposure drafts and releases were analysed. It was not
expected that these submissions would provide clear evidence of influence from any
particular sector in the standard setting process. The submissions were of interest as
indicators of the diversity of opinion on the issues raised in the exposure drafts and
releases. A s expected, and consistent with studies undertaken by Coombes and
Stokes (1985), Morris (1986) and Gavens, Carnegie and Gibson (1989), a distinct
influence could not be readily detected. This is perhaps due to the very wide views
held by those making submissions.

Two conclusions drawn from the formal submissions was that there was not
overwhelming support for any particular translation method or method of accounting
for gains and losses on long term borrowings even though there was a preference for
the current rate method and the defer and amortise option. T o this extent, it could
not be strongly argued that business had the immediate recognition method imposed
on them against their wishes or that business in Australia, at least, had w o n a victory
with the adoption of the functional currency approach. A s indicated in Chapter 6, the
decision to abandon the temporal method in favour of allowing a choice in methods
was based on events in other countries. O n the other hand, at least one submission in
response to E D 1983 contained what could be identified as a precursor to the idea of
a qualifying asset. E D 1983 also specifically asked for comment on whether gains or
losses should be included in the cost of the assetrelatedto the long term loan. Given
that formal submissions are only one form of lobbying activity, that A A S 20 was given
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selective exposure before it was released in 1985 and that private meetings were held
between the standard setters and select business groups, it is possible that the concept
of a qualifying asset was an initiative introduced in the expectation that the defer and
amortise option would eventually be replaced with the immediate recognition
requirement It is possible that accounting for hedgesrelatedto specific commitments
had the same origin and for the same purpose.

In addition to leaving scope for flexibility in accounting for foreign currency
translation and transactions, neither A A S 20 nor A A S B 1012 addresses the issue of
speculative dealings other than requiring that the methods used to translate
speculative dealings be disclosed.

The A W A

case indicated a clear need for

guidelines dealing with speculative foreign currency transactions and there is no
evidence to suggest that this was an isolated case. In addition, the A A R F s 1987
media release proposing that A A S 20 be amended to replace the defer and amortise
option with immediate recognition also specifically asked if the standard should be
extended to speculative dealings. There was more support (18 submissions) for such
an extension than against (5 submissions). In addition, the Australian Merchant
Bankers Association submitted a proposed accounting standard to the A S R B in 1987.
This proposed standard considered that mere disclosure of foreign currency amounts
was too simplistic and misleading (Killen, 1987e, p28). N o discernible action has
been taken with regard to these proposals (Langfield-Smith, 1987, pl7). Both the
A A R F and the A S R B stated in 1987 that the issue of speculative dealings would be
addressed and added to A A S 20 and A S R B 1012 possibly in 1988. This has not
occurred and, undoubtedly will not occur until another instance such as the A W A
case casts the spotlight on this area once again.

Two reasons can be suggested for the failure of the AARF and AASB to address the
speculative dealings issue. First, it is clearly a contentious issue and perhaps it has
been left in the too hard basket until environmental pressures push it to the fore again.
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Second, by leaving the issue open, it leaves the opportunity for conversation and
communication at a later date.

The development of the foreign currency standard exhibits all the stages in the circui
of power framework. Itentifying the "problem" of variety in the methods used to
account for foreign currency translation and transactions was the starting point. This
"problem" was exacerbated w h e n foreign investment and trade increased and foreign
currency markets were deregulated. The press effectively played a role in bringing
these "problems" into the spotlight by reporting the large foreign exchange losses
being incurred by companies as well as the diversity in accounting for them. While
there is no evidence of an intentional alliance between the press and the accountancy
profession, the actions by the press m a d e public the need for action of some
description. O n e possibility was the promulgation of an accounting standard. B y
developing an accounting standard aimed at ensuring uniformity in accounting
practice and also disclosing the impact of management decisions regarding foreign
loans, the profession was establishing an agency relationship not only between the
users of financial statements and others w h o dealt with corporations but also with the
public. In this sense, there was a m o v e towards interessement and enrolment. Issuing
exposure drafts and releases for comment could be seen as further alliance strategies
and also mobilisation of support for the profession's proposed solutions. The final
promulgation of the standards was the exercise of episodic power.

The various changes in stance on the part of the standard setters is also indicative of
the activities of an autopoietic system. Issuing exposure drafts and releases for
comment were part of the conversation and communication process. W h e n dissidence
orresistancewere perceptible, for example, through formal and informal submissions,
press coverage, in particular that in the U S A over F A S B 8, and comments in
academic journals, conversation and communication recommenced.

This process

continued until dissidence and resistance were quelled. The fact that achieving this
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meant that successive proposals were often in direct contradiction of previous ones
did not matter. The purpose of conversation and communication is survival and
survival is the overriding objective of the system.

Hence, in order to maintain autopoiesis and dominance, alliances, that is, structural
coupling, must be maintained. Conversation and communication must also continue.
Therefore, flexibility and indetermination have been institutionalised in the existing
foreign currency standards. W h e n the next shock to the environment comes in the
form, for example, of some n e w scandal or the revelation that speculative dealings
have grown to what society is convinced is an alarming level, the process will begin
again. This study maintains that this is h o w the cycle of regulatory failure-regulatory
reform is perpetuated.

PROGNOSIS
The above suggests that the cycle ofregulatoryfailure, regulatory reform that Justice
Rogers of the N e w South Wales Supreme Court has described as "endemic to the
Australian economy", will continue for the foreseeable future. However, the problem
lies not so m u c h in the greed and avarice of the management of corporations but in
the uncertainty and ^determination of the rales and laws governing corporations.
This, in turn, makes it difficult to enforce regulation. Evidence was produced in this
study to support that contention.

The flexibility, ambiguity and vagueness in accounting standards are but one source of
uncertainty as was evidenced in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, it is a significant source
given that accounting is the means by which management is m a d e accountable to
those w h o deal with corporations and, thereby, to the public through the allocation of
resources. Often in the wake of regulatory failure in which accounting is implicated,
there is the suggestion that if the accountancy profession does not lift its game, a new
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profession will emerge to take its place. Within the context of the circuits of power
framework and autopoiesis, this is unlikely to occur.

The establishment of the ASRB in 1984 was an attempt to take the standard setting
process out of the direct control of the accountancy profession. The N C S C and the
N e w South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission initially appear to have succeeded in
their mission to establish an independent accounting standard setting authority.
However, the profession had a wealth of resources at its disposal to combat what was
a temporary set back. The profession had an effective organisation in that it had
stable leadership and long standing alliances with business interests. It also had
experience in the standard setting process. The A S R B , on the other hand, lacked a
statutory mandate. There was uncertainty as to its purpose and functions. The body
that brought the A S R B into existence, the Ministerial Council, lacked organisation in
that it had a transient membership dealing with a n e w and complex regulatory system.
The membership of the Ministerial Council not only lacked experience but coming
from separate State Governments, probably lacked clear direction as to what the role
of the A S R B should be. In this environment, the profession was able to outmanoeuvre
the A S R B , thwart its activities and ultimately regain control of the standard setting
process. A n y further attempts to create an independent standard setting body are
likely to suffer the same fate.

Even if a new profession or independent organisation were to emerge and successfully
achieve domination of the standard setting process, it is unlikely the situation would
change. In order to achieve domination, the new organisation would have to go
through the same processes of demonstrating its ability to solve the problems of
corporate regulation and mobilising resources to form alliances and agency
relationships. Once domination was achieved, the same elements of dissidence and
resistance would challenge this domination and, perhaps, seek to once again change
control of the obligatory passage points.
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If this system was also autopoietic, a similar process would apply. The system would
use conversation and communication to create its structures and a boundary around
them. It would need to ensure structural coupling within the structures of the system
itself and between the system and its environment Conversation and communication
would be needed to maintain autopoiesis and extend the boundaries where necessary
to ensure its continued existence. Structural coupling or alliances would tend to
require the same compromises m a d e by accountancy in order to maintain domination
and survival of the autopoietic state.

From this perspective, the prognosis for effective reform of the regulatory system is
not hopeful. Justice Rogers argued that the primary flaw in the area of corporate
regulation was " . . .

the prohibitive difficulty and cost required to prove an

infringement" (1991, pi). The underlying problem, according to Justice Rogers, did
not lie in the corporations law, but in the difficulty in gathering evidence (pp2-3).
This sentiment has been echoed throughout the course of this study with evidence
provided from regulators such as Henry Bosch and Ian Langfield-Smith w h o have
consistently complained that ftexibility in accounting standards m a d e it difficult to
prove conclusively that financial statements did or did not give a true and fair view.
A s long as there is a commitment to flexibility and indetermination in the bid for
survival either on the part of corporate management or on the part of regulators,
unexpected corporate failures or the reporting of profits where losses have actually
been incurred is likely to continue. If for no other reason than that management and
company auditors can claim they have adopted the rules and be secure in the
knowlege that even if losses are subsequendy revealed there is little likelihood that a
successful prosecution will be launched against them.

Finally, then, perhaps the solution to the problem of unexpected corporate failures or
the reporting of large losses lies not in the making of ever more rules and accounting
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standards but in a commitment to m a k e the rules that are in existence work. This
point was raised in a Parliamentary debate in the Senate in 1992. The speaker made
reference to an article in the financial press regarding comments made by Henry
Bosch about corporate transgressors and highfliers. According to Bosch, for every
one of these there were thousands of professionals including lawyers, accountants and
auditors who followed them. A point made in relation to this state of affairs makes a
fitting conclusion to this study
. . . without their cooperation and without the belief in the ethics
and the efficacy of all of the players in the corporate world, it does
not matter h o w m a n y millions of dollars w e give to the Australian
Securities Commission, it does not matter h o w hard nosed the
head of the Australian Securities Commission is ... w e will not
achieve theresultsthat w e all desire ... inrebuildingthe integrity
in Australia's commercial sector and security sector (Australia,
1992a, p2205).
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